[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 157 (Tuesday, August 15, 1995)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 42079-42085]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-20035]
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Proposed Rules
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
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Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 157 / Tuesday, August 15, 1995 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 42079]]
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Parts 60, 72, 73, and 75
RIN: 3150-AF32
Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend
its regulations to clarify safeguards requirements for spent nuclear
fuel or high-level radioactive waste stored at independent spent fuel
storage installations, power reactors that have permanently ceased
reactor operations, monitored retrievable storage installations, and
geologic repository operations areas. This rule would allow general
licensees the option of implementing the proposed safeguards
requirements for spent nuclear fuel stored in approved casks at
operating power reactor sites. This action is necessary to reduce the
regulatory uncertainty regarding the safeguards requirements for the
storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste without
reducing the level of protection for public health and safety.
DATES: Comment period expires November 13, 1995. Comments received
after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the
Commission is able to assure consideration only for comments received
on or before this date.
ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Attn: Docketing and
Service Branch. Hand deliver comments to 11555 Rockville Pike,
Rockville, Maryland, between 7:45 am and 4:15 pm on Federal workdays.
Comments may be submitted electronically, in either ASCII text or
Wordperfect format (version 5.1 or later), by calling the NRC
Electronic Bulletin Board (BBS) on FEDWORLD. The bulletin board may be
accessed using a personal computer, a modem, and one of the commonly
available communications software packages. Background documents on the
rulemaking are also available for downloading and viewing on the
bulletin board.
The NRC rulemaking subsystem on FEDWORLD can be accessed directly
by dialing the toll free number: 1-800-303-9672. Communication software
parameters should be set as follows: parity to none, data bits to 8,
and stop bits to 1 (N,8,1). Using ANSI or VT-100 terminal emulation,
the NRC rulemaking subsystem can then be accessed by selecting the
``Rules Menu'' option from the ``NRC Main Menu.'' For further
information about options available for NRC at FEDWORLD consult the
``Help-Information Center'' from the ``NRC Main Menu.'' Users will find
the ``FEDWORLD Online User's Guides'' particularly helpful. Many NRC
subsystems and databases also have a ``Help-Information Center'' option
that is tailored to the particular subsystem.
The NRC subsystem on FEDWORLD also can be accessed by a direct dial
phone number for the main FEDWORLD BBS: 703-321-3339. If you access NRC
this way, then you may return to FEDWORLD by selecting the ``Return to
FEDWORLD'' option from the NRC Online Main Menu. However, if you access
NRC at FEDWORLD by using NRC's toll-free number, then you will have
full access to all NRC systems, but you will not have access to the
main FEDWORLD system. For more information on NRC bulletin boards
contact Mr. Arthur Davis, Systems Integration and Development Branch,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001,
telephone (301) 415-5780; e-mail AXD[email protected].
Documents related to this rulemaking, including comments received,
may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW.
(Lower Level), Washington, DC. These same documents may also be viewed
and downloaded electronically via the Electronic Bulletin Board
established by NRC for rulemaking as indicated above under the
ADDRESSES heading.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. John L. Telford (301) 415-6229 or
e-mail [email protected], or Dr. Sandra D. Frattali (301) 415-6261 or e-mail
[email protected], Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, or Ms. Priscilla A.
Dwyer (301) 415-8110 or e-mail [email protected], Office of Nuclear Material
Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555-0001.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The Commission's regulations addressing the storage of spent
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste (HLW), 10 CFR part 72,
``Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear
Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste,'' refer the applicant or
licensee to `` * * * applicable requirements of part 73 * * * '' for
requirements for physical protection. However, part 73 does not
identify any safeguards requirements that are specific to the storage
of spent nuclear fuel or HLW. In practice, the NRC has imposed specific
safeguards requirements on affected facilities through license
conditions using selected portions of 10 CFR 73.50 and 73.55 and
interim licensing criteria as guidance.
The Commission's regulations for disposal of spent nuclear fuel or
HLW by DOE at a geologic repository operations area (GROA) take a
different approach. Instead of specifying applicable requirements to
protect the common defense and security, they call for DOE to certify
that it will provide `` * * * such safeguards as it requires at
comparable surface facilities * * * '' of DOE. They also require DOE to
describe a physical security plan for protection against radiological
sabotage, but the contents of that plan are not specified.
The only physical protection requirements in NRC regulations that
are specific to the storage of spent nuclear fuel are those that apply
to spent nuclear fuel stored in certified casks under a general license
at operating nuclear power reactors. These requirements are found in
Sec. 72.212(b)(5).
The Commission is proposing regulations to codify existing practice
for the safeguarding of stored spent nuclear fuel or HLW. The proposed
amendments would provide a set of physical protection and material
control and accounting requirements directed at the storage of spent
nuclear fuel or HLW, whether at an independent spent
[[Page 42080]]
fuel storage installation (ISFSI), a monitored retrievable storage
installation (MRS), a power reactor that has permanently ceased reactor
operations, or a geological repository. In addition, these proposed
amendments are consistent with safeguards requirements for spent
nuclear fuel storage under a general license at operating power
reactors. Because the proposed amendments codify the existing
regulatory practice there would not be any additional burden placed
upon current licensees.
These amendments would make minor changes to existing regulatory
language to clarify the meaning of the requirements. These amendments
would also make the requirements of 10 CFR part 75 (pertaining to
international safeguards) applicable to the GROA. This change is needed
because the Terms of Reference, dated August 1, 1994, for the Subgroup
on IAEA Safeguards in the U.S., part of the Subcommittee on
International Safeguards and Monitoring of the IAEA Steering Committee,
states that NRC shall be the U.S. agency responsible for maintaining
necessary regulations for implementing the US-IAEA Safeguards Agreement
at NRC licensed or certified facilities, including the promulgation of
regulations, incorporation of appropriate amendments in NRC licenses,
and the issuance of such orders as may be necessary to assure
compliance. These Terms of Reference regarding the agreement between
the U.S. and the IAEA are available for inspection in the NRC's public
document room.
These proposed amendments do not require specific protection
against the malevolent use of a vehicle. As stated in the final rule
``Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power
Plants'' (59 FR 38889, August 1, 1994), the NRC staff, with contractor
assistance, is studying this issue and attempting to quantify the
consequences of a vehicle bomb detonated in the vicinity of an ISFSI.
The results of this study will assist the staff in making a
determination as to whether vehicle bomb protection is needed for
ISFSIs. Also, if any significant safety issues are identified in this
study, those issues would be resolved by an appropriate regulatory
action, which could include rulemaking. In the interim, the staff
believes that the inherent nature of the spent nuclear fuel or HLW,
along with the degree of protection provided by the approved storage
means, provides adequate protection against the malevolent use of a
vehicle.
Regulatory Approach
The proposed requirements would amend 10 CFR parts 60, 72, 73, and
75. For part 60, the Commission is proposing that the regulatory
approach for safeguarding a GROA be the same as that which applies to
spent nuclear fuel storage facilities licensed under part 72. The basic
reason for this proposal is that the GROA operations, at least insofar
as they are expected to be conducted in surface facilities, appear to
present the same kinds of potential risks that are characteristic of
the storage of spent nuclear fuel. And the safeguards that would thus
be required are deemed to be sufficient as well to protect against acts
affecting the underground facility that might be inimical to the common
defense and security. This regulatory approach is predicated on
maintaining the physical integrity of the spent nuclear fuel rods. If
their physical integrity is not maintained, additional license
conditions might be found to be necessary and would then be
incorporated in the license.
The current proposal represents a departure from the Commission's
prior position, as explained in the statement of considerations
accompanying its promulgation of 10 CFR part 60 (46 FR 13971, 13975,
February 25, 1981). The prior view was that ``DOE, as a Federal agency
operating under the Atomic Energy Act, has its own obligation to
promote the common defense and security. Indeed, DOE is responsible
under the Atomic Energy Act for protection of materials and facilities
far more sensitive from a safeguards standpoint than nuclear waste
materials in a geologic repository. Therefore, the rule provides that a
DOE certification that its repository operations area safeguards are
equal to those at comparable DOE surface facilities shall constitute a
rebuttable presumption on the question of inimicality to the common
defense and security.''
Implementation of the current rule has proved to be difficult for
two reasons. The first has been the identification of DOE surface
facilities that are ``comparable,'' so that the protective measures are
neither too burdensome nor too lax. The second reason concerns the
indefiniteness of the ``rebuttable presumption'' language. Neither DOE
nor the NRC staff nor any other potential party can be certain about
the level of detail that might be necessary to support the
certification or to rebut the presumption of noninimicality. It appears
likely to the Commission that the specification of reasonable
safeguards requirements, as it is here proposing, will enable DOE to
discharge its common defense and security obligations more efficiently
than would be the case under the existing language. And there would be
the added benefit of ensuring that similar operations (i.e., at a GROA
as well as at spent nuclear fuel storage facilities) are addressed in a
consistent manner. Moreover, by defining the requirements more clearly
in advance of the submission of a license application, opportunities
for timely public review and comment may be enhanced.
The proposed amendments would replace existing Sec. 60.21(b)(3)
with a requirement for DOE to submit a detailed plan to provide
physical protection for the storage of HLW at a GROA in accordance with
a new Sec. 73.51. Also, the proposed amendment would replace existing
Sec. 60.21(b)(4) with a requirement for DOE to comply with a new
Sec. 60.78, which requires DOE to provide a description of a program to
meet the requirements of existing Secs. 72.72, 72.74, 72.76, and 72.78.
The rationale for these changes is, as discussed above, to ensure that
the safeguards for similar facilities are addressed in a consistent
manner. In addition, because these specific requirements are being
provided, the general requirement for DOE to provide ``* * * such
safeguards as it requires at comparable surface facilities * * *''
would also be removed from Secs. 60.31, 60.41, and 72.24(o), because it
would not be needed. Also, all of the requirements of Sec. 73.51 would
be applicable to surface operations including the entry points to the
underground facility, and the earth cover together with the remoteness
of the facility would provide additional protection of the public
against a significant offsite release from the underground facility.
Therefore, only the more general performance objectives set out in
paragraph 73.51(b) would be applicable to the underground facility.
Surveillance and detection measures would be required for surface
operations and access would be controlled at entry points to the
underground facility; within the underground facility itself, however,
no further measures would need to be implemented for purposes of this
regulation.
An additional revision to Part 60 relates to the nuclear material
control and accounting program that is referred to in
Sec. 60.21(c)(10). To the extent that this program relates to
safeguards issues, it is more properly addressed as ``general
information'' under Sec. 60.21(b) rather than as part of the Safety
Analysis Report under Sec. 60.21(c). The proposed rule will accomplish
this. However, existing Sec. 60.21(c)(10) has a broader
[[Page 42081]]
purpose that does implicate safety issues. There is a need for DOE to
describe the materials inventory and recordkeeping program that is
designed to assure protection of public health and safety during
operations of the GROA and after permanent closure. Such information is
important, for example, for purposes of performance confirmation,
potential retrieval, and archival documentation. Section 60.21(c) would
accordingly be revised to reflect this focus.
The proposed amendment to Sec. 72.180 would provide requirements
for the storage of spent nuclear fuel or HLW under a specific license
by referring applicants to the same new section, Sec. 73.51. The
proposed amendment to Sec. 72.212 would allow the licensee or applicant
the option of either using Sec. 73.51 for the storage of spent nuclear
fuel under a general license or continuing to use Sec. 73.55 with the
additional conditions and exceptions provided in Sec. 72.212(b)(5).
In licensing the storage of spent nuclear fuel or HLW at an ISFSI
or a power reactor that has permanently ceased reactor operations, the
NRC staff has had to sort through the many safeguards requirements of
Part 73 to choose appropriate safeguards requirements, and impose those
requirements through license conditions. As a result of this
experience, however, a set of principles has evolved that reflects both
the nature of potential threats and the hazardous radioactive
characteristics of the materials. Accordingly, the proposed amendments
in Sec. 73.51 would codify safeguards requirements currently imposed on
spent nuclear fuel storage licensees and would provide a consistent set
of requirements for future licensing. Specifically, this new section
would have the objective of ensuring that the following basic physical
protection performance capabilities are met:
(1) Spent nuclear fuel or HLW is stored only within a protected
area;
(2) Only authorized individuals are granted access to the protected
area;
(3) Unauthorized penetrations of or activities within the protected
area are detected and assessed;
(4) Communication with a designated response force, whenever
necessary, is conducted in a timely fashion; and
(5) The physical security organization is managed properly.
These amendments would not apply to spent nuclear fuel storage
pools at operating nuclear power plants. In addition, because these
proposed safeguards requirements would codify the existing regulatory
practice, there would not be any additional burden placed on current
licensees. Further, the industry would benefit from a reduction of
current regulatory uncertainties. The public would benefit from a
greater level of assurance that appropriate safeguards requirements are
being imposed on spent nuclear fuel and HLW storage licensees through
public review and comment on the proposed rule. The DOE would benefit
from the proposed amendments by having a clear statement of the
safeguards measures the Commission plans to require at the GROA. Also,
NRC would benefit as a result of a more efficient licensing process.
In addition, the current reporting requirements in Sec. 73.71 would
be amended to specifically include facilities that are subject to this
rulemaking. However, because the amended reporting requirements are
equivalent to current practice, no additional burden will be placed on
current licensees as a result of these amended reporting requirements.
Specific Considerations
Comments with supporting rationale are particularly requested on
the following questions:
1. Would the proposed amendments impose any significant additional
costs for safeguards of currently stored spent nuclear fuel beyond what
is now incurred for that purpose?
2. Is there reason to expect the costs to future licensees to
differ substantially from those of current licensees?
3. Are the cost estimates in Table III of the Draft Regulatory
Analysis representative of current industry experience? Are there
significant costs that have not been included in the table?
4. Are the costs justified by the benefits that would be afforded
by the proposed amendments? Are there alternatives that would afford
essentially the same benefits, but be more cost effective?
5. Are the proposed amendments in 10 CFR 73.51 appropriate for an
MRS or geologic repository operated by the U.S. Department of Energy?
Criminal Penalties
The Commission notes that these proposed amendments are issued
under Sections 161b and i of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
Therefore, violation of these regulations may subject a person to
criminal sanctions under Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act.
Environmental Impact: Categorical Exclusion
The Commission has determined that this regulation is the type of
action described as a categorical exclusion in 10 CFR 51.22 (c)(3)(i)
and (iii). Therefore, neither an environmental impact statement nor an
environmental assessment has been prepared for this proposed rule.
Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
This proposed rule does not contain a new or amended information
collection requirement that is subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act
of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing requirements were approved
by the Office of Management and Budget, approval numbers 3150-0002, -
0127, and -0132.
Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspects
of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing
the burden, to the Information and Records Management Branch (T6F33),
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and to
the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, (3150-
0132), NEOB-10202, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC
20503.
Regulatory Analysis
The Commission has prepared a draft regulatory analysis for this
proposed rule. The draft analysis examines the benefits and impacts of
the alternatives considered by the Commission. The draft regulatory
analysis is available for inspection in the NRC Public Document Room,
2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Single copies of the
analysis may be obtained from Dr. Sandra D. Frattali, Division of
Regulatory Applications, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. The draft
regulatory analysis also is available for viewing and downloading from
the NRC's rulemaking bulletin board as discussed above under ADDRESSES.
Regulatory Flexibility Certification
As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the
Commission certifies that this rule, if adopted, will not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
This proposed rule would affect operators of ISFSIs, power reactors
that have permanently ceased operation, and DOE as the operator of the
MRS and GROA. The affected licensees do not fall within the scope of
the definition of ``small entities'' set forth in Section 601(3) of
[[Page 42082]]
the Regulatory Flexibility Act, or the Small Business Size Standards
set out in regulations issued by the Small Business Administration Act,
13 CFR part 121.
Backfit Analysis
The Commission has determined that the backfit rule in 10 CFR
50.109 does not apply to this proposed rule because these proposed
amendments do not impose new requirements on existing 10 CFR Part 50
licensees. Also, the backfitting requirements in 10 CFR 72.62 do not
apply because these proposed amendments neither impose new requirements
nor modify procedures or organizations of currently licensed ISFSIs.
Therefore, a backfit analysis was not prepared for this proposed rule.
List of Subjects
10 CFR Part 60
Criminal penalties, High-level waste, Nuclear power plants and
reactors, Nuclear materials, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements,
Waste treatment and disposal.
10 CFR Part 72
Manpower training programs, Nuclear materials, Occupational safety
and health, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security
measures, Spent fuel.
10 CFR Part 73
Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Export,
Import, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.
10 CFR Part 75
Criminal penalties, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear materials,
Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Security measures.
For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 553; the Commission is proposing
to adopt the following amendments to 10 CFR Parts 60, 72, 73, and 75.
PART 60--DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES IN GEOLOGIC
REPOSITORIES
1. The authority citation for part 60 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 62, 63, 65, 81, 161, 182, 183, 68 Stat.
929, 930, 932, 933, 935, 948, 953, 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2071,
2073, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233); secs. 202, 206, 88
Stat. 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5842, 5846); secs. 10 and 14, Pub. L.
95-601, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 2021a and 5851); sec. 102, Pub. L.
91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332); secs. 114, 121, Pub. L. 97-
425, 96 Stat. 2213g, 2228, as amended (42 U.S.C. 10134, 10141) and
Pub. L. 102-486, sec. 2902, 106 Stat. 3123 (42 U.S.C. 5851).
2. In Sec. 60.21, paragraphs (b)(3), (b)(4), and (c)(10) are
revised to read as follows:
Sec. 60.21 Content of application.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(3) A detailed plan to provide physical protection of high-level
radioactive waste in accordance with Sec. 73.51 of this chapter. This
plan must include the design for physical protection, the licensee's
safeguards contingency plan, and security organization personnel
training and qualification plan. The plan must list tests, inspections,
audits, and other means to be used to demonstrate compliance with such
requirements.
(4) A description of the program to meet the requirements of
Sec. 60.78.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(10) A description of the program to be used to maintain the
records described in Secs. 60.71 and 60.72.
* * * * *
3. In Sec. 60.31, paragraph (b) is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 60.31 Construction authorization.
* * * * *
(b) Common defense and security. That there is reasonable assurance
that the activities proposed in the application will not be inimical to
the common defense and security.
* * * * *
4. In Sec. 60.41, paragraph (c) is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 60.41 Standards for issuance of a license.
* * * * *
(c) The issuance of the license will not be inimical to the common
defense and security and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to
the health and safety of the public.
* * * * *
5. A new Sec. 60.78 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 60.78 Material control and accounting records and reports.
DOE shall implement a program of material control and accounting
(and accidental criticality reporting) that is the same as that
specified in Secs. 72.72, 72.74, 72.76, 72.78 of this chapter.
PART 72--LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF
SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE
6. The authority citation for part 72 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 57, 62, 63, 65, 69, 81, 161, 182, 183,
184, 186, 187, 189, 68 Stat. 929, 930, 932, 933, 934, 935, 948, 953,
954, 955, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2071, 2073, 2077, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2099, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233,
2234, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2282); sec. 274, Pub. L. 86-373, 73 Stat.
688, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2021); sec. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88
Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846);
Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851); sec. 102,
Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332); secs. 131, 132, 133,
135, 137, 141, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2229, 2230, 2232, 2241, sec.
148, Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-235 (42 U.S.C. 10151, 10152,
10153, 10155, 10157, 10161, 10168).
Section 72.44(g) also issued under secs. 142(b) and 148 (c),
(d), Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-232, 1330-236 (42 U.S.C.
10162(b), 10168 (c), (d)). Section 72.46 also issued under sec. 189,
68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2239); sec. 134, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat.
2230 (42 U.S.C. 10154). Section 72.96(d) also issued under sec.
145(g), Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-235 (42 U.S.C. 10165(g)).
Subpart J also issued under secs. 2(2), 2(15), 2(19), 117(a),
141(h), Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2202, 2203, 2204, 2222, 2224 (42
U.S.C. 10101, 10137(a), 10161(h)). Subparts K and L are also issued
under sec. 133, 98 Stat. 2230 (42 U.S.C. 10153) and sec. 218(a), 96
Stat. 2252 (42 U.S.C. 10198).
7. In Sec. 72.24, paragraph (o) is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 72.24 Contents of application: Technical information.
* * * * *
(o) A description of the detailed security measures for physical
protection, including design features and the plans required by Subpart
H. For an application from DOE for an ISFSI or MRS, DOE will provide a
description of the physical security plan for protection against
radiological sabotage as required by subpart H of this part.
* * * * *
8. Section 72.180 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 72.180 Physical security plan.
The licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow a detailed plan
for physical protection as described in Sec. 73.51 of this chapter. The
licensee shall retain a copy of the current plan as a record until the
Commission terminates the license for which the procedures were
developed and, if any portion of the plan is superseded, retain the
superseded
[[Page 42083]]
material for 3 years after each change or until termination of the
license. This plan must describe how the applicant will meet the
requirements of Sec. 73.51 of this chapter and provide physical
protection during on-site transportation to and from the proposed ISFSI
or MRS including the design for physical protection, the licensee's
safeguards contingency plan, and the security organization personnel
training and qualification plan. The plan must list tests, inspections,
audits, and other means to be used to demonstrate compliance with such
requirements.
9. In Sec. 72.212, paragraph (b)(1)(iv) is added and (b)(5) is
revised to read as follows:
Sec. 72.212 Conditions of general license issued under Sec. 72.210.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(1) * * *
(iv) Notify the NRC as to whether they will implement Sec. 73.51 or
of this chapter their approved physical security plan pursuant to
Sec. 73.55 of this chapter. If a licensee implements Sec. 73.51 of this
chapter, its approved physical security plan must be modified to
clearly indicate that Sec. 73.51 of this chapter will be followed for
safeguarding spent nuclear fuel. For those persons who have not begun
use of the general license, this notice must be included in the 90-day
letter required by paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section. For those
persons who have begun use of the general license, this notice must be
provided no later than 30 days after implementation of Sec. 73.51 of
this chapter to the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Commission regional
office listed in Appendix D to part 20 of this chapter.
* * * * *
(5) Protect the spent nuclear fuel against the design basis threat
of radiological sabotage in accordance with either Sec. 73.51 of this
chapter or the same provisions and requirements as are set forth in the
licensee's physical security plan pursuant to Sec. 73.55 of this
chapter with the following additional conditions and exceptions.
* * * * *
PART 73-- PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
10. The authority citation for part 73 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, sec.
147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as
amended, 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245 sec. 1701, 106 Stat.
2951, 2952, 2953 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844, 2297f).
Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97-425,
96 Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161). Section 73.37(f) also
issued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841
note). Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606, Pub. L. 99-399, 100
Stat. 876 (42 U.S.C. 2169).
11. In Sec. 73.1, paragraph (b)(6) is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 73.1 Purpose and scope.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(6) This part prescribes requirements for the physical protection
of spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste stored in either
an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) or a monitored
retrievable storage installation (MRS) licensed under part 72 of this
chapter, or stored at the geologic repository operations area licensed
under part 60 of this chapter.
* * * * *
12. The introductory text of Sec. 73.50 is revised to read as
follows:
Sec. 73.50 Requirements for physical protection of licensed
activities.
Each licensee who is not subject to Sec. 73.51, but who possesses,
uses, or stores formula quantities of strategic special nuclear
material which is not readily separable from other radioactive material
and which has a total external radiation dose rate in excess of 100
rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any accessible surface
without intervening shielding other than at a nuclear reactor facility
licensed pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter shall comply with the
following:
* * * * *
13. A new Sec. 73.51 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 73.51 Requirements for the physical protection of stored spent
nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste.
(a) Applicability. Notwithstanding the provisions of Secs. 73.20,
73.50, or 73.67, the physical protection requirements of this section
apply to each licensee who stores:
(1) Spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste (HLW) under
a specific license issued pursuant to Part 72 of this chapter:
(i) At an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI);
(ii) At a monitored retrievable storage (MRS) installation; or
(iii) At a nuclear power reactor that has permanently ceased
reactor operations licensed pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter;
(2) Spent nuclear fuel or HLW at a geologic repository operations
area (GROA) licensed pursuant to Part 60 of this chapter; or
(3) Spent nuclear fuel under a general license issued pursuant to
Part 72 of this chapter and has exercised the option provided by
Sec. 72.212(b)(5) of this chapter to use the provisions of Sec. 73.51
for the physical protection of spent nuclear fuel.
(b) General performance objectives.
(1) Each licensee subject to this section shall establish and
maintain a physical protection system with the objective of providing
high assurance that activities involving special nuclear material do
not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.
(2) To meet the general objective of paragraph (b)(1) of this
section, each licensee subject to this section shall meet the following
performance capabilities:
(i) Store spent nuclear fuel or HLW only within a protected area;
(ii) Grant access to the protected area only to individuals who are
authorized to enter the protected area;
(iii) Detect and assess unauthorized penetration of or activities
within the protected area;
(iv) Provide timely communication to a designated response force
whenever the response force is called upon to act; and
(v) Manage the physical security organization in a manner that
maintains its effectiveness.
(3) The physical protection system must be designed to protect
against radiological sabotage.
(c) Plan retention. Each licensee subject to this section shall
retain a copy of the effective physical protection plan as a record for
3 years or until termination of the license for which the procedures
were developed. Copies of superseded material must be retained for 3
years after each change or until termination of the license.
(d) Physical protection systems, subsystems, components, and
procedures. To meet the performance capabilities of paragraph (b)(2) of
this section, a physical protection system must include, but is not
necessarily limited to, the measures specified in paragraphs (d)(1)
through (d)(14) of this section. The Commission may require alternate
or additional measures necessary to meet the performance objectives of
paragraph (b)(1) of this section. The Commission may also authorize
other necessary protection measures.
(1) Spent nuclear fuel or HLW must be stored only within a
protected area so that access to this material requires passage through
or penetration of two physical barriers, one barrier at the perimeter
of the protected area and one
[[Page 42084]]
barrier offering substantial penetration resistance. The physical
barrier at the perimeter of the protected area must be as defined in
Sec. 73.2. Isolation zones, typically 20 feet wide each, on both sides
of this barrier must be provided to facilitate assessment. The barrier
offering substantial resistance to penetration may be provided by an
approved storage cask or building walls such as those of a reactor or
fuel storage building. Other suitable measures to provide the barrier
may be acceptable, if approved by the NRC on a case by case basis.
(2) A means of illumination must be provided sufficient to permit
assessment of unauthorized penetration of or activities within the
protected area and associated isolation zones.
(3) The perimeter of the protected area must be subject to
continual surveillance and be protected by an intrusion detection
system with provisions for redundant monitoring of the system. The
detection and surveillance systems must be monitored in a continuously
staffed alarm station, not necessarily located within the protected
area, and in one redundant location.
(4) The protected area must be monitored by random patrols of a
frequency not less than once every 8 hours.
(5) A security organization, with written procedures, must be
established. The security organization must include a minimum of two
watchmen per shift to provide for monitoring of detection and
surveillance systems and for communications with a designated response
force or local law enforcement agencies (LLEA) in the event of
detection of unauthorized penetration or activities. Members of the
security organization shall be trained, equipped, and qualified in
accordance with the applicable provisions of appendix B to this part.
(6) Documented liaison with a designated response force or LLEA
must be established to permit response to unauthorized penetration or
activities.
(7) Screening must be conducted before granting an individual
unescorted access to the protected area to obtain information on which
to base a decision to permit such access. Screening should typically
include a criminal history check, a previous employment check, and two
personal reference checks.
(8) A controlled personnel identification and lock system must be
established and maintained to limit access to the protected area to
individuals authorized unescorted access or escorted individuals who
have been approved for such access.
(9) All escorted individuals to the protected area must be under
the constant escort of an individual who has been authorized unescorted
access to the protected area.
(10) Redundant communications capability must be provided between
the security organization and designated response force or LLEA.
(11) All individuals, vehicles, and hand-carried packages entering
the protected area must be checked for proper authorization and
searched for explosives before entry.
(12) Written response procedures must be established and maintained
for addressing unauthorized penetration of or activities within the
protected area including Category 5, Procedures, of appendix C to part
73. The licensee shall retain a copy of the response procedures as a
record for 3 years or until termination of the license for which the
procedures were developed. Copies of superseded material must be
retained for 3 years after each change or until termination of the
license.
(13) All detection and surveillance systems and supporting
subsystems must be tamper-indicating with line supervision and be
maintained in operable condition. Compensatory measures must be taken
during periods of inoperability.
(14) The security program must be reviewed once every 24 months by
individuals independent of both security program management and
personnel who have direct responsibility for implementation of the
security program. The security program review must include an
evaluation of the effectiveness of the physical security system and a
verification of the liaison established with the designated response
force or LLEA.
(15) The following documentation must be retained as a record for 3
years after the record is made or until termination of the license.
Duplicate records to those required under Sec. 73.71 need not be
retained under the requirements of this section:
(i) A log of individuals granted access to the protected area;
(ii) Screening records of individuals granted unescorted access to
the protected area;
(iii) A log of routine patrols;
(iv) A record of each alarm received identifying the type of alarm,
location, date and time when received, and disposition of the alarm;
and
(v) The security program review reports.
(e) Exception. The physical protection system for the underground
facility of a geologic repository operations area must meet the
performance capabilities of paragraph (b) of this section, but need not
include the specific measures set out in paragraph (d) of this section
provided that access is controlled at the underground facility entry
points.
14. In Sec. 73.71, paragraphs (b)(1) and (c)(1) are revised to read
as follows:
Sec. 73.71 Reporting of safeguards events.
* * * * *
(b)(1) Each licensee subject to the provisions of Secs. 73.20,
73.37, 73.50, 73.51, 73.55, 73.60, or 73.67 shall notify the NRC
Operations Center within 1 hour of discovery of the safeguards events
described in paragraph I(a)(1) of appendix G to this part. Licensees
subject to the provisions of Secs. 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.51, 73.55,
73.60, or each licensee possessing strategic special nuclear material
(SSNM) and subject to Sec. 73.67(d) shall notify the NRC Operations
Center within 1 hour after the discovery of the safeguards events
described in paragraphs I(a)(2), (a)(3), (b), and (c) of appendix G to
this part. Licensees subject to the provisions of Secs. 73.20, 73.37,
73.50, 73.51, 73.55, or 73.60 shall notify the NRC Operations Center
within 1 hour after discovery of the safeguards events described in
paragraph I(d) of appendix G to this part.
* * * * *
(c)(1) Each licensee subject to the provisions of Secs. 73.20,
73.37, 73.50, 73.51, 73.55, 73.60, or each licensee possessing SSNM and
subject to the provisions of Sec. 73.67(d) shall maintain a current log
and record the safeguards events described in paragraphs II (a) and (b)
of appendix G to this part within 24 hours of discovery by a licensee
employee or member of the licensee's contract security organization.
The licensee shall retain the log of events recorded under this section
as a record for 3 years after the last entry is made in each log or
until termination of the license.
* * * * *
PART 75--SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA
AGREEMENT
15. The authority citation for part 75 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: Secs. 53, 63, 103, 104, 122, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 932,
936, 937, 939, 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2093, 2133, 2134,
2152, 2201); sec. 201, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841).
Section 75.4 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97-425,
96 Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161).
[[Page 42085]]
16. In Sec. 75.4, paragraph (k)(5) is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 75.4 Definitions.
* * * * *
(k) * * *
(5) Any location where the possession of more than one effective
kilogram of nuclear material is licensed pursuant to parts 40, 60, or
70 of this chapter, or pursuant to an Agreement State license.
* * * * *
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 8th day of August, 1995.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Andrew L. Bates,
Acting Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 95-20035 Filed 8-14-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P