[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 161 (Monday, August 21, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 43479-43480]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-20638]



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[[Page 43480]]


NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-298]


Nebraska Public Power District (Cooper Nuclear Station); 
Revocation of Exemption

I

    Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD or the licensee) is the holder 
of Facility Operating License No. DPR-46, which authorizes operation of 
the Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) at power levels not in excess of 2381 
megawatts thermal. The facility consists of a boiling water reactor at 
the licensee's site in Nemaha County, Nebraska. The operating license 
provides, among other things, that CNS is subject to all rules, 
regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect.

II

    Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Sec. 50.48, 10 CFR 
part 50, appendix A, Criterion 3, and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, 
establish requirements and design criteria for fire protection at 
operating nuclear power plants. Section III.G of Appendix R specifies 
the required fire protection features necessary to assure that safe 
shutdown of the plant can be achieved in the event of a postulated 
fire. On September 21, 1983, the NRC granted several exemptions to the 
requirements of 10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, for CNS. 
One of the exemptions applied specifically to the Critical Switchgear 
Rooms 1F and 1G on the 932 foot elevation of the reactor building. 
These areas were considered to not meet the requirements of Section 
III.G. of Appendix R, because 3-hour rated fire barriers were not 
provided in the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) ducts 
where they penetrate three-hour rated fire walls. The licensee had 
provided 1\1/2\-hour rated dampers in the ductwork and had committed to 
upgrade one electrical bus duct penetration through the east wall of 
Critical Switchgear Room 1G and through the common wall between the two 
switchgear rooms to a 3-hour rating. The exemption was granted by the 
staff, based on the low combustible loading in the area, the automatic 
detection system provided, and the commitment to upgrade the electrical 
bus duct penetration seals to 3-hour rated barriers.
    By letter dated December 16, 1994, the Nebraska Public Power 
District submitted revised commitments for the fire protection program 
at CNS. In that letter, the licensee also proposed to withdraw the 
exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50, appendix R, for the 
critical switchgear rooms on the 932 foot elevation of the reactor 
building.

III

    The NRC staff determines the acceptability of existing fire area 
boundaries based on information provided in the Appendix A Fire Hazards 
Analysis for that facility, the associated NRC fire protection safety 
evaluation (SE), and the positions documented in NRC Generic Letter 
(GL) 86-10, ``Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements.''
    Generic Letter 86-10 provides NRC staff interpretations and answers 
to specific questions regarding implementation of Appendix R 
requirements, including requirements for review of previously reviewed 
and approved fire boundaries. The GL identifies that, if a fire area 
boundary was described as a rated barrier in the Fire Hazards Analysis 
(FHA) for that plant, and was evaluated and accepted in an NRC SE, the 
fire area boundary need not be reviewed as part of the reanalysis for 
compliance with Section III.G of Appendix R. However, The GL guidance 
also provides that if all penetrations in the previously reviewed fire 
boundaries were not explicitly addressed in the aforementioned 
analyses, an evaluation of those penetrations should be performed to 
confirm that the boundary will withstand the hazards to which it could 
be exposed in compliance with Appendix R.
    The subject fire area boundary was identified as a rated fire 
barrier in the Appendix A FHA for CNS submitted on March 31, 1977. The 
existing configuration of the barrier was accepted by the NRC staff in 
its fire protection SE on May 23, 1979, based on certain commitments 
that were subsequently met. However, the electrical bus duct 
penetrations through the east wall of Critical Switchgear Room 1G and 
through the common wall between the two switchgear rooms were not 
specifically identified and analyzed in the 1977 FHA; therefore, the 
licensee performed a separate evaluation to demonstrate that the fire 
boundary is capable of withstanding the hazards to which it could be 
exposed, consistent with the guidance of GL 86-10.
    In NPPD's December 16, 1994, submittal, the licensee stated that 
the fire area boundary separating the redundant critical switchgear 
rooms on the 932 foot elevation of the reactor building has been 
analyzed in accordance with the guidance of Appendix A to NRC Branch 
Technical Position 9.5-1, 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R and GL 86-10. The 
engineering evaluations performed by the licensee conclude that the 
barrier and its penetrations can withstand the hazards to which they 
could be exposed and therefore, provide adequate protection for 
redundant safe shutdown systems located in the critical switchgear 
rooms on opposite sides of the barrier. On the basis of these 
evaluations, the licensee has concluded that the existing fire boundary 
configuration is acceptable and that the electrical bus duct 
penetrations do not need to be upgraded to a 3-hour rating.
    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's justification for 
withdrawal of the exemption. The staff finds that the licensee has 
conformed with the applicable staff positions identified in GL 86-10 
regarding the evaluation of previously accepted fire area boundaries 
for compliance with Appendix R and concludes that the previously 
approved exemption is not needed.

IV

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that the specific 
exemption from 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G., granted on 
September 21, 1983, for the fire area boundaries for Critical 
Switchgear Rooms 1F and 1G is hereby revoked in that it is no longer 
necessary.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
revoking of this exemption will have no significant effect on the 
quality of the human environment (60 FR 41907). This revocation of 
exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, MD, this 14th day of August 1995.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Jack W. Roe,
Director, Division of Reactor Projects III/IV, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 95-20638 Filed 8-18-95; 8:45 am]
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