

raised serious doubt as to whether he can be relied upon to comply with NRC requirements and to provide complete and accurate information to NRC licensees. Further, Dr. Yu has demonstrated an unwillingness to comply with NRC requirements necessary for the protection of the health and safety of personnel and patients affected by the areas of his responsibility. Dr. Yu's deliberate false statements to Licensee officials concerning radiological exposure to patients and his deliberate violation of NRC requirements is not acceptable conduct for a person engaged in NRC-licensed activities.

Consequently, I lack the requisite reasonable assurance that licensed activities can be conducted in compliance with the Commission's requirements and that the health and safety of the public would be protected if Dr. Yu were permitted at this time to be involved in any NRC-licensed activities.

Therefore, the public health, safety and interest require, pending completion of the investigation and further action by the NRC, that Dr. Yu be prohibited from involvement in licensed activities. Furthermore, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202, I find that the significance of the conduct described above is such that the public health, safety and interest require that this Order be immediately effective.

IV

Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 81, 161b, 161i, 182 and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, 10 CFR 30.10, and 10 CFR 150.20, it is hereby ordered, effective immediately, that:

Pending further investigation and order by the NRC, Hung Yu, Ph.D. is prohibited from participation in any respect in NRC-licensed activities. For the purposes of this paragraph, NRC-licensed activities include licensed activities of: (1) An NRC licensee, (2) an Agreement State licensee conducting licensed activities in NRC jurisdiction pursuant to 10 CFR 150.20, and (3) an Agreement State licensee involved in distribution of products that are subject to NRC jurisdiction.

The Director, Office of Enforcement, may, in writing, relax or rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration by Dr. Yu of good cause.

V

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, Hung Yu, Ph.D. must, and any other person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this Order, and may request a hearing on this

Order, within 20 days of the date of this Order. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the time to request a hearing. A request for extension of time must be made in writing to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and include a statement of good cause for the extension. The answer may consent to this Order. Unless the answer consents to this Order, the answer shall, in writing and under oath or affirmation, specifically admit or deny each allegation or charge made in this Order and shall set forth the matters of fact and law on which Hung Yu, Ph.D. or other person adversely affected relies and the reasons as to why the Order should not have been issued. Any answer or request for a hearing shall be submitted to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attn: Chief, Docketing and Service Section, Washington, DC 20555. Copies also shall be sent to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to the Assistant General Counsel for Hearings and Enforcement at the same address, to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region IV, Suite 400, 611 Ryan Plaza, Arlington, Texas 76011, and to Hung Yu, Ph.D., if the answer or hearing request is by a person other than Hung Yu, Ph.D. If a person other than Hung Yu, Ph.D. requests a hearing, that person shall set forth with particularity the manner in which his or her interest is adversely affected by this Order and shall address the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.714(d).

If a hearing is requested by Hung Yu, Ph.D. or a person whose interest is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order should be sustained.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), Hung Yu, Ph.D., or any other person adversely affected by this Order, may, in addition to demanding a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move the presiding officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the Order on the ground that the Order, including the need for immediate effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, unfounded allegations, or error.

In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions specified in Section IV above shall be final 20 days from the date of this Order without further order or proceedings. If an

extension of time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the provisions specified in Section IV shall be final when the extension expires if a hearing request has not been received. An answer or a request for hearing shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this Order.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 18th day of September 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Hugh L. Thompson, Jr.,
Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Materials Safety, Safeguards, and Operations Support.

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[Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-323]

Pacific Gas and Electric Company; Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an exemption from certain requirements of its regulations for Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-80 and DPR-82, issued to Pacific Gas and Electric Company (the licensee), for operation of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant (DCPP) located in San Luis Obispo County, California.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of Proposed Action

The proposed action would allow implementation of a hand geometry biometric system of site access control such that photograph identification badges can be taken offsite.

The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's application dated May 5, 1995, and supplemental letters dated July 28, 1995, September 14, 1995 and September 19, 1995, for exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 73.55, "Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power plant reactors against radiological sabotage."

The Need for the Proposed Action

Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, paragraph (a), the licensee shall establish and maintain an onsite physical protection system and security organization.

Paragraph (1) of 10 CFR 73.55(d), "Access Requirements," specifies that "licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area.* * *" It is specified in 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) that "A numbered picture badge identification system shall

be used for all individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without escort." It also states that an individual not employed by the licensee (i.e., contractors) may be authorized access to protected areas without escort provided the individual "receives a picture badge upon entrance into the protected area which must be returned upon exit from the protected area
* * *."

Currently, unescorted access into protected areas of the DCPD is controlled through the use of a photograph on a combination badge and keycard. (Hereafter, these are referred to as badges). The security officers at the entrance station use the photograph on the badge to visually identify the individual requesting access. The badges for both licensee employees and contractor personnel who have been granted unescorted access are issued upon entrance at the entrance/exit location and are returned upon exit. The badges are stored and are retrievable at the entrance/exit location. In accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5), contractor individuals are not allowed to take badges offsite. In accordance with the plant's physical security plans, neither licensee employees nor contractors are allowed to take badges offsite.

The licensee proposes to implement an alternative unescorted access control system which would eliminate the need to issue and retrieve badges at the entrance/exit location and would allow all individuals with unescorted access to keep their badges with them when departing the site.

An exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to permit contractors to take their badges offsite instead of returning them when exiting the site.

The Commission has completed its evaluation of the proposed action. Under the proposed system, each individual who is authorized for unescorted entry into protected areas would have the physical characteristics of their hand (hand geometry) registered with their badge number in the access control system. When an individual enters the badge into the card reader and places the hand on the measuring surface, the system would record the individual's hand image. The unique characteristics of the extracted hand image would be compared with the previously stored template to verify authorization for entry. Individuals, including licensee employees and contractors, would be allowed to keep their badges with them when they depart the site.

Based on a Sandia report entitled "A Performance Evaluation of Biometric Identification Devices" (SAND91-0276 UC-906 Unlimited Release, printed June 1991), and on its experience with the current photo-identification system, the licensee stated that the false acceptance rate of the proposed hand geometry system is comparable to that of the current system. The licensee stated that the use of the badges with the hand geometry system would increase the overall level of access control. Since both the badge and hand geometry would be necessary for access into the protected area, the proposed system would provide for a positive verification process. Potential loss of a badge by an individual, as a result of taking the badge offsite, would not enable an unauthorized entry into protected areas. The licensee will implement a process for testing the proposed system to ensure continued overall level of performance equivalent to that specified in the regulation. The Physical Security Plan for DCPD will be revised to include implementation and testing of the hand geometry access control system and to allow licensee employees and contractors to take their badges offsite.

The access process will continue to be under the observation of security personnel. A numbered picture badge identification system will continue to be used for all individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without escorts. Badges will continue to be displayed by all individuals while inside the protected area.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

The change will not increase the probability or consequences of accidents, no changes are being made in the types of any effluent that may be released off site, and there is no significant increase in the allowable individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant radiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed action involves features located entirely within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. It does not affect nonradiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impact. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant nonradiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

Since the Commission has concluded there is no measurable environmental impact associated with the proposed action, any alternatives with equal or greater environmental impact need not be evaluated. The principal alternative to the action would be to deny the request. Such action would not change any current environmental impacts. The environmental impacts of the proposed action and the alternative action are similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

This action does not involve the use of any resources not previously considered in the "Final Environmental Statement related to the Nuclear Generating Station Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2", dated May 1973.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

In accordance with its stated policy, on August 23, 1995, the staff consulted with the California State official, Mr. Steve Hsu of the Department of Health Services, regarding the environmental impact statement for the proposed action. The State official had no comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

Based upon the environmental assessment, the Commission concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the Commission has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed action.

For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the licensee's letter dated May 5, 1995, and supplements dated July 28, 1995, September 14, 1995 and September 19, 1995, which are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, The Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC and at the local public document room located at the California Polytechnic State University, Robert E. Kennedy Library, Government Documents and Maps Department, San Luis Obispo, California 93407.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 20th day of September 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

James C. Stone,

Senior Project Manager, Project Directorate IV-2, Division of Reactor Projects III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

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