[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 202 (Thursday, October 19, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 54065-54067]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-25946]



=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

[Recommendation 95-2]


Safety Management

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

ACTION: Notice; recommendation.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) has made a 
recommendation to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
2286a(a)(5) concerning Safety Management. The Board requests public 
comments on this recommendation.

DATES: Comments, data, views or arguments concerning this 
recommendation are due on or before November 20, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views or arguments concerning this 
recommendation to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana 
Avenue NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004.


[[Page 54066]]


FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Kenneth M. Pusateri or Carole J. Morgan, at the address above or 
telephone (202) 208-6400.

    Dated: October 16, 1995.
John T. Conway,
Chairman.

[Recommendation 95-2]

Safety Management
    Dated: October 11, 1995.
    The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) has issued and 
the Secretary of Energy has accepted three sets of recommendations (90-
2, 92-5, and 94-5) concerning the use of standards by contractors at 
the Department of Energy's (DOE) defense nuclear facilities, and the 
level of conduct of operations to be maintained at these facilities. 
These recommendations intersect in many of their implications. The 
Board now wishes to combine and modify these recommendations into a 
form that (1) reflects what it has learned from DOE's response to the 
recommendations, (2) more sharply focuses continued activity on the 
objectives DOE and the Board seek to achieve, and (3) is more clearly 
consonant with the actions which DOE has under way to modify DOE's 
system of Orders.
    On March 8, 1990, the Board forwarded to the Secretary of Energy 
Recommendation 90-2. Briefly paraphrased, it recommended that (1) DOE 
identify the particular standards that it considered should apply to 
certain designated defense nuclear facilities of DOE, (2) DOE provide 
its views of the adequacy of these standards, and (3) DOE establish the 
extent to which the standards were being applied to the facilities. The 
Secretary accepted this Recommendation on June 11, 1990, and provided 
the Board with an acceptable Implementation Plan on November 9, 1994.
    The principal product of implementation was to be a set of 
facility-specific documents that set forth the applicable standards and 
requirements for a selected set of DOE's defense nuclear facilities. 
These were termed Standards/Requirements Implementation Documents (S/
RIDs). The S/RID was to contain those requirements considered necessary 
and sufficient for ensuring safety in the particular application. These 
were to be principally extracted from DOE Orders, appropriate 
standards, NRC guides, and similar sources. The S/RID was envisioned as 
the basis upon which work controls would be developed and implemented.
    This concept has been maturing in the course of its application to 
several DOE defense nuclear facilities. Subsequently, in connection 
with its internal plans to restructure its system of Orders, DOE has 
developed the concept of the ``necessary and sufficient'' set of 
requirements at a site or a facility or for an activity. As applied to 
safety requirements, we recognize the ``necessary and sufficient'' and 
S/RID concepts to be identical. In the following, the identity of the 
two will be implicitly understood, although we shall continue to use S/
RID as the preferred term for the documented set of applicable 
standards and requirements in agreements between DOE and its defense 
contracts. This is the nomenclature found in implementation plans 
submitted by DOE to the Board. To avoid confusion, we suggest that DOE 
continue uniform use of the term S/RID in this connection.
    DOE is to determine the extent to which standards are implemented 
through a process of Order Compliance Self-Assessment. This has 
generally been accomplished through review of detailed compliance with 
the DOE safety Orders of interest to the Board. The practice is to be 
followed until S/RIDs are in place, after which time, the issue becomes 
compliance with requirements in S/RIDS.
    The Board has viewed the Order Compliance Self-Assessment Program 
of DOE as an initial activity in the formulation of the S/RIDs. As part 
of this compliance self-assessment, DOE required the contractors to 
justify in documented form the rationale for judging requirements to be 
non-applicable. This procedural requirement has been reported to have 
caused the expenditure of more effort than merited to achieve the end 
result the Board sought, which was the establishment of the particular 
subset of requirements upon which the safety management programs at a 
site would be structured. In the recommendations below, the Board seeks 
to streamline the process of arriving at an Authorization Basis and 
Authorization Agreements with respect to DOE's safety management of its 
sites, facilities, and activities. The review and acceptance by DOE of 
(1) the hazards assessment of the work contracted, (2) the standards/
requirements identified as appropriate, and (3) safety management 
controls committed by the contractor for the work would in effect 
constitute, in the view of the Board, a DOE determination of adequacy 
relative to sufficiency of the requirements base.
    In another action, on August 17, 1992, the Board forwarded its 
Recommendation 92-5, which called for establishing certain safety 
policies at defense nuclear facilities faced with missions that were 
changing in response to the shifting world situation. The principal 
features of Recommendation 92-5 can be paraphrased as follows: (1) that 
facilities to be used in the longer term in nuclear defense missions or 
in cleanup from previous nuclear defense activities should be operated 
according to a superior level of conduct of operations, (2) that 
certain safety practices be followed at nuclear defense facilities 
being restarted after a long period of idleness, and (3) that defense 
nuclear facilities designated for various other kinds of use (such as 
standby) should be subject to a graded approach of safety criteria and 
requirements to be developed. The Board requested that it be informed 
on a timely basis of changes in the intended use of DOE's defense 
nuclear facilities.
    Implicit in the Recommendation was a broader view of conduct of 
operations than adherence to written procedures and related activities 
directly in support of operations. It encompassed the entire set of 
practices used to ensure safety in a facility, and in the operations 
conducted therein, extending to coverage implied by the term ``safety 
culture.''
    On December 16, 1992, the Secretary of Energy accepted 
Recommendation 92-5, and forwarded to the Board an Implementation Plan 
which the Board accepted on January 8, 1993.
    Circumstances affecting DOE's defense programs have continued to 
evolve since then, and the view of the future of the defense nuclear 
establishment is now different from that in late 1992. Many facilities 
then scheduled for restart or standby are now slated for deactivation 
and decommissioning. Though the future form of the establishment 
continues to be uncertain, the Board believes that the extent of the 
changes and other intervening events makes it necessary to bring major 
features of its Recommendation 92-5 up to date and in line with the 
updating of Recommendation 90-2.
    Another important development has been the elaboration of the S/RID 
concept into a system view of a standards-based safety management 
system.\1\ This has shed further light on such important matters as 
permissible variability of safety management at facilities of different 
kinds and different levels of risk, and the formal means whereby an 
Authorization Agreement 

[[Page 54067]]
related to environment, safety and health objectives is incorporated 
into contractual terms.

    \1\ Fundamentals for Understanding Standards-Based Safety 
Management, Joseph J. DiNunno, DNFSB/TECH-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Principles that should guide the structure and use of safety 
management, the framework for conduct of operations appropriate to 
different cases, the basis for grading of safety management and conduct 
of operations, and the application to the important defense nuclear 
laboratories of the Department of Energy, are outlined in another 
document in the DNFSB/TECH sequence.\2\ The points laid out in DNFSB/
TECH-6 are consistent with those in DNFSB/TECH-5. Although the concepts 
and processes discussed in these documents are couched in terms of 
radiological hazards, they are more general, and apply as well to 
hazards of other kinds. In addition, they offer an appropriate match to 
requirements established elsewhere for safety in decommissioning of 
facilities, and would serve as a bridge to such operations.

    \2\ Safety Management and Conduct of Operations at the 
Department of Energy's Defense Nuclear Facilities, DNFSB/TECH-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Board agrees with the view adopted by DOE in certain pilot 
tests presently under way, that the contractor for a site, facility, or 
activity should originate the drafting of the Safety Management Plan 
and the S/RID with assistance and input as appropriate by DOE. DOE has 
the responsibility for determining that the proposed S/RID will ensure 
an adequate level of safety, and finally approving it when it is found 
to be satisfactory. In the Board's view, an S/RID should be the central 
component of the Authorization Agreement which should have contractual 
status as part of the agreement with the contractor relevant to 
performance of the work authorized for the site, facility, or activity.
    In accordance with its statutory directive to review DOE's safety 
standards and their implementation, the Board plans to track selected 
S/RIDs and the associated Safety Management Programs as they are 
developed. The Board will formally review them after their completion 
and will provide its comments to DOE in letters to the Secretary or in 
the statutory form of recommendations. The Board would normally expect 
DOE to have performed its own review with documentation of the results 
before being formally provided with the Board's comments.
    We recognize that the various DOE organizational units which may be 
delegated review and approval authority for S/RIDs and associated 
Safety Management Programs may not have enough individuals with 
qualifications in the technical specialties required to carry out 
effectively the streamlined process being recommended. This means that 
technical assistance may need to be retained from elsewhere to 
compensate for such personnel deficiencies where they exist. It also 
means that DOE may need to augment its own technical expertise so as 
not to be obliged to continue indefinitely to rely on technical 
assistance from outside DOE.
    The Board renews its request that it be informed on a timely basis 
of changes in planned use of defense nuclear facilities. In addition, 
the Board now wishes to replace Recommendations 90-2 and 92-5. The 
schedule agreed to by DOE and the Board for S/RID development and 
implementation pursuant to Recommendation 90-2 will be revised and 
carried forward as a part of Recommendation 94-5, which is not being 
otherwise modified at this time.
    Therefore, the Board recommends, that DOE:
    1. Institutionalize the process of incorporating into the planning 
and execution of every major defense nuclear activity involving 
hazardous materials those controls necessary to ensure that 
environment, safety and health objectives are achieved.
    2. Require the conduct of all operations and activities within the 
defense nuclear complex or the former defense nuclear complex that 
involve radioactive and other substantially hazardous materials to be 
subject to Safety Management Plans that are graded according to the 
risk associated with the activity. The Safety Management Plans and the 
operations should be structured on the lines discussed in the 
referenced documents DNFSB/TECH-5 and DNFSB/TECH-6.
    3. Establish a new list of facilities and activities prioritized on 
lines of hazard and importance to defense and cleanup programs, to 
focus the transition from implementation programs related to 90-2 and 
92-5 to this revised development of S/RIDs and associated Safety 
Management Plans, following the process of Section I of DNFSB/TECH-6.
    4. Promulgate requirements and associated instructions (Orders/
standards) which provide direction and guidance for this process 
including responsibilities for carrying it out. The manner of 
establishing responsibilities and authorities as currently set forth in 
DOE Order 5480.31 (425.1) for Operational Readiness Reviews should 
serve as a model for preparing, reviewing, and approving the Safety 
Management Programs. The requirement for conformance should be made a 
contract term.
    5. Take such measures as are required to ensure that DOE itself has 
or acquires the technical expertise to effectively implement the 
streamlined process recommended.
John T. Conway,
Chairman.
October 11, 1995
The Honorable Hazel R. O'Leary,
Secretary of Energy, Washington, DC 20585
    Dear Secretary O'Leary: On October 11, 1995, the Defense Nuclear 
Facilities Safety Board, in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 
Sec. 2286a(a)(5), unanimously approved Recommendation 95-2 which is 
enclosed for your consideration. Recommendation 95-2 deals with 
Safety Management.
    42 U.S.C. Sec. 2286d(a) requires the Board, after receipt by 
you, to promptly make this recommendation available to the public in 
the Department of Energy's regional public reading rooms. The Board 
believes the recommendation contains no information which is 
classified or otherwise restricted. To the extent this 
recommendation does not include information restricted by DOE under 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2161-68, as amended, 
please arrange to have this recommendation promptly placed on file 
in your regional public reading rooms.
    The Board will publish this recommendation in the Federal 
Register.

    Sincerely,
John T. Conway,
Chairman.

Enclosure
c: Mark Whitaker, EH-9

[FR Doc. 95-25946 Filed 10-18-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3670-01-M