[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 199 (Monday, October 16, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 53588-53596]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-25596]



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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Record of Decision Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test 
Facility

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Record of decision.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) is issuing this Record of 
Decision (ROD) regarding the DOE's proposed Dual Axis Radiographic 
Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory 
(LANL) in northern New Mexico. DOE has decided to complete and operate 
the DARHT facility at LANL while implementing a program to conduct most 
tests inside steel containment vessels, with containment to be phased 
in over ten years. The environmental analysis to support this decision 
was issued by DOE in the August 1995, DARHT Facility Final 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), DOE/EIS-0228, which identified 
the Phased Containment Option of the Enhanced Containment Alternative 
as DOE's preferred alternative. DOE has decided to implement the 
preferred alternative.

DATES: This ROD is effective immediately. On January 27, 1995, DOE was 
enjoined from further procurement or construction of the DARHT facility 
pending completion of the DARHT EIS 

[[Page 53589]]
and this ROD. Actions to implement this ROD will not occur unless and 
until the injunction is dissolved; DOE will seek immediate dissolution 
of the injunction.

ADDRESSES: Requests for copies of the DARHT EIS or this ROD should be 
addressed to: Ms. Elizabeth Withers, NEPA Compliance Officer, Los 
Alamos Area Office, Department of Energy, 528 35th Street, Los Alamos 
NM 87544. Ms. Withers may be contacted by telephone at (505) 667-8690 
or by facsimile at (505) 665-4872.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general information on the DOE 
NEPA process, please contact Ms. Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office 
of NEPA Policy and Assistance, EH-42, Department of Energy, 1000 
Independence Avenue SW., Washington DC 20585. Ms. Borgstrom may be 
contacted by leaving a message at (800) 472-2756 or by calling (202) 
586-4600.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    DOE is responsible for ensuring that the United States nuclear 
weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable. As part of its 
mission to ensure the safety and reliability of the weapons in the 
stockpile, DOE and its predecessor agencies have conducted a 
hydrodynamic testing program at LANL since the late 1940's. The 
existing hydrodynamic testing facility at LANL is the Pulsed High-
Energy Radiation Machine Emitting X-Rays (PHERMEX), which has been in 
operation since 1963. In 1983, DOE began hydrodynamic testing operation 
of the Flash X-Ray (FXR) facility at the Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory (LLNL) in California.
    In September 1992, President Bush declared a moratorium on all 
nuclear testing by the United States. In July 1993, President Clinton 
extended the moratorium, and in August 1995 the President announced 
that the United States will seek a ``zero-yield'' Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty. He further stated that the conduct of a science-based 
stockpile stewardship program is a condition of U.S. entry into such a 
treaty.
    PHERMEX and FXR historically have been used in conjunction with 
underground nuclear testing to identify and correct potential problems 
with the stockpile. Neither PHERMEX nor FXR can provide the degree of 
radiographic resolution, x-ray intensity, or three-dimensional or time-
sequenced views that are needed to provide answers to current questions 
regarding weapons condition or performance necessary for science-based 
stockpile stewardship. Although DOE expects to operate and upgrade the 
FXR facility as described in section 3.3.4 of the final EIS, and also 
expects to operate and appropriately upgrade PHERMEX until use of the 
latter is phased out after initial DARHT operation, neither facility 
can fully meet DOE's purpose and need to provide enhanced high-
resolution radiography capability. In addition to its radiographic 
performance limitations, PHERMEX is over thirty years old, and DOE does 
not expect it to remain a viable facility over an extended time because 
of the increasing difficulty and cost of maintaining and operating the 
facility as it ages.
    To conduct an effective science-based stockpile stewardship 
program, DOE needs to obtain an enhanced capability to conduct 
radiographic hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments. The capability 
to obtain high-resolution, multiple-time, multiple-view information is 
needed to assess the safety, performance, and reliability of nuclear 
weapons; evaluate aging weapons; obtain information about plutonium 
through dynamic experiments; and for other uses. Such an enhanced 
capability cannot be obtained at either PHERMEX or FXR, as currently 
configured. Accordingly, DOE has decided to complete and operate the 
DARHT facility to provide an enhanced high-resolution radiographic 
capability to perform hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments in 
support of its historical mission and the near-term stewardship of the 
nation's nuclear weapons stockpile.
    DOE began construction of the DARHT facility in April 1994. In 
October 1994, three citizen groups requested of the Secretary of Energy 
that DOE prepare an EIS on the DARHT facility, and halt further 
construction until an EIS was completed. On November 16, 1994, two of 
these groups filed suit in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Mexico, seeking to enjoin DOE from proceeding with the 
DARHT project until completion of an EIS and associated ROD. On 
November 22, 1994, DOE published a notice of its intent to prepare the 
DARHT EIS [59 FR 60134]. On January 27, 1995, the court issued a 
preliminary injunction of further construction of the DARHT facility, 
and related activities such as the procurement of special facility 
equipment, pending completion of the EIS and ROD. The court entered 
final judgment on May 5, 1995. No construction or procurement for DARHT 
has taken place since January 27, 1995; in January and February, 1995, 
DOE took actions allowed by the court to stabilize the construction 
site.
    The DARHT EIS was prepared pursuant to the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) [42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.], the Council on 
Environmental Quality NEPA regulations [40 CFR Parts 1500-1508] and the 
DOE NEPA regulations [10 CFR Part 1021]. DOE issued the final DARHT 
Facility Environmental Impact Statement, DOE/EIS-0228, in August 1995 
following the issuance of the draft DARHT EIS for public review in May 
1995. The Environmental Protection Agency published its Notice of 
Availability regarding the final DARHT EIS on September 8, 1995 [60 FR 
46833].
    The DARHT EIS includes a classified supplement that provides 
additional information and analyses. The NEPA regulations provide that 
EISs which address classified proposals may be restricted from public 
dissemination; however, the document may be organized so that 
classified information is segregated in order that the unclassified 
portions can be made available to the public [40 CFR Part 1507.3(c); 10 
CFR Part 1021.340(a)]. NEPA's public disclosure requirements are 
subject to the exceptions spelled out in the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) [5 U.S.C. 552; 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(c)]. FOIA exempts materials 
from public disclosure where specified by statute. Under the Atomic 
Energy Act [42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.], material pertaining to nuclear 
weapons design or related national security matters is classified and 
exempted from public disclosure under FOIA and therefore under NEPA. 
Accordingly, DOE prepared a classified supplement to the DARHT EIS, and 
relied on information in that supplement to make this decision. The 
classified supplement has been withheld from public dissemination, but 
DOE provided the draft classified supplement for review by 
appropriately cleared representatives of parties with a need to know 
the classified information. These representatives include the 
Department of Defense, the Environmental Protection Agency, the State 
of New Mexico and certain American Indian tribal governments, so that 
in accordance with the provisions of NEPA, these government agencies 
could ensure that the public health and welfare are being adequately 
protected.
    DOE invited the public to comment on the adequacy and accuracy of 
the draft EIS, and on any other matter concerning the DARHT review. The 
public comment period on the draft DARHT EIS ended on June 26, 1995; 

[[Page 53590]]
DOE held public hearings on the draft EIS in Los Alamos, New Mexico, on 
May 31, 1995, and in Santa Fe, New Mexico, on June 1, 1995. The final 
DARHT EIS includes transcripts of the public hearings and copies of 
written comments, and explains how DOE considered all comments 
received.

Alternatives Considered

    The DARHT EIS analyzed six alternative ways to implement DOE's 
proposed action to obtain enhanced radiographic capability. DOE 
considered, but did not analyze in detail, other alternatives which DOE 
determined would not meet the Department's purpose and need for 
enhanced testing capability.
    Certain aspects of the DOE hydrodynamic testing and dynamic 
experiment program would not change regardless of the course of action 
selected, and were considered to be common to all alternatives. These 
include: the way hydrodynamic tests are conducted; the conducting of 
contained dynamic experiments with plutonium; infrastructure 
requirements; continued operation of the FXR Facility at LLNL; 
continued operation of the LANL Radiographic Support Laboratory at 
Technical Area 15; waste management considerations; decontamination and 
decommissioning considerations; and other operational and site 
characteristics of LANL. (Aside from the provisions in this ROD 
regarding PHERMEX and DARHT, this ROD does not affect operation of any 
other facility at LANL or any other DOE site, including the continued 
operation of the FXR facility at LLNL or the continued operation of the 
Radiographic Support Facility at LANL.)
    Alternatives analyzed in the DARHT EIS are as follows:

--No Action Alternative. DOE would continue to use PHERMEX at LANL and 
FXR at LLNL in support of its stockpile stewardship mission. The DARHT 
structure would be completed for other uses.
--DARHT Baseline Alternative. DOE would complete and operate the DARHT 
facility and phase out operations at PHERMEX, but would not pursue a 
program of enhanced containment.
--Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative. The DARHT facility would be completed 
for other uses. DOE would construct major upgrades at PHERMEX, 
including installing the high-resolution radiography planned for DARHT 
and constructing a second accelerator for two-axis imaging.
--Enhanced Containment Alternative. DOE would complete and operate the 
DARHT facility and phase out operations of PHERMEX as under the DARHT 
Baseline Alternative; in addition, some or all tests would be conducted 
inside a containment vessel or structure. Three options were 
considered: (1) Vessel Containment Option (most tests would be 
contained in modular steel vessels, starting with operation of the 
first axis of DARHT); (2) Building Containment Option (all tests would 
be contained inside a permanent building starting with operation of the 
first axis of DARHT); and (3) Phased Containment Option, the DOE's 
preferred alternative (most tests would be contained in modular steel 
vessels, to be implemented over a ten-year period). Under options 1 and 
3, DOE would construct and operate a Vessel Cleanout Facility to clean 
the portable steel vessels and recycle materials as appropriate; under 
option 2, DOE would construct and operate a separate cleanout facility 
to assist in maintaining the containment building and recycling 
materials as appropriate.
--Plutonium Exclusion Alternative. DOE would implement the DARHT 
Baseline Alternative; however, plutonium would not be used in any of 
the experiments at DARHT. Under this alternative, in the future, DOE 
may perform some dynamic experiments with plutonium; those involving 
radiography would be conducted at PHERMEX and would be contained in 
double-walled vessels.
--Single Axis Alternative. DOE would implement the DARHT Baseline 
Alternative; however, only one accelerator hall (single axis) would be 
operated for hydrodynamic tests or dynamic experiments. The other hall 
would be completed for other uses.

Environmentally Preferable Alternative

     While some of the alternatives analyzed in the DARHT EIS were 
unacceptable in that they did not meet programmatic needs, none posed 
unacceptable environmental impacts. The analyses in the DARHT EIS 
indicate very little difference in the environmental impacts among the 
alternatives analyzed. The major discriminators would be contamination 
of soils near the firing point, health effects to workers, and the 
amount of construction materials consumed. After consideration of the 
environmental impacts identified through the EIS, DOE has determined 
that the three options of the Enhanced Containment Alternative, 
including DOE's preferred alternative (the Phased Containment Option), 
would be somewhat environmentally preferable. These three options, 
particularly the building containment option, would result in 
considerably less release of depleted uranium and other metals to the 
general environment than would the other alternatives analyzed 
(including No Action because of the continued use of PHERMEX). However, 
these options would result in a higher radiation dose to workers over 
the life of the project compared to the other alternatives analyzed 
(although the dose would be well below regulatory and administrative 
limits). The benefit of reducing the amounts of materials released is 
directly related to DOE's responsibility for environmental stewardship 
and the desire to minimize cleanup activities at the end of the 
facility's lifetime.

Environmental Impacts of Alternatives

    DOE weighed environmental impacts as one factor in its decision 
making process regarding the DARHT facility. DOE considered the impacts 
from construction and operation of alternative facilities, and the 
consequences that might be expected under accident scenarios. After 
consideration of the environmental impacts identified and analyzed in 
the DARHT EIS, DOE concludes that for the most part, environmental 
impacts would be expected to be similar among all six of the 
alternatives analyzed. None of these alternatives would present an 
unacceptable level of adverse environmental impact to the human 
environment.
    DOE analyzed the potential impacts that might occur to land 
resources, air quality, noise, water resources, soils, biotic 
resources, cultural resources, socioeconomics, and human health. DOE 
considered impacts that might occur from use of plutonium; facility 
accidents, and transportation of radioactive materials. DOE considered 
the amount of waste that would be generated under different 
alternatives; irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources; 
and the relationship between short-term uses of the environment and the 
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity. For all 
alternatives analyzed, DOE determined that some contamination of soils 
could occur and would present an unavoidable adverse impact.
    Most impacts identified were essentially the same for all 
alternatives analyzed. For the Vessel Containment Option and the Phased 
Containment Option, one additional acre of land would be disturbed to 
construct the Vessel Cleanout Facility. All three 

[[Page 53591]]
options under the Enhanced Containment Alternative would result in less 
materials dispersed (the amount of depleted uranium released to the 
environment is of particular interest because of its potential to 
result in soil or water contamination); therefore, soils and water 
resources would be less contaminated under that alternative. Under the 
postulated testing program analyzed in the DARHT EIS, the amount of 
materials released from the firing point under any of the action 
alternatives would be 15% lower than under the No Action Alternative. 
Because all of the action alternatives would provide an enhanced 
radiographic capability, less material would need to be expended to 
obtain more and better data. An even greater reduction would be 
achieved under the Enhanced Containment Alternative options (a total of 
95% reduction for Building Containment, 75% for Vessel Containment, and 
50% for Phased Containment). Annual releases of depleted uranium would 
be up to 90 pounds (41 kilograms) under the Building Containment 
Option; up to 450 pounds (205 kilograms) under the Vessel Containment 
Option; and up to 720 pounds (327 kilograms) (averaged over the 
lifetime of the project with a range of from 1,460 pounds [664 
kilograms] to 450 pounds [205 kilograms] per year) under the Phased 
Containment Option. Under the other five alternatives, up to 1,540 
pounds (700 kilograms) would be released annually. Compared to the 
other five alternatives, the Enhanced Containment Alternative would 
result in an unquantified beneficial impact to noise levels, wildlife 
habitat and cultural resources; the benefit would be greatest under the 
Building Containment Option.
    The adverse impact to the health of the uninvolved public would be 
less under the Enhanced Containment Alternative than the other five 
alternatives: the dose to the affected population would be 8 person-rem 
over the 30-year life of the project under the Building Containment 
Option, 13 person-rem under the Vessel Containment Option, and 17 
person-rem under the Phased Containment Option, compared to 30 person-
rem under all other alternatives. However, due to the concentration of 
depleted uranium and other hazardous materials inside the Vessel 
Cleanout Facility, the health hazard to workers would be greater under 
the three options of the Enhanced Containment Alternative when compared 
to the other alternatives, although doses would be well below 
regulatory and administrative limits. The average annual dose to 
workers under the three options of the Enhanced Containment Alternative 
would be 0.6 rem compared to 0.3 rem for the other five alternatives 
and the collective dose over the 30-year life of the project would be 
60 person-rem compared to 9 person-rem. No additional latent cancer 
fatalities would be expected over 50 years to the general population or 
workers under normal operations under any of the six alternatives 
analyzed.
    Under the accident scenarios examined, an unexpected high-
explosives detonation would result in 15 fatalities (all personnel 
present) at the facility under all alternatives analyzed. No additional 
latent cancer fatalities would be expected over 50 years among members 
of the general public from accidental release of depleted uranium under 
any of the alternatives. Between 5 and 12 additional latent cancer 
fatalities could occur from the accidental release of vaporized 
plutonium. Such an accident is extremely unlikely (estimated to occur 
once in every 10,000 to 1,000,000 years).
    The two alternatives involving major additional construction (the 
Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative and the Building Containment Option of the 
Enhanced Containment Alternative) would result in considerably greater 
commitment of construction resources (concrete and diesel fuel); the 
Vessel Cleanout Facility under the Vessel Containment Option and the 
Phased Containment Option would result in a slightly greater commitment 
of construction resources.
    Socioeconomic impacts would vary for each alternative, primarily 
driven by duration and timing of new construction and whether PHERMEX 
would be phased out of operation. More people would be employed under 
any other alternative than under the No Action Alternative. The Vessel 
Containment Option would result in the greatest increase in employment 
(321 additional full-time jobs generated in the regional economy). 
Under the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative, 273 additional jobs would be 
generated, compared with 253 under the Phased Containment Option, 238 
under the Building Containment Option, 199 under the Upgrade PHERMEX 
Alternative, 191 under the DARHT Baseline Alternative and 104 under the 
Single Axis Alternative.

Review of Final EIS

    DOE distributed approximately 800 copies of the final EIS to the 
State of New Mexico, American Indian tribal governments, local 
governments, other federal agencies, and the general public. The United 
States Environmental Protection Agency commented that selection of the 
Phased Containment Option as the preferred alternative should provide 
additional environmental protection over the life of the project. No 
other written comments specific to the final DARHT EIS were received. 
However, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, in a letter to DOE dated 
September 12, 1995, clarified the language of its August 3, 1995 letter 
regarding mitigation measures to protect the nesting habitat of the 
Mexican spotted owl, a federally-listed threatened species. (The August 
3, 1995 letter concurred with the DOE determination that operation of 
DARHT would not be likely to adversely affect the Mexican spotted owl, 
and the September 12, 1995 letter does not affect that concurrence.)
    A member of the public telephoned DOE and pointed out a typographic 
and calculational error in the tables regarding air quality in the 
final EIS. An error was noted in the conversion of the three-hour 
standard for sulfur dioxide from parts per million to micrograms per 
cubic meter in calculating the percent of regulatory standard in 
conjunction with potential air quality impacts. The corrected 
calculated percent of regulatory standard is a factor of 10 higher for 
sulfur dioxide concentrations. For tables S-1, 3-3, and C1-8 the 
percent of regulatory standard in the most restrictive case increases 
from 2.2 to 22%; this is constant across all alternatives and does not 
change the overall analysis of air quality impacts. In addition, the 
caller pointed out a typographic error in table 5-1 regarding the 
calculated annual concentration of nitrogen dioxide; it should be 0.04 
micrograms per cubic meter rather than 0.004. None of these changes 
affect the results of the environmental analysis.
    DOE also identified an additional typographic error in the 
document. The DARHT EIS provides a comparison of costs for the reader's 
information; there is an inconsistency between the cost figures shown 
in the summary table 3-4 and the corresponding table in the body of the 
analysis, table 5-19. The cost estimates in table 3-4 are correct 
(those in table 5-19 are from the draft EIS but inadvertently were not 
updated).

Decision

    DOE has decided to complete and operate the DARHT facility at LANL 
to provide enhanced high-resolution radiography (x-ray photography) 
capability to perform hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments in 

[[Page 53592]]
support of the Department's historical mission and the near-term 
stewardship of the nuclear weapons stockpile. DOE will mitigate 
potential environmental effects by implementing an enhanced approach to 
containing expended test materials. This will be done by conducting 
tests in modular steel containment vessels to be phased in over ten 
years. DOE will also construct and operate a separate Vessel Cleanout 
Facility in conjunction with the operation of the DARHT facility. This 
is the Phased Containment Option of the Enhanced Containment 
Alternative, identified as the preferred alternative in the DARHT Final 
EIS.
    DOE will complete construction of the DARHT facility with the 
intent to operate both axes of the facility. As soon as possible, DOE 
will resume construction of the firing site facility, complete both of 
the two accelerator halls (dual axes), and will resume procurement, 
testing and installation of equipment required for operating the DARHT 
firing site facility with the first axis x-ray machine. DOE will equip 
the first axis with an accelerator capable of achieving a nominal 20 
million electron volts (MeV) of electron- beam energy, and an output x-
ray dose of up to 1,650 roentgens (R). The DARHT facility will be 
completed to the original plans, with minor modifications if necessary 
to accommodate the accelerator and x-ray equipment and the use of the 
portable modular containment vessels.
    DOE intends to eventually operate DARHT in a dual axis mode, and 
will procure, test and install equipment for the second axis. Based on 
the results of installing, testing and proving the linear accelerator 
equipment in the first axis, DOE may incorporate modified or improved 
technology for the second axis or retrofit the equipment previously 
installed in the first axis. As long as no substantial change to the 
building footprint is required, and as long as the energy output of 
both the first and second accelerator falls within the range analyzed 
in the DARHT EIS (electron beam energies of up to 30 MeV and output x-
ray dose of up to 2,000 R for each accelerator), no additional NEPA 
review will be required for modifications to equipment for the first or 
second axis.
    DOE will operate the DARHT facility to provide high-speed, high-
resolution flash radiographs which will be used to measure or diagnose 
the results of tests and experiments involving high explosives and 
other systems. Other types of portable low- energy x-ray, electronic, 
optical, and photographic diagnostic equipment may be used at the 
facility. DARHT may be operated with one or two x-ray beams from one or 
both axes, either simultaneously or with a timing variation.
    DOE plans to conduct some dynamic experiments using plutonium. 
Dynamic experiments with plutonium will always be conducted in 
specially-designed double- walled containment vessels. DOE will 
maintain the capability to stage, maintain, and clean out plutonium 
containment vessels at LANL. The Vessel Cleanout Facility will not be 
used for this purpose.
    DARHT will have the following uses and potential uses:

--To study the implosion of mock nuclear weapons primaries. This 
information would be used to assist the DOE with its stockpile 
stewardship and management mission in order to ensure the continued 
safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the enduring stockpile, 
and to further a basic scientific understanding of the behavior of 
nuclear weapons.
--To conduct dynamic experiments with plutonium in order to obtain more 
information regarding the physical and chemical properties of 
plutonium. All such experiments will be conducted in specially-
designed, double-walled steel containment vessels.
--To continue to assist other nations in evaluating the condition, 
safety and reliability of their existing nuclear weapons under current 
international agreements, and any future agreements.
--To assess the condition, safety and performance reliability of other 
nuclear weapons, such as those that might be designed by a non-friendly 
nation or a terrorist and obtained by the United States.
--To continue to assist the Department of Defense with evaluations of 
conventional weapons and other military equipment.
--To continue to study explosives-driven materials and high-velocity 
impact phenomena for non-weapons applications and other uses of 
interest to industry.
--To pursue other applications of the radiography or accelerator 
technology and other equipment developed for high-resolution 
radiography.

    In 1991, President Bush stated that the United States would not 
design new nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. However, in the 
event that this nation decides, as a matter of policy, that new nuclear 
weapons should be developed, or in the event that retrofit components 
need to be developed for existing nuclear weapons, DARHT could be used 
to assist in the development of weapons or weapons components. Any 
decision to develop new nuclear weapons would be made by the President 
subject to the review and approval of Congress. Neither DARHT nor any 
other facility operated by DOE will be used for this purpose unless 
such a Presidential determination is made.
    The completed DARHT facility will be operated with a 2,500 foot 
(950 meter) radius exclusion zone as a safety feature to provide 
protection to personnel and structures while testing takes place. The 
completed DARHT facility will include the already-constructed earthen 
berm on the northern side of the facility to serve as a radiation 
protection measure. Explosives or special nuclear materials will not be 
stored, handled or processed inside the DARHT firing site building.
    As soon as the first axis of the DARHT facility becomes 
operational, DOE will phase out operation of the PHERMEX facility over 
approximately four years and, at the end of that time, will 
decommission and decontaminate the PHERMEX facility unless an 
alternative use is identified for the structure or facility equipment. 
Activities needed to decommission and decontaminate the structure, or 
to convert it to another use, may be subject to further NEPA review or 
other environmental review.
    DOE will use a modular containment vessel system to contain the 
materials released from tests and experiments--materials such as 
depleted uranium, beryllium, lead, copper, and other materials that 
would otherwise be released to the general environment. As discussed 
previously, DOE has always in the past, and will continue in the 
future, to conduct dynamic experiments with plutonium in special 
double-walled containment vessels. However, these vessels are not 
appropriate for tests not involving plutonium. They are limited to high 
explosive charges of 44 pounds (20 kilograms); a containment system for 
non-plutonium tests must accommodate much larger charges (see below). 
The existing vessels also impose substantial limitations on experiment 
configurations and diagnostic capabilities. Therefore, DOE will 
undertake a development program to design, test, and build containment 
vessels specifically for tests that do not use plutonium. This modular 
system will allow the containment vessel to be modified to meet size 
and configuration needs for a given test. Containment of tests not 
involving plutonium will be phased into DOE's long-term hydrodynamic 
testing program at LANL according to the following plan, with 

[[Page 53593]]
the first phase starting when the first axis of DARHT becomes 
operational. The first three phases will involve tests that use up to 
110 pounds (50 kilograms) of high explosives.

--Phase 1--Demonstration (years 1 through 5). DOE will put into place 
at DARHT a prototype vessel system and portable cleanout unit as part 
of a process to reduce the material released to the open air over this 
5-year period. (Based upon the analyses in the DARHT EIS, DOE expects 
that such a reduction would be at least 5% compared to the releases 
expected from the testing program if containment were not used.) During 
this period, DOE will design and build an additional vessel system, 
incorporating experience gained during this phase. Based on the final 
vessel design, DOE will design and start construction of the Vessel 
Cleanout Facility.
--Phase 2--Containment (years 6 through 10). Over the second 5-year 
period DOE will put into place a 5-vessel containment system which will 
be used to further reduce the material released over this 5-year 
period. (Based upon the analyses in the DARHT EIS, DOE expects that 
this reduction would be at least 40%.) DOE will start to operate the 
Vessel Cleanout Facility.
--Phase 3--Enhanced Containment (years 11 through 30). Based on DOE's 
experience gained from the first two phases, the modular containment 
vessels will be continually improved. DOE will use the vessel system to 
further reduce the material released over the next 20-year period. 
(Based upon the analyses in the DARHT EIS, DOE expects that this 
reduction would be at least 75%.)
--Phase 4--440-lb (200-kg) Containment Option. If justified by the 
development effort and operating experience after Phase 1, DOE may 
develop and use a vessel to contain material from tests and experiments 
larger than 110 pounds (50 kilograms). These could include tests of up 
to 440 pounds (200 kilograms) of high explosives, thus allowing DOE to 
contain a greater percentage of material. Phase 4 may be implemented at 
any time after Phase 1.

    DOE will design, construct, and operate the Vessel Cleanout 
Facility to support use of the portable modular containment vessels. 
DOE analyzed two alternative locations for this facility in the DARHT 
EIS. DOE's intention is to locate and construct the Vessel Cleanout 
Facility at the southernmost location analyzed, because that location 
is closest to the DARHT facility and closest to existing utility lines. 
However, if during the detailed design stage DOE determines that it 
would be more beneficial (from the standpoint of operating conditions 
or environmental protection) to construct or operate the cleanout 
facility at the northernmost location, DOE may construct and operate 
the Vessel Cleanout Facility there without performing additional NEPA 
review. DOE will improve an existing firebreak (dirt) road to provide 
access to the Vessel Cleanout Facility at either of the two locations. 
Road improvements will be located to avoid adverse impact to cultural 
resource sites, if any, in the vicinity. If, after designs are 
completed, neither location analyzed in the DARHT EIS proves to be 
suitable, a decision to locate the Vessel Cleanout Facility somewhere 
else may be subject to further NEPA review.
    The modular containment vessel intended for non-plutonium tests has 
not previously been used by DOE, and the operation of this system is 
not well-established. Although DOE expects a highly effective vessel 
design to be achievable, if technological problems were to be 
encountered in fabricating or using the vessel system, or if for some 
other reason the vessels cannot be deployed according to the phased 
schedule, DOE will conduct testing operations at DARHT in such a way as 
to continue to reduce, to the extent practicable, the amount of 
materials released to the environment. Such a reduction may be achieved 
by other methods, including (but not limited to) altering the number of 
experiments or tests, and picking up the expended materials.
    Some non-plutonium tests or experiments of the type anticipated for 
DARHT cannot be conducted inside containment vessels due to diagnostic 
equipment limitations or the type of diagnostic information needed. 
Although DOE will eventually conduct most tests and experiments inside 
containment vessels, DOE may conduct any given test or experiment that 
does not involve plutonium in an open-air configuration, so long as the 
above percentages of material containment are met.

Other Decision Factors

    In addition to environmental factors, DOE considered costs, timing, 
technology, national security, and infrastructure availability. DOE 
considered classified information, including the information and 
analyses in the classified supplement to the DARHT EIS, in making its 
decision. The environmental impacts identified in the classified 
supplement, specifically those relating to human health, were not in 
and of themselves classified, and were therefore also included in the 
environmental analyses in the unclassified portion of the DARHT EIS. 
However, the specific details of the operations that would produce 
those impacts are classified, and are presented only in the classified 
supplement. The factors discussed here include information from the 
classified as well as the unclassified portions of the DARHT EIS.

Cost

    Because DOE must be fiscally prudent, DOE considered construction 
and operating costs. DOE estimates that the total capital cost for 
construction and equipment would vary considerably among alternatives. 
The capital cost for the Phased Containment Option would be the highest 
and that for the No Action Alternative would be the lowest. Over the 
predicted 30 year life of the facility, the Phased Containment Option 
has the lowest estimated total cost of all containment options when 
considering capital cost plus annual operating costs. The total capital 
construction and equipment cost for the Phased Containment Option would 
be about $187 million; on the average, operating costs would be about 
$9.8 million per year. For comparison, DOE estimates the approximate 
total capital costs and operating costs, respectively, for other 
alternatives at $181 million and $10.4 million for the Building 
Containment Option; $176 million and $10.4 million for the Vessel 
Containment Option; $167 million and $6.5 million for the Upgrade 
PHERMEX Alternative; $145 million and $6.5 million for either the DARHT 
Baseline Alternative or the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative; $97 
million and $5.4 million for the Single Axis Alternative; and $49 
million and $4.2 million for the No Action Alternative. As documented 
in the draft DARHT EIS, DOE originally calculated project capital costs 
based on installing 16 MeV linear accelerators. DOE estimates that the 
additional cost to install 20 MeV accelerators would be about $8 
million per machine.

Timing

    Because DOE needs to begin establishing baseline conditions of 
weapons in the enduring stockpile as soon as possible, DOE considered 
when it could achieve that level of enhanced capability provided by a 
single axis, and then considered if it could achieve the full enhanced 
multiple-view capability as well. PHERMEX and FXR are now in 

[[Page 53594]]
use, so under the No Action Alternative the existing (non-enhanced) 
capability is currently available and multiple-view capability would 
never be available. Under the DARHT Baseline Alternative and all other 
alternatives except the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative, the first axis 
would be ready 38 months after construction resumes; for the DARHT 
Baseline Alternative and all other alternatives except as noted, the 
second axis would be available in 66 months (an additional 28 months). 
Under the Building Containment Option, dual axis capability would be 
ready in 77 months without interim single axis capability due to the 
additional time to construct the containment building. (Under this 
option, no tests would be conducted until the containment building was 
operational.) Under the Single Axis Alternative, a multiple-axis 
capability would never be available. Under the Upgrade PHERMEX 
Alternative, the existing operating capability would be lost for 51 
months due to construction, and the second axis would be ready 71 
months after construction began.
    DOE considered whether it would be prudent to wait for development 
of the technology and design of an even more advanced multiple-view 
hydrodynamic testing capability instead of pursuing DARHT. Although DOE 
has conceptualized the next generation of advanced hydrodynamic testing 
capability, potential technologies for such a facility have not yet 
been selected, developed or proven. DOE would incur additional risk to 
its ability to ensure the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons 
stockpile if, instead of obtaining a known enhanced capability in the 
near-term, it waited the several years necessary to identify and 
develop an advanced technology.
    DOE also considered whether it would be prudent to wait until it 
has made the programmatic decisions expected to follow the completion 
of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic EIS [60 FR 
31291] or the LANL Sitewide EIS [60 FR 25697] now under preparation. 
The DARHT EIS notes that the actions needed to improve DOE's capability 
to conduct hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments are included 
within the stockpile stewardship mission defined by the President and 
Congress. The DOE proposal to provide enhanced high-resolution 
multiple-view radiographic capability responds to Presidential and 
Congressional direction. For the reasons noted below, DOE finds that 
this decision to acquire enhanced capability will not prejudice its 
future decisions regarding stockpile stewardship and management, or 
regarding providing an environmentally-sound operating envelope for 
LANL.
    DOE will continue with its ongoing hydrodynamic testing program, 
and will need the enhanced capability provided by DARHT to implement 
that program, regardless of any other decisions to be made regarding 
stockpile stewardship and management. Thus, the courses of action 
analyzed in the DARHT EIS, and the action decided upon in this ROD, are 
justified independently of the stockpile stewardship and management 
program, and will not prejudice any ultimate decision on the program, 
nor will they be influenced by the expected programmatic decisions. The 
LANL Sitewide EIS will assist with decisions on how to operate LANL in 
an environmentally-sound manner; this ROD will not prejudice any 
decisions expected to result from the LANL Sitewide EIS. Accordingly, 
DOE finds that it would not be consistent with the nation's need to 
obtain enhanced radiographic hydrodynamic capability as quickly as 
possible if the Department delayed its decisions on DARHT until after 
completion of the other two EISs, nor would the Department benefit 
programmatically from such a delay.

Technology

    DOE could achieve enhanced high-resolution radiographic capability 
under any of the alternatives analyzed in the DARHT EIS except the No 
Action Alternative. While still operating adequately at this time, the 
existing equipment at PHERMEX is approaching the end of its design life 
and DOE is concerned that it will become increasingly difficult and 
expensive to continue to maintain the aging accelerator over time. 
Under the Single Axis Alternative, DOE could not achieve the three-
dimensional or sequential capability that could be achieved with dual 
axis capability, thus defeating a key component of the purpose and need 
for the project.
    The three options under the Enhanced Containment Alternative would 
impede the image quality somewhat, but not to an unacceptable level. 
Containment also decreases testing efficiency in that it would take 
more time to prepare and execute a new test and would not allow for 
overhead diagnostics.

National Security

    DOE needs to achieve high-resolution, high-speed multiple-axis 
radiographic hydrodynamic capability as soon as possible to ensure the 
greatest degree of confidence in the continued safety and reliability 
of the nuclear weapons stockpile. DOE needs to be able to use this type 
of capability to perform contained dynamic experiments with plutonium 
in support of its nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship and management 
mission. The existing hydrodynamic facilities at PHERMEX and FXR cannot 
provide the needed level of confidence to support our national security 
goals. Under the Single Axis Alternative, DOE could not obtain the 
three-dimensional or rapid-time-sequenced images needed to provide the 
maximum amount of diagnostic information to meet national security 
goals. Under the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative, DOE could not use the 
enhanced capability to diagnose the effects of dynamic experiments 
involving plutonium, which would not meet national security goals. 
Under the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative, DOE would lose the ability to 
perform any hydrodynamic testing at LANL, and the capability to perform 
dynamic experiments with plutonium for 51 months, which would encumber 
national security goals.

Infrastructure

    DOE needs to be able to use an enhanced radiographic capability for 
dynamic experiments involving plutonium. These experiments will always 
be conducted in special double-walled steel containment vessels. 
Special facilities are needed to fabricate plutonium shapes; store and 
handle plutonium; perform plutonium chemistry diagnostics; process 
material for experiments and for storage; and to ensure worker safety 
and security. The large, heavy, double-walled containment vessels that 
would be used for dynamic experiments with plutonium would be difficult 
to handle or to transport over long distances. While LANL already has 
the requisite plutonium storage and handling infrastructure at its 
Plutonium Facility and other facilities, no other DOE site currently 
has a plutonium storage and handling capability sufficient to support 
dynamic experiments with plutonium. DOE has determined that it would be 
unreasonably costly (up to about $10,000 per square foot) to construct 
new plutonium handling and storage facilities at another site when 
adequate operating technical facilities are already in place and in use 
at LANL. In addition, LANL already has an infrastructure in place to 
support the ongoing (non-plutonium) testing program at PHERMEX.

Balancing Decision Factors

    In order to be able to continue to ensure the safety and 
reliability of the existing stockpile, DOE needs to obtain an enhanced 
capability to perform 

[[Page 53595]]
hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments, and to obtain that 
capability as soon as possible. DOE cannot afford to wait for 
development of future advanced technologies, but instead must make use 
of known technology.
    Because DOE needs to be able to perform contained dynamic 
experiments with plutonium, DOE needs to have a plutonium handling 
capability to support the dynamic experiments; this support 
infrastructure is already in place at LANL and it would be too costly 
(several hundred million dollars) to replicate these facilities at 
another site solely to support an enhanced radiographic capability. 
Similarly, the safe transport of containment vessels that have been 
used for dynamic experiments with plutonium from another site to LANL 
would be prohibitively expensive. For these reasons, DOE needs to 
provide an enhanced radiographic capability at LANL.
    DOE has concluded that the existing radiography equipment at 
PHERMEX (the No Action Alternative) does not meet the Department's need 
for enhanced high-resolution multiple-view radiographic capability. 
Enlarging the existing PHERMEX facility or constructing a second axis 
at PHERMEX would require DOE to forego its hydrodynamic capability at 
LANL for 51 months. DOE finds that a 51-month loss of its ability to 
conduct hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments at LANL is an 
unacceptable situation. Therefore DOE decided not to upgrade the 
existing PHERMEX facility to achieve enhanced single or dual axis 
radiographic capability (the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative).
    DOE needs to obtain high-resolution multiple-view radiographic 
capability to obtain the best information about nuclear weapons 
primaries. To equip only one axis of the dual axis DARHT facility would 
not allow DOE to obtain three-dimensional or time-sequenced 
information. Although there would be a cost reduction of about one-
third if DOE did not equip the second axis, there would be very little 
difference in environmental impact, and national security goals would 
not be met. Therefore, DOE decided against installing accelerator 
equipment in only one axis of the DARHT facility (the Single Axis 
Alternative).
    DOE needs to obtain high-resolution radiographic capability to 
conduct, among other things, contained dynamic experiments with 
plutonium. It would be inconsistent with national security goals to go 
to the expense of obtaining the high-resolution radiographic equipment 
planned for DARHT and to not use it for dynamic experiments with 
plutonium. In the event that DOE decided to operate DARHT without 
conducting plutonium experiments, DOE would have to maintain PHERMEX 
into the indefinite future to provide a capability to conduct plutonium 
experiments without taking advantage of DARHT's enhanced capability. 
This would neither be cost-effective nor meet national security goals. 
Accordingly, DOE decided against the option of completing DARHT but 
limiting the use of the facility to exclude the use of plutonium while 
maintaining PHERMEX indefinitely (the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative).
    DOE initially preferred the DARHT Baseline Alternative. However, 
after examining the environmental impacts identified in the DARHT EIS, 
and the public and agency comments on the draft DARHT EIS, DOE 
recognized that achieving an enhanced level of containment provides an 
opportunity to increase the quality of DOE's environmental stewardship 
by decreasing contamination from expended test materials (the Enhanced 
Containment Alternative). Therefore DOE has decided against 
implementing the DARHT Baseline Alternative by itself, even though 
providing an enhanced level of containment is more expensive. From a 
programmatic standpoint, the immediate use of vessel or building 
containment could have serious design or operating limitations. Phasing 
a program of vessel containment over ten years would allow DOE to take 
advantage of the environmental mitigation effect of enhanced vessel 
containment while still allowing the DARHT facility to be completed 
relatively quickly to meet national security needs as soon as possible.
    Under the Building Containment Option, the concrete containment 
structure would have to be very large in comparison to the firing site 
to contain the overpressure from an explosive test; DOE would forego 
the capability for experiments or tests using large amounts of high 
explosives or other specific types of large-scale tests because of the 
structural limitations of the building. Also, this option would place 
serious constraints on DOE's ability to conduct dynamic experiments 
with plutonium because of the difficulty in moving the large, double-
walled steel containment vessels needed for plutonium experiments in 
and out of the containment building.
    The DARHT EIS analysis of the Vessel Containment Option assumed 
that the DARHT facility would operate from the outset with most tests 
and experiments conducted inside modular single-walled steel 
containment vessels. If this limitation were imposed, the number of 
tests that could be conducted early in the operating life of the 
facility would be significantly reduced. Although some conceptual work 
has been done, DOE has not yet designed the modular vessels. DOE would 
have to perfect a prototype vessel before fabricating all the vessels 
needed. The use of modular vessels depends on construction and 
operation of the Vessel Cleanout Facility; the design for this building 
could not be finalized until after the prototype vessels were perfected 
in order to determine the specific details of cleanout equipment and 
techniques. DOE estimates that it would take approximately 10 years 
beyond the available date of the DARHT facility to complete these 
activities and be able to conduct a full schedule of contained tests. 
DOE finds that a delay of five or ten years to implement the modular 
vessel containment system before operating the DARHT facility would be 
unacceptable and would not meet the Department's need to obtain the use 
of DARHT's capability as soon as possible.
    By phasing the implementation of the vessel prototyping program, 
within about 10 years DOE could achieve the same environmental 
protection results as could be obtained under the Vessel Containment 
Option without delaying or adversely affecting its ability to operate 
DARHT. Therefore, DOE developed the Phased Containment Option. Under 
this option, for the first 10 years environmental mitigation would be 
greater than would occur under the DARHT Baseline Alternative but less 
than would occur under the Vessel Containment Option; after that point, 
environmental mitigation would be the same for the Phased Containment 
Option and the Vessel Containment Option. Accordingly, DOE has decided 
to implement the Phased Containment Option rather than delay operation 
of DARHT, as would have been the case under the Vessel Containment 
Option.
    For some tests, DOE cannot meet programmatic objectives if vessel 
containment is used. Therefore, on a case-by case basis, DOE may opt to 
conduct certain types of non-plutonium tests as uncontained, such as 
those using a very large explosive charge (larger than the containment 
vessel rating); those requiring complex diagnostics (such as certain 
optics or laser tests) that cannot be achieved using a containment 
vessel; those requiring measurement of material movement beyond the 
confines of the vessel; or those using a very small 

[[Page 53596]]
explosives charge or small amounts of hazardous materials in which use 
of the vessel would not be practical, cost-effective, or 
environmentally significant. After the phased containment program is 
fully implemented, DOE expects to reduce by at least 75% the emissions 
from test assemblies made from beryllium, depleted uranium, or Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act characteristic metals. For any experiment 
that is contained, DOE expects that at least 99% by mass of these 
materials would be retained inside the vessel.

Mitigation Measures

    Through the environmental impact analysis process, and in 
conjunction with consultations with affected American Indian tribes and 
with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, DOE developed several 
mitigation measures to protect soils, water, wildlife, biotic, and 
cultural resources. Some mitigation measures would apply during 
construction activities, and some for the duration of the project. DOE 
has agreed to an ongoing consultation process with affected American 
Indian tribes to ensure protection of cultural resources and sites of 
cultural, historic or religious importance to the tribes. DOE will take 
special precautions to protect the Mexican spotted owl, a federally-
listed threatened species, and in consultation with the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service, will prepare a laboratory-wide habitat management 
plan for all threatened and endangered species occurring throughout 
LANL in order to determine long-range mitigation actions to protect the 
habitats for these species. The habitat management plan will be 
completed within 3 years from the date of this decision, and will be 
updated as necessary. DOE will implement the mitigation measures 
discussed in section 5.11 of volume 1 of the DARHT EIS. In accordance 
with 10 CFR 1021.331, DOE is preparing a Mitigation Action Plan that 
will identify specific actions needed to implement these mitigation 
measures, and provide schedules for completion. These mitigation 
measures represent all practicable means to avoid or minimize harm from 
the alternative selected.

Conclusion

    In accordance with the provisions of NEPA, its implementing 
regulations, and DOE's NEPA regulations, and consistent with the U.S. 
District Court Order of May 5, 1995, I have considered the information 
contained within the final DARHT EIS, including the classified 
supplement to that EIS, and the public comments received in response to 
the draft DARHT EIS. Being fully apprised of the environmental 
consequences of the proposal and its several alternatives, as well as 
the cost considerations and other decision factors described above, I 
have concluded the following:

--Completing and operating the DARHT facility at LANL would meet the 
need of the Department and this nation to obtain as soon as possible an 
enhanced capability to perform high-resolution, multiple-image 
radiography to diagnose hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments.
--Conducting most tests and experiments inside modular steel 
containment vessels will reduce the potential for contamination from 
dispersal of materials from the explosive-driven tests.
--Phasing in the implementation of the modular vessel system over a 
ten-year period will allow DOE to gain the benefit of operating the 
DARHT facility as quickly as possible.
--The incrementally higher impacts during the phase-in period do not 
pose an unacceptable risk to public health and welfare, or to the 
environment.

    I have therefore determined that DOE will implement the Phased 
Containment Option of the Enhanced Containment Alternative, identified 
as the preferred alternative in the DARHT EIS. As part of this action, 
DOE will take additional mitigation measures, specified herein, 
including those to protect the habitat of threatened or endangered 
species, and to protect cultural resource sites and other locations of 
interest to affected American Indian tribes. These actions will allow 
DOE to meet its responsibility to ensure the safety and reliability of 
the nuclear weapons stockpile, while meeting its additional 
responsibility for environmental stewardship of the lands and resources 
entrusted to its care.

    Issued at Washington, D.C. October 10, 1995.
Victor H. Reis,
Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs.
[FR Doc. 95-25596 Filed 10-13-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P