[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 226 (Friday, November 24, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 58107-58108]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-28608]



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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-003 and 50-247]


Consolidated Edison Company of New York (Indian Point Nuclear 
Generating Unit Nos. 1 and 2); Exemption

I

    Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., (the licensee) is 
the holder of Facility Operating License No. DPR-26 which authorizes 
the operation of Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 and 
Provisional Operating License (POL) No. DPR-5 which authorizes the 
operation of Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 1. The operating 
authority of POL DPR-5 for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 1 
was revoked by Commission Order dated June 19, 1980. The operating 
licenses provide, among other things, that the licensee is subject to 
all rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now and hereafter 
in effect.
    The facility comprises two pressurized-water reactors at the 
licensee's site in Westchester County, New York.

II

    The Code of Federal Regulations at 10 CFR 73.55, ``Requirements for 
physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors 
against radiological sabotage,'' paragraph (a), in part, states that 
``The licensee shall establish and maintain an onsite physical 
protection system and security organization which will have as its 
objective to provide high assurance that activities involving special 
nuclear material are not inimical to the common defense and security 
and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and 
safety.''
    Paragraph (1), ``Access Requirements,'' of 10 CFR 73.55(d), 
specifies that ``The licensee shall control all points of personnel and 
vehicle access into a protected area.'' 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) requires 
that ``A numbered picture badge identification system shall be used for 
all individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without 
escort.'' 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) also states that an individual not 
employed by the licensee (i.e., contractors) may be authorized access 
to protected areas without escort provided the individual ``receives a 
picture badge upon entrance into the protected area which must be 
returned upon exit from the protected area * * *''
    The licensee proposed to implement an alternative unescorted access 
control system which would eliminate the need to issue and retrieve 
badges at the entrance into the protected area and would allow all 
individuals with unescorted access to keep their badge with them when 
departing the site.
    An exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to allow 
contractors who have unescorted access to take their badges offsite 
instead of returning them when exiting the site. By letter dated August 
10, 1995, the licensee requested an exemption from certain requirements 
of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) for this purpose.

III

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, ``Specific exemptions,'' the Commission 
may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own 
initiative, grant such exemptions from the requirements of the 
regulations in this part as it determines are authorized by law and 
will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, 
and are otherwise in the public interest.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the Commission may authorize a licensee 
to provide alternative measures for protection against radiological 
sabotage provided the licensee demonstrates that the alternative 
measures have ``the same high assurance objective'' and meet ``the 
general performance requirements'' of the regulation, and ``the overall 
level of system performance provides protection against radiological 
sabotage equivalent'' to that which would be provided by the 
regulation.
    Currently, employee and contractor identification badges/keycards, 
are issued and retrieved on the occasion of each entry to and exit from 
the protected areas of the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1 
and 2 site. Station security personnel are required to maintain control 
of the badges/keycards while the individuals are offsite. This practice 
has been in effect at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1 and 2 
since the operating licenses were issued. Security personnel retain 
each identification badge/keycard when not in use by the authorized 
individual, within appropriately designed storage receptacles. An 
individual who meets the access authorization requirements is issued an 
individual picture badge/keycard which allows entry into preauthorized 
areas of the station. While entering the plant in the present 

[[Page 58108]]
configuration, an authorized individual is ``screened'' by the required 
detection equipment and by the issuing security officer. Having 
received the picture badge/keycard, the individual proceeds to the 
access portal, inserts the picture badge/keycard into the card reader, 
and passes through the turnstile which unlocks if the preset criteria 
are met.
    This present procedure is labor intensive since security personnel 
are required to verify badges/keycards issuance, ensure badges/keycards 
retrieval, and maintain the badges/keycards in orderly storage until 
the next entry into the protected area. The regulations permit 
employees to remove their badges/keycards from the site, but an 
exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to permit contractors to 
take their badges/keycards offsite instead of returning them when 
exiting the site.
    Under the proposed system, all individuals authorized to gain 
unescorted access will have the physical characteristics of their hand 
(hand geometry) recorded with their badge/keycard. Since the hand 
geometry is unique to each individual and its application in the entry 
screening function would preclude unauthorized use of a badge/keycard, 
the requested exemption would allow employees and contractors to keep 
their badges/keycards at the time of exiting the protected area. The 
process of verifying badge/keycard issuance, ensuring badge/keycard 
retrieval, and maintaining badges/keycards could be eliminated while 
the balance of the access procedure would remain intact. Firearm, 
explosive, and metal detection equipment and provisions for conducting 
searches will remain as well. The security officer responsible for the 
last access control function (controlling admission to the protected 
area) will also remain isolated within a bullet-resistant structure in 
order to assure his or her ability to respond or to summon assistance.
    Use of a hand geometry biometrics system exceeds the present 
verification methodology's capability to discern an individual's 
identity. Unlike the photograph identification badge/keycard, hand 
geometry is nontransferable. During the initial access authorization or 
registration process, hand measurements are recorded and the template 
is stored for subsequent use in the identity verification process 
required for entry into the protected area.
    Authorized individuals insert their picture badges/keycards into 
the card reader and the biometrics system records an image of the hand 
geometry. The unique features of the newly recorded image are then 
compared to the template previously stored in the database. Access is 
ultimately granted based on the degree to which the characteristics of 
the image match those of the ``signature'' template.
    Since both the badges/keycards and hand geometry would be necessary 
for access into the protected area, the proposed system would provide 
for a positive verification process. Potential loss of a badge/keycard 
by an individual, as a result of taking the badge/keycard offsite, 
would not enable an unauthorized entry into protected areas.
    The access process will continue to be under the observation of 
security personnel. The system of identification badges/keycards will 
continue to be used for all individuals who are authorized access to 
protected areas without escorts. Badges/keycards will continue to be 
displayed by all individuals while inside the protected area. Addition 
of a hand geometry biometrics system will provide a significant 
contribution to effective implementation of the security plan at the 
site.

IV

    For the foregoing reasons, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the NRC staff 
has determined that the proposed alternative measures for protection 
against radiological sabotage meet ``the same high assurance 
objective,'' and ``the general performance requirements'' of the 
regulation and that ``the overall level of system performance provides 
protection against radiological sabotage equivalent'' to that which 
would be provided by the regulation.
    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
73.5, an exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or 
property or common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public 
interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Consolidated Edison 
Company of New York, Inc. an exemption from those requirements of 10 
CFR 73.55(d)(5) relating to the returning of picture badges/keycards 
upon exit from the protected area such that individuals not employed by 
the licensee, i.e., contractors, who are authorized unescorted access 
into the protected area, can take their badges/keycards offsite.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will have no significant impact on the 
quality of the human environment (60 FR 56357). This exemption is 
effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 1st day of November 1995.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Steven A. Varga,
Director, Division of Reactor Projects--I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation.
[FR Doc. 95-28608 Filed 11-22-95; 8:45 am]
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