[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 213 (Friday, November 3, 1995)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 55904-55931]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-27185]




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Part III





Department of Transportation





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Coast Guard



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33 CFR Part 157



46 CFR Parts 31 and 35



Operational Measures To Reduce Oil Spills From Existing Tank Vessels 
Without Double Hulls; Proposed Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 213 / Friday, November 3, 1995 / 
Proposed Rules  

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Coast Guard

33 CFR Part 157

46 CFR Parts 31 and 35

[CGD 91-045]
RIN 2115-AE01


Operational Measures To Reduce Oil Spills From Existing Tank 
Vessels Without Double Hulls

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DOT.

ACTION: Supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Coast Guard proposes regulations that would require the 
owners, masters, or operators of tank vessels of 5,000 gross tons (GT) 
or more that do not have double hulls and that carry oil in bulk as 
cargo to comply with certain operational measures. The proposed 
regulations contain requirements for bridge resource management 
training, rest hour minimums, enhanced surveys, maneuvering performance 
capability requirements, and other measures aimed at reducing the 
likelihood of an oil discharge from these vessels. Additionally, the 
Coast Guard proposes to amend requirements for the carriage of onboard 
emergency lightering equipment. These proposed regulations represent 
the second step in the Coast Guard's three-step effort to establish 
structural and operational measures for tank vessels without double 
hulls as required by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90).

DATES: Comments must be received on or before February 1, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be mailed to the Executive Secretary, Marine 
Safety Council (G-LRA/3406) (CGD 91-045), U.S. Coast Guard 
Headquarters, 2100 Second Street SW., Washington, DC 20593-0001, or may 
be delivered to room 3406 at the same address between 8 a.m. and 3 
p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The telephone 
number is (202) 267-1477. Comments on collection-of-information 
requirements must be mailed also to the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, 725 17th Street 
NW., Washington DC 20503, ATTN: Desk Officer, U.S. Coast Guard.
    The Executive Secretary maintains the public docket for this 
rulemaking. Comments will become part of this docket and will be 
available for inspection or copying at room 3406, U.S. Coast Guard 
Headquarters, between 8 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through Friday, except 
Federal holidays.
    A copy of the material listed in ``Incorporation by Reference'' of 
this preamble and references for this preamble are available for 
inspection at room 1312, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters and have also 
been included in the public docket.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
LCDR Suzanne Englebert, Project Manager, Standards Evaluation and 
Development Division, at (202) 267-6490. This number is equipped to 
record messages on a 24-hour basis.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Request for Comments

    The Coast Guard encourages interested persons to participate in 
this rulemaking by submitting written data, views, or arguments. 
Persons submitting comments should include their names and addresses, 
identify this rulemaking (CGD 91-045) and the specific section of this 
proposal to which each comment applies, and give the reason for each 
comment. Please submit two copies of all comments and attachments in an 
unbound format, no larger than 8\1/2\ by 11 inches, suitable for 
copying and electronic filing. Persons wanting acknowledgment of 
receipt of comments should enclose stamped, self-addressed postcards or 
envelopes.
    The Coast Guard will consider all comments received during the 
comment period. It may change this proposal in view of the comments.
    On January 20, 1994, the Coast Guard held a public meeting on 
structural and operational measures for tank vessels. The Coast Guard 
plans no additional public meetings. Persons may request a public 
meeting by writing to the Marine Safety Council at the address under 
ADDRESSES. The request should include the reasons why a meeting would 
be beneficial. If it determines that an additional opportunity for oral 
presentations will aid this rulemaking, the Coast Guard will hold a 
public meeting at a time and place announced by a later notice in the 
Federal Register.

    Drafting Information. The principal persons involved in drafting 
this document are LCDR Suzanne Englebert, Project Manager, and 
Jacqueline Sullivan, Project Counsel, Office of Chief Counsel.

Regulatory History

    Section 4115(b) of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) (which 
appears as a statutory note following 46 U.S.C. 3703a) directs the 
Coast Guard to develop structural or operational requirements for tank 
vessels of 5,000 gross tons or more without double hulls to serve as 
regulations until 2015, when all tank vessels operating in U.S. waters 
are required to have double hulls under section 4115(a) of OPA 90 (46 
U.S.C. 3703a). Regulations issued under the authority of section 
4115(b) must provide as substantial protection to the environment as is 
economically and technologically feasible.
    On November 1, 1991, the Coast Guard published an advance notice of 
proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) (56 FR 56284) which discussed structural 
and operational measures intended to meet the requirements of section 
4115(b) of OPA 90. The ANPRM included a request for data on the 
technical and economic feasibility of those measures for use on vessels 
covered by section 4115(b). Eighty-eight comments were received by the 
close of the extended comment period, which ended on January 30, 1992 
(57 FR 1243).
    After reviewing the comments, the Coast Guard published a notice of 
proposed rulemaking (NPRM) entitled ``Structural and Operational 
Measures to Reduce Oil Spills from Existing Tank Vessels Without Double 
Hulls'' (Existing Vessels) on October 22, 1993 (58 FR 54870). The Coast 
Guard issued two subsequent correction notices on November 19, 1993 (58 
FR 61143), and December 14, 1993 (58 FR 65298), which made technical 
corrections to the NPRM. In response to several comments received on 
the NPRM, the Coast Guard published on December 16, 1993, a notice of 
public meeting and extension of comment period (58 FR 65683).
    The Coast Guard held a public meeting on January 20, 1994, to 
obtain information from the public on the proposed regulations. Topics 
addressed by speakers included applicability, differences between tank 
barges and tankships, exemptions, and economic and technical 
feasibility of the proposed regulations. Some of the basic assumptions 
of the proposed regulations related to certain structural measures were 
also discussed, particularly their reliance on Regulation 13G of Annex 
I of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL 73/78). 
Information on the public meeting is available for public review at the 
address under ADDRESSES.
    In light of the comments received at the public meeting and in 
response to the written comments received on the NPRM, the Coast Guard 
is reviewing the proposed requirements for structural measures. To 
expedite the implementation of section 4115(b) of OPA 90, the Coast 
Guard developed a three-pronged approach which 

[[Page 55905]]
encompassed three separate rulemaking projects. First, the Coast Guard 
issued a final rule on August 5, 1994, requiring the carriage of 
emergency lightering equipment and the inclusion of the vessel's 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) number in the advance notice 
of arrival report (59 FR 40186); second, it is issuing this 
supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM) regarding additional 
operational measures; and third, it is reviewing comments on the NPRM 
for major structural measures and revising the Regulatory Assessment 
(RA) before issuing an SNPRM regarding structural requirements for tank 
vessels. Structural measures that will be addressed in this third step 
include hydrostatic loading requirements, structural refit of existing 
hull areas, emergency cargo off-loading capabilities and other 
structural adaptations or major cargo carrying adjustments.

Background and Purpose

    Section 4115 of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) (Pub. L. 
101-380) mandates regulations to provide improved protection from oil 
spills from tank vessels in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States due to collisions and groundings. This section applies to 
tank vessels that are constructed or adapted to carry, or that carry 
oil in bulk as cargo or cargo residue.
    The Coast Guard has determined that the applicability of these 
proposed regulations would reflect section 4115(a) of OPA 90 which 
requires certain existing tank vessels without double hulls to be 
phased out of operation by 2015. The Coast Guard rulemaking 
implementing section 4115(a) entitled ``Double Hull Standards for 
Vessels Carrying Oil in Bulk'' (CGD 90-051) (57 FR 36222) added 33 CFR 
157.10(d), which establishes the applicability of the regulations. The 
regulations also apply to certain tank vessels carrying oil in bulk as 
cargo operating in U.S. waters, including vessels unloading oil as 
cargo at deepwater ports, lightering in established lightering zones, 
or lightering more than 60 miles from the territorial sea baseline; 
they also apply to non-dedicated oil spill response vessels (OSRVs). 
The Navigation and Inspection Circular (NVIC) 10-94, ``Guidance for 
Determination and Documentation of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 
90) Phaseout Schedule for Existing Single Hull Vessel Carrying Oil in 
Bulk,'' provides a detailed explanation of the applicability of section 
4115(a).
    In the preamble to the Existing Tank Vessels NPRM, the Coast Guard 
proposed to limit the applicability of the rule to ``oil tankers'' as 
defined in 33 CFR 157.03(oo) rather than tank vessels as defined in 33 
CFR 157.03(v). The NPRM specifically excluded vessels carrying only 
animal fats and vegetable oils because the proposed structural 
requirements were believed to be too costly for vessels carrying only 
non-petroleum oils. Additionally, the exemption was proposed in an 
effort to be consistent with the international standards of MARPOL 73/
78, which also establishes structural measures for certain existing 
vessels. The Coast Guard has determined that the operational 
requirements proposed in this SNPRM would be applied to all existing 
tank vessels, including vessels which carry only non-petroleum oils. 
The Coast Guard has long contended that a discharge of non-petroleum 
oils can be as damaging to the environment as a discharge of petroleum 
oil, especially if spilled in bulk. In 1992, an IMO study entitled 
``Harmful Effects on Birds of Floating Lipophilic Substances Discharge 
from Ships On the Plumage of Birds'' was published by the Netherlands 
Institute for Sea Research. This study gives numerous examples of 
lethal contamination of seabirds by certain non-petroleum oils spilled 
from ships. This study is available for public inspection at the 
address under ADDRESSES. The Coast Guard also researched the number of 
tank vessels potentially affected by this proposal and found no tank 
vessels which are certificated to carry only non-petroleum oils. The 
Coast Guard requests comments on the impact of this proposed rulemaking 
on vessels that carry only non-petroleum oils. Comments on the impact 
of the proposed rulemaking on areas that could be adversely affected by 
a non-petroleum spill are also requested.
    The Coast Guard proposes to revise the applicability of 
Sec. 157.400 of the Existing Tank Vessels final rule issued on August 
5, 1994 (59 FR 40186), which requires oil tankers to carry emergency 
lightering equipment and report the vessel's IMO number in the advance 
notice of arrival report. The SNPRM proposes to apply the lightering 
equipment requirement to all tank vessels. A separate rulemaking 
proposes to change the reporting requirements of a vessel's IMO number 
to include vessels 300 gross tons (GT) or more.
    To clarify how each of these regulations, both existing and 
proposed, apply to foreign flag vessels, the Coast Guard proposes to 
amend the applicability section of 33 CFR part 157. The proposed change 
would ensure that, to be consistent with international law, the 
regulations do not apply to foreign flag vessels in innocent passage in 
U.S. navigable waters, including the territorial sea of the United 
States, or while operating in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) unless 
they are engaging in lightering operations or off-loading oil in bulk 
at a deepwater port.
    This proposal would also require a barge owner to assume additional 
responsibility for the actions of the towing vessel. Barge operations 
for loading cargo are generally handled by company representatives or 
facility personnel. However, navigational control of the tank barge has 
historically been the responsibility of the towing vessel. Although 
section 4115(b) of OPA 90 did not specifically recognize the towing 
vessel's shared role in tank barge operations, the towing vessel's role 
in the navigation and control of the tank barge must be addressed to 
reduce accident risk from tank barges. The proposed regulations require 
the tank barge owner or operator to ensure the towing vessel meets 
certain standards comparable to those proposed for tankships.
    This additional level of control should have a minimal effect on 
tank barge companies because most tank barge owners or operators also 
own the towing vessels and employ their crews. For those tank barge 
companies that rely on leased towing vessels to move their tank barges, 
these proposed requirements could result in some additional contractual 
arrangements, additional oversight of the towing vessel companies, or 
hiring criteria that incorporate these requirements. These measures 
would ensure that tank barge owners exercise direct control over the 
manner in which their cargo is transported. This direct oversight is 
prudent for tank barge owners because in most cases, under section 1002 
of OPA 90, tank barge owners are held financially responsible for any 
removal costs and damages for discharged oil. The Coast Guard is 
soliciting comments on the extension of certain towing vessel 
requirements to the tank barge industry.

Discussion of Comments and Changes

    Background information on proposals for structural measures for 
existing vessels without double hulls is provided in the preambles to 
the ANPRM and the NPRM. Operational measures were discussed in both the 
ANPRM and the NPRM; however, the NPRM focused on measures to reduce oil 
outflow after collisions and groundings, not on the mishap risk 
reduction for these vessels.

[[Page 55906]]

    The Coast Guard has issued many requirements that could be 
considered operational in nature. Other regulations mandated by OPA 90 
affect the marine industry, especially the tank vessel fleet. To 
address the most common hazardous operational deficiencies on tank 
vessels today, the Coast Guard has conducted a qualitative evaluation 
of the tank vessel operating system. Previous studies of this type 
include (1) ``Research Needs to Reduce Maritime Collisions, Rammings, 
and Groundings'' by the Maritime Transportation Research Board (1981); 
(2) ``Development and Assessment of Measures to Reduce Accidental Oil 
Outflow from Tank Ships'' by the Coast Guard (May 1989); and (3) 
``Human Error in Merchant Marine Safety'' by the Maritime 
Transportation Research Board (1976). These studies along with other 
risk analysis literature formed the baseline for the ``fault trees'' 
depicted in the following figures:

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    Figure 1 shows how a qualitative evaluation of a marine system can 
identify effective improvements for existing or proposed regulations. 
Figure 2 identifies the general pollution hazard created by tank 
vessels. The scope of this analysis was further narrowed to those areas 
where a tank vessel without a double hull may pose a higher risk than 
other vessels or to areas where inconsistencies exist between 
requirements for U.S. domestic vessels and foreign certificated 
vessels. The Coast Guard developed detailed qualitative models for 
structural and fire or explosion accidents because the majority of the 
existing tank vessel fleet is older and not required to conform to many 
of the recent safety regulations. Collisions, allisions, and groundings 
were considered because of the oil spill potential of these incidents. 
The operational spill segment of the fault tree in Figure 2 and the 
terminal operations portion are only included in this analysis in areas 
where present regulations do not hold U.S. and foreign vessels to 
comparable standards. Figures 3 through 6 display the detailed 
qualitative models and associated high risk components within each 
identified hazard.
    This type of analysis contains a subjective element. The Coast 
Guard has drawn from the knowledge of its experienced inspectors and 
licensed mariners to develop the fault trees identified in Figures 3-6. 
These fault trees are not meant to be comprehensive, instead they are 
used to clarify further discussion within this proposed regulation by 
identifying major operational causes of oil discharges and the measures 
that could potentially mitigate these causes from a tank vessel without 
a double hull.
    As an example of this process, 33 CFR 164.35(g) requires all ships 
of 1,600 GT or more to post a list in the wheelhouse which identifies 
the vessel's general maneuvering characteristics. This requirement 
mitigates problems arising from ``lack of knowledge'' which may cause a 
collision, allision, or grounding as identified in Figure 5. In 
analyzing this requirement's effectiveness to mitigate this ``lack of 
knowledge'' component, it becomes clear that the requirement may not be 
as effective as it could be. A discussion of this issue can be found in 
a recent ``Marine Technology'' paper entitled ``Maneuvering Information 
for the Pilot/Navigator: Its Source Value and Limitations,'' written by 
Mr. Thomas G. Knierim (Vol 31, No. 2, April 1994, pp. 123-144).
    The Coast Guard received a total of 132 comments on the Existing 
Vessel NPRM. Thirty of these comments discussed over 70 issues relating 
to operational measures. The following discussion is divided into seven 
categories: (1) General comments which address broad issues and the 
general content of the NPRM; (2) comments on proposed revisions to 
emergency lightering equipment requirements in 33 CFR 157.410; (3) 
comments on personnel training and information (see the fault-tree 
components of Figures 5 and 6 which address failure to perform a task, 
failure to correctly perform a task, and lack of knowledge or 
training); (4) comments on vessel maintenance surveys (see the 
components of Figures 3 through 6 for equipment failure, hull 
structural failure, or failure due to explosion); (5) comments on 
navigation and maneuverability (see the components of Figures 5 and 6 
involving a lack of knowledge, training, or the use of incorrect 
information); (6) comments on requirements for the control and movement 
of tank barges (see the components of Figure 6 related to towing vessel 
operations and equipment); (7) comments on operational measures that 
are not addressed elsewhere in this SNPRM.

1. General

    Several comments expressed concern that the proposed regulations do 
not reflect congressional intent. The comments stated that the NPRM 
improperly emphasized structural measures without adequate regard for 
operational measures which could have an equal or greater benefit for 
the environment at less cost. They also stated that the failure to 
assess significant regulatory alternatives violates the statutory 
mandate of OPA 90 and the requirements of Executive Order 12866. This 
SNPRM proposes operational measures that meet both the statutory 
mandate of OPA 90 and the mandate of the Executive Order.
    Some of the comments stated that the requirements proposed in the 
NPRM would not satisfy the statutory mandate to provide ``as 
substantial protection to the environment as is economically and 
technologically feasible'' as required by section 4115(b) of OPA 90. 
One comment stated that operational measures would do more to protect 
the environment because 80 percent of all oil pollution is caused by 
human error, not by structural malfunctions. Several comments indicated 
that the operational measures could be implemented more quickly than 
structural measures. Many comments stressed the need for operational 
measures to prevent collisions or groundings, rather than structural 
requirements to reduce oil outflow after a vessel collision or 
grounding.
    This SNPRM proposes operational measures for both foreign and U.S. 
vessels that should improve the overall quality of tank vessel 
operations. Rulemakings complementing this effort propose navigation 
equipment for towing vessels and towing vessel operating license 
changes.
    One comment suggested that vessel owners should be able to choose 
from a list of measures that, when used together, would equal a 
specified level of protection. This would require that each operational 
measure be assigned a credit based upon additional prevention or 
decreased oil outflow.
    The Coast Guard considered various ways of allotting credits and 
developing a minimum level of protection. This concept did not address 
the different objectives of each proposed requirement. For example, how 
could a requirement for the pilot to plan a passage, intended to reduce 
the risk of a collision, allision, or grounding (Figure 5), be 
quantified in relation to a maintenance program intended to reduce the 
risk of a structural failure (Figure 3)? Blurring the lines between 
failure modes and risk components would not achieve equitable risk 
reduction among affected tank vessels. An ``a la carte'' idea was also 
researched to compare each failure mode with a list of possible risk 
reduction measures. Equivalencies between each measure could not be 
determined because, even among the components, an accurate quantitative 
assessment method was not available.
    Instead, the Coast Guard evaluated these operational measures in 
terms of the failure mode which they address, whether vessel personnel, 
navigation, or maintenance practices. The Coast Guard is proposing 
minimum training requirements to address vessel personnel, information 
requirements and minimum equipment and tests to address navigation and 
maneuvering problems, and survey and physical prevention measures to 
address the integrity of the vessel's structure. Where the same risk 
component is addressed, within each measure, some equivalency 
determinations are provided to allow individual companies or vessels to 
tailor requirements to their operational needs. The proposed measures 
consider both the technical and economical feasibility mandates of the 
statute.
    Other comments recommended that the Coast Guard strictly enforce 
its current pollution prevention regulations. The Coast Guard enforces 
the requirements of both international and domestic law. Additional 

[[Page 55913]]
enforcement measures have been established and implemented that include 
the increased scrutiny of certain vessels that consistently violate 
laws or have a history of casualties. Until the effectiveness of these 
recent enforcement measures has been assessed, the Coast Guard does not 
intend to propose additional measures.
    One comment requested that Canadian or other foreign flag vessels 
passing through the St. Lawrence Seaway in route to a Canadian port be 
exempt from these proposals. The comment estimated that the true cost 
of the proposals would be four to five times those quoted by the Coast 
Guard. Another comment requested that tankers calling at deepwater 
ports, where there are already various operational measures in effect, 
be exempted. One comment requested exemption for vessels which lighter 
60 miles offshore and for those that call at the Louisiana. Offshore 
Oil Port (LOOP) because section 3703a of title 46 of the United States 
Code does not apply to them. As previously discussed, these vessels do 
have phaseout requirements and are subject to the provisions in section 
4115(b). The Coast Guard has determined that the proposed operational 
measures are appropriate and do not conflict with St. Lawrence Seaway 
or LOOP operations.
    One company requested that asphalt carriers be exempted from the 
proposed rule; the Coast Guard does not agree. Asphalt is a petroleum-
based cargo and the requirements contained in this portion of the 
rulemaking present no unique difficulties for an asphalt carrier.
    Two comments requested that vessels transporting oil to American 
Samoa be exempted because of the remoteness of the islands and the 
fragility of the economy. Both comments stated that vessels calling 
there satisfy international requirements and will have no incentive to 
incur the additional cost these rules would impose. One of these 
comments contended that if this regulation were applied to these 
vessels, the supply of crude oil and petroleum products to American 
Samoa would be in jeopardy and the cost of fuel would rise. The other 
comment specifically requested that vessels transporting oil to the 
Pacific Islands be exempt from the requirements of the proposed rule 
that exceed the requirements of Regulation 13G of MARPOL 73/78. This 
would include the Hawaiian Islands, American Samoa, Guam, the 
commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and other U.S. 
possessions in the Western Pacific. The comment stated that the small 
number of foreign tanker operators willing to comply with the 
regulation, coupled with the limited U.S. flag product tanker fleet, 
will severely limit the supply of essential petroleum products to the 
Pacific Islands.
    The Coast Guard believes that the operational requirements 
contained in this rulemaking are economically feasible for vessels 
transporting oil to all of these areas. Equivalency provisions offer 
flexibility in compliance with certain requirements. Incorporated 
international standards accommodate both the foreign and domestic 
industry. The Coast Guard requests comments on the impact of this 
proposed rulemaking on vessels transporting oil to specific remote 
geographic areas like American Samoa and other Pacific Islands. 
Comments on the impact of the proposed rulemaking on areas that are 
economically dependent on tourism or fishing are also requested.

2. Emergency Lightering Requirements

    The Coast Guard is proposing revisions to requirements for 
emergency lightering equipment published in a final rule on August 5, 
1994, (59 FR 40186) entitled ``Emergency Ligthering Equipment and 
Advanced Notice of Arrival Requirements for Existing Tank Vessels 
Without Double Hulls.'' Section 157.410(c) of the final rule referenced 
the requirements of 46 CFR part 56.25 for cast iron and malleable iron 
fittings and flanges. Cast iron and malleable iron have very high 
failure rates in cargo piping systems due to their low cycle fatigue 
susceptibility and tendency to weaken when subjected to high 
temperatures. To ensure that these fittings are not installed in piping 
lines carrying flammable or combustible fluids near open flame, or any 
parts reaching temperatures above 260 deg.C (500 deg.F), this SNPRM 
proposes to amend Sec. 157.410(c) to specifically prohibit the use of 
such valves or fittings.

3. Personnel Training and Information

    Data attributes 80 percent of marine accidents to some form of 
human error. Human factors are broadly defined as a scientific and 
engineering discipline concerned with analysis, research, design 
development, and evaluation of human/human, human/machine, human/
information and human/environment interfaces. Human factors issues 
include any condition or circumstance which affects the quality of 
human performance required to accomplish a complex task or series of 
tasks safely and effectively. As related to vessel navigation, this 
applies to four general subjects: error trapping or human intervention, 
task or mission coordination, team communication, and vessel 
integration. Error trapping or human intervention is responsible for 
``near misses'' as discussed in the report entitled ``The Role of Human 
Error in Design, Construction, and Reliability of Marine Structures'' 
published by the Ship Structure Committee (SSC-378, November 1994). 
Error trapping occurs when humans intervene to interrupt potentially 
catastrophic combinations of actions and events to bring systems back 
to within safe operating conditions. This SNPRM emphasizes human 
factors issues which would reduce the risk of accidents caused by ship 
personnel: failing to perform tasks, incorrectly performing tasks, 
lacking knowledge or training to perform assigned tasks, using 
incomplete or incorrect information, and failing to identify or correct 
social or managerial problems.
    Because the prevention of accidents through improving the people 
involved in the system is an effective way to reduce risk within the 
marine industry, the Coast Guard established a task group on January 
13, 1995 (60 FR 3289), formed by the Chief, Office of Marine Safety, 
Security and Environmental Protection to develop a long-term strategy 
to focus prevention efforts on casualties caused by human error. The 
Coast Guard's Prevention Through People (PTP) initiative has 
established a framework by which the Coast Guard, other government 
agencies, and the maritime industry, nationally and internationally, 
can work together outside of the regulatory process to manage maritime 
risks systematically. The task force report entitled ``Prevention 
Through People'' stresses the use of risk management tools to identify 
root causes and cost effective preventive measures; the employment of 
proactive action to detect, assess, and prevent human errors that 
affect safety; and improvement of investigative methods, data 
collection, analyses, and feedback. This report is available for public 
inspection at the address under ADDRESSES.
    Training. The Coast Guard received several comments on improving 
personnel training. Six comments stated that additional personnel 
training was needed to ensure the competency of the crew. One of these 
comments urged the Coast Guard to require specific in-house training. 
Another of these comments suggested that drug and alcohol testing and 
awareness training be required.
    Proposed Secs. 157.415 and 157.420 include training requirements 
and performance standards to ensure the development and retention of 
certain skills. Drug and alcohol testing program requirements already 
exist and are applicable to the crews of tank vessels. For this SNPRM, 
existing drug and 

[[Page 55914]]
alcohol requirements were considered. The Coast Guard has determined 
that additional requirements are not needed for drug and alcohol 
testing or awareness training at this time. The Coast Guard, however, 
commends companies with programs that exceed Federal requirements.
    Three comments stated that bridge management training, including 
simulator training, would improve the competency of the crew. They 
recommended that vessels carry a bridge management manual which 
codifies the company's standards, practices, policies, and procedures.
    Two different risk reduction solutions were proposed by the 
comments. The first solution addressed additional training requirements 
for improving crew navigational skills or development of management 
skills for the bridge crew. The second solution pertained to developing 
extensive operational procedures for various shipboard operations and 
navigational situations. Both risk reduction solutions address the lack 
of knowledge and the management components noted in Figure 5.
    Company management generally develops various operational 
procedures in the form of bridge reference material. The crew is then 
expected to review the material and refer to it, if time permits, prior 
to acting in an emergency or a unique situation. Several sections of 
OPA 90 contain extensive planning requirements for emergency situations 
(i.e., the Vessel Response Plan requirement in 33 CFR part 155.) In 
contrast to these written procedures, recently developed team training 
techniques focus on the operation of the bridge team during both normal 
and emergency situations. This type of training is an example of 
reducing the risk of a marine casualty through improving the response 
of the people directly involved with the system.
    The Coast Guard has proposed general bridge management training 
requirements to the Standards of Training and Watchkeeping (STW) 
Subcommittee of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) since 
1991. However, the STW Subcommittee has not yet developed a training 
standard. The Coast Guard consider such training desirable for the 
crews of all vessels. This rulemaking may serve as the precedent for 
future regulations addressing the reduction of accident risk due to 
human error through team management training programs.
    The bridge resource management (BRM) training proposed in 
Sec. 157.415 of this SNPRM is similar to the techniques and practices 
that have been used in the aviation field. BRM is not intended to teach 
the more ``traditional'' aspects of bridge watchstanding (i.e., 
navigation, shiphandling, and collision avoidance); rather, it focuses 
on integrating ``traditional'' technical skills with human factors 
skills to reduce the risk of human error-related accidents. These 
concepts reflect an emphasis on effective communication among 
watchstanders; the proper delegation of tasks and responsibilities; the 
importance of using all available resources (equipment, information, 
and personnel); and the need for watchstanders to understand the way 
stress and fatigue affect their performance.
    The Coast Guard seeks uniform curriculum requirements for both U.S. 
and foreign licensed officers, and is presently working within IMO to 
develop these requirements. If IMO develops and adopts a resolution or 
other instrument that includes BRM skills and course curriculum, the 
Coast Guard intends to substitute, incorporate by reference or propose 
rules which reflect these international standards. In the interim, a 
general course curriculum was developed based on review of various 
existing courses used to train pilots, masters, mates, and military 
personnel. The Coast Guard proposes this general curriculum to ensure 
that the training courses emphasize open team communications, task 
coordination, and the integration of operations. Specific course length 
and a requirement for simulator training have not been included. The 
following references were used to develop the general course curriculum 
proposed in this rulemaking:
    (1) IMO Guidelines ``Human Relationships, 1.21'' and ``Ship 
Simulator and Bridge Teamwork, 1.22'';
    (2) American Petroleum Institute's ``Guidelines for Developing 
Bridge Management Teams'';
    (3) U.S. proposal papers for both the Standards, Training and 
Watchkeeping Subcommittee (STW 25/3/14, STW 26/4/13) and the Safety of 
Navigation Subcommittee (NAV 38/13);
    (4) Presentation on ``Bridge Resource Management'' by Mr. Richard 
T. Johnson, et al. (Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers 
Panel 0-44), to the International Conference on Marine Simulation and 
Ship Manoeuvrability (MARSIM 93), Saint John, Newfoundland, Canada, 
September 1993;
    (5) SAS Flight Academy's course curriculum for its ``Bridge 
Resource Management'' course;
    (6) ARCO Marine's Bridge Team Management Training course curriculum 
utilizing SimShip and the Star 360 deg. simulator; and
    (7) The Coast Guard's student handbook for its course on ``Team 
Coordination Training.''
    The training proposed in Sec. 157.415 would be required for 
designated officers in charge of a navigational watch serving on either 
tankships and towing vessels. The Towing Safety Advisory Committee 
(TSAC) recommended that this type of training be required for towing 
vessel personnel as well as tankship personnel because it is an 
effective means of preventing accidents. Thus, an example of the 
personnel affected by Sec. 157.415 would be the master, chief mate, one 
second mate, and the two third mates (a typical tankship officer 
complement) or the master and two mates (a towing vessel's officer 
complement). These individuals would be required to attend the initial 
BRM training and refresher training no less than once every 5 years. 
Initial course completion including a series of performance standards 
and course completion documentation is proposed in Sec. 157.415 to 
verify that a vessel's officers have been adequately trained. The 5-
year refresher training would coincide with present license renewal 
requirements. For U.S. licensed individuals, a rulemaking to propose 
requirements for this training and provisions for an endorsement 
directly onto the license is under development.
    The Coast Guard recognizes that vessel owners, masters, or 
operators would be required to research course availability and to 
establish training programs to comply with the proposed bridge resource 
management training requirements. Therefore, in Sec. 157.415(a) the 
Coast Guard is proposing that compliance with these requirements would 
not be required until 1 year after the effective date of the final 
rule. In addition, the Coast Guard recognizes that a substantial pool 
of merchant mariners already have received comparable BRM training and 
is proposing that these individuals be credited for the completion of 
this training if it has occurred within 3 years of the effective date 
of the final rule.
    A more aggressive measure to address the entire crew and their 
interaction with the vessel operations is ``Vessel Resource 
Management'' training. This training course would apply to engine room 
personnel as well as other personnel assigned to the vessel. The 
integration of support services, bridge functions, engine room 
functions, maintenance, and communications with facilities or company 
management would be covered by this training. The Coast Guard 
recognizes the value of this 

[[Page 55915]]
training and solicits comments on whether this type of comprehensive 
training should be required or recommended.
    Training of unlicensed watchstanding personnel is also imperative. 
The Coast Guard is proposing vessel specific watch training for those 
watchstanding personnel who assist the officer in charge of a 
navigational watch. TSAC also recommended that this training 
requirement be applied to towing vessel personnel. This training would 
ensure that unlicensed watchstanders receive training tailored to 
management expectations and the equipment on board either the tankship 
or the primary towing vessel, prior to taking on watchstanding duties. 
General subjects for training are listed in Sec. 157.420(a) to ensure 
watchstanders receive instruction on essential items that would enable 
them to provide accurate and useful information to the officer in 
charge of a navigational watch or other senior personnel. To ensure 
this training remains current and to account for personnel changes or 
equipment upgrades, an annual refresher of this watchstanding training 
is proposed.
    The Coast Guard has included a proposed definition for the term 
``officer in charge of a navigational watch'' to clarify which 
personnel would be required to complete the bridge resource management 
training. This term would also provide consistency with the terminology 
of the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification 
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 (STCW). The proposed definitions 
for ``primary towing vessel'' and for ``fleeting or assist towing 
vessel'' would clarify that personnel on the towing vessel responsible 
for the navigation and control of the tank barge during most of the 
voyage would be required to have bridge resource management training, 
vessel specific watch training, and certain other requirements proposed 
in this rulemaking. This distinction is made because (1) during assist 
towing operations, the towing vessel personnel that made the transit 
with the barge (the primary towing vessel) generally stay on site and 
direct the mooring or anchoring operation; (2) in most cases, the tank 
barge company has management control over the primary towing vessel and 
its personnel because they directly own the vessel and employ its crew; 
and (3) this would ensure integrated tug barge operations are included 
in the rulemaking.
    Pilot Licensing Programs. Three comments suggested improvements to 
the pilot licensing process. One comment recommended more aggressive 
pilot licensing and revocation procedures and the adoption of more 
rigorous penalty standards. Another comment recommended a comprehensive 
review of mariner licensing standards and more rigorous enforcement of 
current regulations such as background checks; one recommended checking 
the National Drivers Register (NDR) before issuing a license.
    A separate NPRM published on March 13, 1995 (60 FR 13570), proposed 
the incorporation of an NDR check prior to issuing a license. A 
licensing study is underway and revisions to current requirements are 
anticipated. In conjunction with the licensing study, a 1994 National 
Research Council Committee on Advances in Navigation and Piloting 
report entitled ``Minding the Helm'' (ISBN 0-309-04829-X) discusses and 
recommends several actions that could be taken by the Coast Guard to 
improve marine navigation and piloting. The Coast Guard is presently 
reviewing this report and anticipates future rulemakings to implement 
some of the recommendations.
    Minimum Rest Hour Requirement. Another component of the accident 
hazards, shown in Figures 4, 5, and 6, deals with fatigue. Current work 
hour restrictions and rest hour requirements attempt to mitigate the 
risk of accidents. The Coast Guard evaluated existing requirements and 
proposes to expand the rest hour requirement for both foreign and U.S. 
crew members with duties directly related to vessel safety and oil 
transfer operations.
    Proposed Sec. 157.425 would require the owner, master, or operator 
of each tank vessel to ensure crew members involved in navigation, 
engineering, or oil transfer operations are provided a minimum of 6 
continuous hours of rest within 12 hours prior to departing port or 
prior to cargo transfer operations. Because the operation and safe 
navigation of the tank barge hinges on the actions of the towing vessel 
personnel, tank barge owners would have to ensure that the towing 
vessel master or operator, any crew member assigned to helm or lookout 
tasks, as well as any personnel assigned tankerman duties for the barge 
cargo complied with these requirements. For tank barge companies that 
do not directly own the towing vessel or employ its crew, this 
requirement could be met by management oversight of the towing vessel 
company, a contractual agreement, or by towing vessel hiring practices.
    A definition for ``rest hour'' is proposed to be added to 
Sec. 157.03. This term is borrowed from STCW. Watchstanding, assigned 
clerical duties, assigned painting, maintenance, or housekeeping duties 
all fall within a crewman's typical daily work load. A rest hour is 
that period during which a crew member has no assigned tasks. A rest 
hour, however, does include the time spent on drills or during an 
emergency situation. The Coast Guard also recognizes travel to a work 
site is not addressed in this proposal. The intention of this proposal 
is to ensure that well rested individuals are assigned to tasks that 
are important to vessel operations. Travel can have a negative effect 
on an individual's alertness; however, some commute time to the job 
site is standard for every profession. The Coast Guard is soliciting 
comments on when and how travel time should be factored into a rest 
hour requirement.
    The Coast Guard recognizes the benefit of adequate rest for all 
mariners and is working within the IMO framework to establish an 
international standard. If IMO develops and adopts a resolution or 
other instrument that includes provisions for rest, the Coast Guard 
intends to substitute, incorporate by reference, or propose rules which 
reflect these international standards. The Coast Guard is also 
considering the incorporation of the more stringent work hour and rest 
hour requirements found in section 4114 of OPA 90 to include foreign 
tankships and other tank vessels. These work hour requirements have 
been included in the Designation of Lightering Zones Final Rule 
published on August 29, 1995 (60 FR 45006). The Coast Guard is 
soliciting comments on the feasibility of expanding application of the 
work hour and rest hour restrictions of section 4114 or the adoption of 
similar IMO provisions, under the authority of section 4115(b) of OPA 
90.

4. Vessel Maintenance Surveys

    Figure 3 depicts the qualitative evaluation of a structural failure 
hazard to a tank vessel. These types of hazards have been reduced in 
the past through drydock examinations, classification society 
requirements, and construction requirements such as the welding 
qualifications of 46 CFR part 57. The Coast Guard analyzed past 
requirements addressing structural failures and equipment failures as 
indicated in Figures 5 and 6. More significantly, because these vessels 
have been scheduled for a mandatory phase-out, it is suspected that the 
human factors issues related to management's reluctance to sufficiently 
supply or upkeep the vessel, and the vessel operator's failure to 
inspect or test the 

[[Page 55916]]
tank vessel equipment may become more frequent. Vessel owners or 
operators may begin to weigh the maintenance investment against the 
short-lived return and could down-scale vessel upkeep accordingly. The 
Coast Guard recognizes this possibility and has evaluated existing 
requirements that would ensure vessel structure and equipment remain in 
safe operating condition. This analysis indicated that some additional 
measures could reduce the risk of a structural or equipment failure, 
and the risk of a collision, allision, or grounding due to equipment or 
upkeep problems.
    The Coast Guard received several comments on improved maintenance 
aboard vessels. Three comments suggested that the Coast Guard require 
internal audits of vessel operations, equipment, and personnel for 
compliance with all applicable regulations and company standards. One 
comment recommended preventive maintenance programs on ships; another 
suggested formal in-house ship inspection programs.
    In Secs. 157.430 and 157.435, the Coast Guard is proposing a two-
step approach to ensuring existing tank vessels are maintained at a 
level that will reduce the risk of a structural or equipment failure. 
Under this proposal, tankships, integrated tug barges, and tank barges 
would be required to (1) have an enhanced survey or an enhanced survey 
equivalent, and (2) conduct frequent vital system surveys.
    Enhanced Surveys. Proposed Sec. 157.430(a) would require an 
enhanced survey for all tank vessels of 5,000 GT or more as detailed in 
IMO Resolution A.744(18), entitled ``Guidelines on the Enhanced 
Programme of Inspections During Surveys of Bulk Carriers and Oil 
Tankers.'' To prevent the need for additional drydockings, the 
requirement would reflect either the frequency of the U.S. scheduled 
drydock exam requirements in 46 CFR part 31 or that of a foreign 
vessel's flag administration. This requirement already exists under the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 
1973 and the related amendment to Annex I of MARPOL 73/78; however, the 
U.S. has expanded the scope of this requirement to include tank vessels 
of 5,000 GT or more that do not have double hulls. This survey requires 
detailed visual inspection as well as specific gauging. This survey 
should reduce the risk of both a global and local structural failure by 
closely recording and inspecting the hull prior to the vessel's 
phaseout date. It would also ensure that a detailed survey of the cargo 
piping and hull are available for Coast Guard examination. This would 
enable the Coast Guard to affirm that vessel upkeep is adequate for 
safe operation.
    Alternate Enhanced Surveys. To allow companies flexibility and 
credit for existing in-house survey programs, tankships not required to 
meet Annex I of MARPOL 73/78 and all tank barges would have the option 
of meeting an equivalent standard. This provision is proposed in 
Sec. 157.430(b) and would allow companies with established in-house 
survey programs to simply upgrade them slightly and include oversight 
provisions.
    The Coast Guard anticipates that many tank barge owners and small 
tankship owners already have preventive maintenance programs that 
include routine hull gaugings, pipe gaugings, and inspections beyond 
current Coast Guard requirements. These programs provide company 
management personnel with material condition documentation necessary 
for long-range company planning of vessel replacement or overhaul 
scheduling. Proposed Sec. 157.430(b) would permit the company to follow 
its own program rather than start an entirely new process if the 
company can document that the present survey process is comparable in 
scope and recordkeeping to the IMO requirements. In addition, this 
section would require oversight of these programs to ensure that the 
vessel is adequately surveyed until it is phased out of service. Review 
of the gauging and inspection analysis would provide clear assessment 
of the vessel's structural soundness. The enhanced survey or preventive 
maintenance program reports would be required to be retained on board 
or made available within 24 hours to enable Coast Guard personnel to 
readily assess the vessel's suitability for service and also to assist 
in any emergency cargo transfer operations or emergency repairs.
    Vital Systems Surveys. While an enhanced survey reduces the risk of 
both catastrophic and local hull failure, it does not directly address 
risk of equipment failure or the risk of a fire or an explosion. 
Figures 3 through 6 indicate certain mechanical or equipment failures 
which may contribute to or cause these types of accidents. The Coast 
Guard researched the present inspection and regulatory requirements in 
effect for each system. Many of these systems are inspected annually by 
either flag or port administrations. However, while 33 CFR 164.25 
requires some tests and inspections, it does not detail some of the 
systems unique to tank vessels. While most companies already have 
routine equipment maintenance and inspection programs, several systems 
are overlooked or not included in these programs.
    In Sec. 157.435, the Coast Guard is proposing more frequent surveys 
of systems deemed vital to the safe transfer of cargo, fire and 
explosion risk reduction, and maintaining navigational control. To 
ensure these systems get the maintenance they need to remain safe, 
these inspections would be conducted by vessel personnel, company 
personnel, or company designated representatives that are knowledgeable 
of the equipment's safe operating parameters and that have the 
authority, capability, and responsibility to initiate corrective action 
when equipment is not functioning properly. Because tank barge systems 
require similar vigilance to ensure they remain safe, tank barge 
owners, masters, or operators would be included in this requirement and 
would have a responsibility to ensure the barge systems outlined in 
proposed Sec. 157.435 are surveyed by the appropriate personnel.
    Those systems related to vessel control, such as steering and 
navigational equipment, are presently required to be tested and 
inspected as specified in 33 CFR part 164 if the vessel is 1,600 GT or 
more. For towing vessels, the Coast Guard recently proposed similar 
control and navigational equipment checks. However, the inspection of 
the emergency towing equipment required in the IFR published December 
22, 1993 (58 FR 67988), is not covered in 33 CFR part 164. This 
emergency towing equipment is generally located on the vessel's deck 
and is required to be rigged for ready use. This towing equipment along 
with mooring lines and similar equipment are included as a vital system 
survey because of their exposure to prolonged adverse environmental 
conditions and their infrequent use. The Coast Guard solicits comments 
on these vital systems survey requirements. The Coast Guard 
specifically requests comment on whether additional systems should be 
surveyed to prevent equipment failure, which could lead to an oil 
spill, fire, or an explosion during cargo transfer operations, and 
whether specific emergency systems should be inspected more frequently 
than proposed or required.
    This proposal also would require the inspection findings to be 
logged in the Oil Record Book required by 33 CFR 151, in the vessel's 
log, or other similar onboard documentation to ensure that the master 
or operator is aware of the condition of these vital systems.

[[Page 55917]]

    No reporting requirements are proposed in Sec. 157.435; however, 
there are existing port specific reporting requirements or port entry 
restrictions that would remain in effect if this proposal became a 
final rule. The Coast Guard solicits comments on reporting requirements 
for the failure of specific components within the proposed vital 
systems.

5. Navigation and Maneuverability

    Improved navigation equipment and maneuvering systems would 
mitigate the risk of a collision, allision, or grounding attributable 
to lack of knowledge or reliance on incomplete or incorrect data. These 
two components within Figure 5 and 6 can be effectively addressed in 
various ways. Present regulations reflect highly technical navigation 
equipment requirements for tank vessels in 33 CFR part 164. This 
navigation equipment is being improved almost daily as computing 
systems and programming capabilities increase. Human error in reading 
the equipment or interpreting the data is also addressed within present 
requirements through radar operator endorsement requirements and other 
licensing requirements. The risk of an accident due to navigation 
equipment failure is also mitigated by the reporting requirements of 33 
CFR parts 160 (Ports and Waterways Safety) and 164 (Navigation). 
Maneuvering systems are addressed in present requirements for 
information about the vessel's maneuvering characteristics and 
reliability of the vessel's control systems.
    Autopilot Alarm. One comment stated that vessels should be equipped 
with an alarm that sounds when the helm is turned more than 5 deg. from 
amidships while the autopilot is engaged.
    The Coast Guard agrees with this practical and simple alarm 
requirement and in Sec. 157.440(a) is proposing a requirement for an 
additional alarm on all tankships with installed autopilot equipment. 
As recommended by TSAC, a tank barge owner or operator would be 
required to ensure that the towing vessel has a means to indicate to 
the towing vessel operator that the autopilot is engaged and manual 
rudder commands would not be effective unless the autopilot is shut 
off. Because a towing vessel wheelhouse is generally arranged for a 
single operator and the autopilot system is simplistic, a physical 
indicator to remind the master or operator that the autopilot is 
engaged would serve as adequate warning. On tankships, there are 
multiple watchstanders, frequent duty rotations, and complex autopilot 
systems that make it easier to lose track of the autopilot status. An 
alarm requirement on a tankship would ensure both the officer in charge 
of a navigational watch and the helmsman are aware of the autopilot 
status.
    Accident data indicates that there have been incidents when bridge 
crew personnel were unaware of the autopilot status and attempted to 
manually steer the vessel while the autopilot was engaged. In some 
instances their actions did not result in the desired change to the 
ship's heading or rudder angle due to the autopilot settings. The 
requirements proposed under Sec. 157.440 would be in addition to 
requirements in 33 CFR 164.13 which restrict the use of an autopilot on 
tank vessels of 1,600 GT or more in certain areas and under certain 
conditions. These two requirements would not conflict because 33 CFR 
part 164 restricts the use of the autopilot, while this proposal would 
alert the tankship officer in charge of a navigational watch and the 
helmsman if the helm is turned manually while the autopilot is engaged. 
The Coast Guard is soliciting comments on the inclusion of a 
requirement for primary towing vessels to have a restriction on the use 
of the autopilot similar to 33 CFR 164.13(d).
    Maneuvering Performance Capability. Proposed Sec. 157.445 addresses 
both the lack of knowledge component and the use of incorrect or 
incomplete information component in Figure 5. Maneuvering performance 
capability is directly related to the vessel's design and can easily be 
established. The standards for ship maneuverability outlined in IMO 
Resolution A.751(18) use conventional trial maneuvers to evaluate vital 
maneuverability characteristics. IMO has deliberated ship maneuvering 
issues since 1968. Resolution A.601(15), entitled ``Provision and 
Display of Maneuvering Information On Board Ships,'' was adopted in 
1987. Resolution A.751(18) was adopted in November 1993, and is based 
on the premise that vessel maneuvering characteristics can be assessed 
from the results of typical sea trials. It differs from the present 
posting requirements of 33 CFR part 164 in two fundamental ways: (1) It 
scales maneuvering test results against minimum criteria; and (2) it 
requires zigzag maneuvers to establish first and second overshoot 
angles.
    This performance standard serves to highlight those vessels with 
poor control capabilities due to design, or vessels that experience 
dynamic instability during some maneuvers. Under proposed 
Sec. 157.445(b), the owner, master, or operator must inform the COTP if 
the vessel fails to meet the IMO minimum criteria in any of the seven 
test areas. This provides the port state a guideline for recognizing 
the capabilities of approaching vessels and for taking appropriate 
action to reduce the risk of a grounding, allision, or collision. 
Providing advance notice to the Captain of the Port (COTP) that a 
vessel does not meet this performance standard mitigates the external 
factor component of Figure 5.
    The Coast Guard also recognizes the twofold potential for these 
test results to assist a pilot: (1) They provide overshoot angle 
information; and (2) they provide the maneuvering information in 
relationship to the ship's length. This type of information is not 
contained within IMO's Resolution A.601(15) maneuvering wheelhouse 
poster nor in the existing 33 CFR part 164 wheelhouse maneuvering 
characteristic requirement. Posting of the test results of this 
performance standard would provide pilots with nondimensional 
maneuvering information. In addition, a thorough knowledge of this 
performance standard and its development would enable the pilot to 
compare the test results among vessels. It provides a benchmark for 
quantifying how well the vessel can be expected to respond under 
general conditions.
    The Coast Guard has considered the applicability of these 
performance standards. The IMO resolution applies only to vessels of 
100 meters or more in length constructed on or after July 1, 1994. The 
Coast Guard proposes to apply these requirements to all tankships of 
5,000 GT or more that do not have double hulls. The IMO performance 
criteria was based on a study of 600 existing vessel designs and 
reflects simple, practical changes to current ship maneuverability 
trials. For those vessels which do not meet this standard, the proposed 
regulation does not bar them from port entry. Proposed Sec. 157.445(b) 
would allow vessels which do not meet the standard to continue port 
entry; however, a vessel would be required to comply with a mandatory 
reporting requirement to ensure that the COTP is alerted to the 
inferior maneuvering performance of the vessel.
    The Coast Guard recognizes that vessel owners and operators would 
require adequate time to perform the maneuverability tests required by 
this proposed requirement; therefore, under proposed Sec. 157.445(a), 
the Coast Guard intends to delay the implementation of this proposed 
measure until 1 year after the final rule is published in the Federal 
Register.

[[Page 55918]]

    Maneuvering and Vessel Status Information. Section 157.450 proposes 
to incorporate by reference an IMO resolution with three specific 
requirements: (1) standardizing the presentation of the maneuvering 
information required by 33 CFR part 164; (2) requiring the use of a 
pilot card; and (3) requiring a maneuvering booklet to be available to 
the master on board the vessel. The maneuvering poster required by this 
resolution incorporates all of the information that is required to be 
displayed by a vessel of 1,600 GT or more under 33 CFR part 164. This 
proposed requirement would ensure that every tankship presents this 
maneuvering data in the same format so the pilot can quickly assess the 
maneuvering characteristics of the vessel. The pilot card provides a 
``snapshot'' of the vessel's current equipment status and maneuvering 
information unique to the transit. The maneuvering booklet gives 
detailed information on the specific maneuvering capabilities at 
various drafts and in various hydrodynamic situations. These details, 
along with squat characteristics, are essential for difficult transits 
through constricted channels and for damage control situations in the 
event of a marine casualty.
    All three of these requirements have been recommended by the Coast 
Guard since 1989 through NVIC 7-89, ``Maneuvering Information.'' Use of 
standardized forms to help prevent omission of important information is 
a common theme within bridge resource management philosophy. The Coast 
Guard also solicits comments on whether the pilot card should have 
additional information.
    Minimum Under-keel Clearance. Three comments favored the 
implementation of minimum under-keel clearance requirements to prevent 
groundings. The Coast Guard agrees and in Sec. 157.455 is proposing 
regulations which would establish a minimum under-keel clearance 
requirement for all tank vessels departing or entering a port. This 
proposed regulation is intended for both tankships and tank barges. The 
tank barge company would be required to ensure the tank barge meets 
this minimum under-keel clearance requirement either through 
establishing and enforcing company policy, through a contractual 
agreement with the towing vessel company, through hiring practices, or 
through direct company oversight of the tank barge's under-keel 
clearance calculations prior to port entry or departing port.
    This requirement has been suggested in several forms over the past 
10 years. The Coast Guard, with the aid of the Navigation Safety 
Advisory Council (NAVSAC), considered a draft for similar requirements 
in 1991. After much debate, it decided not to pursue a federally-
mandated clearance requirement. The difference between the current 
proposal and past proposals is fundamental. Past proposals considered 
``real-time'' or actual under-keel depth and minimum under-keel depth 
throughout a transit. Problems with this type of requirement were 
substantial. The accuracy of the onboard depth sounder, the number of 
depth sounders and their hull placement, and the inconsistencies 
between published data and actual water depth, all complicated the task 
of regulating actual under-keel depth.
    The proposed requirements in Sec. 157.455 are based on anticipated 
under-keel depth and represent a fundamental passage planning 
requirement. IMO has provided guidance on general under-keel clearance 
considerations since 1978 in its ``Guide to the Planning and Conduct of 
Passages'' (SN/Circ. 92, 23 October 1978). As a passage planning 
requirement, this proposal would reduce human error by ensuring the 
hazard components (shown in Figures 5 and 6) related to failure to do a 
task, failure to correctly perform a task, incomplete or incorrect 
information, and lack of knowledge or training are addressed on those 
tank vessels presenting a higher oil spill risk, due to design, if a 
grounding occurs. Conscientious operators already carefully calculate 
the deepest draft of the vessel and then review the intended route to 
ensure there is adequate depth underneath the keel. Several companies 
already have policies dictating this planning requirement and several 
U.S. ports, such as the ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles, already 
have established guidance for minimum under-keel clearances. NAVSAC 
recommended that an adequate depth for transit determination be made by 
a joint agreement between the local Captain of the Port (COTP) and the 
port and harbor safety authority or association or other similar group. 
This recommendation would be appropriate if the safe navigation of a 
particular port indicates that it is necessary to establish permanent 
under-keel clearance requirements. The Coast Guard recognizes that some 
local COTP and port and harbor safety authorities presently have or may 
wish to establish clearance requirements. This proposal would not 
preempt present or future local standards. The proposal establishes an 
anticipated minimum under-keel clearance of at least .5 meters (2 feet) 
for all ports. If a local standard is less than the proposed .5 meter 
clearance, the proposed notification requirement enables the COTP to 
positively control the local policy. It is anticipated that a local 
under-keel clearance requirement that is more stringent than the .5 
meter clearance would be enforced through a joint COTP and harbor 
safety authority agreement. This proposed clearance reflects general 
industry standards and provides an added cushion of safety for vessels 
while operating in areas where charted depths may not have been updated 
by surveying agencies for sometime. Tank vessels fitted with double 
bottoms would be exempt from this under-keep clearance requirement 
because within the risk framework developed for this rulemaking, the 
double bottoms provide protection from oil spills that may be caused by 
this type of accidental or non-emergency intentional grounding.
    A vessel's log or similar onboard documentation should indicate 
that the master or operator has considered the factors that may affect 
a vessel's draft and has reviewed the appropriate scaled charts, tide 
tables, and other applicable publications to calculate the anticipated 
controlling depth. Charts and publications may contain conflicting 
water depth information. Some of these variances are due to different 
survey periods, survey techniques, or recording purposes. The most 
conservative depth should be used to calculate the anticipated depth.
    This preventive measure would require all affected vessels to 
carefully plan port transits. Grounding would not indicate a violation 
of the requirements in proposed Sec. 157.455 if the owner, master, or 
operator has properly logged or documented the proposed planning 
requirements and can recreate the calculations done prior to port entry 
or departure. Satisfying the planning requirements, however, does not 
relieve the owner, master, or operator of ensuring that other 
navigational requirements and practices are followed.
    Intentional grounding during a transit, unless done to reduce the 
risk of a collision or allision, or during a similar type of emergency, 
would violate the regulation if done with without the express approval 
of the COTP. This proposed restriction on intentional grounding is not 
intended to unconditionally prohibit this practice rather, it focuses 
on ensuring that the local COTP understands the vessel's operation and 
agrees to the practice. In areas where port bottom conditions are 

[[Page 55919]]
known and do not pose a threat to the integrity of the hull, approval 
for certain vessels to load cargo by intentionally grounding would be 
acceptable. An anticipated caveat to a vessel being allowed to 
routinely ground for loading operations is a specific shell plate and 
weld condition survey or some other type of structural review provision 
to ensure the vessel remains structurally fit for the additional 
loading stresses.
    Pilotage Passage Plans. One comment recommended that the Coast 
Guard require pilot passage plans. This would require the pilot to 
prepare a written passage plan prior to boarding a vessel, provide 
copies of the plan to the bridge team, and discuss the plan with the 
bridge team prior to beginning the passage. Guidance on this issue has 
been developed by IMO and is entitled, ``Guide to the Planning and 
Conduct of Passages'' (SN/Circ. 92, 23 October 1978).
    Although many pilots already prepare plans for passage through a 
port, the vessel's crew also needs to actively communicate with the 
pilot prior to a port transit. This proposed rulemaking addresses only 
the vessel's responsibility to accurately inform the pilot of the 
vessel's status and to monitor the pilot during a transit by 
incorporation of pilot cards and bridge resource management training. 
The Coast Guard and IMO are undertaking a separate initiative to 
address the pilot's responsibilities to the vessel.
    Navigation Equipment. Several comments stressed the need for 
improved navigation equipment and suggested requiring state-of-the-art 
navigation equipment such as a Global Positioning System (GPS) Receiver 
and collision avoidance radar. Other suggestions included electronic 
charts, advanced sonar systems and a speed log.
    Within both the international community and among U.S. vessel 
operators, a significant amount of discussion has centered on the value 
of navigational information versus the training of navigators. While 
equipment with additional capabilities is extremely useful, 
navigational safety also depends on the officer using this information. 
The Coast Guard has determined that the present automatic radar 
plotting aid (ARPA) requirements and the electronic positioning device 
required in 33 CFR part 164 set an adequate minimum standard. The 
proposed bridge resource management training would give the officers 
responsible for vessel navigation the tools they need to interpret and 
use all the information gathering systems at their disposal. The Coast 
Guard is considering future proposals for Electronic Chart Display and 
Information System (ECDIS) or differential GPS (DGPS) capabilities on 
vessels. While ECDIS may indicate the ship's actual position on an 
electronically generated chart, any requirement for electronic 
positioning devices is premature until standards for equipment have 
been developed and DGPS signals can provide an accurate, high integrity 
signal throughout the United States. However, owners purchasing new 
units should consider a GPS unit capable of receiving a DGPS signal or 
interfacing with a differential receiver.
    VEssel Traffic Service Systems. Several comments stated that the 
Coast Guard needs to develop stronger rules for Vessel Traffic Service 
Systems (VTS). Three comments stated that the Coast Guard should 
require a vessel's mandatory participation in a harbor's active VTS. 
Other comments stated that more ports were in need of VTS. One comment 
stated that the VTS existing in Valdez, AK, San Francisco, CA, New 
Orleans, LA, and New York, NY, have deficiencies including inadequate 
funding, lack of maintenance and poor training. Most comments stated 
that VTS are an obvious measure to reduce oil pollution which should be 
improved and extended to more ports.
    Section 4107(b)(1)(B) of OPA requires the Secretary to study the 
need for new, expanded or improved VTS. The 1991 Port Needs Study 
(Vessel Traffic Service Benefits) documents the benefits and costs of 
Coast Guard VTS in 23 selected ports on the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific 
coasts. The study employs a comprehensive cost-benefit model that 
considers the far-reaching consequences of marine accidents based on 
navigational risk. The results are being used by the Coast Guard to 
make capital investment decisions for the entire VTS program. One 
change is the establishment of requirements and procedures which 
simplify previous VTS regulations and mandate participation in all VTS 
(59 FR 36316; July 15, 1994). Other VTS developments are being proposed 
in separate documents and are not within the ambit of this rulemaking.
    Voyage Data Recorder (Black Box). Another comment suggested 
installation of a comprehensive event recorder (black box) to allow 
investigators to reconstruct the events leading to a near-miss or 
marine casualty.
    As indicated in Figures 3 through 6, a black box would not directly 
reduce the risk of an accident. Present regulations require recording 
capabilities on depth sounding devices and logging requirements for 
various other navigation indicators. This information has been used in 
the past to reconstruct accident events. A comprehensive recording 
system such as a black box could improve investigation quality and 
reduce the time needed to reconstruct accident events. Additionally, it 
might be a factor in reducing the risk of future casualties if used as 
a management oversight tool to heighten management's awareness of 
vessel operations. In addition, use of the black box could provide 
information on near-misses which could be used to assess regulatory 
effectiveness and pinpoint potential areas of traffic or operational 
concern.
    Other types of recorders that include active warning systems 
(linked into existing VTS or capable of alarming a vessel automatically 
in a potential collision situation) are in use on some offshore oil 
platforms. These early warning systems work in conjunction with DGPS 
and ECDIS. Because of their dependence on DGPS and ECDIS, the Coast 
Guard believes that it is premature to require active warning systems. 
While voyage data recorders and early warning systems are both 
technologically feasible, they are costly. A general requirement for an 
automatic, tamper proof voyage recording system that would record 
voice, radar, position information, engine, and course data would 
impose significant costs. This SNPRM solicits comments on a voyage data 
recorder requirement, inclusion of an early warning capability in a 
recording device, and recommended provisions for near miss data 
collection.

Escort Vessels

    Several comments pointed out the value of escort vessels. One 
comment also recommended requiring bow thrusters for tankers without 
tug escorts. The escort vessel issue is being addressed in a separate 
regulatory project. This proposed rule considers escorts as a possible 
alternative when the vessel does not meet certain maneuverability 
performance standards. The Coast Guard has determined that the proposed 
requirements for emergency steering capabilities combined with 
maneuvering performance standards would reduce the risk of a collision, 
allision, or grounding due to poor maneuverability and mitigates some 
of the equipment failure components in Figure 5. Comments on possible 
requirements for bow thrusters are solicited in this proposed 
rulemaking.

Routing Restrictions.

    Several comments suggested various route restrictions to increase 
safety. 

[[Page 55920]]
Four comments recommended more stringent pilotage requirements. Five 
comments recommended limitation of vessel movement. Two other comments 
recommended voluntary routing. One comment recommended mandatory speed 
limits. One comment suggested that the Coast Guard identify those ports 
with rocky bottoms and prohibit entry by tankers without double 
bottoms. Such provisions directly correlate with the risks of 
structural failure (Figure 3) from impact.
    Although the Coast Guard recognizes that groundings and collisions 
could be reduced through routing restrictions, it does not have the 
authority at this time to enforce mandatory routing restrictions or 
exclusionary transit zones on foreign vessels outside of U.S. navigable 
waters. At the sixty-fifth session of the Marine Safety Committee 
(MSC), in May of 1995, the Committee adopted amendments to the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, and its 
Protocol of 1978, which would permit the establishment of mandatory 
routing measures through IMO. This MSC resolution, MSC 46(65), becomes 
effective January 1, 1997.
    Present routing practices off the coast of California are voluntary 
and were developed after extensive research. Diverse weather patterns, 
vessel traffic, marine life considerations, and other factors pose 
safety problems in some geographic areas. Because of the unique nature 
of each port and offshore area, the Coast Guard has traditionally left 
speed limit, safety zone and other restrictions to the local COTP. As 
required by section 4111(b) of OPA 90, the Coast Guard is currently 
studying tanker routing and solicits comments on establishing routing 
restriction requirements.

6. Additional Operational Requirements for Tank Barges

    Several comments suggested improvements to towing vessels. One 
comment stated that the Coast Guard should require navigation equipment 
on towing vessels. Another comment stated that independent emergency 
steering capability should be required on towing vessels. One comment 
recommended restrictions on tandem towing when loaded, requiring twin 
screw tugs, and requiring towing vessel horsepower to barge deadweight 
ratios. One comment recommended that the Navigational Safety 
requirements of 33 CFR part 164 be extended to towing vessels. One 
comment suggested two independent propulsion systems.
    The Coast Guard has issued several rulemakings affecting the entire 
commercial towing industry. The recent proposed rulemaking entitled 
``Navigation Safety Equipment for Towing Vessels'' (60 FR XXXX) 
contains several of the requirements mentioned above. It proposes 
requirements for vessels engaged in towing that are 8 meters or more in 
length. These requirements include certain navigational equipment, such 
as radar; searchlights; and electronic position fixing devices, 
depending on the vessel's area of operation; general navigation safety 
requirements; and towline inspections for vessels engaged in towing 
astern. Further requirements on licensing for towing vessel operators 
also may be proposed.
    Emergency Steering Capability. In Sec. 157.460(a), the Coast Guard 
is proposing that the owner or operator of a tank barge would be 
responsible for ensuring the primary towing vessel has either twin 
screws with independent power or a backup steering system. Twin 
propulsion designs with separate engine controls, dual shafts, and 
propellers certainly would meet the intent of this requirement and are 
allowed under this proposal. To reduce the impact of this regulation 
and to allow vessel owners time to schedule shipyard facilities, the 
Coast Guard proposes a 1-year delayed implementation of this 
requirement.
    This requirement was proposed after review of the risks of 
equipment failure and loss of steering as shown in Figures 5 and 6. 
Loss of steering for tankships is addressed by 33 CFR 164.39, 46 CFR 
58.25, and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 
1974, and its Protocol of 1978, with amendments, Chapter II-1, Part C, 
regulation 29. Therefore, this SNPRM does not propose additional 
steering requirements for tankships.
    Fendering Systems. The qualitative evaluation of the structural 
failure hazard (Figure 3) revealed that structural fractures due to the 
stress on local hull areas of a tank barge, where a towing vessel or a 
pier routinely comes in contact with the barge, have not been addressed 
and could contribute to the cause of some oil spills. While this type 
of fracturing may be identified by the enhanced survey requirements 
proposed in Sec. 157.430 of this SNPRM, a more fundamental and cost 
effective solution is adequate fendering. Because fendering on a barge 
would be very costly, would decrease structure accessibility under the 
fendering system, and may increase the rate of local structural 
deterioration surrounding the fendering system, the Coast Guard is 
proposing that the owner or operator of a tank barge would be 
responsible for ensuring the primary towing vessel and any other assist 
or fleeting towing vessels have adequate fendering systems. This 
proposal would require vessel owners and operators to ensure towing 
vessel fendering systems are assessed through management policy, on-
site inspection or oversight, contractual arrangements, or hiring 
practices as an important protective measure for their barge's 
structural integrity. Fleeting and assist towing vessels are included 
in this proposal because during docking operations, the forces they 
exert on the barge hull also contribute to the fracture problem. 
Although there are no international or domestic guidelines for 
appropriate fender technical specifications, Sec. 157.460(b) proposes a 
performance guidelines for preventing metal to metal contact of the 
towing vessel and the tank barge.

7. Other Operational Measures

    Many of the comments proposed improvements through other 
operational measures, including planning improvements. Two comments 
recommended cargo loading and casualty planning. The comments stated 
that the risk of pollution could be reduced significantly through a 
strategic cargo loading plan which included criteria for loading a 
partial cargo or discharging at several ports. For example, if cargo is 
retained after discharging at the first port of call, cargo can be 
retained in center tanks instead of wing tanks. One comment stated that 
effective casualty planning would reduce the likelihood of a pollution 
incident; these plans are not currently required.
    Hydrostatic balanced loading minimizes the accidental oil outflow 
by strategically loading cargo tanks to take advantage of the 
hydrostatic balance between the cargo and sea water. This concept is 
presently being studied and will be considered in the Existing Vessel 
Structural Measures rulemaking. Casualty planning requirements are 
addressed in ``Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plans'' (59 FR 51332; 
October 7, 1994).
    Three comments were received regarding emergency transfer systems 
(ETS). Two of these comments supported the implementation of ETS while 
one comment stated that ETS was unproven and not likely to prevent 
pollution. These systems generally require additional cargo piping and 
pump refit or installation. It should also be noted that the Coast 
Guard has completed a report to Congress entitled, ``The Feasibility of 
Using Segregated Ballast Tanks (SBT) for Emergency 

[[Page 55921]]
Transfer of Cargo and Storage of Recovered Oil,'' 1995. In this study, 
it was found that in the event of a vessel casualty, such as a 
collision or grounding, there are often fundamental changes in the 
vessel's stability condition which make it potentially unsafe and 
inadvisable to use SBT for emergency transfer of cargo. The regulatory 
assessment study for the third portion of this project will address 
these systems and any special considerations in their use.
    Three comments recommended that wing tanks be kept empty. One 
stated that empty wing tanks would reduce the likelihood of oil outflow 
in collisions by 100 percent and in groundings by at least 50 percent, 
compared to estimates of 30 percent and 15 percent provided in the 
Existing Tank Vessels NPRM. This comment specifically suggested that 
the wing tanks remain empty rather than ballasted with water or other 
non-petroleum cargo. Significant structural refit to reinforce 
bulkheads between empty wing tanks and cargo tanks, possible piping 
refit, and substantial stability reassessment may be required. The 
Coast Guard is soliciting comments on the economic and technical 
feasibility of this proposal.
    One comment recommended emergency retrieval equipment or emergency 
towing pendants similar to those provided for in Washington State 
regulations. Four comments stated that tow wire maintenance and 
inspection should be required. An interim final rule (IFR) requiring 
emergency towing equipment was published in the Federal Register on 
December 22, 1993, entitled, ``Discharge Removal Equipment for Vessels 
Carrying Oil'' (58 FR 67988). This required the majority of existing 
tank vessels to have an emergency towing wire meeting an IMO standard. 
This IMO standard has been revised to incorporate a requirement that 
the equipment can be deployed automatically and by a limited number of 
crew. The Coast Guard supported these changes at IMO and intends to 
implement these new requirements in a future rulemaking. In addition, 
an NPRM entitled, ``Navigation Safety Equipment for Towing Vessels'' 
published elsewhere in this issue of the Federal Register proposes 
minimum tow wire standards and inspection requirements.

Amendments to 46 CFR Part 31

    To ensure cross reference to the proposed enhanced survey 
requirements, tables (a) and (b) in 46 CFR 31.10-21 would be revised to 
direct individuals using 46 CFR part 31 to Sec. 157.430(a); however, it 
does not change existing drydock requirements.

Amendment to 46 CFR Part 35

    To ensure cross reference to part 157, Sec. 35.01-40(c) of title 46 
of the CFR is revised to refer individuals using 46 CFR part 35 to the 
applicable pollution prevention requirements.

Incorporation by Reference

    The following material, in part, would be incorporated by reference 
in Sec. 157.02: IMO Assembly Resolution A.601(15) with Appendices 1-3, 
``Provision and Display of Manoeuvring Information on Board Ships''; 
IMO Assembly Resolution A.744(18) Annex B, ``Guidelines on the Enhanced 
Programme of Inspections During Surveys of Bulk Carriers and Oil 
Tankers''; IMO Assembly Resolution A.751(18) with Explanatory Notices 
in MSC/Circ.644, ``Interim Standards for Ship Manoeuvrability''; and 
Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) ``International Safety 
Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals'' (Second Edition). Copies of the 
materials are available for inspection where indicated under ADDRESSES. 
Copies of the material are available for the sources listed in 
Sec. 157.02.
    Before publishing a final rule, the Coast Guard will submit this 
material to the Director of the Federal Register for approval of the 
incorporation by reference.

Assessment

    This proposal is a significant regulatory action under section 3(f) 
of Executive Order 12866 and has been reviewed by the Office of 
Management and Budget under that order. It requires an assessment of 
potential costs and benefits under section 6(a)(3) of that order. It is 
significant under the regulatory policies and procedures of the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) (44 FR 11040; February 26, 1979).
    A draft Assessment has been prepared and is available in the docket 
for inspection or copying where indicated under ADDRESSES. The 
Assessment is summarized as follows.
    This rulemaking would apply to all existing vessels of 5,000 GT or 
more that do not have double hulls and that carry oil, including non-
petroleum oil, in bulk as cargo. An estimated 1359 existing tank 
vessels (190 U.S. tankships, 1080 foreign tankships, 86 U.S. tank 
barges and 3 foreign tank barges) currently operating on the U.S. 
navigable waters would be affected by this proposed rulemaking.

Industry Cost

    Some of the proposed operational measures require actions prior to 
each port transit or cargo transfer. As a result, vessels on coastwise 
or frequent transit schedules would incur higher expenses than vessels 
with a lower frequency of port calls. In contrast, the decrease in 
fleet size as vessels arrive at their phaseout date results in a 
downward trend in estimated annual costs from 1996 through 2014.
    First year compliance cost of this SNPRM would total about $183.8 
million. Annual costs of the proposal would trend downward, leveling 
out at $5.8 million during 2012-2014, the final years that the proposal 
would be in effect. The present value of this proposal is discounted at 
7 percent throughout this assessment in accordance with current Office 
of Management and Budget guidance to reflect the costs or benefits as 
they would have been in the year OPA 90 was enacted. The present value 
of this proposal, discounted at 7 percent, would total $443.6 million. 
U.S. tankships and tank barges would together account for an estimated 
one-third of total costs, and foreign tank vessels and barges would 
account for the remainder. A discussion of costs for each proposed 
requirement follows.
    The costs associated with the operational measures proposed in this 
SNPRM were developed based on vessel type, vessel use, and average 
vessel size. The cost analysis was applied to tankships and tank 
barges. Cost analysis calculations were based upon the following 
assumptions:
    (1) The proposed rulemaking would come into effect in 1996;
    (2) The recurring cost of this rulemaking would reflect the future 
vessel population decrease as required by the phaseout schedule in 
section 4115(a) of OPA 90 and shown in NVIC 10-94;
    (3) Both costs and benefits developed for this rulemaking are 
discounted at 7 percent back to 1990; and
    (4) All recurring costs are calculated for the year 2001.
    Emergency Lightering Equipment. Lightering equipment costs were 
based on the costs used in the Emergency Lightering Equipment and 
Advanced Notice of Arrival Requirements for Existing Tank Vessels 
Without Double Hulls Final Rule (59 FR 40186). This SNPRM proposes to 
expand the applicability of these emergency lightering requirements 
from oil tankers to all tank vessels. No U.S. tank vessels with 
exclusive non-petroleum oil cargo carriage authority are in operation. 

[[Page 55922]]
There would be no costs to U.S. tankships or tank barges. An estimated 
114 foreign tankships and 2 foreign tank barges carry non-petroleum 
cargo and may be affected by this change. The onetime costs for this 
proposed requirement for foreign tankships is estimated to be $456,000-
$1.1 million and for foreign tank barges would be $8,000-$19,000. Based 
on the average onetime cost for foreign tankships and tank barges, the 
present value of point-estimate costs for emergency lightering 
discounted at 7 percent to 1990 would be $530,000.
    Bridge Resource Management Training. The cost of proposed 
Sec. 157.415 would vary based on crew complement, crew salary, and 
estimated existing training programs. Based on typical crew compliments 
and accounting for personnel turnovers, seven tankship officers were 
assumed to require this training per tankship while six officers were 
used to estimate the cost to each tank barge. Crew daily wages were 
estimated based on American Institute of Merchant Shipping (AIMS) data, 
Tanker Advisory Report statistics, and American Waterways Operators 
(AWO) information. Although simulator training is not proposed as a 
required element of the BRM training course, past completion of an 
existing Coast Guard approved bridge resource management course would 
meet the proposed requirements. An estimated 60 percent of U.S. 
tankships and tank barge companies have already met this training 
requirement for their deck officers through commercial bridge 
management courses. An estimated 30 percent of the foreign vessels 
operating on routes within U.S. waters have trained their officers in 
management-type curriculum. The commercial bridge management course 
fees, approximately $5,000 per person (for a 5-day course), were used 
to estimate the cost of this proposal. The refresher training course 
offered by commercial vendors was estimated to be $500 per person.
    Total cost of the proposed BRM training requirement to industry for 
U.S. tankships would be $3.7 million. Foreign tankship total initial 
estimated cost would be $33.0 million. The U.S. tank barge total 
initial estimated cost would be $2.0 million. The total cost to the 
foreign tank barge industry would be $79,000. The present value of the 
costs of BRM training discounted at 7 percent to 1990 would total $35.1 
million.
    Vessel Specific Watch Training. The Coast Guard estimates the 
additional cost incurred by proposed Sec. 157.420 would be negligible. 
The cost attributed to time loss due to this training is negligible 
because this type of training falls within the scope of a master's 
present responsibility to ensure the crew is ``fit for duty.'' 
Recordkeeping requirements are addressed in the ``Collection of 
Information'' section.
    Minimum Rest Hour Requirement. To meet proposed Sec. 157.425, 
shoreside augmentation of the vessel crew to allow the vessel officers 
and crew members time to rest, is estimated to include one officer 
(assume average second mate salary) and two tankerman (assume average 
third mate salary) for each port visit on a tankship and one tankerman 
(assume average mate salary) for a tank barge. On U.S. vessels, one 
officer was not included because under 46 U.S.C. 8104(a), the master is 
presently required to meet this rest hour minimum. Shoreside 
augmentation requirements would vary based on the number of port visits 
per vessel correlated with an estimate on average visit length. Careful 
crew scheduling and time management could reduce the amount of 
augmentation required prior to departing port. It is estimated that 
U.S. tankships would require shoreside augmentation prior to 60 percent 
of their port departures, foreign tankships would require augmentation 
prior to 40 percent of their port departures, and tank barges (both 
foreign and U.S.) would require 80 percent augmentation to meet this 
proposal. If shoreside augmentation would be required prior to a port 
departure, a full day's wage for the estimated number of personnel 
required for augmentation was used. The cost for posting a notice to 
crew members on the rest hour minimums was not calculated because it is 
minimal.
    The 1-year cost for augmented shoreside manning on U.S. tankships 
would be $2.2 million and for foreign tankships would be $1.5 million. 
The 1-year cost for augmented shoreside manning on U.S. tank barges 
would be $991,000. The 1-year cost for augmented manning for foreign 
tank barges would be $6,500. By 2001, the total cost of this proposed 
requirement to the U.S. tankship industry would be $1.55 million, and 
to foreign tankships, $1.03 million. For the tank barge industry, this 
recurring augmentation cost would be $714,000 for the U.S. industry and 
slightly less than $4,000 for the foreign industry. The present value 
of the costs of rest hour minimums discounted at 7 percent to 1990 
would total $19.7 million.
    Enhanced Survey and Alternate for Enhanced Survey. Those tankships 
regulated by flag administrations signatory to MARPOL 73/78 and having 
adopted Regulation 13G of Annex I are presently required to complete 
the proposed enhanced survey of Sec. 157.430(a) starting in 1995. For 
this proposed rulemaking, no cost is associated to this group of 
vessels for the enhanced survey requirement. U.S. tankships presently 
are not required to meet Regulation 13G of Annex I of MARPOL 73/78. 
Under this proposal, they would be required to conduct enhanced surveys 
and incur the cost associated with these surveys.
    The cost of an enhanced survey for a vessel classed by a recognized 
classification society is estimated to be 25 percent higher than the 
cost of the special survey currently performed by the class societies. 
This cost includes the fee for the surveyor's time and required 
documentation. For a 21,000 GT tankship, the increased cost for a 
surveyor and a final report is estimated to be $11,000. Additional 
costs to the industry for this proposed requirement would include 
making approximately two tank interiors accessible to the surveyor 
through the use of scaffolding, ladders, lines, or other arrangements 
and additional gauging requirements (approximately 30 percent more than 
present classification society requirements). Some additional repair 
costs could also be incurred after a review of the survey is completed. 
Cost estimates do not include the cost to drydock the vessel, gas free 
it for inspection, or keep it in the drydock. These costs are already 
incurred with present drydocking requirements.
    It is estimated that 64 tankships are either not classed or are 
classed by classification societies not recognized by the Coast Guard. 
These vessels would incur additional costs associated with a design 
review and a condition survey for reclassification by a recognized 
society. Classification costs or enhanced survey costs for vessels 
already required to drydock, but never classed or not classed by a 
recognized classification society, would be $514,000.
    Tank barges are not required to meet Regulation 13G of Annex I of 
MARPOL 73/78. Proposed Sec. 157.430(b) allows tank barges and vessels 
smaller than the MARPOL cutoff to substitute comparable company 
programs for the enhanced survey requirements. Because the company 
program clause assumes the owner has an established survey program and 
would not need to conduct extensive additional repairs, the cost of 
these company programs would be less than the cost of a classification 
survey.
    The cost estimates associated with proposed Sec. 157.430 (a) and 
(b) were amortized to reflect a 12-month period. First year cost 
averages would be $14.9 

[[Page 55923]]
million for U.S. tankships; $23.0 million for foreign tankships; $2.3 
million for U.S. tank barges; and $80,000 for foreign tank barges. 
Because the cost estimates have been averaged and it has been assumed 
that the vessels affected by this rulemaking would be in service for at 
least two drydock enhanced surveys prior to their phaseout, recurring 
cost would be the same as the first year costs listed above. The Coast 
Guard recognizes this recurring cost estimate is conservative; however, 
as the fleet population diminishes the average cost of an enhanced 
survey may increase due to the age and possible repair requirements of 
the remaining tank vessels subjected to the survey. The present value 
of the costs of the enhanced survey discounted at 7 percent to 1990 
would total $67.38 million.
    Vital Systems Surveys. The cost of proposed Sec. 157.435 would vary 
based on port departure frequency, crew salary, and the estimated time 
required for each survey. A survey would be required before a tank 
vessel begins cargo transfer operations or prior to a vessel departing 
port. An estimate of port departures was calculated based on 1993 Coast 
Guard data and reflects an average departure frequency of 28 for U.S. 
tankships, 32 for U.S. tank barges, 6 for foreign tankships, and 7 for 
foreign tank barges. Three surveys were estimated for each port 
departure.
    Crew members affected by this proposed requirement would be senior 
personnel. For tank barge surveys, an average towing vessel master's 
wage was used for cost evaluation. For tankship surveys, an average 
chief mate's wage and a chief engineer's wage were used for cost 
evaluation. Survey time was estimated at 1 hour on a tankship (\1/2\ 
hour each for both the chief mate and the chief engineer) and 
approximately 48 minutes for the master of a primary towing vessel or a 
senior tank barge representative.
    The vital systems survey cost for U.S. tankships would be $660,000 
with a recurring cost (for year 2001) of $472,000. The cost to foreign 
tankships would be $465,000 with a recurring cost (for year 2001) of 
$322,000. The survey cost to U.S. tank barges would be $289,000 with a 
recurring cost (for year 2001) of $208,000. The survey cost to foreign 
tank barges would be $2,500 with a recurring cost (for year 2001) of 
$1,500. The present value of the costs of vital systems discounted at 7 
percent to 1990 would total $6.0 million.
    Autopilot Alarm or Indicator. The cost for the alarm or indicator 
proposed in Sec. 157.440 was calculated based on the assumption that 10 
percent of the U.S. tankships presently meet this requirement, none of 
the foreign tankships presently have this capability, and 3 towing 
vessels would require an indicator for every 2 tank barges affected by 
this rulemaking. It was also assumed that the tank barge company owned 
the towing vessel and would incur the cost of this requirement. The 
estimated installation cost of a visual and audible autopilot alarm is 
$5,000 on electronic tankship steering systems and the estimated 
autopilot indicator cost is $100. The cost attributed to the testing of 
this alarm would be negligible based on the short amount of time 
required to test the device and the preexisting requirement to do so 
under 33 CFR 164.25. This proposal would have a onetime estimated cost 
to U.S. tankships of $855,000; to foreign tankships, $5,400,000; to 
U.S. tank barges, $12,900; and to foreign tank barges, $500. The 
present value of autopilot alarm costs discounted at 7 percent to 1990 
would total $4.2 million.
    Maneuvering Performance Capability. To meet proposed Sec. 157.445, 
tankships would require additional maneuvering tests and also 
recalculation or confirmation of previous maneuvering characteristics 
presently required by 33 CFR 164.35(g). Additional tests are proposed 
primarily to evaluate overshoot angles and time to check yaw. Computer 
simulations of these performance tests would not be accepted. A cost of 
$18,500 was based on an independent subcontractor coming on board a 
tankship to conduct the tests and provide the documentation required. 
This estimate reflects industry cost for test preparation, equipment, 
personnel, transportation, vessel operational delay, data processing, 
and final report collation. It was assumed that the tests required to 
meet this performance standard proposal have not been completed by any 
of the tankships affected by this SNPRM. The total onetime cost to the 
U.S. tankship industry would be $3.5 million and the cost to the 
foreign tankship industry would be $20.0 million. The present value of 
maneuvering performance capability costs discounted at 7 percent to 
1990 would total $15.7 million.
    Maneuvering and Vessel Status Information. No additional 
maneuvering tests would be required for proposed Sec. 157.450, however, 
some recalculation of data from the original tests used to develop the 
wheelhouse poster of 33 CFR 164.35(g) may be required. To compile a 
maneuvering booklet, additional calculations and documentation also may 
be required. A cost estimate of $1,080 was developed for this proposal 
and reflects an average U.S. licensed naval architect fee for 4 hours 
spent to recalculate wheelhouse poster data and 16 hours spent to 
assemble the maneuvering booklet. Vessel population estimates indicated 
that 75 percent of both foreign and U.S. tankships presently meet the 
wheelhouse poster requirement and 20 percent presently meet the 
maneuvering booklet requirement. The cost attributed to the pilot card 
requirement would be negligible because the cost of the pilot cards 
themselves would be minimal while the time spent to complete them would 
be incorporated into the scope of an officer in charge of a 
navigational watch's normal duties.
    Proposed Sec. 157.450 has a onetime cost attributed to the 
wheelhouse poster and the maneuvering booklet. The estimated onetime 
cost of this proposal would be $142,000 for the 190 U.S. tankships and 
$805,000 for the 1,080 foreign tankships. The present value of 
maneuvering and vessel status information costs discounted at 7 percent 
to 1990 would total $631,000.
    Minimum Under-keel Clearance. The cost estimate for proposed 
Sec. 157.455 assumed that tankships presently entering or departing 
U.S. navigable waters operate with an under-keel clearance range of 
0.15 meters to 2.00 meters and an average anticipated under-keel 
clearance of 0.6 meters (2 feet). Present tank barge under-keel 
clearances were estimated to be much less than tankship averages. An 
estimate of the number of port entries and departures was made for each 
vessel type. Tank barges were estimated to be affected by this proposal 
during each port entry and each port departure. U.S. tankships were 
estimated to be affected by this proposal during each port entry and 
during 35 percent of the port departures. Foreign tankships were 
estimated to be affected by this proposal during each port entry and 
during 20 percent of the port departures.
    The cost of the proposal was estimated to be a 3 percent loss of 
cargo carrying capacity for each .3 meters needed to decrease the tank 
vessel's draft. An estimate of required draft decrease or cargo loss 
due to this proposal was made for each vessel type. It was estimated 
that 30 percent of the affected tank barge (10,000 GT average size) 
population would not lose cargo carrying capacity due to this proposal, 
50 percent of the population would lose 3 percent of their cargo 
carrying capacity, and 20 percent would lose 6 percent of their cargo 
carrying capacity. It was estimated that 75 percent of the affected 
U.S. tankship (33,300 GT average size) and foreign tankship (50,000 GT 
average size) population 

[[Page 55924]]
would not lose cargo carrying capacity due to this proposal, 20 percent 
of the tankship population would lose 3 percent of their cargo carrying 
capacity, and 5 percent of the tankship population would lose 6 percent 
of their cargo carrying capacity. The cost attributed to the proposed 
recording requirement would be negligible because the time spent 
completing the vessel log entry or other similar documentation would be 
incorporated into the scope of the officer of a navigational watch's 
normal duties.
    As a result of the reduced cargo capacity, the first year cost of 
proposed Sec. 157.455 for a U.S. tankship would be $18 million. Foreign 
tankship costs would be $35.1 million. U.S. tank barge costs would be 
$12.4 million and foreign tank barge costs would be $142,000. By 2001, 
the total cost of proposed Sec. 157.455 to the U.S. tankship industry 
would decrease to $13 million, and the cost to foreign tankships would 
decrease to $27.3 million. For the tank barge industry, the recurring 
cost of under-keel clearance would be $13.3 million for the U.S. 
industry and $142,000 for the foreign industry. The present value of 
the costs of under-keel clearance discounted at 7 percent to 1990 would 
total $292.6 million.
    Emergency Steering Capability. Proposed Sec. 157.460(a) applies to 
the primary towing vessels engaged in towing tank barges of 5,000 GT or 
more without a double hull. An estimated total of 134 towing vessels 
would be affected by this proposal. Of these vessels, research 
indicates 80 percent presently meet this proposed requirement. It was 
assumed that the towing vessels that do not meet this proposed 
requirement are owned by the tank barge company. The cost to 
reconfigure the towing vessel's steering gear would be $25,000 based on 
an independent subcontractor installing additional piping and tankage 
on an existing hydraulic steering system.
    The onetime emergency steering requirement cost would be $645,000 
for U.S. tank barge companies; and $25,000 for foreign tank barge 
owners or operators. The present value of emergency steering capability 
costs discounted at 7 percent to 1990 would total $446,000.
    Fendering System. Proposed Sec. 157.460(b) applies to the primary 
towing vessels and the fleeting or assist towing vessels engaged in 
maneuvering tank barges of 5,000 GT or more without double hulls. A 
total of 312 towing vessels would be affected by this proposal. Of 
these vessels, research indicates 80 percent presently have adequate 
fendering systems. It was assumed that those towing vessels that do not 
meet this proposed requirement are owned by the tank barge company or 
the tank barge company would realize a cost increase in the leasing of 
an adequately fendered towing vessel. The cost to add or reconfigure 
the towing vessel's fendering system would be $1,320 based on a towing 
vessel's personnel installing an additional 8 linear feet of commercial 
fenders during a routine maintenance period.
    Proposed Sec. 157.460(b) would have an estimated initial cost to 
U.S. tank barges of $79,500; and to foreign tank barges of $3,000. 
Recurring costs, reflecting the diminishment of the tank barge fleet by 
2001, would be $57,000 for U.S. tank barges and $2,000 for foreign tank 
barges. The present value of the cost of fendering systems discounted 
at 7 percent of 1990 would total $329,000.

Government Cost

    Federal Government cost would include Coast Guard personnel time 
and resources to review survey records and documentation required by 
this proposed SNPRM during annual tank vessel examinations (foreign 
vessels) or annual inspections (U.S. vessels). The length of time added 
to a typical examination or inspection would vary based on the type of 
service in which the vessel engages. The Coast Guard is estimating that 
these requirements would increase the time of examination or inspection 
by an average of 0.5 hours for any given requirement. The various 
requirements range from 0.25 hours to inspect log entries or records to 
8 hours to review documentation of an enhanced survey on a U.S. 
tankship or tank barge.
    Government costs attributable to implementation of this rule are 
based on twelve proposed requirements. The Coast Guard examination or 
inspection would evaluate relevant documentation on BRM training, 
vessel specific training, minimum rest hours, enhanced surveys, vital 
systems surveys, maneuvering performance capability information, 
maneuvering information, and minimum under-keel clearance. During an 
annual examination or inspection the Coast Guard inspector would also 
ensure the emergency lightening equipment, the autopilot alarm or 
indicator, the emergency steering gear and the fendering systems on the 
towing vessels meet the proposed requirements.
    The proposed maneuvering performance test requirement, specified in 
Sec. 157.445(b), instructs tankships that do not meet the IMO criteria 
to report their maneuvering capability to the COTP 24 hours prior to 
port entry. Requests of this nature are not anticipated to be frequent. 
For this cost estimate, 10 percent of the existing tankship population 
was assumed to require some deviation from the IMO criteria. To review 
a vessel request for port entry and determine appropriate operational 
restrictions would take Coast Guard personnel an average of 4 hours.
    Therefore, the government cost analysis assumes the increased 
annual inspection time would average 6.95 hours for U.S. tank vessels 
and 4.75 hours for foreign tank vessels. In addition, deviation 
requests from U.S. tankships for the proposed maneuvering performance 
standard would be 76 hours while requests from foreign tankships would 
average 432 hours. Based on a $35.00 per hour wage estimate for a Coast 
Guard inspector, the Coast Guard expects the 1,188 additional man-hours 
of inspection and deviation request evaluation time would cost $39,801 
annually.

Cost-Benefit Evaluation

    Costs. Cost estimates were based on the forecast 19-year life for 
this proposed rulemaking. For all proposed requirements, the 
undiscounted costs of compliance are projected to be $897.6 million. 
The present value of the costs of this proposed regulation discounted 
at 7 percent to 1990 would total $443.6 million.
    Benefits. Pollution mitigation benefits from the proposed 
operational measures would accrue mainly in areas around loading 
terminals, narrow channels, and in open waters during lightering 
operations.
    A review of casualty and spill data was conducted in an attempt to 
pinpoint past accident frequency as related to each proposed 
operational measures. However, the complex cumulative effect of human 
error and equipment failure made it difficult to quantify the benefits 
of each measure. For example, the grounding of the foreign tankship 
WORLD PRODIGY off Brenton Reef in Rhode Island Sound was caused by a 
combination of fatigue, poor bridge resource management, and 
insufficient passage planning (especially under-keel clearance) which 
lead to this 1989 oil spill. The major explosion aboard the U.S. 
tankship MT SURF CITY was caused by poor tank entry precautions and 
undetected bulkhead deterioration between a cargo tank and a ballast 
tank. Because of the interrelationship between the proposed 
requirements that focus on a reduction in human error along with the 
proposed requirements for improved equipment inspections and 
capabilities, the Coast 

[[Page 55925]]
Guard chose to quantify the benefits using a gross estimate of benefits 
for this SNPRM regulatory assessment.
    A preliminary estimate of the anticipated benefits and resultant 
cost-benefit for each measure was conducted and is described in detail 
within the regulatory assessment. This preliminary estimate included a 
review of certain tank vessel casualties from 1989 through 1994, the 
resultant oil spill or potential for an oil spill, vessel damage, and 
loss of life. Benefits were estimated for each proposed measure by 
reviewing the casualty report, analyzing each casualty's root causes, 
and estimating a percentage of the recorded or estimated spillage 
associated with each root cause. The actual and potential amounts of 
oil spilled were then broken down from these estimated root cause 
percentages and accredited to each of the proposed measures, if 
applicable.
    Using Figures 3 through 6 of this SNPRM, a risk effectiveness 
factor was developed that estimated the percentage of causal factors 
leading to an accident that would be eliminated if each proposed 
measure was established. A range of total anticipated benefits over the 
19-year span of this rulemaking was estimated for each proposed measure 
by annualizing the per-vessel benefits resulting from the actual and 
potential spill data, extrapolating this into a cumulative present 
value of oil spills avoided based on the number of vessels remaining in 
service each year, and multiplying this cumulation by the measure's 
effectiveness factor. The Coast Guard intends to include an estimate or 
qualitative discussion of the benefits of each proposed measure in the 
final rule. Relevant comments are requested on the methodology used for 
the preliminary benefit analysis as well as each measure's anticipated 
benefits and its economic feasibility.
    The gross estimate of benefits for this rulemaking was conducted 
and involved an assessment of casualty data over the past 20 years. The 
Coast Guard estimates that the proposed measures would avert at least 
one major spill of about 300,000 barrels over the next 19 years. This 
is equivalent to a spill resulting from a collision between two 70,000 
GT tankships, with cargo loss from at least two tanks on each tank 
vessel. Alternatively, this would be equivalent to a grounding that 
results in a complete loss of cargo from a small (21,000 GT) tankship.
    The monetary benefits of the proposed regulation would include the 
avoided costs of spill cleanup, third-party compensation (lost earnings 
to fishermen, etc.), and natural resource damages. Historically, 
casualty reports have either not addressed these avoided costs, or 
their results have been widely disputed. There are many reasons for 
this. For example, there are numerous factors affecting the possible 
impact associated with an oil spill, such as type of product, 
environment, time of year, location, and weather conditions. Therefore, 
the assessment of damage and associated costs were subjective and in 
some cases, even in large spills, they were never confirmed. 
Accordingly, the Coast Guard uses the unspilled oil quantity in barrels 
as the benefit value, discounted at 7 percent back to 1990. If the 
averted 300,000-barrel spill were to occur in 1996, when the final rule 
is scheduled to take effect, the discounted benefit would be the value 
of avoiding a 213,896 barrel spill in 1990. If the averted 300,000-
barrel spill were to occur in 2014, the discounted benefit would be the 
value of avoiding a 77,526 barrel spill in 1990.
    Cost-Benefit. The benefit of this proposed rule would range from 
the value of avoiding a 77,526 barrel spill in 1990 to the value of 
avoiding a 213,896 barrel spill in 1990, depending on when the averted 
spill is assumed to occur. The net present value of the cost of this 
proposed rulemaking would range from $2,075 to $5,700 per barrel of 
unspilled oil, when a mean present value of $3,900 per barrel of 
unspilled oil. This compares with, for example, $13,000 per barrel of 
unspilled oil for the ``Discharge Removal Equipment for Vessels 
Carrying Oil'' IFR (58 FR 67988); $12,500 per barrel of unspilled oil 
for the ``Vessel Response Plans'' IFR (58 FR 7376); $7,000 per barrel 
of unspilled oil for the ``Overfill Devices'' IFR (59 FR 53286); and 
$1,300 per barrel of unspilled oil for the ``Response Plans for Marine 
Transportation-Related Facilities'' IFR (58 FR 7330).

Small Entities

    Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.), the 
Coast Guard must consider whether this proposal, if adopted, will have 
a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities. ``Small entities,'' may include (1) small businesses and not-
for-profit organizations that are independently owned and operated and 
are not dominant in their fields and (2) governmental jurisdictions 
with populations of less than 50,000.
    This rulemaking considered small business impact for vessels 
privately held by independent companies with an estimated capital 
investment value of less than $500 million or companies that have less 
than 500 employees. State and local governments, which altogether own 
less than a dozen tank vessels, will not be significantly affected. 
Not-for-profit organizations do not engage in the transportation of oil 
in bulk by water.
    There are a number of companies meeting the definition of small 
business operating in each segment of industry (tankship, tank barge, 
and towing vessel). Of the 190 U.S. tankships affected by this proposed 
rulemaking, 16 are owned by 6 small businesses. Many of these company's 
tankships are over 30 years old, have less cargo carrying capacity than 
their competition, and are laid up due to market or company financial 
conditions. Six small businesses own or operate 32 of the affected U.S. 
tank barge population. No foreign small businesses own or operate 
foreign tank vessels that would be affected by this proposed 
rulemaking. Tank barge companies are required under this proposal to 
enlist towing vessels with certain capabilities and trained personnel. 
Indirectly, some towing vessel companies may also be affected by these 
proposed requirements; however, the Coast Guard has determined that 
most tank barge owners also own their towing vessels or regularly 
contract with a limited number of towing companies.
    An economic impact is unavoidable, as the statute clearly targets 
existing vessels of 5,000 GT or more than carry oil in bulk as cargo 
and that do not have double hulls. The present value of the total cost 
to the industry of this proposal discounted at 7 percent to 1990 would 
total $443.6 million. However, the Coast Guard has proposed several 
measures within this rulemaking to accommodate small business needs and 
provide flexibility to small entities affected by this rulemaking.
    The proposed training requirements include allowances for 
comparable company training courses and a 1-year compliance delay. In-
house training by smaller businesses would be accepted as long as the 
curriculum and demonstration of skill provisions could be met. Company 
programs are anticipated to cost a fraction of commercial training and 
should provide smaller businesses with a means to train personnel at a 
lower cost than the present commercial courses.
    Additionally, the proposed rulemaking acknowledges past course 
completion; thus, personnel would be given a longer time to meet this 
requirement if they have completed similar courses, either company-
sponsored or commercial, within 3 years of the effective date of the 
rule. Maritime schools and many commercial courses have been offering 
this type of curriculum since 1991. Allowing for the 

[[Page 55926]]
delayed compliance date and past course completion, the training course 
phase-in period would be 4 years. This longer phase-in period should 
assist smaller companies in setting up a suitable in-house or 
commercial course program. It also recognizes that a substantial number 
of merchant mariners in the industry are already trained. The 4-year 
phase-in is also intended to ease the competitive burden of obtaining 
commercial course slots, should entities choose to use commercial 
training facilities.
    Small business needs are accommodated in the proposed enhanced 
survey requirement by allowing companies owning tank barges or tank 
vessels less than 30,000 dwts to conduct their own surveys and to 
choose among various organizations for program oversight.
    To accommodate small businesses in the tank barge industry, the 
cost of reconfiguring a towing vessel owned by the tank barge company 
was minimized by requiring the proposed autopilot alarm to be an 
indicator; a simple sign placed on the wheel would suffice. This gives 
a comparable warning in the small confines of the one-man towing vessel 
wheelhouse as would an alarm for the larger, multiple-person, complex 
bridge of a tankship. The proposed emergency steering capability 
requirement accommodates a range of designs by allowing for either a 
secondary steering system or twin propulsion capability. This allows 
the majority of tank barge companies to continue using their vessels or 
the vessels they typically lease; however, it also ensures that the 
master or operator would have some maneuvering capability in an 
electrical, hydraulic or engine failure, which would be a benefit to 
all operators.
    Smaller tankship companies should have the capability to conduct 
the maneuvering performance standard tests of IMO Resolution A.751(18). 
While the assessment cost of this item is for a commercial company to 
conduct the maneuvering tests, this proposed rulemaking in no way 
prohibits a company from conducting the tests in-house. The guidelines 
and technical details of the tests are well documented and are within 
the capabilities of a licensed master or pilot. The equipment needed 
for these types of maneuvering tests, such as a DGPS, is available on 
the commercial market at low cost.
    The proposed operational measures would affect several small 
businesses within the maritime industry until 2015, a period of about 
19 years. Through the design of this proposal's measures as described 
in the preceding paragraphs, the Coast Guard believes that the 
flexibility in this proposed rulemaking balances the requirements on 
tank barges and tankships and provides equitable treatment of U.S. and 
foreign flag vessels.
    Therefore, the Coast Guard certifies under 5 U.S.C. 605(b) that 
this proposal, if adopted, will not have a significant economic impact 
on a substantial number of small entities. If, however, you think that 
your business or organization qualifies as a small entity and that this 
proposal will have a significant economic impact on your business or 
organization, please submit a comment (see ADDRESSES) explaining why 
you think it qualifies and in what way and to what degree this proposal 
will economically affect it.

Unfunded Mandate

    Under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (Pub. L. 104-4), the Coast 
Guard must consider whether this proposal, if adopted, will result in 
an annual expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, in the 
aggregate, or by the private sector, or $100 million (adjusted annually 
for inflation). That Act also requires (in Section 205) that the Coast 
Guard identify and consider a reasonable number of regulatory 
alternatives and from those alternatives select the least costly, most 
cost-effective, or least burdensome alternative that achieves the 
objective of the rule.
    The cost analysis completed for this SNPRM estimates first year 
compliance costs to be 183.8 million. Annual costs of the proposal 
would trend downward, leveling out at $5.8 million during 2012-2014, 
the final years that the proposal would be in effect. The only time 
this proposal would result in estimated costs of $100 million or more 
to either State, local, or tribal governments in the aggregate, or to 
the private sector would be in its first year of implementation. State, 
local, and tribal governments, which altogether own less than a dozen 
tank vessels, would account for less than 2 percent of the estimated 
first-year costs. Therefore, the private sector would be most impacted 
by first-year costs. The preliminary cost-benefit analysis done for 
this SNPRM addresses expected cost-effectiveness for each proposed 
measure. For those measures that were estimated to be the most costly, 
alternative requirements, extended implementation periods, or 
provisions for a COTP to determine appropriate implementation on a 
case-by-case basis were proposed in this SNPRM.
    If you think that your business or organization falls under the 
provisions of the Act and this proposal will have an annual impact on 
your business or organization that meets the parameters, please submit 
a comment (see ADDRESSES) explaining why you think it qualifies and in 
what way and to what degree this proposal will economically affect it.

Collection of Information

    Under the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reviews each proposed rule that 
contains a collection-of-information requirement to determine whether 
the practical value of the information is worth the burden imposed by 
its collection. Collection-of-information requirements include 
reporting, recordkeeping, notification, and other, similar 
requirements.
    This proposal contains collection-of-information requirements in 
the following sections: Secs. 157.415, 157.420, 157.425, 157.430, 
157.435, 157.445, 157.450, and 157.455. The following particulars 
apply:
    Dot No: 2115.
    Administration: U.S. Coast Guard.
    Title: Operational Measures to Reduce Oil Spills From Existing Tank 
Vessels Without Double Hulls.
    Need for Information: Without adequate operational measures on tank 
vessels, the potential for spills as a result of human error is greatly 
increased. This proposal requires the mariner to record, post, keep 
documentation or provide notification that is necessary for the safe 
operation of the vessel including: (1) Documentation for company 
management and the Coast Guard to ensure personnel are trained and 
systems are being surveyed both frequently and thoroughly; (2) 
information to ensure the crew is informed of rest hour requirements; 
(3) certain vessel specific maneuvering characteristics so that 
personnel navigating the vessel have a quick reference to critical 
information; (4) documentation of a vessel's command and control status 
to ensure a pilot receives accurate information prior to maneuvering 
evolutions. These requirements are consistent with good commercial 
practice and the dictates of good seamanship for safe navigation and 
maintenance of vital equipment. Additionally, a vessel owners, master, 
or operator would be required to notify the COTP if the vessel did not 
have certain maneuvering capabilities so that safe port entry 
provisions can be made.
    Proposed Use of Information: The primary use of this information 
would be for Coast Guard inspectors to determine if a vessel is in 
compliance or, in the case of a casualty, whether 

[[Page 55927]]
failure to meet these proposed regulations contributed to the casualty. 
The Coast Guard has no specific plan to collect this data for 
statistical analysis.
    Frequency of Response: Owners, masters, or operators of tank 
vessels subject to this proposed regulation would be required to 
record, post, keep documentation, or provide notification of the 
following: (1) Under Sec. 157.415(d), annual completion of bridge 
resource management training for each officer of the navigational 
watch; (2) under Sec. 157.420(d), completion of annual training by 
letter or vessel log entry, by each crew member assigned to a 
navigational or engineering watch; (3) under Sec. 157.425(b), permanent 
posting of the minimum rest hour requirement in crew lounge areas and 
work spaces; (4) under Sec. 157.430 (a) and (b), completion of an 
enhanced survey during each drydock examination (this information must 
also be provided to the Coast Guard upon its request); (5) under 
Sec. 157.435, by vessel log entry or similar means on board the vessel, 
completion of each required vital systems survey; (6) under 
Sec. 157.445(b), notification of a maneuvering capability that is less 
than the IMO criteria; (7) under Sec. 157.445(c), permanent posting of 
test results for maneuvering performance capability; (8) under 
Sec. 157.450, permanent posting of standardized IMO maneuvering 
information in the wheelhouse, completion of a pilot card before 
entering the port or place of destination and prior to departing port, 
and maintenance of an onboard maneuvering booklet; (9) under 
Sec. 157.455(a)(3), by vessel log entry or similar means on board the 
vessel, calculations of under-keel clearance before entering the port 
or place of destination and prior to departing port.
    Burden Estimate: 76,913 hours.
    Respondents: 1404.
    Average Burden Hours per Respondent: 55.
    The Coast Guard has submitted the requirements to OMB for review 
under section 3504(h) of the Paperwork Reduction Act. Persons 
submitting comments on the requirements should submit their comments 
both the OMB and to the Coast Guard as indicated under ADDRESSES.

Federalism

    The Coast Guard has analyzed this proposal under the principles and 
criteria contained in Executive Order 12612 and has determined that 
this proposal does not have sufficient federalism implications to 
warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

Environment

    The Coast Guard considered the environmental impact of this 
proposal and concluded that preparation of an Environmental Impact 
Statement is not necessary. An Environmental Assessment and a draft 
Finding of No Significant Impact are available in the docket for 
inspection or copying where indicated under ADDRESSES. The additional 
training, survey, and operational considerations required by this rule 
would enhance navigation safety and thereby reduce the likelihood of an 
oil spill or other environmental damage.

List of Subjects

33 CFR Part 157

    Cargo vessels, Oil pollution, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements.

46 CFR Part 31

    Cargo vessels, Marine safety, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements.

46 CFR Part 35

    Cargo vessels, Marine safety, Navigation (water), Occupational 
safety and health, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Seaman.
    For the reasons set out in the preamble, the Coast Guard proposes 
to amend 33 CFR part 157, 46 CFR part 31, and 46 CFR part 35 as 
follows:

PART 157--RULES FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 
RELATING TO TANK VESSELS CARRYING OIL IN BULK

    1. The authority citation for part 157 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 33 U.S.C. 1903; 46 U.S.C. 3703, 3703a (note); 49 CFR 
1.46. Subpart G also is issued under section 4115(b), Pub. L. 101-
380, 104 Stat. 520.

    2. In Sec. 157.01, paragraph (a)(2) is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 157.01  Applicability.

    (a) * * *
    (2) Any other vessel that enters or operates in the navigable 
waters of the United States, or that operates, conducts lightering 
under 46 U.S.C. 3715, or receives cargo from or transfers cargo to a 
deepwater port under 33 U.S.C. 1501 et seq., in the United States 
Exclusive Economic Zone, as defined in 33 U.S.C. 2701(8).
* * * * *
    3. Section 157.02 is added to read as follows:


Sec. 157.02  Incorporation by reference.

    (a) Certain material is incorporated by reference into this part 
with the approval of the Director of the Federal Register under 5 
U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. To enforce any edition other than that 
specified in paragraph (b) of this section, the Coast Guard must 
publish notice of change in the Federal Register; and the material must 
be available to the public. All approved material is available for 
inspection at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol 
Street NW., suite 700, Washington, DC, and at the U.S. Coast Guard, 
Merchant Vessel Inspection and Documentation Division (G-MVI), 2100 
Second Street SW., Washington, DC 20593-0001, and is available from the 
sources indicated in paragraph (b) of this section.
    (b) The material approved for incorporation by reference in this 
part and the sections affected are as follows:

International Maritime Organization (IMO)

    4 Albert Embankment, London SE1 7SR, England.

IMO Assembly Resolution A.601(15), Provision and Display of 
Manoeuvring Information on Board Ships, Annex sections 1, 2.3, 
and 3 with appendices...........................................157.440
IMO Assembly Resolution A.744(18), Guidelines on the Enhanced 
Programme of Inspections During Surveys of Bulk Carriers and Oil 
Tankers, Annex B sections 1.1.3-1.1.4, 1.2-1.3, 2.1, 2.3-2.6, 3-
8, and Annexes 1-10 with appendices.............................157.430
IMO Assembly Resolution A.751(18), Interim Standards for Ship 
Manoeuvrability, Annex sections 1.2.2, 2.2-2.4, 3-5 with 
Explanatory Notes in MSC/Circ.644...............................157.440

Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF)

    6th Floor, Portland House, Stag Place, London SWIE 5BH, England.

International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals, Second 
Edition, Chapters 6, 7, and 9...................................157.430

    4. In Sec. 157.03, paragraphs (pp) through (tt) are added to read 
as follows:


Sec. 157.03  Definitions.

* * * * *
    (pp) Departing port means departing from an anchorage or facility 
for a transit beyond the navigable waters of the United States as 
established in 33 CFR 2.05-25(b) or, for a vessel on the Great Lakes, a 
transit beyond the breakwater of harbor entrance.
    (qq) Fleeting or assist towing vessel means any commercial vessel 
engaged in towing astern, alongside, or pushing ahead, used solely 
within a limited 

[[Page 55928]]
geographic area, such as a particular barge fleeting area or commercial 
facility, and used solely for restricted service, such as making up or 
breaking up larger tows.
    (rr) Officer in charge of a navigational watch means any officer 
employed or engaged to be responsible for navigating or maneuvering the 
vessel and for maintaining a continuous vigilant watch during his or 
her periods of duty and following guidance set out by the master, 
international or national regulations, and company policies.
    (ss) Primary towing vessel means any vessel engaged in towing 
astern, alongside, or pushing ahead and includes the tug in an 
integrated tug barge. It does not include fleeting or assist towing 
vessels.
    (tt) Rest hour means an off-duty period of 1 hour during which no 
tasks are assigned to the crew member and the crew member is not 
scheduled to perform any duty. A rest hour may include response to 
drills or emergencies.

SUBPART G--STRUCTURAL AND OPERATIONAL MEASURES FOR CERTAIN TANK 
VESSELS WITHOUT DOUBLE HULLS

    5. Section 157.400 is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 157.400  Applicability.

    This subpart applies to each tank vessel of 5,000 gross tons or 
more that--
    (a) Carries oil in bulk as cargo or cargo residue;
    (b) Enters or operates in the navigable waters of the United States 
or that operates, conducts lightering under 46 U.S.C. 3715, or receives 
cargo from or transfers cargo to a deepwater port under 33 U.S.C. 1501 
et seq., in the United States Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), as defined 
in 33 U.S.C. 2701(8); and
    (c) Is not currently equipped with a double hull meeting 
Sec. 157.10d of this part, or an equivalent to the requirements of 
Sec. 157.10d, but required to be equipped with a double hull at a date 
set forth in 46 U.S.C. 3703a(b)(3) and (c)(3).
    6. In Sec. 157.410, paragraph (c) is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 157.410  Emergency lightering requirements for tank vessels.

* * * * *
    (c) Reducers, bolts, and gaskets must meet the requirements of 46 
CFR subpart 56.25. Cast iron and malleable iron shall not be used for 
valves or fittings in lines carrying flammable or combustible fluids 
which are directly connected to, or in the proximity of, equipment or 
other lines having open flames, or any parts operating at temperatures 
above 260 deg.C (500 deg.F).
    7. Section 157.415 is added to read as follows:


Sec. 157.415  Bridge resource management training.

    (a) After [12 months after the effective date of the final rule.], 
a tank vessel owner, master, or operator shall not assign a person to 
duties as an officer in charge of a navigational watch unless that 
person has satisfactorily completed a course that includes the 
following:
    (1) Instruction in the following areas:
    (i) Communications: effective management of the flow of 
information, including but not limited to, the exchange of information 
between the master and the pilot, the master and the crew members, and 
the officer in charge of a navigational watch and crew members.
    (ii) Voyage planning: the planning of both ocean and pilotage water 
transits to account for navigational hazards, weather, vessel traffic, 
operational restrictions, facility and port requirements, and 
compliance with local and international regulations.
    (iii) Error trapping: identifying and verifying elements in a 
sequence of events that could lead to an accident.
    (iv) Situational awareness: accurate perception of any factors and 
conditions that affect a vessel over time.
    (v) Pilot and bridge team integration: the effective flow of 
knowledge between the vessel's crew and the pilot to incorporate 
knowledge of the local port area and ensure cooperation in the 
development of the vessel's navigation plan.
    (vi) Watch team training: method for training watchstanding 
personnel to efficiently and effectively stand a watch.
    (vii) Emergency situation procedures: development and use of 
procedures, including communications between crew and shoreside 
personnel and use of onboard safety equipment, for successful emergency 
response.
    (2) Practical demonstration of the following skills:
    (i) Ability to recognize potential hazards to navigation, 
incorporate these considerations into a voyage plan, and communicate 
these hazards to subordinates, senior watchstanding personnel, and a 
pilot during a voyage.
    (ii) Ability to recognize subordinate limitations and take 
appropriate action to ensure the subordinates are attentive and provide 
accurate feedback on their assigned tasks during a voyage.
    (iii) Ability to recognize and initiate communications with other 
vessels, subordinates, and senior watchstanding personnel to prevent 
miscommunication or an inappropriate action.
    (iv) Ability to work with and, at the same time, monitor a pilot to 
ensure consistency with vessel operating characteristics and the voyage 
passage plan.
    (v) Ability to use all available bridge equipment to perform their 
assigned duties, and to display knowledge of the appropriate action(s) 
to take in the event of an equipment malfunction.
    (b) Tank vessel owner, master, or operator shall not assign a 
person to duties as an officer in charge of a navigational watch unless 
that person has demonstrated knowledge of company and vessel standard 
operating procedures including allowed variations, watch augmentation 
provisions, relationship of the officer in charge of a navigational 
watch to the master or pilot when both are on the bridge, and emergency 
navigation procedures.
    (c) The training identified in paragraph (a) of this section must 
be completed at least once every 5 years.
    (d) Satisfactory completion of a commercial or company course 
approved by the Coast Guard or, for an individual holding a foreign 
license, the appropriate flag administration, that contains elements 
comparable to those required in paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this 
section meets the initial training requirement if completed after [36 
months prior to the effective date of the final rule.].
    (e) Course completion must be documented by a certificate, license 
endorsement, or a letter confirming that each officer in charge of a 
navigational watch has satisfactorily completed the training 
requirements. Copies of each officer's certificate, endorsement, or 
letter confirming their completion must be retained on board the vessel 
or otherwise be made readily available to the Coast Guard for 
examination upon request.
    (f) A tank barge owner or operator shall ensure that those 
individuals assigned to duties on the primary towing vessel that are 
similar to the duties of the officer in charge of a navigational watch 
also complete bridge resource management training as specified in 
paragraphs (a) through (e) of this section.
    8. Section 157.420 is added to read as follows:


Sec. 157.420  Vessel specific watch training.

    (a) The owner, master, or operator of a tank vessel shall not 
assign duties to an individual assigned lookout, helmsman, or 
engineering watch duties unless that person has successfully 

[[Page 55929]]
completed a course that includes academic instruction in the following 
areas, as applicable to the individual's job responsibilities:
    (1) Communications: effective flow of information between 
personnel, including the importance of feedback and timeliness.
    (2) Error trapping: identifying and verifying elements in a 
sequence of events that could lead to an accident.
    (3) Equipment: employing correct use and monitoring requirements of 
the equipment necessary to perform assigned duties, including the 
appropriate action(s) to take in the event of an equipment malfunction.
    (4) Watch team integration: the effective flow of information among 
the vessel's crew to ensure the person in charge of vessel navigation 
is kept aware of events pertaining to equipment operation and personnel 
effectiveness.
    (b) Each individual must complete initial training that meets the 
requirements of paragraph (a) of this section prior to assignment of 
watchkeeping duties.
    (c) Each individual must complete annual training that meets the 
requirements of paragraph (a) of this section.
    (d) Completion of training must be documented by a certificate, 
vessel log entry, or a letter confirming that each individual has 
satisfactorily completed the training requirements. Copies of the 
certificate or letter confirming completion must be retained on board 
the vessel or otherwise made readily available to the Coast Guard for 
examination upon request.
    (e) A tank barge owner or operator shall ensure that those 
individuals assigned to duties on the primary towing vessel that are 
similar to lookout, helmsman, or engineering watch duties also complete 
vessel specific watch training as specified in paragraphs (a) through 
(d) of this section.
    9. Section 157.425 is added to read as follows:


Sec. 157.425  Minimum rest hour requirement.

    (a) A tankship owner, master, or operator shall ensure each person 
is provided a minimum of 6 continuous rest hours within the 12 hours 
prior to departing port or prior to cargo transfer operations before 
assuming the following duties:
    (1) Officer in charge of a navigational watch, lookout, helmsman, 
engineer officer in charge of a manned engine room on a tankship, 
member of an engineering watch on a tankship, and the operator or 
master of the vessel, if scheduled as a member of the duty rotation for 
officer in charge of a navigational watch.
    (2) Person in charge of cargo transfer operations.
    (b) A tank barge owner or operator shall ensure that the 
individuals on the primary towing vessel having duties similar to those 
listed in paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this section are provided a 
minimum of 6 continuous rest hours within the 12 hours before assuming 
his or her duties prior to departing port or prior to cargo transfer 
operations.
    (c) If a crew member's rest hours have been interrupted by drills 
or emergencies, the operator or master shall assess the crew member's 
fitness for duty before assigning him or her to any of the duties 
described in this section.
    (d) Minimum rest hour requirements must be posted on tank vessels 
in crew lounge areas and work spaces.
    10. Section 157.430 is added to read as follows:


Sec. 157.430  Enhanced survey requirements.

    (a) Enhanced survey. The tank vessel owner, master, or operator 
shall ensure an enhanced survey is conducted during each regularly 
scheduled drydock examination required under 46 CFR part 31 or at a 
frequency specified by the vessel's flag administration. Survey scope 
and recordkeeping requirements must comply with the standards of IMO 
Resolution A.744(18), Annex B sections 1.1.3-1.1.4, 1.2-1.3, 2.1, 2.3-
2.6, 3-8, and Annexes 1-10 with appendices.
    (b) Alternate enhanced survey. For a tankship of less than 20,000 
deadweight tons (dwt) carrying crude oil, a tankship of less than 
30,000 dwt carrying product, or a tank barge, one of the following may 
be substituted for the enhanced survey requirements in paragraph (a) of 
this section:
    (1) An enhanced survey performed by a recognized classification 
society.
    (2) An enhanced survey performed by the company with oversight by 
the Coast Guard or the vessel's flag administration, a recognized 
classification society, or an independent auditing authority approved 
by the Coast Guard if--
    (i) The frequency of survey is no less than that required by 46 CFR 
part 31 or as specified by the vessel's flag administration;
    (ii) Program plans establishing comparable standards with the 
requirements in paragraph (a) of this section are approved by the 
Commandant (G-MVI) and contain the following information:
    (A) The scope of the inspection program.
    (B) Permanent recordkeeping requirements.
    (C) An implementation plan outlining a continuous survey program 
and identifying by job title those individuals whom the company will 
assign to conduct the surveys.
    (D) Confirmation from the administration, a recognized 
classification society, or an independent auditing authority approved 
by the Coast Guard that the oversight implementation plan is feasible.
    (c) A copy of the most recent survey must be retained onboard the 
vessel or, upon request by the Coast Guard, made available within 24 
hours for examination.
    11. Section 157.435 is added to read as follows:


Sec. 157.435  Vital systems surveys.

    (a) A tank vessel owner, master, or operator shall survey the 
following systems:
    (1) Cargo systems. The survey must include the examination and 
testing of the items listed in Chapters 6, 7, and 9 of the 
International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals, if 
applicable, prior to cargo transfer operations.
    (2) Mooring systems. The survey must include a visual examination 
of the emergency towline, the anchor releasing mechanism, and mooring 
lines prior to departing port.
    (b) Surveys must be conducted by company management personnel, 
company designated individuals, or vessel senior officers knowledgeable 
about the equipment operating parameters and having the authority, 
capability, and responsibility to initiate corrective action when the 
equipment is not functioning properly.
    (c) The material condition of each system identified in paragraph 
(a) of this section must be recorded in the vessel's Oil Record Book, 
Part I or Part II, as applicable, the vessel's log, or other onboard 
documentation.
    12. Section 157.440 is added to read as follows:


Sec. 157.440  Autopilot alarm or indicator.

    (a) A tankship owner, master, or operator shall ensure that each 
installed autopilot unit without automatic manual override has an 
audible and visual alarm, which is distinct from other required bridge 
alarms, that will activate if the helm is manually moved while the 
autopilot is engaged.
    (b) A tank barge owner or operator shall ensure that each autopilot 
unit without automatic manual override installed on the primary towing 
vessel has a means to clearly indicate the autopilot status and warns 
personnel of 

[[Page 55930]]
the requirement to disengage the autopilot if positive rudder control 
is needed.
    13. Section 157.445 is added to read as follows:


Sec. 157.445  Maneuvering performance capability.

    (a) A tankship owner, master, or operator shall ensure that 
maneuvering tests in accordance with IMO Resolution A.751(18), sections 
1.2.2, 2.3-2.4, and 3-5 (with Explanatory Notes in MSC/Circ.644) have 
been conducted by [12 months after the effective date of the final 
rule]. Satisfactory completion of maneuvering performance tests must be 
shown by--
    (1) For a foreign flag tankship, a letter from the flag 
administration or a recognized classification society stating the 
requirements in paragraph (a) of this section have been met; or
    (2) For a U.S. flag tankship, test results from the vessel owner 
confirming the completion of sea trial maneuvers or a letter from a 
recognized classification society stating the requirements in paragraph 
(a) of this section have been met.
    (b) If a vessel undergoes a major conversion or alteration 
affecting the control systems, control surfaces, propulsion system, or 
other areas which may be expected to alter maneuvering performance, the 
tankship owner, master, or operator shall ensure that maneuvering tests 
are conducted as required by paragraph (a) of this section.
    (c) If a vessel does not meet the performance standards of IMO 
Resolution A.751(18), the owner, master, or operator must inform the 
Captain of the Port (COTP) by message, letter, or radio contact, at 
least 24 hours before entering the port of place of destination. Upon 
notification, the COTP will determine if additional operational 
restrictions for port entry should be imposed on the vessel. These may 
include, but are not limited to--
    (1) Requiring a tug escort or augmentation of existing escorts;
    (2) Restricting transit times;
    (3) Restricting vessel speed;
    (4) Requiring the vessel to follow a specified route and make 
specified reports;
    (5) Barring entry into port; or
    (6) Imposing other measure(s) appropriate for local conditions.
    (d) Performance test results, recorded in the format of Appendix 6 
of the Explanatory Notes in MSC/Circ.644, must be prominently displayed 
in the wheelhouse.
    14. Section 157.450 is added to read as follows:


Sec. 157.450  Maneuvering and vessel status information.

    A tankship owner, master or operator shall comply with IMO 
Resolution A.601(15), Annex sections 1, 2.3, and 3 with appendices.
    15. Section 157.455 is added to read as follows:


Sec. 157.455  Minimum under-keel clearance.

    (a) For a tank vessel that is not fitted with a double bottom that 
covers the entire cargo tank length, a vessel owner, master, or 
operator shall meet the following requirements prior to entering the 
port or place of destination and prior to departing port:
    (1) The tank vessel's deepest navigational draft must be calculated 
including the following factors--
    (i) The mean draft;
    (ii) The trim and list characteristics; and
    (iii) The intended transit speed and the corresponding squat 
characteristics, if known.
    (2) The anticipated controlling depth must be calculated including 
the following factors--
    (i) Tide and current conditions;
    (ii) Present sea state conditions;
    (iii) Past weather impact on water depth;
    (iv) The depth at the facility or anchorage; and
    (v) The depth of the transit area found in the publication and 
chart materials required to be on board the vessel by 33 CFR part 164.
    (3) The anticipated under-keel clearance must be calculated by 
subtracting the tank vessel's deepest navigational draft from the 
anticipated controlling depth. The vessel's calculated deepest 
navigational draft, anticipated controlling depth, and the calculated 
anticipated under-keel clearance must be recorded in the vessel's log 
or in other onboard documentation.
    (4) The vessel shall not proceed without the approval of the local 
COTP if the anticipated under-keel clearance is less than .5 meter (2 
feet).
    (b) For a tank barge that is not fitted with a double bottom that 
covers the entire cargo tank length, the tank barge owner or operator 
shall ensure that the primary towing vessel owner, master, or operator 
meets the requirements specified in paragraphs (a) (1) through (4) of 
this section.
    16. Section 157.460 is added to read as follows:


Sec. 157.460  Additional operational requirements for tank barges.

    (a) Emergency steering capability. The owner or operator of each 
tank barge shall ensure that by [12 months after effective date of the 
final rule] the primary towing vessel has--
    (1) A steering gear system with a main power unit, an alternative 
power unit, and two remote steering gear control systems, except that 
separate steering wheels or steering levers are not required. The 
steering gear control systems shall be arranged so that if the system 
in operation fails, the other system can be brought into immediate 
operation from a position on the navigating bridge; or
    (2) Twin screw propulsion with separate control systems for each 
propeller.
    (b) Fendering system. An owner or operator of a tank barge shall 
ensure the primary towing vessel and any fleeting or assist towing 
vessels have a fendering system that is of substantial size and 
composition to prevent metal to metal contact between the towing vessel 
and the barge during maneuvering operations.

PART 31--INSPECTION AND CERTIFICATION

    17. The authority citation for part 31 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 33 U.S.C. 1321(j); 46 U.S.C. 2103, 3306, 3703; 49 
U.S.C. App. 1804; E.O. 12234, 45 FR 58801, 3 CFR, 1980 Comp., p. 
277; E.O. 11735, 38 FR 21243, 3 CFR, 1971-1975 Comp., p. 793; 49 CFR 
1.46; Section 31.10-21a also issued under the authority of Sec. 
4109, Pub. L. 101-380, 104 Stat. 515.

    18. In Sec. 31.10-21, Table (a) is revised to read as follows:

                                                                                                                

[[Page 55931]]
                                     Table 31.10.--21 (a) Salt Water Service Vessels Examination Intervals in Years                                     
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                            Ship and     Double                         
                                                             Double      Double                              single       hull                          
                                                 Ship and  hull barge  hull barge  Single hull  Wood hull  hull barge    barge    Single hull    Double 
                                                  single      with        with      barge with   ship and    grade D    grade D     asphalt       hull  
                                                   hull     internal    external   independent    barge       and E      and E    barge\6\\9\   asphalt 
                                                 barge\9\  framing\1\  framing\2\  tanks\3\\9\               cargoes    cargoes                 barge\7\
                                                                                                           only\4\\9\   only\5\                         
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Drydock.......................................        2.5         5.0         5.0         5.0         2.5         2.5        5.0         2.5         5.0
Internal structural...........................        2.5         2.5         2.5         2.5         5.0         5.0        2.5        10.0         2.5
Cargo tank internal...........................     \8\2.5      \8\5.0     \8\10.0     \8\10.0      \8\2.5         5.0       10.0        10.0        15.0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:                                                                                                                                                  
\1\Applicable to double hull tank barges (double sides, ends, and bottoms) when the structural framing is on the internal tank surface.                 
\2\Applicable to double hull tank barges (double sides, ends, and bottoms) when the structural framing is on the external tank surface accessible for   
  examination from voids, double bottoms, and other similar spaces.                                                                                     
\3\Applicable to single hull tank barges with independent cargo tanks where the cargo tanks are not a contiguous part of the hull structure and which   
  has adequate clearance between the tanks and between the tanks and the vessel's hull to provide access for examination of all tank surfaces and the   
  hull structure.                                                                                                                                       
\4\Applicable to single hull tankships and tank barges certificated for the carriage of grade D and E cargoes only.                                     
\5\Applicable to double hull tank barges (double sides, ends, and bottoms) certificated for the carriage of grade D and E cargoes only.                 
\6\Applicable to single hull tank barges certificated for the carriage of asphalt only.                                                                 
\7\Applicable to double hull tank barges (double sides, ends, and bottoms) certificated for the carriage of asphalt only.                               
\8\Or as specified in part 38 or 151 as applicable.                                                                                                     
\9\Enhanced survey requirements apply as specified in 33 CFR part 157.                                                                                  


    19. In Sec. 31.10-21, Table (b) is revised to read as follows:

                                     Table 31.10.--21(b) Fresh Water Service Vessels Examination Intervals in Years                                     
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                               Ship and                                 
                                                                                                                single     Double                       
                                                    Ship and    Double      Double    Single hull                hull       hull      Single     Double 
                                                     single   hull barge  hull barge   barge with  Wood hull    barge      barge       hull       hull  
                                                      hull       with        with     independent   ship and   grade D    grade D    asphalt    asphalt 
                                                    barge\9\   internal    external     tanks3,9     barge      and E       an E     barge6,9   barge\7\
                                                              framing\1\  framing\2\                           cargoes    cargoes                       
                                                                                                               only4,9    only\5\                       
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Drydock..........................................        5.0        10.0        10.0        10.0         2.5        5.0       10.0        5.0       10.0
Internal structural..............................        5.0         5.0         5.0         5.0         5.0        5.0        5.0       10.0        5.0
Cargo tank internal..............................     \8\5.0      \8\5.0     \8\10.0     \8\10.0      \8\2.5        5.0       10.0       10.0       15.0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:                                                                                                                                                  
\1\Applicable to double hull tank barges (double sides, ends, and bottoms) when the structural framing is on the internal tank surface.                 
\2\Applicable to double hull tank barges (double sides, ends, and bottoms) when the structural framing is on the external tank surface accessible for   
  examination from voids, double bottoms, and other similar spaces.                                                                                     
\3\Applicable to single hull tank barges with independent cargo tanks where the cargo tanks are not a contiguous part of the hull structure and which   
  has adequate clearance between the tanks and between the tanks and the vessel's hull to provide access for examination of all tank surfaces and the   
  hull structure.                                                                                                                                       
\4\Applicable to single hull tank ships and tank barges certificated for the carriage of grade D and E cargoes only.                                    
\5\Applicable to double hull tank barges (double sides, ends and bottoms) certificated for the carriage of grade D and E cargoes only.                  
\6\Applicable to single hull tank barges certificated for the carriage of asphalt only.                                                                 
\7\Applicable to double hull tank barges (double sides, ends and bottoms) certificated for the carriage of asphalt only.                                
\8\Or as specified in part 38 or 151 as applicable.                                                                                                     
\9\Enhanced survey requirements apply as specified in 33 CFR part 157.                                                                                  

PART 35--OPERATIONS

    20. The Authority citation for part 35 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 33 U.S.C. 1321(j); 46 U.S.C. 3306, 3703, 6101; 49 
U.S.C. App. 1804; E.O. 11735, 38 FR 21243, 3 CFR, 1971-1975 Comp., 
p. 793; E.O. 12234, 45 FR 58801, 3 CFR, 1980 Comp., p. 277; 49 CFR 
1.46.

    21. In Sec. 35.01-40, paragraph (c) is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 35.01-40  Prevention of oil pollution-TB/ALL.

* * * * *
    (c) 33 CFR parts 151, 155, 156, 157 and 164.

    Dated: October 27, 1995.
A.E. Henn,
Vice Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard Acting Commandant.
[FR Doc. 95-27185 Filed 10-31-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-14-M