[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 167 (Tuesday, August 29, 1995)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 44822-44823]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-21424]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
49 CFR Part 195
[Docket No. PS-133, Notice 2]
RIN 2137-AC39
Emergency Flow Restricting Devices/Leak Detection Equipment on
Hazardous Liquid Pipelines
AGENCY: Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), DOT.
ACTION: Public workshop notice.
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SUMMARY: This notice announces a public workshop to discuss issues
relevant to development of regulations on the circumstances under which
operators of hazardous liquid pipelines must use emergency flow
restricting devices (including remotely controlled valves and check
valves). In addition, the public workshop will discuss issues relevant
to development of regulations on the circumstances under which
operators of hazardous liquid pipelines identify ruptures on their
pipelines. Congress mandated regulations on these items in order to
limit hazardous liquid releases subsequent to a failure by more quickly
identifying the releases and isolating the failed segment of pipe
involved.
DATES: The workshop will be held on October 19, 1995, from 8:30 am to
4:00 pm. Persons who want to participate in the workshop should call
(703) 218-1449 or e-mail their name, affiliation, and telephone number
to [email protected] before close of business October 2, 1995. The
workshop is open to all interested persons, but RSPA may limit
participation because of space considerations and the need to obtain a
spectrum of views. Callers will be notified if participation is not
open.
Persons who are unable to attend may submit written comments in
duplicate by November 27, 1995. Interested persons should submit as
part of their written comments all material that is relevant to a
statement of fact or argument. Late filed comments will be considered
so far as practicable.
ADDRESSES: The workshop will be held at the U.S. Department of
Transportation, Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., room 9230-34,
Washington, DC. Non-federal employee visitors are admitted into the DOT
headquarters building through the southwest entrance at Seventh and E
Streets, SW.
Send written comments in duplicate to the Dockets Unit, room 8421,
Research and Special Programs Administration, U.S. Department of
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590-0001.
Identify the docket and notice numbers stated in the heading of this
notice.
All comments and docketed material will be available for inspection
and copying in Room 8421 between 8:30 am and 4:30 pm each business day.
A summary of the workshop will be available from the Dockets Unit about
three weeks after the workshop.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lloyd Ulrich, (202) 366-4556, about
this document or the Dockets Unit, (202) 366-5046, for copies of this
document or other material in the docket.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
RSPA has been concerned for some time with operators' optimum
placement of emergency flow restricting devices (EFRD), and more rapid
detection of leaks on hazardous liquid pipelines to limit commodity
release.
The Department's March 1991 study titled ``Emergency Flow
Restricting Devices Study'' (1991 EFRD Study) contained recommendations
that RSPA seek public input on the placement of EFRDs in urban areas,
at water crossings, at other critical areas affected by commodity
release, and areas in close proximity to the public outside of urban
areas. The 1991 EFRD Study concluded remote control and check valves
are the only effective EFRDs. A copy of the 1991 EFRD Study is filed in
Docket No. PS-133.
In May 1992, RSPA commenced a research study with the Volpe
National Transportation Systems Center (VNTSC) to analyze SCADA
systems1 and computer-generated leak detection equipment. RSPA
anticipates a report on SCADA and leak detection equipment based on
interviews with a number of pipeline operators and equipment vendors
will be completed well in advance of the workshop. Once the report is
completed, a copy will be placed in Docket No. PS-133.
\1\SCADA is an acronym for Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition. SCADA systems utilize computer technology to analyze
data (e.g., pressure, temperature, and delivery flow rates) that are
continuously gathered from remote locations on the pipeline.
Computer analysis of this data is used to assist in day-to-day
operating decisions on the pipeline and to provide input for real-
time models of the pipeline operation which can identify and locate
leaks.
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Congress, in 49 U.S.C. 60102(j), mandated the Secretary of
Transportation, by October 24, 1994, conduct a survey and assess the
effectiveness of EFRDs and other procedures, systems, and equipment
used to detect and locate hazardous liquid pipeline ruptures and
minimize product releases from hazardous liquid pipeline facilities.
The mandate also required that the Secretary issue regulations within
two years of completion of the survey and assessment (no later than
October 24, 1996). These regulations would prescribe the circumstances
under which operators of hazardous liquid pipelines would use EFRDs and
other procedures, systems, and equipment to detect and locate pipeline
ruptures and minimize product release from pipeline facilities. The
Secretary delegated this authority to RSPA.
RSPA issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) (59 FR
2802, Jan. 19, 1994) to solicit data from the public through a series
of questions mostly directed to the operators of hazardous liquid
pipelines primarily concerning the performance of leak detection
equipment and location of EFRDs, including the costs involved, as the
means of conducting the survey mandated in 49 U.S.C. 60102.
Nineteen comments were submitted in response to the ANPRM. Sixteen
comments were from hazardous liquid operators, two were from leak
detection vendors, and one from a trade association, American Petroleum
Institute (API). Commenters were generally against requiring leak
[[Page 44823]]
detection equipment and EFRDs. Only ten of the 16 hazardous liquid
operators responded with usable data.
Meanwhile, the liquid pipeline industry, through an API formed task
force, is producing a document (API Publication 1130) to assist
pipeline operators in the selection, implementation, testing, and
operation of leak detection systems. API's goal is to publish API
Publication 1130 by the end of 1995.
II. Workshop
Consistent with the President's regulatory policy (E.O. 12866),
RSPA wants to accomplish this Congressional mandate to provide for
public safety and environmental protection at the least cost to
society. Toward this end, and because RSPA received limited data in
response to the questionnaire in the ANPRM, RSPA is holding a public
workshop at which participants, including RSPA staff, may exchange
views on relevant issues. RSPA hopes the workshop will enable
government and industry to reach a better understanding of the problem
and the potential solutions before proposed rules are issued.
Workshop participants are encouraged to focus their remarks on the
following issues and questions, but may address other issues as time
permits and in supplementary written comments. Participants are urged
to present supporting data for views expressed at the workshop or in
written submissions:
A. Placement of EFRDs
Congress, in 49 U.S.C. 60102, mandates RSPA to prescribe the
circumstances under which hazardous liquid operators would use EFRDs.
RSPA needs to identify these circumstances. Activated EFRDs can reduce
release from a rupture after the rupture has been detected and located.
Comments to the ANPRM endorsed the selective use of remotely controlled
valves in high-risk areas after an analysis is made of the operator's
particular pipeline system. The determination of what constitutes a
``high-risk area'' needs to be explored at this workshop.
The question of valve spacing of EFRDs on new pipelines and the
costs involved should be addressed. Should EFRD spacing on new
pipelines be risk-based? If so, what risks should be included? If
proximity to high-density population is one of the risks, what is a
precise definition for ``proximity'' and ``high density?''
The question of valve spacing of EFRDs on existing pipelines and
the costs involved should be addressed. The existing regulations
require valves at water crossings (49 CFR Sec. 195.260). Retrofitting
all water crossing valves to be remotely controlled cannot be
quantified because the number of these crossings is unknown. However,
there may be a subset of these water crossings at a higher risk because
of high volumes of waterborne traffic which should be remotely
controlled. Identification of classes of higher risk locations, if any,
and the economic implications of alternatives, or reasons why there
should not be higher risk locations should be addressed at the
workshop.
Circumstances for requiring non-water crossing existing valves to
be retrofitted to be remotely controlled needs to be explored. Should
circumstances such as response time to an existing valve location,
pipeline profile and draindown characteristics, proximity to population
and high risk environmental areas, hazards of commodity transported,
and resource requirements to respond to a release be considered? What
are specific values for each circumstance cited above which should be
included? What are the economic impacts of alternatives?
Following are general questions concerning EFRDs which should be
addressed by workshop participants:
(1) What conditions or situations prompt a pipeline company to
install remote controlled valves?
(2) What are the operational and economic problems with remotely
controlled valves?
(3) What are the operational and economic benefits of remotely
controlled valves?
(4) Does the presence of remotely controlled valves actually result
in a more rapid response to a leak?
B. Leak Detection Sensitivity
Congress, in 49 U.S.C. 60102, expressly stated the magnitude of
release to be detected as a ``rupture.'' Participants at this workshop
should be prepared to comment on a precise definition of ``rupture''
since leak detection equipment must be sensitive enough to detect this
size of release. Comments to the ANPRM indicated that it is not
technically feasible for a leak detection system to detect ``all''
releases. The VNTSC study indicated that there are enormous differences
both in reliability and sensitivity of SCADA and leak detection
equipment.
Operators, responding to a request for information (54 FR 20945,
May 15, 1989) to provide input to the 1991 EFRD Study, reported the
range of sensitivity of their leak detection equipment as between 0.5
and 5 percent of flow over a one to two hour period, with sensitivity
depending on the sophistication of the SCADA system used as the primary
leak detection system. Should a definition for ``rupture'' be based on
a percentage of release over a specific time interval? If yes, what
should the percentage and time interval be? Should it be a tiered
requirement (as the release increases, the detection time decreases)?
If not, why not and upon what criteria should a definition of
``rupture'' be based?
C. Requirements for a Leak Detection System
Congress mandated RSPA to prescribe the circumstances under which
hazardous liquid operators would use EFRDs and other procedures,
systems, and equipment to detect and locate pipeline ruptures. This
workshop also will address the ``other'' procedures, systems, and
equipment in addition to EFRDs.
Following are general questions concerning leak detection systems
which should be addressed by workshop participants:
(1) What should these procedures, systems, and equipment include,
under what circumstances should they be used, and what are their cost
including installation?
(2) What conditions or situations prompt a pipeline company to
install leak detection systems?
(3) What are the operational and economic problems with leak
detection systems?
(4) What are the operational and economic benefits of leak
detection systems?
(5) Does the presence of a leak detection system actually result in
a more rapid response to a leak?
(6) What requirements should be proposed for locating releases
after they've been detected?
D. Scope
RSPA would like opinions from participants at the workshop on
whether the use of EFRDs should be limited to the ``cross-country''
portion of operators' pipelines, or should also apply to pump stations
and breakout tanks.
(49 U.S.C. Chapter 601)
Issued in Washington, DC on August 24, 1995.
Richard B. Felder,
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 95-21424 Filed 8-28-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P