[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 220 (Wednesday, November 15, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 57460-57461]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-28157]



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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-344]


Portland General Electric Company, Trojan Nuclear Plant; 
Exemption

I.

    Portland General Electric Company (PGE or the licensee) is the 
holder of Facility Operating (Possession Only) License No. NPF-1, which 
authorizes possession and maintenance of the Trojan Nuclear Plant 
(Trojan or the plant). The license provides, among other things, that 
the plant is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the 
Commission now or hereafter in effect.
    The plant is a permanently shutdown, defueled, pressurized light-
water reactor undergoing the initial stages of decommissioning, which 
is located along the banks of the Columbia River in Columbia County, 
Oregon.

II.

    Trojan received an operating license on November 21, 1975. On 
January 4, 1993, the Directors of PGE voted to accept the 
recommendation of the PGE management to permanently cease power 
operations at Trojan. The facility had been shut down since November 9, 
1992, when a leak in the ``B'' steam generator was detected. PGE 
completed defueling of the reactor on January 27, 1993. On March 24, 
1993, the NRC staff issued a confirmatory order to confirm a commitment 
by PGE not to move new or spent fuel into the reactor building without 
prior NRC approval. On May 5, 1993, the Commission issued Amendment No. 
190 for Facility Operating License No. NPF-1, which converted the 
license to a possession-only license (POL).
    Section 140.11(a)(4) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, (10 CFR 140.11(a)(4)) requires each licensee to have and 
maintain primary nuclear liability insurance of $200 million. In 
addition, each licensee is required to maintain secondary financial 
protection in the form of private liability insurance under an industry 
retrospective plan. However, 10 CFR 140.8 allows the Commission, upon 
application of any interested person or upon its own initiative, to 
grant such exemptions from the requirements of Part 140 as it 
determines are authorized by law and are otherwise in the public 
interest.
    In a letter dated April 6, 1995, the licensee requested a reduction 
in primary financial coverage and an exemption from participation in 
the industry retrospective rating plan requiring secondary level 
coverage requirements in 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4). The licensee requested 
that the exemption become effective on November 9, 1992, 3 years from 
the date of final shutdown of the reactors.

III.

    The licensee justified the exemption request by citing existing NRC 
policy that provides for exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 
140.11(a)(4) for plants that have been permanently shut down, as 
presented in a staff requirements memorandum (SRM) dated July 13, 1993, 
on SECY-93-127, ``Financial Protection Required of Licensees of Large 
Nuclear Power Plants During Decommissioning.'' The licensee contends 
that as of November 9, 1995, no potential will exist for a reasonably 
conceivable accident at Trojan that could cause offsite damage 
resulting in liability claims exceeding $100 million. The licensee's 
conclusion is based on (1) Its analyses of operating events and design-
basis accidents for Trojan in the permanently defueled condition 
described in the Trojan Defueled Safety Analysis Report; (2) the NRC 
staff's technical evaluation in SECY-93-127; and (3) the permanently 
shutdown status of the plant, including the significant period of 
elapsed time (3 years on November 9, 1995) in which the spent fuel 
decay heat will have had to dissipate.
    The NRC staff independently evaluated the legal and technical 
issues associated with the application of the Price-Anderson Act to 
permanently shutdown reactors in SECY 93-127. In its evaluation, the 
staff concluded that the legislative history of the Price-Anderson Act 
establishes a legal framework and the discretionary authority to 
respond to licensee requests for a reduction in the level of primary 
financial protection and withdrawal from participation in the industry 
retrospective rating plan. Depending on the plant-specific 
configuration and the amount of elapsed time since permanent shutdown, 
the staff also concluded that potential hazards may exist at 
permanently shutdown reactors for which financial protection is 
warranted. The staff further concluded that accidents and hazards 
insured against under the Price-Anderson Act go beyond design-basis 
accidents and beyond those accidents considered ``credible'' as that 
term is used in 10 CFR Part 100 and in cases interpreting the 
application of the regulation.
    In the exercise of its discretionary authority, the Commission 
could, so long as a potential hazard existed at a permanently shutdown 
reactor, require the full amount of primary financial protection and 
full participation in the industry retrospective rating plan. At such 
time as the hazard is determined to no longer exist, the Commission may 
reduce the amount of primary financial protection and permit the 
licensee to withdraw from participation in the industry retrospective 
rating plan.
    Because the legislative history does not explicitly consider the 
potential hazards that might exist after termination of operation, the 
staff generically evaluated the offsite consequences associated with 
normal and abnormal operations, design-basis accidents, and beyond-
design-basis accidents for reactors that have been permanently defueled 
and shut down. The staff concluded that aside from the handling, 
storage, and transportation of spent fuel and radioactive materials, no 
potential exists for a reasonably conceivable accident that could cause 
significant offsite damage.
    A severe transportation accident could cause local contamination 
requiring cleanup and offsite liabilities resulting from traffic 
disruption and damage to property. The possibility of this type of 
accident would warrant the licensee's maintaining some level of 
liability insurance. The liabilities and indemnification requirements 
associated with the transfer of spent fuel from the licensee to the 
Department of Energy will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in the 
future, when spent fuel is shipped to a repository.
    The most significant accident sequence for a permanently defueled 
and shutdown reactor involves the complete loss of water from a light-
water reactor spent fuel pool. This beyond-design-basis accident 
sequence could result in a zirconium fuel cladding fire that could 
propagate through the spent fuel storage pool and result in significant 
offsite consequences. Although such an accident is beyond the design 
bases, it may be considered ``reasonably conceivable'' and could 
warrant requiring substantial financial protection. Such an accident is 
possible during the first year after reactor shutdown for a low-density 
spent fuel storage configuration and during the first 2 to 3 years 
after shutdown for spent fuel stored in certain high-density 
configurations. 

[[Page 57461]]

    Accident scenarios involving blockage of coolant channels in 
conjunction with loss of spent fuel pool water could hypothetically 
further extend the time at which a zirconium fuel cladding fire could 
occur. However, in addition to being less likely than loss of water, 
air flow to react with the zirconium and to disperse fission products 
would most likely be inhibited by such blockage. The staff believes 
that this sequence approaches the strictly hypothetical.
    Once the requisite cooling period after reactor shutdown has 
elapsed, the zirconium fuel cladding fire sequence is no longer a 
concern because the fuel would air cool sufficiently to avoid zirconium 
fuel cladding combustion. Possible accident scenarios after these 
cooling periods have elapsed possess greatly reduced consequences but 
could result in small releases or precautionary evacuations that could 
result in offsite liability.
    With respect to the Trojan plant-specific evaluation, the NRC staff 
independently evaluated the legal and technical justifications for the 
exemption presented by the licensee. The NRC recognizes the current 
condition of the Trojan plant, that is, permanently shut down and 
defueled, licensed for ``possession-only,'' and under a confirmatory 
order that prohibits fuel movement from the spent fuel pool into the 
reactor building without approval of the Commission. The staff 
concurred with the licensee's evaluation of credible design-basis 
accidents and their minimal associated offsite consequences.
    The staff also considered liability coverage needs associated with 
decommissioning activities, transportation of radioactive materials, 
design-basis accidents, and beyond-design-basis accidents as previously 
noted herein. The results of the staff's evaluation, as embodied in the 
staff requirements memorandum of July 13, 1993, on SECY 93-127 and in 
SECY 93-127, allow (after the requisite minimum spent fuel cooling 
period has elapsed) a reduction in the amount of financial protection 
required of licensees of large nuclear plants that have been 
prematurely shut down. The Trojan plant was permanently shut down on 
November 9, 1992; therefore, as of November 9, 1995, 3 years will have 
elapsed since the permanent shutdown of the Trojan plant. This time 
period meets the criteria established in SECY 93-127 for relief from 
financial protection requirements.

IV.

    On the basis of its independent evaluation as embodied in the staff 
requirements memorandum of July 13, 1993, on SECY 93-127 and in SECY 
93-127, the staff concluded that sufficient bases exist for the 
Commission's approval of relief from the financial protection 
requirements for the Trojan plant. The staff also concluded that 
granting the proposed exemption does not increase the probability or 
consequences of any accidents or reduce the margin of safety at this 
facility.

V.

    Based on Sections III. and IV. above, the Commission has determined 
that pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, this exemption is authorized by law and 
is otherwise in the public interest. Therefore, the Commission grants 
an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) to the extent 
that primary financial protection in the amount of $100 million shall 
be maintained. An exemption from participation in the industry 
retrospective rating plan (secondary level financial protection) is 
granted for the Trojan plant effective November 9, 1995, 3 years from 
the date of final shutdown of the reactor.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the 
quality of the human environment (60 FR 55741 dated November 2, 1995).
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day of November 1995.

Brian K. Grimes,
Acting Director, Division of Reactor Program Management, Office of 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 95-28157 Filed 11-14-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P