[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 152 (Tuesday, August 8, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 40390-40400]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-19510]



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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-160]


Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech) Georgia Tech 
Research Reactor; Issuance of Partial Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 
2.206

    Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued a 
Partial Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206 regarding the Georgia 
Tech Research Reactor in response to a Petition received from Ms. 
Pamela Blockey-O'Brien (Petitioner), dated October 23, 1994. The 
Partial Director's Decision also considered subsequent letters from the 
Petitioner dated November 12, and December 4, 1994, February 21, 
February 23, March 6, March 28, April 19, May 18, June 27, and July 18, 
1995.
    On October 23, 1994, the Petitioner requested (1) the shutdown and 
decontamination of the Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech) 
Research Reactor, (2) the revocation of liquid radioactive material 
release authority to all licensees, (3) the revocation of licenses that 
use the principle of as low as reasonably achievable, (4) the 
termination of transportation of radioactive material by mail, and (5) 
the modification to posting requirements for radioactive material. With 
regard to request (1), the enclosed Partial Director's Decision 
addressed the Petitioner's issues which are not currently being 
considered as part of a license renewal proceeding. The remaining 
Petitioner's issues relating to request (1) will be addressed under 
separate cover upon completion of the ongoing adjudicatory proceedings 
and NRC staff review. The Partial Director's Decision also addresses 
requests (2) through (5). The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation found that the Petitioner's concerns, addressed to date, do 
not raise a substantial health and safety concern warranting the 
requested actions. The reasons for this denial are explained in the 
``Partial Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-95-15), the 
complete text of which follows this notice, and which is available for 
public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
    A copy of this Partial Director's Decision will be filed with the 
Secretary of the Commission for review in accordance with 10 CFR 
2.206(c). As provided in that regulation, the Decision will constitute 
the final action of the Commission 25 days after the date of the 
issuance of the Decision, unless the Commission, on its own motion, 
institutes a review of the Decision within that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 31st day of July 1995.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank J. Miraglia,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Appendix

Partial Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

I. Introduction

    On October 23, 1994, Ms. Pamela Blockey-O'Brien (the Petitioner) 
filed a Petition with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
staff pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206, that requested that the NRC staff 
revoke the license of the Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia 
Tech) Research Reactor, shut down this research reactor and its support 
facilities, and remove all radioactive material and contamination 
offsite to a government created ``National Sacrifice [A]rea'' such as 
the Savannah River or Oak Ridge facilities. In addition, the Petitioner 
requested that the NRC staff withdraw all license authority nationwide 
involving the discharging or dumping of any quantity of radioactive 
material to all the sewers or waters in the United States or oceans of 
the world, and withdraw all licenses to all nuclear facilities, 
including nuclear power plants (NPPs), which operate under as low as 
reasonably achievable (ALARA) principles. Finally, the Petitioner 
requested both that the NRC staff modify every license issued to 
transporters of radioactive materials and builders of NPPs so that 
these parties must put two foot high letters on everything transported 
or built stating ``DANGER-RADIOACTIVE'' and in smaller letters ``there 
is no safe level of radiation, any exposure can [a]ffect health,'' and 
prohibit the transportation of radioactive material by mail. The NRC 
staff received additional letters dated November 12, December 4, 1994, 
February 21, February 23, March 6, March 28, April 19, May 18, June 27, 
and July 18, 1995, from the Petitioner and also considered these 
letters in this Partial Director's Decision. All letters related to 
this Petition have been placed in the Public Document Room and docketed 
under the Georgia Tech Research Reactor Docket No. 50-160, in 
accordance with NRC Management Directive 8.11, ``Review Process for 10 
CFR 2.206 Petitions.''
    As bases for the request to shut down and decontaminate the Georgia 
Tech Research Reactor, the Petitioner asserted that (1) a water flume 
comes out of the ground ``destabilizing the reactor and the ground in 
some way;'' (2) ``(r)adiation levels in soil and vegetation climb 
markedly in GA EPD documents'' around the Georgia Tech Research 
Reactor; (3) there is no record of air monitoring ever having been 
done; (4) heavy rainfall causes water to back up in the sewer and 
drainage lines causing flooding of the reactor parking lot and campus, 
as well as causing sinkholes, ``puff-ups'' on campus ground, and 
welded-shut manhole covers to be blown off; (5) radioactive 
contaminants have been routinely discharged into the sanitary sewer 
from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor's waste water holding tank and 
contamination spread by backup of the sewage system; (6) should the 
Georgia Tech Research Reactor be further destabilized, the reactor and 
the tank holding cobalt-60 could ``break apart,'' causing radioactive 
contaminants to ``drain into groundwater/down sewers/into the runoff 
ditch;'' (7) the Georgia Tech Research Reactor is in an earthquake 

[[Page 40391]]
zone; (8) there is absolutely no reason to keep the Georgia Tech 
Research Reactor operating; (9) security at the Georgia Tech Research 
Reactor is extremely lax; and (10) in case of an accident or terrorist 
attack, evacuation of the campus and downtown Atlanta would be 
impossible both now and during the Olympics.1

    \1\ Issue (8) includes concerns that substantial management 
deficiencies persist. Issue (9) involves concerns on general 
security and, particularly, security during the period of the 1996 
Olympics. Issue (10) includes concerns on evacuation in case of a 
terrorist attack. Since these concerns are the subject of an ongoing 
license renewal proceeding before an Atomic Safety and Licensing 
Board, these concerns will be addressed in a Final Director's 
Decision at an appropriate time after considering the decisions 
reached in the license renewal process. All other issues related to 
this 2.206 Petition were considered in this Partial Director's 
Decision.
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    As the bases for the request to withdraw all license authority 
nationwide involving the discharging or dumping of any quantity of 
radioactive material to all the sewers or waters in the United States, 
to withdraw all licenses for all nuclear facilities, including NPPs, 
which operate under ALARA principles, and to change labeling 
requirements for radioactive material, the Petitioner asserted that 
there is no safe level of radiation, that storage and disposal of 
radioactive waste is inadequate, and that the NRC's new sewage dumping 
guidelines are totally inadequate. The Petitioner also asserted that 
the request to restrict mailing of radioactive materials relates to the 
occurrence of transportation accidents.

II. Discussion

A. Revocation of Georgia Tech Research Reactor License
    The following discussion relates to the request that the NRC staff 
revoke the license of the Georgia Tech Research Reactor, shut down this 
research reactor and its support facilities, and remove all radioactive 
materials and contamination offsite. This Partial Director's Decision 
addresses NRC licensed activities.2

    \2\ The 10 CFR 2.206 Petition included some mention of the 
cobalt-60 irradiation facility which is not licensed by the NRC and 
is, therefore, not covered in this discussion except as it may 
affect research reactor safety. The 2.206 Petition and this Partial 
Director's Decision have been transmitted to the State of Georgia, 
the licensing authority for the cobalt-60 facility and for other 
state licensed material also mentioned in the Petition.
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    (1) A water flume comes out of the ground ``destabilizing the 
reactor and the ground in some way.'' The Petitioner stated that 
``(d)etailed maps show that a water flume comes out of the ground 
directly next to and west of the reactor.'' On request, the Petitioner 
identified the ``detailed maps'' as City of Atlanta, Department of 
Public Works (DPW) Sheets I-11 and H-11, which show ``flumes'' or 
``storm drain inventory.''
    The NRC staff reviewed these drawings. Drawing I-11 did not show a 
flume indication. Drawing H-11 does indicate a ``flume'' to the west of 
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The NRC staff discussed this drawing 
and indication of a ``flume'' with DPW, the agency responsible for the 
sewer system and the drawings. The DPW indicated that the word 
``flume'' in the drawing means a surface drainage path. Physical onsite 
examination of this location showed a surface drainage path consisting 
of a concrete lined channel extending along the back retaining wall of 
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor facility site, approximately where 
the ``flume'' was indicated on the drawing.
    Furthermore, physical examination of the Georgia Tech Research 
Reactor facility and site have found no evidence of an underground 
water flume or destabilization of the Georgia Tech Research Reactor 
facility or ground. Additional factors related to stability of the 
Georgia Tech Research Reactor are addressed under issues (4), (6), and 
(7).
    The NRC staff finds no reason to conclude that there is an 
underground water flume destabilizing the Georgia Tech Research Reactor 
and surrounding ground. The Petitioner provided no facts to conclude 
otherwise. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the Petitioner's 
concerns do not present a substantial health or safety issue warranting 
the action requested by the Petitioner.
    (2) ``Radiation levels in soil and vegetation climb markedly in GA 
EPD documents'' around the reactor. The State of Georgia (GA) 
Environmental Protection Division (EPD) provided the NRC staff with its 
environmental radiation monitoring results as compiled on November 23, 
1994. These results included data from environmental monitoring for 
radioactivity with thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs), and from soil 
and vegetation sampling around the Georgia Tech Research Reactor.
    The NRC staff discussed the results with EPD. EPD stated that its 
monitoring found no evidence of release of radioactive material from 
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. EPD further indicated that the 
values and variations in monitored radiation exposures and 
concentrations were typical of environmental monitoring results and 
showed no increasing trend.
    The NRC staff has concluded based on the types, quantities and 
relative concentrations of the isotopes measured by EPD that they are 
not from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. Some of the isotopes 
measured by EPD are naturally occurring. Specifically, beryllium-7 is 
from reactions of cosmic rays with air, potassium-40 is from primordial 
sources, radium-226 is from the decay of naturally occurring uranium-
238, and radium-228 is from decay of naturally occurring thorium-
232.3 Additionally, radiation monitoring of effluents from the 
Georgia Tech Research Reactor and of areas within the research reactor 
containment by Georgia Tech, as required by the Technical 
Specifications 3.2.a and 3.5.b, provided further evidence that the 
measurements by EPD of other isotopes (i.e., cesium-137, cerium-141, 
cerium-144, ruthenium-103, zirconium-95, and niobium-95) were not from 
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. Rather, EPD indicated that the 
radioisotopes were from other sources, such as fallout from nuclear 
weapons testing around the world. Furthermore, as measured by EPD, 
there is no indication of other radioisotopes, which would be expected 
if the radioactivity were from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor.

    \3\ Kathren, R. L., ``Radioactivity in the Environment: Sources, 
Distribution, and Surveillance.''
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    The conclusion, that there is no evidence that the release of 
radioactive material from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor has 
contributed to the monitored radiation levels in the soil and 
vegetation, is also corroborated by the Georgia Tech environmental 
monitoring program. This environmental monitoring program has used film 
badges, and currently uses TLDs, at various locations around the 
Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The film badges were provided by a 
National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program certified vendor. 
The TLDs meet American National Standards Institute Standards. One 
monitored location in the Georgia Tech Research Reactor stack measured 
the direct radiation for airborne releases from operation of the 
Georgia Tech Research Reactor. This monitor has indicated airborne 
effluent releases generally below detectable levels and always well 
below the limits of 10 CFR part 20, ``Standards for Protection Against 
Radiation,'' as verified most recently in NRC staff Inspection Report 
Nos. 50-160/95-01, 50-160/94-02, and 50-160/93-02 4. These results 
are consistent with the EPD data and further confirmed the conclusions 
of the State of Georgia EPD that its monitoring 

[[Page 40392]]
found no evidence of release of radioactive material from the Georgia 
Tech Research Reactor which has contributed to the monitored radiation 
levels in soil and vegetation.

    \4\ These, and the other inspection reports referenced in this 
Partial Director's Decision are available from the NRC's Public 
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW, Washington, 
DC 20037.
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    The NRC staff evaluation of the data confirmed the EPD conclusion 
that the EPD data showed no increasing trend in radiation levels around 
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The values and variations of all 
monitored locations around the Georgia Tech Research Reactor were 
typical of environmental monitoring results at other locations, were 
attributable to non-reactor sources, and showed no record of an 
increasing trend. Further corroboration of this conclusion was provided 
in the discussion addressing issues (3) and (5) in this Partial 
Director's Decision in that releases of radioactive isotopes from the 
Georgia Tech Research Reactor are well within NRC regulatory limits and 
do not correspond to the radioisotopes found in the soil or vegetation 
samples.
    The NRC staff finds no reason to conclude that the Georgia Tech 
Research Reactor is contributing to radiation levels in soil or 
vegetation. The Petitioner provided no facts to conclude otherwise. 
Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the Petitioner's concern does 
not present a substantial health or safety issue warranting the action 
requested by the Petitioner.
    (3) There is no record of air monitoring ever having been done. The 
Petitioner asserted that monitoring for airborne radioactive releases 
from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor is inadequate. However, in 
addition to the environmental monitoring programs previously discussed, 
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor is required by its Technical 
Specifications 3.2.a and 3.5.b to monitor and restrict radioactive 
releases, including airborne releases. The monitoring system includes 
instruments to monitor gaseous and particulate radioactivity and to 
initiate safety related functions (e.g., containment isolation). All 
radioactive releases are required to be within the limits established 
in 10 CFR Part 20. NRC staff inspections, as documented most recently 
in Inspection Report Nos. 50-160/95-01, 50-160/94-02, and 50-160/93-02 
related to the Georgia Tech Research Reactor, have found that the 
effluent releases have been within 10 CFR Part 20 limits. Therefore, 
there is neither a technical need nor a regulatory requirement for 
additional monitoring of air samples outside the Georgia Tech Research 
Reactor, since all releases are controlled, as required by Technical 
Specifications and in accordance with NRC regulations.
    The Petitioner also raised a concern related to the storage of 
waste at the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The concern is that there 
is a large amount of waste material stored at the facility and this 
storage is generally unsafe. Inspection Report Nos. 50-160/95-01, 50-
160/94-02, and 50-160/93-02 have verified that storage of radioactive 
waste has been maintained in accordance with applicable regulatory 
requirements (10 CFR part 20) at the Georgia Tech Research Reactor.
    The Petitioner also raised concerns about various health effects 
around the Atlanta area and in other localities (e.g., around the Three 
Mile Island nuclear power plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania), but did 
not provide correlation to conditions related to the Georgia Tech 
Research Reactor. Therefore, the Petitioner did not provide bases for 
further action based on these concerns. Further, the data and 
information from EPD, the licensee, the Oak Ridge Institute for Science 
and Education (ORISE) and the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory 
(INEL), as evaluated by the NRC staff in this issue and on issues (2) 
and (5), indicate little potential for the Georgia Tech Research 
Reactor to have contributed to such health effects.
    The NRC staff finds no reason to conclude that the Georgia Tech 
Research Reactor radiation monitoring program is unacceptable. The 
Petitioner provided no facts to conclude otherwise or bases to conclude 
that additional monitoring should be required. Therefore, the NRC staff 
concludes that the Petitioner's concern does not present a substantial 
health or safety issue warranting the action requested by the 
Petitioner.
    (4) Heavy rainfall causes water to back up in the sewer and 
drainage lines causing flooding of the reactor parking lot and campus, 
as well as causing sinkholes, ``puff-ups'' on campus ground, and 
welded-shut manhole covers to be blown off. The Petitioner indicated 
that a major sinkhole of the Orme Street line (a major sewer line in 
the area) caused a backup and flooding in 1993 on the Georgia Tech 
Campus at the North parking lot at the Georgia Tech Research Reactor 
facility site. This flooding had no effect on the Georgia Tech Research 
Reactor, since the research reactor structures, systems and components 
are isolated from the sewer by a series of valves. Further, the 
containment steel-reinforced concrete floor is approximately 8 feet 
thick.5 This structure supports containment internals and provides 
weight to protect against the buoyancy of ground water. The structure 
is designed to withstand the effects of buoyancy due to ground water 
which has been found on test borings at levels ranging from 11 to 40 
feet.6 Further, DPW stated that the work that is being done on the 
Orme Street line and related construction activities minimize the 
potential for such future flooding or other problems associated to that 
line.

    \5\ ``Safety Analysis Report for the 5 MW Georgia Tech Research 
Reactor,'' Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia 30332-
0425, April 1994 (hereinafter SAR), Section 4.3, Description of 
Reactor Containment Building, page 43.
    \6\ SAR, Section 2.3, Hydrology and Geology, page 23.
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    As also indicated by the Petitioner, there is a 72 inch diameter 
storm drain/sanitary sewer line that could be a potential source of 
flooding or a sinkhole near the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. This 
sewer line is approximately 100 feet from the containment.7 By 
letter,8 DPW confirmed that the line had been inspected to ensure 
integrity and was found in ``very good condition'' on a May 24, 1994, 
walk-through. The DPW was ``not aware of any problems with this storm 
sewer'' and did not ``anticipate any problem with the maintenance or 
operation of this sewer in the foreseeable future.'' This conclusion 
was reverified with DPW, including consideration of the construction 
(e.g., blocks and concrete pipe) and configuration (e.g., on old 
drainage paths) of the sewer. DPW also indicated that this drain line 
is considered to be a private sewer and is not part of the City system, 
although DPW also indicated that they have been involved in the 
inspection and maintenance of such lines and there is no plan to 
discontinue that practice.

    \7\ SAR, Figure 4.3, page 30.
    \8\ Letter dated January 9, 1995, from L. Chambers of the 
Department of Public Works for the City of Atlanta to R. Karam of 
Georgia Tech.
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    The Petitioner raised related issues on the structural capability 
of the foundation bearing material and water intrusion around the 
containment foundation potentially causing destabilization of the 
structure. This concern referenced three Georgia Geologic Survey 
documents.9 The Georgia Geologic Survey was requested to evaluate 
the Petitioner's references to these reports with respect to the 
geology and seismology related to the Georgia 

[[Page 40393]]
Tech Research Reactor. By letter dated May 11, 1995, the State 
Geologist responded to the NRC staff.10 The letter stated, in 
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part, that:

    \9\ ``Geology of the Greater Atlanta Area'' McConnell and 
Abrams, Georgia Geologic Survey Bulletin 96, ``Groundwater in the 
Greater Atlanta Region'' by Cressler, Thurmond and Hester, Georgia 
Geologic Survey, Bulletin Information Circular 63 and ``Geology and 
Groundwater Resources of the Atlanta Area, Georgia,'' Herrick and 
Legrand, Georgia Geological Survey Bulletin 55.
    \10\ Letter from William H. McLemore, State Geologist, Georgia 
Department of Natural Resources, to Marvin M. Mendonca, NRC Staff, 
May 11, 1995.

    I have reviewed the letters from a petition to shut down the 
Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The letters suggest (1) that the 
reactor overlies the Wahoo Creek Formation, which is not a suitable 
nor a stable foundation material; (2) that there is an earthquake 
risk, particularly from the Brevard Zone; (3) that unique geologic 
fractures, particularly horizontal fractures, might cause large 
quantities of ground water to seep into the reactor and cause 
problems. My review indicates that the petition's suggestions are 
specious.
    The Wahoo Creek formation is one of many geologic formations of 
the Piedmont Physiographic Province. The fact that the Wahoo Creek 
Formation weathers into ``slabs'' is not relevant; in situ, it is a 
competent rock adequate to provide suitable foundation for the 
reactor. Comparison of the foundation characteristics of weathered 
and in situ rock material is not reasonable nor appropriate.
    Georgia is a relatively aseismic state and earthquakes are rare. 
The Brevard Zone should not be considered as an ``earthquake 
fault''.
    The proximity of the Brevard Zone to the reactor is not 
relevant. Fractured rock, which is ubiquitous to the Piedmont, 
underlies the reactor. There are no data to suggest that horizontal 
fractures having high water yielding characteristics underlie or are 
even near the reactor. From a hydrogeological point of view, there 
are no known unique features of the reactor site to suggest that 
ground water would affect reactor safety.
    The Piedmont extends from Alabama to New Jersey and occupies 
many tens of thousands of square miles. The comments made in the 
petition would apply at virtually any location in the Piedmont. In 
addition, the petition cites several reports published by the 
Geologic Survey Branch of The Georgia Environmental Protection 
Division. The reports cited were prepared under my direction; I 
personally reviewed and approved them. There are no data in these 
reports that indicate the reactor at Georgia Tech is not safe or 
poses an environmental threat.

    These findings confirm the NRC staff geologic and seismic 
conclusions presented in issue (7), and further support the related 
data and design for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor as discussed 
under this issue. These findings confirm that further analysis or 
testing is not needed for hydrogeological conditions at the Georgia 
Tech Research Reactor.
    The Petitioner also indicated that ``* * * a sinkhole appeared next 
to the reactor years ago and was filled in. A [w]itness to that is 
still very much alive.'' The Petitioner provided the NRC staff with 
information to contact the witness. This individual said that while he 
and two other individuals were walking from the facility, one of the 
individuals fell into a sinkhole to the armpits or so, and the two 
other individuals helped him get out. This individual also stated that 
the sinkhole was near the waste storage tank facility and that the time 
frame was somewhere between the late 1960s and middle 1970s. The area 
near the waste storage tank facility was physically examined while 
going over the area on foot at about 3 feet intervals. No sinkhole was 
observed.
    In addition, the NRC staff questioned several members of the 
Georgia Tech Research Reactor staff. One of these Georgia Tech Research 
Reactor staff members recalled the sinkhole referred to by the 
Petitioner. However, none of the questioned Georgia Tech staff members 
recalled any other sinkholes at the research reactor facility. This was 
further confirmed by discussions with selected NRC staff members with 
experience related to the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. These NRC 
staff members were not aware of any sinkholes at the facility other 
than the one of concern to the Petitioner.
    Additionally, drawings of the research reactor site 11 and 
physical examination of the research reactor facility and site showed 
no major drainage paths (other than the 72 inch storm drain line 
previously discussed) that could impact the Georgia Tech Research 
Reactor.

    \11\ SAR, Figures 4.2 and 4.3, pages 29 and 30.
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    Construction drawings and records 12 were also reviewed and 
selected portions of the installation examined by the NRC staff to 
determine the vulnerability of the foundation structure for the Georgia 
Tech Research Reactor to the phenomena that were raised in the 
Petition. The drawings showed the bottom of the Georgia Tech Research 
Reactor containment building steel shell about 25 feet below finished 
grade. The drawings indicated that the Georgia Tech Research Reactor 
containment building is anchored by bolts to a steel-reinforced 
concrete pad about 1 foot thick and to a ring foundation that extends 
approximately another 12 feet down under the concrete pad. Further, 
examination of selected portions of the foundation and containment 
structure found the structure consistent with the construction and 
drawing details. Construction test boring records also showed that the 
pad and ring foundation rest on material that meets or exceeds 
construction specifications for safe bearing capacity. The construction 
test boring records showed the material at the bottom of the foundation 
ring to be moderately hard to hard gray gneiss. As previously discussed 
in issue (4) and in this issue, no information has been provided by the 
Petitioner or is known to the NRC staff to suggest that this foundation 
and support structure are not as designed or are not acceptable.

    \12\ Letter from R. A. Karam, Georgia Tech, to D. M. Collins, 
U.S.N.R.C., dated October 22, 1993.
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    Sinkholes develop in soils or in limestone as solution cavities. 
Although sinkholes could develop in the soil fill material surrounding 
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor facility, there is no credible source 
for sinkhole development. Sinkholes cannot develop in or significantly 
affect gneiss such as that on which the Georgia Tech Research Reactor 
foundation is built. Therefore, the development of sinkholes near or 
underneath the Georgia Tech Research Reactor is not a credible event.
    Even in the unlikely event of failures of the 72 inch storm drain 
line or the Orme Street line previously mentioned, erosion or sinkhole 
effects could not be expected to affect the Georgia Tech Research 
Reactor, since the lines are far from the research reactor containment 
relative to these potential effects, and the design of the reactor 
facility is such that it would not be impacted by such phenomena. The 
72 inch storm drain is about 100 feet from the reactor containment and 
passes below the northwest corner of the laboratory and office building 
which is adjacent to the containment building. The footings for the 
office building, which measures approximately 90 by 130 feet, were 
founded on the partially weathered rock. Assuming the 72 inch line did 
collapse where it passes under the building, approximately a 20 feet 
square section of the northwest corner of the building could be 
affected. This section of the building houses laboratories, offices, 
and storage areas. Radioactive materials are not stored in this area. 
The remaining portion of the facility, particularly the research 
reactor containment building, would not be affected because of the 
design characteristics of the foundation and support material as 
previously discussed.
    DPW verified that the Orme Street line is 10 to 12 feet in diameter 
and is about 1200 feet from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The 
sinkhole that resulted from the failure of the Orme Street line was a 
sinkhole approximately 50 feet in radius, which is at the upper limit 
of sinkhole size in the Atlanta area based on DPW experience. Based on 
this experience 

[[Page 40394]]
(which is consistent with NRC staff information on such phenomena) it 
is not credible to consider that a sinkhole from the Orme Street line, 
at a distance of 1200 feet, could affect the Georgia Tech Research 
Reactor.
    The containment foundation for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor is 
considered to be impervious to the effects of sinkholes as the 
foundation rests on relatively hard material to depths and distances 
well beyond the credible influence of any potential source for a 
sinkhole.
    Puff-ups are heaves, or upward expansion, which occur when locked-
in stress in soil, usually clay, exceeds the load above it. The most 
common occurrence of puff-ups is in regions that were overlain by 
glaciers and the soils beneath (till, lake beds, etc.) were over-
consolidated. When the glaciers melted there was still enough material 
over these clays to lock-in the stress. Removal of some of this 
overlying material, either by erosion or excavation, allows the clays 
to expand. Puff-ups can occur in unglaciated regions generally soon 
after either erosion or excavation removes the overlying material. 
Research reactor construction was completed in the 1960s, and 
considering this time interval, occurrence of a puff-up at the facility 
is highly unlikely. Further, puff-ups are near surface, soil 
deformation phenomena. As discussed above, the relatively hard, 
relatively deep foundation structure and gray gneiss bearing material 
of the Georgia Tech Research Reactor could not be expected to be 
affected by the geologic phenomenon of puff-ups.
    With regard to the welded manhole covers that were thrown up to 8 
feet as alleged by the Petitioner by sewer backup problems, the 
distance from the containment to the nearest manhole cover has been 
verified by physical examination of the site to be greater than 50 
feet. This physical examination found no other potential impact point 
related to the Georgia Tech Research Reactor that was closer than 50 
feet. The Petitioner has neither provided nor does the NRC staff 
possess any information or experience which would suggest that a 
manhole cover could be thrown the distance and have the force necessary 
to damage the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. Therefore, the potential 
for damage to the Georgia Tech Research Reactor due to this asserted 
phenomenon is not credible.
    Based on the above, these design features and conditions provide 
assurance that the Georgia Tech Research Reactor would not be adversely 
affected by flooding, sinkholes, ``puff-ups'' or thrown welded manhole 
covers. These phenomena could not be expected to affect the Georgia 
Tech Research Reactor given the design and configuration of the 
facility. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the Petitioner's 
concern does not present a substantial health or safety issue 
warranting the action requested by the Petitioner.
    (5) Radioactive contaminants have been routinely discharged into 
the sanitary sewer from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor's waste water 
holding tank and contamination spread by backup of the sewage system. 
Radioactive materials can be released to the sanitary sewer system from 
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor in accordance with 10 CFR 
20.2003.13 The Georgia Tech Research Reactor licensee monitors 
releases to the sewage system, and NRC staff inspections (e.g., 
Inspection Report Nos. 50-160/95-01, 50-160/94-02, and 50-160/93-02) 
have confirmed that the radioactive releases (primarily cobalt-60 and 
tritium) to the sanitary sewer have met NRC discharge limits.14

    \13\ Radioactive releases to the sanitary sewer was previously 
permitted in accordance with 10 CFR 20.303, which was superseded by 
10 CFR 20.2003 on January 1, 1994.
    \14\ It should also be noted that revisions to the NRC's 
regulations with regard to release to sewage systems are under 
consideration (Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, ``Disposal of 
Radioactive Material by Release Into Sanitary Sewer Systems,'' 59 FR 
9146, February 25, 1994).
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    The Petitioner expressed a concern that the release to the sanitary 
sewer system could expose individuals, including sewer workers, to 
radiation. The releases from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor to the 
sanitary sewer have generally been several orders of magnitude less 
than NRC regulatory limits. Further, the assumption in the regulation 
of ingestion directly at the point of release from the campus provides 
considerable conservatism to ensure that individuals, such as sewer 
workers or other individuals, would be exposed to a lesser degree even 
in the event of a potential backup of the sewer system with large 
quantities of water.
    Furthermore, in response to a request from the State of Georgia, 
the NRC staff had ORISE perform an independent analysis for 
radioisotopes in process sludge and ash samples from the City of 
Atlanta's R. M. Clayton sewer treatment facility. The samples were 
taken from the sewer treatment facility on March 13, 1995. This 
analysis detected naturally occurring and accelerator produced 
radioisotopes (used primarily for medical diagnostic and therapeutic 
treatments). There were no detected radioisotopes from the Georgia Tech 
Research Reactor. Similarly, the NRC staff had an independent analysis 
performed by INEL of liquid waste samples from the Georgia Tech 
Research Reactor. This analysis found no indication of the 
contamination suggested by the Petitioner (e.g., plutonium or uranium).
    Georgia EPD and Georgia Tech analysis on waste water are consistent 
with these results. This sampling and analysis verified that a 
relatively small amount of radioactive material has been released from 
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor facility to the sanitary sewer 
system, and any material that has been released is well within NRC 
regulatory limits. These facts, and the regulatory conservatism and 
monitoring results, as previously discussed, establish that no further 
sampling of the sewer releases or system is necessary to ensure that 
the health and safety of the public is protected.
    An issue was also raised by the Petitioner regarding the need for 
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor to have a sewer discharge permit from 
the City of Atlanta. The City of Atlanta does not deal with 
radiological health and safety issues over which NRC has regulatory 
authority (See 10 CFR 8.4). The City of Atlanta is responsible for the 
release of materials to the sanitary sewer system for other than 
radiological health and safety reasons. With regard to the concern 
about compliance with city ordinances, the City of Atlanta is the 
appropriate regulatory body to deal with the implementation of its 
requirements.
    Since there is no evidence of the spread of unacceptable 
contamination from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor effluents to the 
sewage system, the NRC staff finds no reason to conclude that 
unacceptable radioactive contamination was released or could be spread 
by the backup of the sewage system. The Petitioner provided no facts to 
conclude otherwise. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the 
Petitioner's concern does not present a substantial health or safety 
issue warranting the action requested by the Petitioner.
    (6) Should the Georgia Tech Research Reactor be further 
destabilized, the reactor and the tank holding cobalt-60 could ``break 
apart,'' causing radioactive contaminants to ``drain into groundwater/
down sewers/into the runoff ditch.'' 15 From the evaluations and 
inspections to date, there is no evidence that the Georgia Tech 
Research 

[[Page 40395]]
Reactor has been ``destabilized'' in any manner. The Georgia Tech 
Research Reactor is designed to reduce the likelihood and mitigate the 
consequences of uncontrolled releases of radiation. For example, the 
design and configuration features as discussed for issue (4) provides 
considerable assurance that the Georgia Tech Research Reactor has not 
and will not be ``destabilized'' due to the previously postulated 
concerns expressed by the Petitioner.

    \15\ ``Destabilized'' in the context of this Petition issue has 
been defined as some condition that would result in the uncontrolled 
release of radioactive material.
    A recent safety evaluation of the Georgia Tech Research Reactor by 
the NRC staff is associated with the Order to Convert from High 
Enriched Uranium (HEU) to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU).16 The 
associated safety evaluation considered all potential safety analyses 
that are effected by the change out of the fuel, including potential 
design basis accident scenarios. This safety evaluation was issued on 
the bases that the pertinent reactor design features (1) continue to 
acceptably ensure that the health and safety of the public is protected 
for the HEU fuel and (2) have also been demonstrated to be acceptable 
for the LEU fuel.

    \16\ ``Georgia Institute of Technology, (Georgia Tech Research 
Reactor); Order Modifying Facility Operating License No. R-97,'' 60 
FR 32516, June 22, 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Petitioner raised concerns on various structures, systems and 
components at the research reactor. First, the ability of the 
containment building steel structure at the Georgia Tech Research 
Reactor to control releases of radioactive material was questioned. In 
this regard, the containment leak rate is tested, in accordance with 
Technical Specification 4.3.b, for at least 2.0 pounds per square inch 
gauge (psig), which is the design basis pressure. Technical 
Specification 4.3.b requires that leakage from the containment building 
shall not exceed 1.0 percent of the building air volume in 24 hours at 
2.0 psig over-pressure. Actual test results show that leakage is about 
one-half of that value. Containment building structural requirements 
based on expected external pressures have been estimated capable of 
withstanding internal pressures of at least 7.5 psig.17 This 
leakage integrity, and the testing and design margin, provide assurance 
that radioactive materials will not be released in an uncontrolled 
manner from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor containment.

    \17\ SAR, Section 4.3.2, Provisions for Insuring Leak-Tightness, 
page 49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The design function of the shield and crane support wall to 
mitigate potential radiation exposures was also questioned by the 
Petitioner. The steel-reinforced concrete wall inside the containment 
extends about 34 feet above the outside ground level. A safety function 
of the steel-reinforced concrete wall is shielding during potential 
design basis accident conditions.18 The design calculations for 
this shielding function have been reviewed and independently verified. 
This review finds that the calculations conservatively modeled 
radioactive source terms and containment configuration.

    \18\ SAR, Section 4.3 Description of Reactor Containment 
Building, Section 4.3.1 General Layout, pages 42-9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Petitioner also raised an issue of a potential ``runaway chain 
reaction.'' The Georgia Tech Research Reactor is designed with two 
independent and diverse shut down systems: the reactor scram system and 
the top reflector drain system. These systems have significant shut 
down capability and have been shown, both analytically and 
experimentally, capable of withstanding any excess reactivity 
condition.19 These analyses show that the Georgia Tech Research 
Reactor can meet (with substantial margin) the Technical Specification 
3.1.a requirements to be shut down (i.e., subcritical by at least 1.0 
percent delta k/k with both the highest reactivity worth shim-safety 
blade and the regulating rod fully withdrawn). Further, specific design 
features of the Georgia Tech Research Reactor prevent or mitigate 
reactivity and power increase conditions. Analyses 20 show that 
both the HEU and LEU fuels are designed to withstand maximum credible 
reactivity worth/power excursion conditions without damage, including 
maximum reactivity addition conditions. As indicated in SAR, this 
analysis technique has been verified by test data.21 This degree 
of shut down capability and provisions for mitigation of design basis 
accidents is consistent with other U.S. research reactor designs, has 
been verified by data and NRC staff review, and provides assurance that 
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor can be safely shut down for any 
credible condition, including analyzed accident conditions.

    \19\ SAR, Section 5.6, Shutdown Margins.
    \20\ SAR, Section 5.10, Accident Analyses, page 139-144.
    \21\ SAR, Section 5.9.1 Comparison of Calculations with SPERT-II 
Experiments, pages 137-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Petitioner also raised concern that a previous accident 
analysis assumed a fuel loading accident that was considered 
``incredible'' and no analysis of this scenario was performed in the 
current SAR.22 The SAR states: During refueling operations, all 
control elements are required to be fully inserted and the top D2O 
reflector drained to storage. Following the refueling operation, the 
reactor startup will be accomplished with standard practice. Under 
these conditions, a sudden introduction of reactivity is impossible.'' 
23 Although the NRC staff agrees with the licensee that this 
accident is not credible, the NRC staff did verify that the results 
would be acceptable in the unlikely event of such an accident. 
Specifically, in the safety evaluation for the Order to Convert from 
HEU to LEU,24 the NRC staff found that (1) the previous safety 
evaluation 25 remained valid in that the HEU fuel would not be 
damaged by the fuel loading accident and (2) the reactivity 
characteristics of the LEU compared to the HEU fuel are such that the 
maximum fuel temperatures of the LEU fuel would be less than the 
temperature for the HEU fuel during the potential fuel loading 
accident. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that, although the fuel 
loading accident analysis was not and need not be performed in the 
current SAR for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor, the potential 
results, if the analysis were to be performed in the current SAR, would 
remain acceptable for both fuel types.

    \22\ SAR, Section 5.10.3 Fuel Loading Accident.
    \23\ SAR, Section 8.4.2 Fuel Loading Accidents.
    \24\ Letter from Marvin M. Mendonca, NRC, to Dr. Ratib A. Karam, 
Georgia Institute of Technology, ``Issuance of Order Modifying 
License No. R-97 to Convert from High- to Low-Enriched Uranium--
Georgia Institute of Technology (TAC No. M85896),'' Enclosure 3 
Safety Evaluation, Section 2.14.5 Fuel Loading Accident.
    \25\ U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Safety Evaluation by the 
Directorate of Licensing, Docket No. 50-160, Georgia Institute of 
Technology, Section 6.0 Accident Analysis, page 12, dated December 
19, 1972.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Petitioner also raised a concern regarding the emergency 
cooling capabilities at the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The research 
reactor is designed with an emergency cooling system.26 The 
system, as required by Technical Specification 3.7, consists of a 
passive tank capable of providing cooling for 30 minutes, and two 
separate long term supplies, only one of which is required for a total 
of 12 hours of cooling. (It should be noted that in the SAR the 
licensee assumed that (1) the long term cooling supply connections are 
prevented or interrupted, (2) a complete core meltdown and conservative 
fission product release occurred, and (3) conservative radiological 
exposure conditions existed. These assumptions were used in a 
calculation to demonstrate 

[[Page 40396]]
acceptable design bases for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor 
containment, that is leakage rate and shielding functions, as 
previously discussed.) The Petitioner's concern relates to the time 
required to make the manual connections to the backup water supplies 
and potential radiation exposures during this process. These 
connections are made outside the containment structure. The 30 minutes 
cooling period flow is designed to be provided by gravity flow from the 
previously mentioned passive tank through two redundant fast acting, 
fail safe valves. This cooling ensures no fuel damage or radiation 
release effect in the event of the loss of coolant accident in that 30 
minute time period. The NRC staff concludes, based on a walk through 
with the licensee, that 30 minutes continues to be an acceptable time 
to make the connections. The long term emergency cooling connections 
could be accomplished within the 30 minute time period and there would 
be no increased radiation exposure while making these connections. 
Therefore, the previous NRC staff conclusion in licensing the Georgia 
Tech Research Reactor remains valid, that is, there will be acceptable 
emergency cooling of the core in the event of the loss of coolant 
accident.

    \26\ SAR, Section 4.4.8.3, Emergency Cooling System, pages 87-
90.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Petitioner also raised a concern on the reduction in shielding 
for the cobalt-60 storage pool, caused by the use of water from this 
storage pool to provide one of the two alternate long term water 
supplies for emergency cooling of the research reactor. The emergency 
cooling function effect on radiation levels from the cobalt-60 pool was 
reviewed and independently verified. This evaluation has found that the 
reduction in water above the cobalt-60 sources for the long term 
reactor emergency cooling function would not significantly affect the 
shielding of the cobalt-60 source, i.e., there will remain sufficient 
water for shielding. This was confirmed with the Georgia EPD, the 
licensing authority for the cobalt-60 source, and the Georgia Tech 
Research Reactor licensee. Therefore, the use of the cobalt-60 pool for 
emergency cooling of the Georgia Tech Research Reactor would not 
adversely impact that function or radiation safety.
    The Petitioner raised a concern regarding the use of hot channel 
factors and engineering uncertainty factors. The SAR analyzed the fuel 
design to establish safety limits considering power peaking conditions 
(hot channel factors) and conservative fuel manufacturing tolerance 
(engineering uncertainty factors). Consistent with research reactor 
regulatory policy, the SAR verified that these safety limits would not 
be exceeded or even approached, so that no fuel damage would 
occur.27 The NRC staff finds that these conclusions remain valid 
for both the current HEU fuel and for the LEU fuel as documented in the 
Order to convert from HEU fuel.28

    \27\ SAR, Section 5.7, Thermal--Hydraulic Safety Parameters, 
pages 127-135.
    \28\ Letter from Marvin M. Mendonca, NRC, to Dr. Ratib A. Karam, 
Georgia Institute of Technology, Enclosure 3 Safety Evaluation, 
Section 2.11 Thermal-Hydraulics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Petitioner also had a concern related to the reasonableness of 
assuming a scram after pump failures in the SAR. The SAR paragraph in 
question states: ``The loss of the primary D2O pump or the 
secondary cooling water pump can result in undesirable reactor 
operating conditions. These systems are therefore provided with high 
temperature and low flow interlocks with the reactor scram circuitry. 
Of the two pump failures, the loss of the D2O pump is the more 
serious. Two independent low D2O flow scram interlocks, and loss 
of electrical power interlocks have been provided in the reactor safety 
instrumentation. It is therefore acceptable to assume that the reactor 
will scram because of low flow shortly after an electrical power 
failure or the more serious case of pump seizure.'' 29 These 
interlocks provide redundant and diverse scram functions for the 
Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The NRC staff concludes that in the 
unlikely event that one of the independent low D2O flow scram 
interlocks were to fail or be inoperable, the other low D2O flow 
scram interlock would scram the reactor. These redundant scram 
interlocks are required by Technical Specification 3.2.a. Additionally, 
the high D2O temperature and loss of electrical power scram 
interlocks provide additional assurance that the reactor will scram on 
potential pump failure events. Based on the redundancy of the low 
D2O flow scram interlocks and the additional redundancy from 
diverse scram interlocks such as the high D2O temperature scram 
interlocks, the NRC staff concludes that it is acceptable to assume 
that the reactor will scram for the potential pump failure analysis.

    \29\ SAR, Section 8.2.2 Pump Failures
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Petitioner also asserted that plutonium and cesium-137 were not 
included in the core burnout analysis. For the core burnout analysis, 
data show that the assumed release fractions from the fuel of isotopes 
in the SAR are conservative and that plutonium, cesium, or other 
particulate isotopes would not be released.30 Furthermore, page 
196 of the SAR states that the source term includes daughter products 
of the released volatile fission products, which would include cesium-
137 as a daughter product of released isotopes. Based on the above 
quoted data and consideration of volatile fission product decay 
daughters, the release assumptions are acceptable.

    \30\ SAR, page 196 and Reference B.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Petitioner also indicated that there were errors in the Georgia 
Tech Research Reactor SAR. These alleged errors include the following: 
That the half-life of iodine-131 was incorrectly specified; that the 
geologic data are inadequate; that population data are outdated; that 
the radiation exposure calculational technique and data used to 
estimate design basis accident radiological doses are outdated; that 
incorrect names were used for State of Georgia organizations; and that 
a 30 year wind rose was needed.
    Regarding the half-life of iodine-131, there was a typographical 
error where 1.92 hours was typed instead of 192 hours. This has been 
corrected by the licensee in a January 1995 SAR revision.
    The geologic data presented by the licensee in the SAR, along with 
other data and information that were provided by the Petitioner, DPW, 
the Georgia Geologic Survey and the licensee, have been evaluated and 
discussed by the NRC staff in issues (4) and (7) of this Partial 
Director's Decision. Based on these evaluations by the NRC staff, the 
geologic data do not change the previous staff conclusions in licensing 
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor and the NRC staff does not possess 
any information which would suggest that the geologic information for 
the research reactor is not acceptable.
    The population data presented by the licensee were from the 1990 
census rather than from current City of Atlanta or other estimates on 
population as stated by the Petitioner. The use of the 1990 census data 
are acceptable because it is the latest official U.S. census data. The 
use of such data as implemented in the Georgia Tech Research Reactor 
SAR and the Technical Specifications is consistent with reactor 
licensing practices for restricted area, exclusion area and low 
population zones.
    The radiation exposure calculational technique and data used to 
estimate design basis accident radiological doses (SAR Appendices B and 
C) were reviewed and found to be conservative and therefore acceptable 
for use.
    Regarding the use of incorrect names for State of Georgia 
organizations, this was a failure of the licensee to 

[[Page 40397]]
completely update its SAR and will be corrected in the license renewal 
process.
    Finally, the use of a 5 year wind rose, rather than a 30 year wind 
rose, is not significant to the Georgia Tech Research Reactor safety 
analysis or emergency planning because, conservative assumptions, which 
are independent of the wind rose data, are used for dose assessments in 
the SAR.31 In addition, the Georgia Tech emergency preparedness 
plan uses actual measurements, rather than wind rose assumptions, to 
determine necessary protective actions.32 Also, as previously 
discussed in issues (2) and (3), the environmental, effluent, and area 
radiation monitoring for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor, provides 
acceptable verification of compliance to Technical Specification and 10 
CFR Part 20 requirements, and further wind direction data or wind rose 
accuracy for environmental monitoring is not required.

    \31\ SAR, Appendix B.
    \32\ Letter from R. A. Karam, Georgia Tech, to U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, dated April 19, 1994, Attachment 6, Emergency 
Preparedness Plan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The design and analysis features, as documented in the SAR and 
appropriately required and verified in the Technical Specifications for 
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor, reduce the potential for or mitigate 
the consequences of design basis accidents and provide acceptable 
assurance that there will be no uncontrolled release of radioactive 
material. Therefore, the NRC staff finds no reason to conclude that the 
radioactive contaminants would be spread by any credible event or 
condition at the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The Petitioner provided 
no facts to conclude otherwise. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that 
the Petitioner's concern does not raise a substantial health or safety 
issue warranting the action requested by the Petitioner.
    (7) The Georgia Tech Research Reactor is in an earthquake zone. The 
NRC staff has continued to closely follow the seismic and geologic 
developments in the tectonic province in which the Georgia Tech 
Research Reactor is located. The site is located in the southeastern 
Piedmont, which, along with the Blue Ridge, comprises the southern 
portion of the broad region designated by the NRC staff as the ``New 
England-Piedmont Tectonic Province.'' The New England-Piedmont Province 
is bounded on the northwest by the Southern Valley and Ridge Tectonic 
Province and on the southeast by the Coastal Plain Tectonic Province.
    The NRC staff has extensively reviewed the geology and seismology 
of this region (e.g., the Safety Analysis Reports for McGuire, Catawba, 
North Anna, Shearon Harris, Vogtle, and Summer Nuclear Power Plants). 
These studies include considerations of the New Madrid, Charleston, 
east Tennessee, and Brevard seismic zones that were mentioned in the 
Petition. These evaluations by the NRC staff, as documented in the 
safety evaluations for the McGuire, Catawba, North Anna, Shearon 
Harris, Vogtle, and Summer Nuclear Power Plants, and other, nuclear and 
non-nuclear-related evaluations during the last two decades, have 
identified no capable faults 33 in this region.

    \33\ Capable faults are defined in 10 CFR Part 100, ``Seismic 
and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,'' Appendix A, 
Section III ``Definitions.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The NRC also has supported regional seismic networks in the 
southeast.34 In 1990, the NRC began to transfer support from these 
regional networks to the National Seismic Network operated by the 
United States Geological Survey. The NRC staff continues to review the 
results from these networks, and finds no new information which would 
change previous conclusions on the seismicity of the southeastern 
Piedmont (i.e., there are no capable faults and the potential for a 
damaging earthquake is very remote).

    \34\ These Networks include, the Charleston network, first 
operated in 1973 by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Others were 
added during the mid and late 1970's and early 1980's, which were 
operated by Virginia Polytechnic and State University (Central 
Virginia and Giles County Seismic Zones), the University of Memphis 
(Southern Appalachians and New Madrid Seismic Zones), Georgia 
Institute of Technology (Georgia and Alabama), and St. Louis 
University (New Madrid Seismic Zone).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Seismology has been considered in the licensing of the Georgia Tech 
Research Reactor. The New Madrid, Missouri and the Charleston, South 
Carolina earthquakes (that were mentioned in this Petition issue) were 
considered, as were lesser magnitude earthquakes in and near Georgia. 
The Petitioner has presented no new seismic information for the region. 
The NRC staff evaluation continues to support the conclusion that the 
seismology for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor has been acceptably 
considered in the licensing of this facility.
    A study of seismic hazards has been performed for Georgia Tech and 
referenced in the Petition.35 This study reviewed seismic history, 
performed probabilistic and deterministic seismic ground motion 
studies, and made estimates of potential ground motion. The report 
validated Standard Building Code seismic coefficient requirements for 
the Georgia Tech campus, and did not change the conclusion on the 
acceptability of the Georgia Tech Research Reactor.

    \35\ ``Seismic Hazard Study for the Georgia Institute of 
Technology Campus, Atlanta, Georgia,'' Law Engineering Project No. 
57704495.01, March 16, 1993.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The above conclusions, as previously discussed in issue (4), are 
further supported by the Georgia State Geologist in a letter dated May 
11, 1995.
    The NRC staff finds no reason to conclude that the seismic 
characteristics for the site are unacceptable for the Georgia Tech 
Research Reactor. The Petitioner provided no facts to conclude 
otherwise. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the Petitioner's 
concern does not raise a substantial health or safety issue warranting 
the action requested by the Petitioner.
    (8) There is absolutely no reason to keep the Georgia Tech Research 
Reactor operating. The license for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor 
was issued in accordance with all applicable requirements. The licensee 
programs in education, research and development are consistent with the 
Georgia Tech Research Reactor license. Specifically, the Georgia Tech 
license renewal request dated April 19, 1994, discussed activities at 
the research reactor, including nuclear education in nuclear 
engineering and health physics. It also discussed contributions to the 
community, such as plant irradiation experiments for high school 
science classes and use by the Boy Scouts of America for nuclear merit 
badges at the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The Georgia Tech Research 
Reactor has capability for bio-medical irradiation research and 
development, isotope production, neutron diffraction, and activation 
analysis. The license renewal request specified programs evaluating 
radiation decomposition of chemicals, characterizing neutron absorbing 
materials, and characterizing soil samples.
    The Petitioner also raised concerns on the monitoring and 
calibration of neutron beams for medical therapy. At this time, the 
Georgia Tech Research Reactor is not authorized to conduct medical 
therapy,36 so the specific concern is not applicable.

    \36\ The Georgia Tech Research Reactor cannot perform medical 
therapy without specific authorization under the provisions of the 
Atomic Energy Act Section 104(a). Georgia Tech may perform 
experiments, such as the characterization of irradiation conditions 
for potential, future medical therapy as long as the experiments and 
research reactor are within the provisions of the current license 
and other NRC regulatory requirements. In order to perform medical 
therapy at the Georgia Tech Research Reactor, an associated license 
under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.21(a) would be required, as well 
as associated modifications to the Technical Specifications from the 
NRC. 

[[Page 40398]]

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Petitioner has asserted that substantial management 
deficiencies persist, including concerns on the problems related to the 
1987/1988 time frame. This concern on the persistence of substantial 
management deficiencies may be addressed in the pending license renewal 
proceeding. As previously outlined in the Introduction to this Partial 
Director's Decision, the Final Director's Decision will take into 
account any relevant findings from this license renewal proceeding at 
an appropriate time after completion of the NRC staff review.
    The NRC staff finds no reason at this time to conclude that the 
Georgia Tech Research Reactor is not continuing to conduct research and 
development activities in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act and NRC 
regulations. The Petitioner provided no facts to conclude otherwise. 
Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that no information has been 
provided on this issue to conclude that a substantial health or safety 
issue exists warranting the action requested by the Petitioner.
    (9) Security at the Georgia Tech Research Reactor is extremely lax. 
The concerns on security issues, as previously outlined in the 
Introduction to this Partial Director's Decision, may be addressed in a 
pending license renewal proceeding. These issues will be addressed in a 
Final Director's Decision at an appropriate time after taking into 
account any relevant findings from this license renewal proceeding and 
after completion of the NRC staff reviews.
    (10) In case of an accident or terrorist attack, evacuation of the 
campus and downtown Atlanta would be impossible both now and during the 
Olympics.37 With respect to potential accident conditions for the 
Georgia Tech Research Reactor, the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), the 
area within which predetermined protective actions are established, is 
a 100 meters radius from the facility. This EPZ is in accordance with 
NRC emergency preparedness guidance applicable to research 
reactors.38 The Georgia Tech Research Reactor accident analyses 
39 demonstrates that this 100 meter EPZ is conservative for the 
Georgia Tech Research Reactor. These analyses have been found 
acceptable most recently in the safety evaluation for the Order to 
convert from HEU fuel.40 These analyses demonstrate that the 
potential need for protective actions outside the EPZ is highly 
unlikely. The specification of emergency classifications (e.g., no 
general emergency classification) for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor 
has also been reviewed by the NRC staff and found to be consistent with 
the NUREG-0849 guidance. The Georgia Tech Research Reactor emergency 
plan has been previously verified by the NRC staff to be acceptable in 
accordance with this regulatory guidance and applicable regulations.

    \37\ That portion of the issue that deals with potential 
terrorist attacks will be included in issue (9) on security.
    \38\ ``Standard Review Plan for Review and Evaluation of 
Emergency Plans for Research and Test Reactors,'' NUREG-0849, 
Appendix II.
    \39\ SAR, Section 5.10 Accident Analyses, pages 139-144 and 
Section 8, Reactor Hazards Evaluation, and Appendices A, B, and C, 
pages 176-214.
    \40\ Letter from Marvin M. Mendonca, NRC, to Dr. Ratib A. Karam, 
Georgia Institute of Technology, Enclosure 3 Safety Evaluation, 
Section 2.14 Potential Accident Scenarios. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Georgia Tech Research Reactor has conducted emergency response 
drills in accordance with its emergency plan (the last three drills 
were on October 19, 1994, November 4, 1993, and November 9, 1992). The 
drills have included involvement of onsite or offsite agencies, such as 
the Georgia Tech Police Department, the Atlanta Fire Department, the 
Atlanta/Fulton County Emergency Management Agency, the Georgia 
Emergency Management Agency, the Georgia Environmental Protection 
Division, and the Grady Memorial Hospital. Training, equipment, and 
contingency planning for onsite and offsite personnel have been 
acceptably in accordance with emergency plan requirements, as verified 
most recently in NRC staff Inspection Reports 50-160/94-04, 50-160/93-
03, and 50-160/92-04. Police, fire, and medical personnel have been 
observed by NRC staff to acceptably perform their responsibilities. 
Other recent discussions with these emergency response organizations 
demonstrate that they acceptably understand and feel capable of 
discharging their responsibilities under emergency conditions at the 
Georgia Tech Research Reactor.
    With regard to emergency preparedness during the Olympics,41 
the NRC staff and the licensee have been discussing the necessary steps 
to take for reactor safety during this event for some time before this 
Petition was raised. The licensee has decided to not operate the 
research reactor during the 1996 Olympics and to remove the spent fuel 
from the facility prior to the Olympics.42 This would eliminate 
the potential for radiological releases during the Olympics related to 
the presence of such fuel onsite, and would reduce the potential for 
any emergency response to be taken due to radiological conditions for 
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor during the Olympics.

    \41\ As previously noted, the implications of terrorist acts 
during the Olympics relative to emergency preparedness may be 
addressed in a pending license renewal proceeding. These issues will 
be addressed in a Final Director's Decision at an appropriate time 
after taking into account any relevant findings from this license 
renewal proceeding and after completion of the NRC staff reviews.
    \42\ Georgia Institute of Technology's Response to Commission's 
Order Issuing Housekeeping Stay, dated June 21, 1995, and letter 
from Patricia Guilday, Assistant Attorney General, State of Georgia, 
Department of Law, to the Secretary of the NRC dated July 25, 1995.
    Georgia Tech has indicated that there are no events or additional 
resident population that are planned to be within the EPZ, and that the 
entire campus is to be controlled for access such that increased 
transient population through the EPZ is not expected. Further, 
supplemental emergency provisions for the Olympics are being planned by 
Georgia Tech in coordination with the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic 
Games, the U.S. Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the Georgia State Patrol, Georgia Department of 
Transportation, City of Atlanta Police, and City of Atlanta Fire 
Department.
    Additionally, the Petitioner in her July 18, 1995 letter, raised a 
concern on emergency preparedness for power reactor licenses, including 
emergency preparedness during the Olympics. NRC regulations require the 
development of emergency preparedness plans for all reactor licenses. 
The Petitioner presented no information and the NRC staff does not know 
of any information which would suggest that reactor emergency 
preparedness is not acceptable, including emergency preparedness during 
the Olympics.
    The Petitioner also raised an issue addressing the location of the 
emergency command center within the Georgia Tech Research Reactor 
building. However, the emergency command center is outside the 
containment structure in which the Georgia Tech Research Reactor is 
housed. The emergency command center is isolated from the containment 
structure, which, as previously discussed on issue (6), is capable of 
withstanding pressures greater than would result from any analyzed 
accident. The discussions on 

[[Page 40399]]
the preceding issues also demonstrate that there is little likelihood 
that the emergency command center could be affected by a radiological 
event related to the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The emergency 
command center is monitored for radiation so that in the unlikely event 
of an indication of unacceptable radiation in the emergency command 
center, or if it were to otherwise become unavailable, alternative 
actions could be taken (e.g., relocation of emergency response 
personnel). The above is consistent with the Georgia Tech Research 
Reactor emergency plan and previous NRC acceptance of the emergency 
plan, continues to acceptably implement the requirements of NUREG-0849, 
and, therefore, provides acceptable emergency preparedness for the 
Georgia Tech Research Reactor.
    Based on the above, the 100 meter EPZ at the Georgia Tech Research 
Reactor is acceptable as a planning basis to ensure the protection of 
the public health and safety both now and during the Olympics, and the 
likelihood of evacuation or other protective action beyond the EPZ is 
acceptably low. During the Olympics, Georgia Tech's plans to not 
operate and to remove spent fuel ensure that there will be minimal 
potential of radiological related emergencies arising in connection 
with the NRC license for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. Further, 
during the Olympics, the conditions around the research reactor, access 
controls to the campus, and planning for supplementary emergency 
provisions ensure that the provisions of the emergency plan will not be 
adversely affected by the Olympics.
    The NRC staff finds no reason to conclude that the emergency 
planning zone for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor is not acceptable, 
including during the time period of the Olympics. The Petitioner 
provided no facts to conclude otherwise. Therefore, the NRC staff 
concludes that no information has been presented to conclude that a 
substantial health or safety issue exists warranting the action 
requested by the Petitioner.
B. Revocation of Liquid Radioactive Material Release Authority; 
Revocation of Licenses Using the Principle of As Low As Reasonably 
Achievable; Prohibition of Transportation of Radioactive Material by 
Mail; and Modification to Posting Requirements for Radioactive Material
    The following are general requests by the Petitioner for actions 
related to various categories of licenses:
    1. The request to withdraw all license authority nationwide 
involving the discharging or dumping of any quantity of radioactive 
material to all the sewers or waters in the United States;
    2. The request to withdraw all licenses to all nuclear facilities, 
including nuclear power plants, which operate under as low as 
reasonably achievable (ALARA) principles;
    3. The request that the NRC staff prohibit the transportation of 
radioactive material by mail; and
    4. The request that the NRC staff modify every license issued to 
transporters of radioactive materials and builders of nuclear power 
plants so that these parties must put two-foot high letters on 
everything transported or built stating ``DANGER-RADIOACTIVE'' and in 
slightly smaller letters ``there is no safe level of radiation, any 
exposure can [a]ffect health.''
    The bases for these requests are that there is no safe level of 
radiation, that storage and disposal of radioactive waste is 
inadequate, and that the NRC sewage discharge guidelines are totally 
inadequate. The Petitioner has also indicated that the basis for the 
request related to transportation by mail is that accidents have 
occurred while transporting radioactive materials. The issues 
enumerated by the Petitioner are broadly framed requests to take 
actions to prohibit discharging all radioactive material into sewers 
and waters of the U.S., to create a zero release limit of radioactive 
material, and to modify the transportation regulations under 10 CFR 
part 71.\43\ The Petitioner also raises concerns over the adequacy of 
current NRC regulations related to radiation protection.\44\ Finally, 
the Petitioner questions the adequacy of NRC and Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) regulations on allowed radioisotopes in the 
environment.

    \43\ The NRC's packaging and transportation regulations in 10 
CFR part 71 are part of a broad regulatory scheme for the packaging 
and transportation of radioactive materials. The packaging and 
transportation of radioactive materials are also subject to the 
regulations of the U.S. Department of Transportation and the U.S. 
Postal Service. See 10 CFR 71.0(b).
    \44\ These concerns include that the release limits to the sewer 
systems is established as a monthly concentration and allows release 
of soluble material, that the brain and ovaries are not specifically 
mentioned in the organ dose weighting factors, that an individual is 
not considered a member of the public any time in which the 
individual receives an occupational dose, that special exposures 
should not be allowed, that no dose be allowed to the embryo/fetus 
whether the woman is declared pregnant or not, and that radiological 
release limits are established assuming a ``Reference Man.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For each of the Petitioner's concerns cited directly above, the 
Petitioner has provided no specific information or basis which would 
support taking action on the Petitioner's four requests cited in this 
section. The Petitioner's request to withdraw all license authority for 
the discharging of any quantity of radioactive materials to all sewers 
and waters is based on a general assertion that the NRC's sewer dumping 
guidelines are totally inadequate. The Petitioner offers no support for 
this assertion. In addition, the Petitioner's stated bases for the 
request to withdraw all licenses which operate under ALARA principles 
(i.e., there is no safe level of radiation and the storage and disposal 
of radioactive materials, as well as the regulations, are inadequate) 
have not been substantiated by any data or references in the Petition. 
Finally, no information was provided that transportation accidents had 
not been evaluated and issues resolved under the provision of current 
regulations or that present regulations regarding the use of mail to 
transport radioactive material is not acceptable. Because these stated 
concerns are general and are not supported by additional information in 
the Petition, these concerns do not provide the basis for taking 
enforcement action under 10 CFR 2.206.
    No specific information was provided to support the Petitioner's 
general statements on the inadequacy of NRC regulations. The Petitioner 
has provided no information that would lead to a conclusion that the 
packaging and transportation regulations in 10 CFR part 71, the 
radiation protection regulations in 10 CFR part 20, and the NRC's and 
EPA's environmental protection regulations, are not providing 
acceptable protection to the public health and safety, as well as to 
the environment. Since the Petitioner has not submitted any relevant 
technical, scientific or other data to support any of the general 
requests for the actions enumerated in this section, or raised a 
substantial health and safety concern based on these issues, the 
Petitioner's general requests for such actions are denied. However, 
should this Petitioner, or anyone, wish to provide relevant technical, 
scientific or other data and grounds to support any change to NRC 
regulations, a Petition for Rulemaking can be submitted in accordance 
with 10 CFR 2.802.
III. Conclusion

    The institution of proceedings pursuant to Section 2.206 is 
appropriate only if substantial health and safety issues have been 
raised. See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point, Units 1, 
2, and 3), CLI-75-8, 2 NRC 173, 175 (1975); Washington Public Power 
Supply 

[[Page 40400]]
System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2), DD-84-7, 19 NRC 899, 924 (1984). 
This is the standard that has been applied to the concerns raised by 
the Petitioner to determine whether the action requested by the 
Petitioner is warranted.
    With regard to the requests made by the Petitioner discussed 
herein, the NRC staff finds no basis for taking such actions. Rather, 
as explained above, the NRC staff concludes that no substantial health 
and safety issues have been raised by the Petitioner. Accordingly, the 
Petitioner's requests for action, pursuant to Section 2.206 on the 
Georgia Tech Research Reactor, are denied on issues A(1) through A(8) 
and A(10), insofar as the issues on A(8) do not relate to the 
Petitioner's concerns on the persistence of substantial management 
deficiencies and the issues on A(10) do not relate to the Petitioner's 
security issues. As previously noted in the Introduction and Discussion 
to this Partial Director's Decision, the issue related to the 
persistence of management problems [part of A(8)] and the issue related 
to security [A(9) and part of A(10)] will be decided after taking into 
account the results of the licensing proceeding on the license renewal 
application. In addition, the Petitioner's requests on general license 
and authority revocation, as discussed in Section B of this Partial 
Director's Decision, are denied.
    A copy of this Decision will be filed with the Secretary for the 
Commission as provided by 10 CFR 2.206(c) of the Commission's 
regulations. The Decision will become the final action of the 
Commission 25 days after issuance unless the Commission, on its own 
motion, institutes review of the Decision in that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 31st day of July 1995.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank J. Miraglia,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 95-19510 Filed 8-7-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P