

the following issues, but may address other issues as time permits and in supplementary written comments:

A. Apart from internal inspection, are current DOT safety regulations that require periodic inspection of pipelines for corrosion and leaks sufficient under the mandate?

B. What are the circumstances in which the regulations should require operators to use instrumented internal inspection devices?

C. What defects should the regulations require the use of instrumented internal inspection devices to detect?

D. What other inspection methods are as effective as using an instrumented internal inspection device?

E. How should the regulations define areas of high-density population, areas unusually sensitive to environmental damage in the event of a pipeline accident, and navigable waterways.

F. What are the per mile costs of inspection with instrumented internal inspection devices and the factors that determine those costs?
(49 U.S.C. Chapter 601)

Issued in Washington, DC on August 24, 1995.

Richard B. Felder,

Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
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49 CFR Part 195

[Docket No. PS-133, Notice 2]

RIN 2137-AC39

Emergency Flow Restricting Devices/ Leak Detection Equipment on Hazardous Liquid Pipelines

AGENCY: Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), DOT.

ACTION: Public workshop notice.

SUMMARY: This notice announces a public workshop to discuss issues relevant to development of regulations on the circumstances under which operators of hazardous liquid pipelines must use emergency flow restricting devices (including remotely controlled valves and check valves). In addition, the public workshop will discuss issues relevant to development of regulations on the circumstances under which operators of hazardous liquid pipelines identify ruptures on their pipelines. Congress mandated regulations on these items in order to limit hazardous liquid releases subsequent to a failure by more quickly identifying the releases and isolating the failed segment of pipe involved.

DATES: The workshop will be held on October 19, 1995, from 8:30 am to 4:00 pm. Persons who want to participate in the workshop should call (703) 218-1449 or e-mail their name, affiliation, and telephone number to RSPA@walcoff.com before close of business October 2, 1995. The workshop is open to all interested persons, but RSPA may limit participation because of space considerations and the need to obtain a spectrum of views. Callers will be notified if participation is not open.

Persons who are unable to attend may submit written comments in duplicate by November 27, 1995. Interested persons should submit as part of their written comments all material that is relevant to a statement of fact or argument. Late filed comments will be considered so far as practicable.

ADDRESSES: The workshop will be held at the U.S. Department of Transportation, Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., room 9230-34, Washington, DC. Non-federal employee visitors are admitted into the DOT headquarters building through the southwest entrance at Seventh and E Streets, SW.

Send written comments in duplicate to the Dockets Unit, room 8421, Research and Special Programs Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590-0001. Identify the docket and notice numbers stated in the heading of this notice.

All comments and docketed material will be available for inspection and copying in Room 8421 between 8:30 am and 4:30 pm each business day. A summary of the workshop will be available from the Dockets Unit about three weeks after the workshop.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lloyd Ulrich, (202) 366-4556, about this document or the Dockets Unit, (202) 366-5046, for copies of this document or other material in the docket.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

RSPA has been concerned for some time with operators' optimum placement of emergency flow restricting devices (EFRD), and more rapid detection of leaks on hazardous liquid pipelines to limit commodity release.

The Department's March 1991 study titled "Emergency Flow Restricting Devices Study" (1991 EFRD Study) contained recommendations that RSPA seek public input on the placement of EFRDs in urban areas, at water crossings, at other critical areas affected by commodity release, and areas in close proximity to the public outside of

urban areas. The 1991 EFRD Study concluded remote control and check valves are the only effective EFRDs. A copy of the 1991 EFRD Study is filed in Docket No. PS-133.

In May 1992, RSPA commenced a research study with the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (VNTSC) to analyze SCADA systems¹ and computer-generated leak detection equipment. RSPA anticipates a report on SCADA and leak detection equipment based on interviews with a number of pipeline operators and equipment vendors will be completed well in advance of the workshop. Once the report is completed, a copy will be placed in Docket No. PS-133.

Congress, in 49 U.S.C. 60102(j), mandated the Secretary of Transportation, by October 24, 1994, conduct a survey and assess the effectiveness of EFRDs and other procedures, systems, and equipment used to detect and locate hazardous liquid pipeline ruptures and minimize product releases from hazardous liquid pipeline facilities. The mandate also required that the Secretary issue regulations within two years of completion of the survey and assessment (no later than October 24, 1996). These regulations would prescribe the circumstances under which operators of hazardous liquid pipelines would use EFRDs and other procedures, systems, and equipment to detect and locate pipeline ruptures and minimize product release from pipeline facilities. The Secretary delegated this authority to RSPA.

RSPA issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) (59 FR 2802, Jan. 19, 1994) to solicit data from the public through a series of questions mostly directed to the operators of hazardous liquid pipelines primarily concerning the performance of leak detection equipment and location of EFRDs, including the costs involved, as the means of conducting the survey mandated in 49 U.S.C. 60102.

Nineteen comments were submitted in response to the ANPRM. Sixteen comments were from hazardous liquid operators, two were from leak detection vendors, and one from a trade association, American Petroleum Institute (API). Commenters were generally against requiring leak

¹ SCADA is an acronym for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition. SCADA systems utilize computer technology to analyze data (e.g., pressure, temperature, and delivery flow rates) that are continuously gathered from remote locations on the pipeline. Computer analysis of this data is used to assist in day-to-day operating decisions on the pipeline and to provide input for real-time models of the pipeline operation which can identify and locate leaks.

detection equipment and EFRDs. Only ten of the 16 hazardous liquid operators responded with usable data.

Meanwhile, the liquid pipeline industry, through an API formed task force, is producing a document (API Publication 1130) to assist pipeline operators in the selection, implementation, testing, and operation of leak detection systems. API's goal is to publish API Publication 1130 by the end of 1995.

II. Workshop

Consistent with the President's regulatory policy (E.O. 12866), RSPA wants to accomplish this Congressional mandate to provide for public safety and environmental protection at the least cost to society. Toward this end, and because RSPA received limited data in response to the questionnaire in the ANPRM, RSPA is holding a public workshop at which participants, including RSPA staff, may exchange views on relevant issues. RSPA hopes the workshop will enable government and industry to reach a better understanding of the problem and the potential solutions before proposed rules are issued.

Workshop participants are encouraged to focus their remarks on the following issues and questions, but may address other issues as time permits and in supplementary written comments. Participants are urged to present supporting data for views expressed at the workshop or in written submissions:

A. Placement of EFRDs

Congress, in 49 U.S.C. 60102, mandates RSPA to prescribe the circumstances under which hazardous liquid operators would use EFRDs. RSPA needs to identify these circumstances. Activated EFRDs can reduce release from a rupture after the rupture has been detected and located. Comments to the ANPRM endorsed the selective use of remotely controlled valves in high-risk areas after an analysis is made of the operator's particular pipeline system. The determination of what constitutes a "high-risk area" needs to be explored at this workshop.

The question of valve spacing of EFRDs on new pipelines and the costs involved should be addressed. Should EFRD spacing on new pipelines be risk-based? If so, what risks should be included? If proximity to high-density population is one of the risks, what is a precise definition for "proximity" and "high density?"

The question of valve spacing of EFRDs on existing pipelines and the

costs involved should be addressed. The existing regulations require valves at water crossings (49 CFR § 195.260). Retrofitting all water crossing valves to be remotely controlled cannot be quantified because the number of these crossings is unknown. However, there may be a subset of these water crossings at a higher risk because of high volumes of waterborne traffic which should be remotely controlled. Identification of classes of higher risk locations, if any, and the economic implications of alternatives, or reasons why there should not be higher risk locations should be addressed at the workshop.

Circumstances for requiring non-water crossing existing valves to be retrofitted to be remotely controlled needs to be explored. Should circumstances such as response time to an existing valve location, pipeline profile and draindown characteristics, proximity to population and high risk environmental areas, hazards of commodity transported, and resource requirements to respond to a release be considered? What are specific values for each circumstance cited above which should be included? What are the economic impacts of alternatives?

Following are general questions concerning EFRDs which should be addressed by workshop participants:

- (1) What conditions or situations prompt a pipeline company to install remote controlled valves?
- (2) What are the operational and economic problems with remotely controlled valves?
- (3) What are the operational and economic benefits of remotely controlled valves?
- (4) Does the presence of remotely controlled valves actually result in a more rapid response to a leak?

B. Leak Detection Sensitivity

Congress, in 49 U.S.C. 60102, expressly stated the magnitude of release to be detected as a "rupture." Participants at this workshop should be prepared to comment on a precise definition of "rupture" since leak detection equipment must be sensitive enough to detect this size of release. Comments to the ANPRM indicated that it is not technically feasible for a leak detection system to detect "all" releases. The VNTSC study indicated that there are enormous differences both in reliability and sensitivity of SCADA and leak detection equipment.

Operators, responding to a request for information (54 FR 20945, May 15, 1989) to provide input to the 1991 EFRD Study, reported the range of sensitivity of their leak detection equipment as between 0.5 and 5 percent of flow over

a one to two hour period, with sensitivity depending on the sophistication of the SCADA system used as the primary leak detection system. Should a definition for "rupture" be based on a percentage of release over a specific time interval? If yes, what should the percentage and time interval be? Should it be a tiered requirement (as the release increases, the detection time decreases)? If not, why not and upon what criteria should a definition of "rupture" be based?

C. Requirements for a Leak Detection System

Congress mandated RSPA to prescribe the circumstances under which hazardous liquid operators would use EFRDs and other procedures, systems, and equipment to detect and locate pipeline ruptures. This workshop also will address the "other" procedures, systems, and equipment in addition to EFRDs.

Following are general questions concerning leak detection systems which should be addressed by workshop participants:

- (1) What should these procedures, systems, and equipment include, under what circumstances should they be used, and what are their cost including installation?
- (2) What conditions or situations prompt a pipeline company to install leak detection systems?
- (3) What are the operational and economic problems with leak detection systems?
- (4) What are the operational and economic benefits of leak detection systems?
- (5) Does the presence of a leak detection system actually result in a more rapid response to a leak?
- (6) What requirements should be proposed for locating releases after they've been detected?

D. Scope

RSPA would like opinions from participants at the workshop on whether the use of EFRDs should be limited to the "cross-country" portion of operators' pipelines, or should also apply to pump stations and breakout tanks.

(49 U.S.C. Chapter 601)

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Richard B. Felder,

Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
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