[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 192 (Wednesday, October 4, 1995)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 51918-51921]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-24664]



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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Department of the Army

32 CFR Part 505


Privacy Program

AGENCY: Department of the Army, DOD.
ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Department of the Army system of records notice A0381-
45cDAMI was deleted October 4, 1995. Therefore, the exemption rule is 
being deleted with this action.
    In addition, the Army is amending three existing exemption rules to 
reflect the exemptions taken in the system of records notices. The 
amendments to the existing rules change the system identifiers and 
provide the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a from which the system of 
records may be exempt, and the reasons therefore. The system 
identifiers are A0381-20bDAMI, entitled Counterintelligence Operations 
Files; A0614-115DAMI, entitled Department of the Army Operational 
Support Activities; and A0318-100aDAMI, entitled Intelligence 
Collection Files.
EFFECTIVE DATE: October 4, 1995.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Pat Turner at (602) 538-6856 or 
DSN 879-6856.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Executive Order 12866

    The Director, Administration and Management, Office of the 
Secretary of Defense has determined that this proposed Privacy Act rule 
for the Department of Defense does not constitute 'significant 
regulatory action'. Analysis of the rule indicates that it does not 
have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more; does not 
create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action 
taken or planned by another agency; does not materially alter the 
budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs 
or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof; does not raise 
novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the 
President's priorities, or the principles set forth in Executive Order 
12866 (1993).

Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980

    The Director, Administration and Management, Office of the 
Secretary of Defense certifies that this Privacy Act rule for the 
Department of Defense does not have significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities because it is concerned only with 
the administration of Privacy Act systems of records within the 
Department of Defense. 

[[Page 51919]]


Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Director, Administration and Management, Office of the 
Secretary of Defense certifies that this Privacy Act proposed rule for 
the Department of Defense imposes no information requirements beyond 
the Department of Defense and that the information collected within the 
Department of Defense is necessary and consistent with 5 U.S.C. 552a, 
known as the Privacy Act of 1974.
    The Department of the Army system of records notice A0381-45cDAMI 
was deleted October 4, 1995. Therefore, the exemption rule is being 
deleted with this action.
    In addition, the Army is amending three existing exemption rules. 
The amendments to the existing rules change the system identifiers and 
provide the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a from which the system of 
records may be exempt, and the reasons therefore. The system 
identifiers are A0381-20bDAMI, entitled Counterintelligence Operations 
Files; A0614-115DAMI, entitled Department of the Army Operational 
Support Activities; and A0318-100aDAMI, entitled Intelligence 
Collection Files.

List of Subjects in 32 CFR Part 505

    Privacy.

    Accordingly, 32 CFR part 505 is amended as follows:

    1. The authority citation for 32 CFR part 505 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: Pub. L. 93-579, 88 Stat 1896 (5 U.S.C.552a).

    2. Section 505.5, is amended by revising the text of paragraphs 
(e)ac, (e)ad, and (e)af, and removing and reserving paragraph (e)ae as 
follows:


Sec.  505.5  Exemptions.

* * * * *
    (e)  Exempt Army records. * * *

    ac. System identifier: A0381-20bDAMI.
    (1) System name: Counterintelligence/Security Files.
    (2) Exemption: All portions of this system of records may be exempt 
from the provisions of subsections (c)(3), (d)(1) through (d)(5), 
(e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I), and (f) of 5 U.S.C. 552a.
    (3) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5).
    (4) Reasons: (a) From subsection (c)(3) because disclosing the 
agencies to which information from this system has been released could 
inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential 
criminal violation, or intelligence operation or investigation; or the 
existence of that investigation or operation; of the nature and scope 
of the information and evidence obtained as to his/her activities or of 
the identify of confidential sources, witnesses, and intelligence 
personnel and could provide information to enable the subject to avoid 
detection or apprehension. Granting access to such information could 
seriously impede or compromise an investigation; endanger the physical 
safety of confidential sources, witnesses, intelligence personnel, and 
their families; lead to the improper influencing of witnesses; the 
destruction of evidence or the fabrication of testimony and disclose 
investigative techniques and procedures. In addition, granting access 
to such information could disclose classified and sensitive sources, 
information, and operational methods and could constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of others.
    (b) From subsection (d)(1) through (d)(5) because granting access 
to records in this system of records could inform the subject of a 
counterintelligence operation or investigation of an actual or 
potential criminal violation or the existence of that operation or 
investigation; of the nature and scope of the information and evidence 
obtained as to his/her activities; or of the identity of confidential 
sources, witnesses and intelligence personnel and could provide 
information to enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. 
Granting access to such information could seriously impede or 
compromise an operation or investigation; endanger the physical safety 
of confidential sources, witnesses, intelligence personnel and their 
families; lead to the improper influencing of witnesses; the 
destruction of evidence or the fabrication of testimony and disclose 
investigative techniques and procedures. In addition, the agency is 
required to protect the confidentiality of sources who furnished 
information to the Government under an expressed promise of 
confidentiality or, prior to September 27, 1975, under an implied 
promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence. 
This confidentiality is needed to maintain the Government's continued 
access to information from persons who otherwise might refuse to give 
it.
    (c) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to 
detect the relevance or necessity of specific information in the early 
stages of an investigation or operation. Relevance and necessity are 
often questions of judgement and timing, an it is only after the 
information is evaluated that the relevance and necessity of such 
information can be established. In addition, during the course of the 
investigation or operation, the investigator may obtain information 
which is incidental to the main purpose of the investigative 
jurisdiction of another agency. Such information cannot readily be 
segregated. Furthermore, during the course of the investigation or 
operation, the investigator may obtain information concerning 
violations of laws other than those which are within the scope of his/
her jurisdiction. In the interest of effective intelligence operations 
and law enforcement, military intelligence agents should retain 
information, since it an aid in establishing patterns of criminal or 
intelligence activity and provide valuable leads for other law 
enforcement or intelligence agencies.

    (d) From subsection (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f) because this 
system or records is being exempt from subsections (d) of the Act, 
concerning access to records. These requirements are inapplicable to 
the extent that this system of records will be exempt from subsections 
(d)(1) through (d)(5) of the Act. Although the system would be exempt 
from these requirements, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence has 
published information concerning its notification, access, and contest 
procedures because under certain circumstances, the Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Intelligence could decide it is appropriate for an individual 
to have access to all or a portion of his/her records in this system of 
records.

    (e) From subsection (e)(4)(I) because it is necessary to protect 
the confidentiality of the sources of information, to protect the 
privacy and physical safety of confidential sources and witnesses and 
to avoid the disclosure of investigative techniques and procedures. 
Although the system will be exempt from this requirement, the Deputy 
Chief of Staff for Intelligence has published such a notice in broad, 
generic terms.

    ad. System identifier: A0614-115DAMI.
    (1) System name: Department of the Army Operational Support 
Activities.
    (2) Exemption: All portions of this system of records that fall 
within the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), or (k)(5) may be 
exempt from subsections 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d)(1) through (d)(5), 
(e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I), and (f).
    (3) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5).
    (4) Reasons: (a) From subsection (c)(3)because disclosing the 
agencies to which information from this system has 

[[Page 51920]]
been released could reveal the subject's involvement in a sensitive 
intelligence or counterintelligence operation or investigation of an 
actual or potential criminal violation, or intelligence operation or 
investigation; or the existence of that investigation or operation. 
Granting access to such information could seriously impede or 
compromise an investigation or operation; endanger the physical safety 
of participants and their families, confidential sources, witnesses, 
intelligence personnel, and their families; and lead to the improper 
influencing of witnesses; the destruction of evidence or the 
fabrication of testimony and disclose investigative techniques and 
procedures.
    (b) From subsection (d)(1) through (d)(5) because granting access 
to records could inform the subject of an intelligence or 
counterintelligence operation or investigation of an actual or 
potential criminal violation or the existence of that operation or 
investigation; of the nature and scope of the information and evidence 
obtained, or of the identity of confidential sources, witnesses and 
intelligence personnel. Granting access to such information could 
seriously impede or compromise an operation or investigation; endanger 
the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, intelligence 
personnel and their families; lead to the improper influencing of 
witnesses; the destruction of evidence or the fabrication of testimony; 
disclose investigative techniques and procedures; invade the privacy of 
those individuals involved in intelligence programs and their families; 
compromise and thus negate specialized techniques used to support 
intelligence programs; and interfere with and negate the orderly 
conduct of intelligence and counterintelligence operations and 
investigations. In addition, the agency is required to protect the 
confidentiality of sources who furnished information to the Government 
under an expressed promise of confidentiality or, prior to September 
27, 1975, under an implied promise that the identity of the source 
would be held in confidence. This confidentiality is needed to maintain 
the Government's continued access to information from persons who 
otherwise might refuse to give it.
    (c) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to 
detect the relevance of specific information in the early stages of an 
investigation or operation. Relevance and necessity are often questions 
of judgment and timing, and it is only after the information is 
evaluated that the relevance and necessity of such information can be 
established. In addition, during the course of the investigation or 
operation, the investigator or operative may obtain information which 
is incidental to the main purpose of the investigative jurisdiction of 
another agency. Such information cannot readily be segregated. 
Furthermore, during the course of the investigation or operation, the 
investigator may obtain information concerning violations of law other 
than those which are within the scope of his/her jurisdiction. In the 
interest of effective intelligence operations and law enforcement, 
military intelligence agents should retain information, since it is an 
aid in establishing patterns of criminal or intelligence activity and 
provides valuable leads for other law enforcement or intelligence 
agencies.
    (d) From subsection (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f) because this 
system or records is being exempt from subsections (d) of the Act, 
concerning access to records. These requirements are inapplicable to 
the extent that this system of records will be exempt from subsections 
(d)(1) through (d)(5) of the Act. Although the system would be exempt 
from these requirements, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence has 
published information concerning its notification, access, and contest 
procedures because under certain circumstances, the Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Intelligence could decide it is appropriate for an individual 
to have access to all or a portion os his/her records in this system of 
records.
    (e) From subsection (e)(4)(I) because it is necessary to protect 
the confidentiality of sources of information, to protectthe privacy 
and physical safety of participants and their families, confidential 
sources, and witnesses and to avoid the disclosure of specialized 
techniques and procedures. Although the system will be exempt from this 
requirement, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence has published 
such a notice in broad, generic terms.
    ae. [Reserved.]
    af. System identifier: A0381-100aDAMI.
    (1) System name: Intelligence/Counterintelligence Source Files.
    (2) Exemption: All portions of this system of records that fall 
within the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), or (k)(5) may be 
exempt from subsections 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d)(1) through (d)(5), 
(e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I), and (f).
    (3) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5).
    (4) Reasons: (a) From subsection (c)(3)because disclosing the 
agencies to which information from this system has been released could 
reveal the subject's involvement in a sensitive intelligence or 
counterintelligence operation or investigation of an actual or 
potential criminal violation, or intelligence operation or 
investigation; or the existence of that investigation or operation. 
Granting access to such information could seriously impede or 
compromise an investigation or operation; endanger the physical safety 
of participants and their families, confidential sources, witnesses, 
intelligence personnel, and their families; and lead to the improper 
influencing of witnesses; the destruction of evidence or the 
fabrication of testimony and disclose investigative techniques and 
procedures.
    (b) From subsection (d)(1) through (d)(5) because granting access 
to records could inform the subject of an intelligence or 
counterintelligence operation or investigation of an actual or 
potential criminal violation or the existence of that operation or 
investigation; or the nature and scope of the information and evidence 
obtained, or of the identity of confidential sources, witnesses and 
intelligence personnel. Granting access to such information could 
seriously impede or compromise an operation or investigation; endanger 
the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, intelligence 
personnel and their families; lead to the improper influencing of 
witnesses; the destruction of evidence or the fabrication of testimony; 
disclose investigative techniques and procedures; invade the privacy of 
those individuals involved in intelligence programs and their families; 
compromise and thus negate specialized techniques used to support 
intelligence programs; and interfere with and negate the orderly 
conduct of intelligence and counterintelligence operations and 
investigations. In addition, the agency is required to protect the 
confidentiality of sources who furnished information to the Government 
under an expressed promise of confidentiality or, prior to September 
27, 1975, under an implied promise that the identity of the source 
would be held in confidence. This confidentiality is needed to maintain 
the Government's continued access to information from persons who 
otherwise might refuse to give it.
    (c) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to 
detect the relevance or necessity of specific information in the early 
stages of an investigation or operation. Relevance and necessity are 
often questions of judgment and timing, and it is only after the 
information is evaluated that the relevance and necessity of such 
information can be established. In 

[[Page 51921]]
addition, during the course of the investigation or operation, the 
investigator or operative may obtain information which is incidental to 
the main purpose of the investigative jurisdiction of another agency. 
Such information cannot readily be segregated. Furthermore, during the 
course of the investigation or operation, the investigator may obtain 
information concerning violations of law other than those which are 
within the scope of his/her jurisdiction. In the interest of effective 
intelligence operations and law enforcement, military intelligence 
agents should retain information, since it is an aid in establishing 
patterns of criminal or intelligence activity and provides valuable 
leads for other law enforcement or intelligence agencies.
    (d) From subsection (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f) because this 
system of records is being exempt from subsection (d) of the Act 
concerning access to records. These requirements are inapplicable to 
the extent that this system of records will be exempt from subsections 
(d)(1) through (d)(5) of the Act. Although the system would be exempt 
from these requirements, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence has 
published information concerning its notification, access, and contest 
procedures because under certain circumstances, the Deputy Chief of 
staff for Intelligence could decide it is appropriate for an individual 
to have access to all or a portion of his/her records in this system of 
records.
    (e) From subsection (e)(4)(I) because it is necessary to protect 
the confidentiality of sources of information, to protect the privacy 
and physical safety of participants and their families, confidential 
sources, and witnesses and to avoid the disclosure of specialized 
techniques and procedures. Although the system will be exempt from this 
requirement, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence has published 
such a notice in broad generic terms.
* * * * *

    Dated: September 28, 1995.


L. M. Bynum,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
[FR Doc. 95-24664 Filed 10-3-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5000-04-F