[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 167 (Tuesday, August 29, 1995)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 44822-44823]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-21424]



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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
49 CFR Part 195

[Docket No. PS-133, Notice 2]
RIN 2137-AC39


Emergency Flow Restricting Devices/Leak Detection Equipment on 
Hazardous Liquid Pipelines

AGENCY: Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), DOT.

ACTION: Public workshop notice.

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SUMMARY: This notice announces a public workshop to discuss issues 
relevant to development of regulations on the circumstances under which 
operators of hazardous liquid pipelines must use emergency flow 
restricting devices (including remotely controlled valves and check 
valves). In addition, the public workshop will discuss issues relevant 
to development of regulations on the circumstances under which 
operators of hazardous liquid pipelines identify ruptures on their 
pipelines. Congress mandated regulations on these items in order to 
limit hazardous liquid releases subsequent to a failure by more quickly 
identifying the releases and isolating the failed segment of pipe 
involved.

DATES: The workshop will be held on October 19, 1995, from 8:30 am to 
4:00 pm. Persons who want to participate in the workshop should call 
(703) 218-1449 or e-mail their name, affiliation, and telephone number 
to [email protected] before close of business October 2, 1995. The 
workshop is open to all interested persons, but RSPA may limit 
participation because of space considerations and the need to obtain a 
spectrum of views. Callers will be notified if participation is not 
open.
    Persons who are unable to attend may submit written comments in 
duplicate by November 27, 1995. Interested persons should submit as 
part of their written comments all material that is relevant to a 
statement of fact or argument. Late filed comments will be considered 
so far as practicable.

ADDRESSES: The workshop will be held at the U.S. Department of 
Transportation, Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., room 9230-34, 
Washington, DC. Non-federal employee visitors are admitted into the DOT 
headquarters building through the southwest entrance at Seventh and E 
Streets, SW.
    Send written comments in duplicate to the Dockets Unit, room 8421, 
Research and Special Programs Administration, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590-0001. 
Identify the docket and notice numbers stated in the heading of this 
notice.
    All comments and docketed material will be available for inspection 
and copying in Room 8421 between 8:30 am and 4:30 pm each business day. 
A summary of the workshop will be available from the Dockets Unit about 
three weeks after the workshop.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lloyd Ulrich, (202) 366-4556, about 
this document or the Dockets Unit, (202) 366-5046, for copies of this 
document or other material in the docket.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    RSPA has been concerned for some time with operators' optimum 
placement of emergency flow restricting devices (EFRD), and more rapid 
detection of leaks on hazardous liquid pipelines to limit commodity 
release.
    The Department's March 1991 study titled ``Emergency Flow 
Restricting Devices Study'' (1991 EFRD Study) contained recommendations 
that RSPA seek public input on the placement of EFRDs in urban areas, 
at water crossings, at other critical areas affected by commodity 
release, and areas in close proximity to the public outside of urban 
areas. The 1991 EFRD Study concluded remote control and check valves 
are the only effective EFRDs. A copy of the 1991 EFRD Study is filed in 
Docket No. PS-133.
    In May 1992, RSPA commenced a research study with the Volpe 
National Transportation Systems Center (VNTSC) to analyze SCADA 
systems1 and computer-generated leak detection equipment. RSPA 
anticipates a report on SCADA and leak detection equipment based on 
interviews with a number of pipeline operators and equipment vendors 
will be completed well in advance of the workshop. Once the report is 
completed, a copy will be placed in Docket No. PS-133.

    \1\SCADA is an acronym for Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition. SCADA systems utilize computer technology to analyze 
data (e.g., pressure, temperature, and delivery flow rates) that are 
continuously gathered from remote locations on the pipeline. 
Computer analysis of this data is used to assist in day-to-day 
operating decisions on the pipeline and to provide input for real-
time models of the pipeline operation which can identify and locate 
leaks.
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    Congress, in 49 U.S.C. 60102(j), mandated the Secretary of 
Transportation, by October 24, 1994, conduct a survey and assess the 
effectiveness of EFRDs and other procedures, systems, and equipment 
used to detect and locate hazardous liquid pipeline ruptures and 
minimize product releases from hazardous liquid pipeline facilities. 
The mandate also required that the Secretary issue regulations within 
two years of completion of the survey and assessment (no later than 
October 24, 1996). These regulations would prescribe the circumstances 
under which operators of hazardous liquid pipelines would use EFRDs and 
other procedures, systems, and equipment to detect and locate pipeline 
ruptures and minimize product release from pipeline facilities. The 
Secretary delegated this authority to RSPA.
    RSPA issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) (59 FR 
2802, Jan. 19, 1994) to solicit data from the public through a series 
of questions mostly directed to the operators of hazardous liquid 
pipelines primarily concerning the performance of leak detection 
equipment and location of EFRDs, including the costs involved, as the 
means of conducting the survey mandated in 49 U.S.C. 60102.
    Nineteen comments were submitted in response to the ANPRM. Sixteen 
comments were from hazardous liquid operators, two were from leak 
detection vendors, and one from a trade association, American Petroleum 
Institute (API). Commenters were generally against requiring leak 

[[Page 44823]]
detection equipment and EFRDs. Only ten of the 16 hazardous liquid 
operators responded with usable data.
    Meanwhile, the liquid pipeline industry, through an API formed task 
force, is producing a document (API Publication 1130) to assist 
pipeline operators in the selection, implementation, testing, and 
operation of leak detection systems. API's goal is to publish API 
Publication 1130 by the end of 1995.
II. Workshop

    Consistent with the President's regulatory policy (E.O. 12866), 
RSPA wants to accomplish this Congressional mandate to provide for 
public safety and environmental protection at the least cost to 
society. Toward this end, and because RSPA received limited data in 
response to the questionnaire in the ANPRM, RSPA is holding a public 
workshop at which participants, including RSPA staff, may exchange 
views on relevant issues. RSPA hopes the workshop will enable 
government and industry to reach a better understanding of the problem 
and the potential solutions before proposed rules are issued.
    Workshop participants are encouraged to focus their remarks on the 
following issues and questions, but may address other issues as time 
permits and in supplementary written comments. Participants are urged 
to present supporting data for views expressed at the workshop or in 
written submissions:

A. Placement of EFRDs

    Congress, in 49 U.S.C. 60102, mandates RSPA to prescribe the 
circumstances under which hazardous liquid operators would use EFRDs. 
RSPA needs to identify these circumstances. Activated EFRDs can reduce 
release from a rupture after the rupture has been detected and located. 
Comments to the ANPRM endorsed the selective use of remotely controlled 
valves in high-risk areas after an analysis is made of the operator's 
particular pipeline system. The determination of what constitutes a 
``high-risk area'' needs to be explored at this workshop.
    The question of valve spacing of EFRDs on new pipelines and the 
costs involved should be addressed. Should EFRD spacing on new 
pipelines be risk-based? If so, what risks should be included? If 
proximity to high-density population is one of the risks, what is a 
precise definition for ``proximity'' and ``high density?''
    The question of valve spacing of EFRDs on existing pipelines and 
the costs involved should be addressed. The existing regulations 
require valves at water crossings (49 CFR Sec. 195.260). Retrofitting 
all water crossing valves to be remotely controlled cannot be 
quantified because the number of these crossings is unknown. However, 
there may be a subset of these water crossings at a higher risk because 
of high volumes of waterborne traffic which should be remotely 
controlled. Identification of classes of higher risk locations, if any, 
and the economic implications of alternatives, or reasons why there 
should not be higher risk locations should be addressed at the 
workshop.
    Circumstances for requiring non-water crossing existing valves to 
be retrofitted to be remotely controlled needs to be explored. Should 
circumstances such as response time to an existing valve location, 
pipeline profile and draindown characteristics, proximity to population 
and high risk environmental areas, hazards of commodity transported, 
and resource requirements to respond to a release be considered? What 
are specific values for each circumstance cited above which should be 
included? What are the economic impacts of alternatives?
    Following are general questions concerning EFRDs which should be 
addressed by workshop participants:
    (1) What conditions or situations prompt a pipeline company to 
install remote controlled valves?
    (2) What are the operational and economic problems with remotely 
controlled valves?
    (3) What are the operational and economic benefits of remotely 
controlled valves?
    (4) Does the presence of remotely controlled valves actually result 
in a more rapid response to a leak?

B. Leak Detection Sensitivity

    Congress, in 49 U.S.C. 60102, expressly stated the magnitude of 
release to be detected as a ``rupture.'' Participants at this workshop 
should be prepared to comment on a precise definition of ``rupture'' 
since leak detection equipment must be sensitive enough to detect this 
size of release. Comments to the ANPRM indicated that it is not 
technically feasible for a leak detection system to detect ``all'' 
releases. The VNTSC study indicated that there are enormous differences 
both in reliability and sensitivity of SCADA and leak detection 
equipment.
    Operators, responding to a request for information (54 FR 20945, 
May 15, 1989) to provide input to the 1991 EFRD Study, reported the 
range of sensitivity of their leak detection equipment as between 0.5 
and 5 percent of flow over a one to two hour period, with sensitivity 
depending on the sophistication of the SCADA system used as the primary 
leak detection system. Should a definition for ``rupture'' be based on 
a percentage of release over a specific time interval? If yes, what 
should the percentage and time interval be? Should it be a tiered 
requirement (as the release increases, the detection time decreases)? 
If not, why not and upon what criteria should a definition of 
``rupture'' be based?

C. Requirements for a Leak Detection System

    Congress mandated RSPA to prescribe the circumstances under which 
hazardous liquid operators would use EFRDs and other procedures, 
systems, and equipment to detect and locate pipeline ruptures. This 
workshop also will address the ``other'' procedures, systems, and 
equipment in addition to EFRDs.
    Following are general questions concerning leak detection systems 
which should be addressed by workshop participants:
    (1) What should these procedures, systems, and equipment include, 
under what circumstances should they be used, and what are their cost 
including installation?
    (2) What conditions or situations prompt a pipeline company to 
install leak detection systems?
    (3) What are the operational and economic problems with leak 
detection systems?
    (4) What are the operational and economic benefits of leak 
detection systems?
    (5) Does the presence of a leak detection system actually result in 
a more rapid response to a leak?
    (6) What requirements should be proposed for locating releases 
after they've been detected?

D. Scope

    RSPA would like opinions from participants at the workshop on 
whether the use of EFRDs should be limited to the ``cross-country'' 
portion of operators' pipelines, or should also apply to pump stations 
and breakout tanks.

(49 U.S.C. Chapter 601)

    Issued in Washington, DC on August 24, 1995.
Richard B. Felder,
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 95-21424 Filed 8-28-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P