Employment and Training Administration

Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation; Notice of Final Meeting

SUMMARY: The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (ACUC) was established in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act on January 24, 1992 (57 FR 4007, Feb. 3, 1992). Public Law 102–164, the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991, mandated the establishment of the Council to evaluate the overall unemployment insurance program, including the purpose, goals, counter-cyclical effectiveness, coverage, benefit adequacy, trust fund solvency, funding of State administrative costs, administrative efficiency, and other aspects of the program, and to make recommendations for improvement.

TIME AND PLACE: The meeting will be held from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on December 13, 1995 at The Madison Hotel, 15th & M Streets, N.W., Washington, D.C.

AGENDA: The agenda for the meeting is as follows:

(1) Discussion of administrative financing within the unemployment insurance system;

(2) Discussion of performance measurement within the unemployment insurance system;

(3) Discussion of data needs in the unemployment system; and

(4) Discussion of the Council's findings and recommendations.

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: The meeting will be open to the public. Seating will be available to the public on a first-come, first-served basis. Seats will be reserved for the media. Individuals with disabilities in need of special accommodations should contact the Designated Federal Official (DFO), listed below, at least 7 days prior to the meeting.

FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONTACT: Esther R. Johnson, DFO, Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Room S–4231, Washington, D.C. 20210. (202) 219–7831. (This is not a toll-free number.)

Signed at Washington, D.C., this 1st day of November 1995.

Timothy M. Barnicle,

Assistant Secretary of Labor.

[FR Doc. 95–27674 Filed 11–7–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4510–30–M

NATIONAL FOUNDATION ON THE ARTS AND THE HUMANITIES

National Council on the Humanities; Meeting

November 1, 1995.

Pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Public L. 92–463, as amended) notice is hereby given that a meeting of the National Council on the Humanities will be held in Washington, D.C. on November 16–17, 1995.

The purpose of the meeting is to advise the Chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities with respect to policies, programs, and procedures for carrying out his functions, and to review applications for financial support and gifts offered to the Endowment and to make recommendations thereon to the Chairman.

The meeting will be held in the Old Post Office Building, 1100 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. A portion of the morning and afternoon sessions on November 16–17, 1995, will not be open to the public pursuant to subsections (c)(4), (6) and (9)(B) of section 552b of Title 5, United States Code because the Council will consider information that may disclose: Trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential; information of a personal nature the disclosure of which will constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; and information the disclosure of which would significantly frustrate implementation of proposed agency action. I have made this determination under the authority granted me by the Chairman's Delegation of Authority dated July 19, 1993.

The agenda for the sessions on November 16, 1995, will be as follows:

8:30–9:00 a.m.
Continental Breakfast for Council Members—Room 527

Committee Meetings

(Open to the Public) Policy Discussion

9:00–10:00 a.m.
Education Programs—Room M–14
Public Programs—Room 415
Research Programs—Room M07
Preservation and Access & Challenge Grants—Room 315
Federal-State Partnership—Room 507

10:00 a.m. until Adjourned
(Closed to the Public) Discussion of specific grant applications before the Council

The morning session on November 17, 1995, will convene at 10:30 a.m., in the 1st Floor Council Room, M–09, and will be open to the public, as set out below. The agenda for the morning session will be as follows:

(Coffee for Staff of The National Endowment for the Humanities will be served from 10:00–10:30 a.m.)

Minutes of the Previous Meeting

Reports

A. Introductory Remarks
B. National Conversation
C. Budget Reports
D. Legislative Report-Reauthorization
E. Committee Reports on Policy and General Matters
1. Overview
2. Education Programs
3. Public Programs
4. Research Programs
5. Preservation and Access & Challenge Grants
6. Federal-State Partnership
7. Jefferson Lecture Committee

(The meeting will be closed to the public at this point.)

The remainder of the proposed meeting will be given to the consideration of specific applications (closed to the public for the reasons stated above).

Further information about this meeting can be obtained from Ms. Sharon I. Block, Advisory Committee Management Officer, Washington, D.C. 20506, or call area code (202) 606–8322, TDD (202) 606–8282. Advance notice of any special needs or accommodations is appreciated.

Sharon I. Block,

Advisory Committee Management Officer.

[FR Doc. 95–27592 Filed 11–7–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7536–01–M

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–003 and 50–247]

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units No. 1 and 2; Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an exemption from certain requirements of its regulations to Provisional Operating License (POL) No. DPR–5 and Facility Operating License DPR–26, issued to Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (the licensee), for operation of the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1 and 2, located in Westchester County, New York. The operating authority of POL DPR–5 for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 1 was revoked by Commission Order dated June 19, 1980.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's application dated August 10, 1995, for exemption from

certain requirements of 10 CFR 73.55, ''Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.'' The exemption would allow implementation of a hand geometry biometric system for site access control such that combined picture badges/keycards for certain non-employees can be taken offsite.

The Need for the Proposed Action

Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, paragraph (a), the licensee shall establish and maintain an onsite physical protection system and security organization.

Paragraph (1) of 10 CFR 73.55(d), ''Access Requirements,'' specifies that ''licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area.'' Paragraph (5) of 10 CFR 73.55(d) specifies that ''A numbered picture badge identification system shall be used for all individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without escort.'' Paragraph (5) of 10 CFR 73.55(d) also states that an individual not employed by the licensee (i.e., contractors) may be authorized access to protected areas without escort provided the individual ''receives a picture badge upon entrance into the protected area which must be returned upon exit from the protected area * * *''

Currently, employee and contractor combined identification badges/keycards are issued and retrieved on the occasion of each entry to and exit from the protected areas of the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1 and 2 site. Station security personnel are required to maintain control of the badges while the individuals are offsite. This practice has been in effect at the Indian Point site since the operating license was issued. Security personnel retain each identification badge/keycard, when not in use by the authorized individual, within appropriately designed storage receptacles inside a bullet-resistant enclosure. An individual who meets the access authorization requirements is issued an individual picture identification card/keycard which allows entry into preauthorized areas of the station. While entering the plant in the present configuration, an authorized individual is ''screened'' by the required detection equipment and by the issuing security officer. Having received the badge/keycard, the individual proceeds to the access portal, inserts the badge/keycard into the card reader and passes through the turnstile which unlocks if the badge/keycard is valid.

This present procedure is labor intensive since security personnel are required to verify badge/keycard issuance, ensure badge/keycard retrieval, and maintain the badges/keycards in orderly storage until the next entry into the protected area. The regulations permit employees to remove their badges from the site, but an exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to permit contractors to take their badges offsite instead of returning them when exiting the site.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

The Commission has completed its evaluation of the licensee's application. Under the proposed system, all individuals authorized to gain unescorted access will have the physical characteristics of their hand (hand geometry) recorded with their badge/keycard number. Since the hand geometry is unique to each individual and its application in the entry screening function would preclude unauthorized use of a badge/keycard, the requested exemption would allow employees and contractors to keep their badges at the time of exiting the protected area. The process of verifying badge/keycard issuance, ensuring badge/keycard retrieval, and maintaining badges/keycards, could be eliminated while the balance of the access procedure would remain intact. Firearm, explosive, and metal detection equipment and provisions for conducting searches will remain as well. The security officer responsible for the last access control function (controlling admission to the protected area) will also remain isolated within a bullet-resistant structure in order to assure his or her ability to respond or to summon assistance.

Use of a hand geometry biometrics system exceeds the present verification methodology's capability to discern an individual's identity. Unlike the combined photograph identification badge/keycard, hand geometry is nontransferable. During the initial access authorization or registration process, hand measurements are recorded and the template is stored for subsequent use in the identity verification process required for entry into the protected area. Authorized individuals insert their badge/keycard into the card reader and the biometrics system records an image of the hand geometry. The unique features of the newly recorded image are then compared to the template previously stored in the database. Access is ultimately granted based on the degree to which the characteristics of the image match those of the ''signature'' template.

Since both the badge/keycard and hand geometry would be necessary for access into the protected area, the proposed system would provide for a positive verification process. Potential loss of a badge/keycard by an individual, as a result of taking the badge offsite, would not enable an unauthorized entry into protected areas.

The access process will continue to be under the observation of security personnel. The system of identification badges/keycards will continue to be used for all individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without escorts. Badges/keycards will continue to be displayed by all individuals while inside the protected area. Addition of a hand geometry biometrics system will provide a significant contribution to effective implementation of the security plan at the site.

The change will not increase the probability or consequences of accidents, no changes are being made in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite, and there is no significant increase in the allowable individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant radiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed action does involve features located entirely within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. It does not effect nonradiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impact. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant nonradiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

Since the Commission has concluded there is no measurable environmental impact associated with the proposed action, any alternatives with equal or greater environmental impact need not be evaluated. As an alternative to the proposed action, the staff considered denial of the proposed action. Denial of the application would result in no change in current environmental impacts. The environmental impacts of the proposed action and the alternative action are similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

This action does not involve the use of any resources not previously considered in the Final Environmental Statement for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

In accordance with its stated policy, on September 26, 1995, the staff consulted with the New York State official, Heidi Voelk of the Energy Research and Development Authority, regarding the environmental impact of the proposed action. The State official had no comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

Based upon the environmental assessment, the Commission concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the Commission has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed action.

For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the licensee's letter dated August 10, 1995, which is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, The Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at the White Plains Public Library, 100 Martine Avenue, White Plains, NY 10610.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 31st day of October 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Ledyard B. Marsh,

Director, Project Directorate I–1, Division of Reactor Projects—I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95–27622 Filed 11–7–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

Proposed Generic Communication; Boraflex Degradation in Spent Fuel Pool Storage Racks (M91447)

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Notice of opportunity for public comment.

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to issue a generic letter concerning Boraflex degradation in spent fuel pool storage racks. The purpose of the proposed generic letter is to request that licensees who use Boraflex as a neutron absorber in their spent fuel storage racks (1) assess the capability of the boraflex to maintain a 5 percent subcriticality margin and (2) submit a plan of action if this subcriticality margin cannot be maintained by the Boraflex material because of current or projected degradation. The NRC is seeking comment from interested parties regarding both the technical and regulatory aspects of the proposed generic letter presented under the Supplementary Information heading.

The proposed generic letter was endorsed by the Committee to Review Generic Requirements (CRGR) on September 26, 1995. The relevant information that was sent to the CRGR will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. The NRC will consider comments received from interested parties in the final evaluation of the proposed generic letter. The NRC's final evaluation will include a review of the technical position and, as appropriate, an analysis of the value/impact on licensees. Should this generic letter be issued by the NRC, it will become available for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room.

DATES: Comment period expires December 8, 1995. Comments submitted after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given except for comments received on or before this date.

ADDRESSEES: Submit written comments to Chief, Rules Review and Directives Branch, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Mail Stop T–6D–69, Washington, DC 20555–0001. Written comments may also be delivered to 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 am to 4:15 pm, Federal workdays. Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, N.W. (Lower Level), Washington, D.C.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Laurence I. Kopp (301) 415–2879.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

NRC Generic Letter 95–XX: Boraflex Degradation in Spent Fuel Pool Storage Racks (M91447)

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this generic letter to request that each addressee that uses Boraflex as a neutron absorber in its spent fuel storage racks (1) assess the capability of the Boraflex to maintain a 5 percent subcriticality margin and (2) submit to the NRC a plan describing its proposed actions if this subcriticality margin cannot be maintained by Boraflex material because of current or projected future Boraflex degradation.

Background

Degradation of Boraflex has been previously addressed by the NRC in Information Notice (IN) 87–43, ''Gaps in Neutron-Absorbing Material in High-Density Spent Fuel Storage Racks,'' September 8, 1987, IN 93–70, ''Degradation of Boraflex Neutron Absorber Coupons,'' September 10, 1993, and IN 95–38, ''Degradation of Boraflex Neutron Absorber in Spent Fuel Storage Racks.'' The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) has been studying the phenomenon of Boraflex degradation for several years and recently issued EPRI TR–103300, ''Guidelines for Boraflex Use in Spent-Fuel Storage Racks,'' December 1993, identifying two issues with respect to using Boraflex in spent fuel storage racks. The first issue related to gamma radiation-induced shrinkage of Boraflex and the potential to develop tears or gaps in the material. This phenomenon is typically accounted for in criticality analyses of spent fuel storage racks. The second issue concerned long-term Boraflex performance throughout the intended service life of the racks as a result of gamma irradiation and exposure to the wet pool environment.

Description of Circumstances

Palisades Nuclear Power Station

During the removal of several Boraflex surveillance coupons from the Palisades spent fuel pool in August 1993, a loss of as much as 90 percent of the Boraflex was observed and has been attributed to exposure to high-level gamma radiation in conjunction with interaction with the pool water. The Boraflex in these coupons was sandwiched and bolted between two stainless steel strips, allowing a relatively large area of Boraflex to be exposed to the pool water environment and flow. Neutron attenuation testing (blackness tests) of the actual Palisades storage racks indicated that because of the relatively watertight Boraflex panel enclosures, there was no similar degradation.

South Texas Project

The results of blackness tests performed in August 1994 at South Texas indicated that the Boraflex was degraded, as evidenced by gaps and/or localized washout of the boron content in 20 of the 37 storage cells tested. Of the eight cells that had been designated to receive an accelerated gamma dose, five cells exhibited substantial degradation (0.91 to 1.37 m [3 to 4.5 ft]). The licensee postulated that the degradation mechanism was washout-accelerated dissolution of the Boraflex caused by pool water flow through the panel enclosures. As a justification for continued operation, the licensee has placed restrictions on the use of the