[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 148 (Wednesday, August 2, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 39475-39479]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-18997]



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[[Page 39476]]


DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Office of Commercial Space Transportation
[Docket 50324]


Commercial Space Transportation; Grant of Petition for Waiver of 
Safety Criterion for METEOR Reentry Vehicle System

AGENCY: Office of the Secretary; Office of Commercial Space 
Transportation, DOT.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY:- Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX, ch. 701, formerly the 
Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, as amended, and the Department of 
Transportation licensing regulations, the Department of Transportation 
(the Department) has been evaluating a proposed commercial reentry 
vehicle system as part of the first application for a license to place 
a reentry vehicle into space. EER Systems Corporation, the operator of 
the proposed reentry vehicle system, has petitioned the Department for 
relief from the first of three safety criteria against which its 
vehicle is being assessed. The Department has determined to waive the 
accuracy and reliability criterion in light of the applicant's proposed 
operations and that doing so will not jeopardize public safety. This 
notice sets forth the basis for the Department's determination to grant 
the petition.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ronald K. Gress, Deputy Associate 
Director for Licensing and Safety, Office of Commercial Space 
Transportation, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street 
SW., Washington, DC 20590 (202) 366-2929.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background -

    The Department of Transportation's (the Department) Office of 
Commercial Space Transportation (Office) is evaluating the first 
commercial reentry vehicle system, known as METEOR (Multiple Experiment 
to Earth Orbit and Return), to determine whether it may be launched 
into space. The Office is conducting its review as part of the 
Department's responsibility to license and otherwise regulate 
commercial space launch activities under 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX, ch. 
701--''Commercial Space Launch Activities,'' formerly the Commercial 
Space Launch Act of 1984, as amended. Under 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX, ch. 
701, the Department has broad authority to determine whether the launch 
of an otherwise unlicensed payload, such as a reentry vehicle system, 
should be prevented because the launch would jeopardize public health 
and safety, safety of property, or any national security or foreign 
policy interest of the United States (49 U.S.C. 70104(c)). The Office 
is the Secretary's designee for carrying out the Department's mandate 
under the statute.

OCST's Payload Determination Process-

    The Office's approach to evaluating the first commercial reentry 
vehicle system is described in two Notices previously published in the 
Federal Register (57 FR 10213-10216, published March 24, 1992; and 57 
FR 55021, published November 23, 1992). Under that approach, the 
applicant or operator of the reentry vehicle system is required to 
apply for and obtain a favorable payload determination, consisting of: 
(i) A vehicle safety approval (VSA), whereby the applicant demonstrates 
that its integrated system is capable of being operated safely, and 
(ii) an operations review approval (ORA), whereby the operator 
demonstrates its capability to operate the system safely. Both 
approvals (VSA and ORA) are necessary to obtain a favorable payload 
determination.-
    The first Notice set forth the three criteria against which the 
COMET (COMmercial Experiment Transporter) reentry vehicle system would 
be assessed for purposes of obtaining a VSA. The latter Notice set 
forth the Office's intent to issue a single license authorizing the 
launch into space of the COMET reentry vehicle system, subject to, 
among other things, a favorable payload determination for the reentry 
vehicle system. Although the three criteria enumerated by the Office in 
the first Notice were developed in response to the COMET Program, which 
has since been discontinued, they are equally applicable to the pending 
application for METEOR.\1\ -

    \1\ The COMET Program, as originally administered, was suspended 
in May 1994, when NASA determined not to augment a grant to the 
Center for Space Transportation and Applied Research (CSTAR), which 
was responsible for procuring the COMET mission. Nearly a year 
later, EER Systems Corporation (EER), one of the original 
participants in the COMET Program, advised the Office that it had 
taken over the COMET Program and would be responsible for the entire 
program, including the reentry. The spacecraft, originally developed 
by Space Industries, Inc., as part of the COMET Program, has been 
renamed METEOR.
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    EER Systems Corporation (EER) is proposing to operate and reenter 
the METEOR reentry vehicle system and has applied to the Office for a 
payload determination. By letter dated May 1, 1995, EER petitioned the 
Office requesting relief from the probability of accuracy criterion 
(Criterion 1) enumerated in the March 24, 1992 Notice.
The METEOR Program-

    Under the METEOR Program, EER is proposing to launch the METEOR 
reentry vehicle system to low earth orbit using its newly-developed 
Conestoga launch vehicle. The Conestoga will be launched from NASA's 
Wallops Flight Facility, Virginia. EER is currently authorized to 
launch the Conestoga launch vehicle under License No. LLS 94-030. The 
authorization to launch is conditional upon issuance by the Office of 
final mission approval, including a favorable payload determination, 
for the METEOR reentry vehicle system. -
    The METEOR Program is similar to COMET. EER is proposing to launch 
METEOR to a 40.5 degree inclination low earth orbit (approximately 250 
nautical miles) where it will remain on orbit for approximately 30 days 
for long duration microgravity experiments. Upon command from EER 
ground personnel, the reentering portion of the system (the reentry 
vehicle) will separate from the service module, its retromotor will 
activate, and the reentry vehicle will reenter along a ballistic 
trajectory to a designated landing site on earth. The reentry vehicle 
is smaller than the Mercury capsules used to return astronauts to earth 
in the early years of the manned space program, weighs about 730 pounds 
and is roughly three feet high by 52 inches in diameter at its widest 
point. The reentry vehicle is unguided; however, its ability to land 
within the designated site is affected by several factors determined 
immediately preceding initiation of reentry, including pointing 
accuracy, timing of the retroburn, and duration of the retroburn. Upon 
descent, a parachute is released to assure a soft landing. The service 
module will remain on orbit and continue to support microgravity 
experiments for approximately 130 days or more. The service module's 
orbit will eventually decay and it will reenter the earth's atmosphere, 
burning up during reentry and presenting no greater risk to public 
safety than other reentering orbital debris.
    In a significant departure from the COMET Program, EER's proposal 
designates an oceanic landing site, whereas the COMET proposal had 
designated the Utah Test and Training Range, a 24 x 51 mile U.S. 
Government facility located in a sparsely populated area of Utah. EER 
is proposing to reenter the METEOR reentry vehicle in the Atlantic 
Ocean and has designated as its landing site an area that is 18.4 
nautical miles wide and 87.1 nautical miles long, centered around a 
targeted mid-point 

[[Page 39477]]
approximately 85 miles off the coast of Virginia.

Vehicle Safety Approval Criteria -

    The three criteria enumerated in the March 24, 1992 Notice for the 
first COMET mission, and now METEOR, all of which would have to be 
satisfied under the Notice, are as follows:-
    1. The probability of the reentry vehicle landing outside the 
designated landing site shall not be greater than three in one thousand 
missions. -
    2. The additional risks to the public in the immediate vicinity of 
the landing site (i.e., the area within 100 miles of the designated 
landing site) shall not exceed the normal background risks to which 
those individuals would ordinarily be exposed but for the reentry 
missions. This normal background risk is characterized as: the 
probability of any casualty occurring within the 100-mile zone shall 
not exceed one in a million on an annual basis. In addition, the 
probability of any casualty occurring within the zone shall not exceed 
one in a million for a single mission.-
    3. The additional risks to the general public beyond the 100-mile 
zone around the designated landing site, and to property on orbit, 
shall not exceed normal background risks to which the public would 
ordinarily be exposed but for the reentry missions. This normal 
background risk is characterized as: the probability of any casualty 
occurring shall not exceed one in a million on an annual basis. In 
addition, the probability of any casualty occurring in the area that is 
both outside of the designated landing site and the 100-mile zone 
around the site shall not exceed one in a million for a single mission. 
-
    The March 24, 1992 Notice also provides supporting rationale for 
the criteria and explains their separate but interrelated safety 
objectives generally as follows:-
     Criterion 1 is intended to assure reliable, accurate, 
incident-free reentry operations in order to foster public acceptance 
of commercial space transportation and minimize public exposure to 
risk. Criterion 1 assumes nominal pre-reentry operations conditions and 
addresses factors that affect accuracy after reentry is initiated. In 
its petition, EER has requested that OCST waive this criterion. -
     Criterion 2 is intended to limit risks to the population 
that believes it may be more exposed to hazards resulting from 
commercial reentry operations because of their proximity to the 
designated landing site and to ensure they face no greater risk from 
commercial reentry operations than ordinary background risk. Criterion 
2 becomes most relevant in the event of a system error or failure that 
causes a deviation from the vehicle's planned trajectory.-
     Criterion 3 is intended to limit risks to the general 
public to ensure it, too, faces no additional risk beyond ordinary 
background risk as a result of commercial reentry activities. Criterion 
3 addresses the risks posed by an essentially random reentry as a 
result of a major system failure during the reentry process.-
     As stated in the March 24, 1992 Notice, the criteria 
acknowledge that some hazards, and therefore risks accompany the 
proposed reentry activity. The criteria reflect those hazards reduced 
to acceptable levels of risk. Through the criteria, the Office has 
established a level of acceptability comparable to that employed in 
other safety regulatory regimes, such as those administered by the 
Environmental Protection Agency, and consistent with risk thresholds 
utilized by Federal launch ranges as part of range safety. -
    Since early 1992, when the criteria addressing the COMET Program 
proposal were established, the design of the reentry vehicle system and 
the proposal to reenter it have evolved and matured. These developments 
have allowed the Office to assess specific aspects of reentry risks and 
their impact on public safety with greater clarity. -
    The three criteria are intended to address the risks to public 
safety that result from a human-induced reentry. For the majority of 
its mission, the risks presented by the METEOR reentry vehicle system 
are the same as those presented by other space payloads. It is the fact 
that the METEOR reentry vehicle is operated so as to land at a 
designated landing site and designed to withstand the stress of reentry 
that raises the potential of risk to public safety. Accordingly, in 
evaluating whether METEOR satisfies the criteria, the Office considers 
only human-induced or intentional reentries. The Office has determined 
that a human-induced reentry occurs when reentry is intentionally 
initiated upon command from ground personnel and the vehicle returns to 
earth within one orbit. The Office believes that there should be a 
direct relationship between initiating reentry and the reentry event 
itself for it to be considered human-induced or intentional. If the 
vehicle does not reenter upon command within one orbit, the direct 
relationship is broken and the vehicle remains on orbit as any other 
payload. A malfunctioning vehicle that remains on orbit and then 
reenters the atmosphere as a result of orbital decay or other 
intervening events has not completed a human-induced or intentional 
reentry and the criteria do not apply.\2\ Thus, the Office considers 
only those system failures or nominal system variations that may occur 
during the course of a ``human-induced'' or intentional reentry in 
assessing METEOR's ability to meet Criteria 1, 2 and 3.

    \2\ Even if an operator attempts an intentional reentry, it may 
fail for a number of reasons. METEOR includes a number of built-in 
fail-safe systems that automatically terminate the reentry sequence 
if certain conditions that would cause an inaccurate or otherwise 
unsafe reentry are detected. In addition, a system required for 
reentry to proceed could fail, leaving the reentry vehicle on orbit 
for more than one orbit. In both instances, there has not been a 
human-induced reentry and the spacecraft assumes a status 
essentially equivalent to other objects left in space. In the 
Office's assessment of the vehicle, neither of these failure 
scenarios are considered in determining whether the criteria have 
been met.
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Petition to Waive Criterion 1--

    EER's petition requesting relief from Criterion 1 is based, in 
part, on its misunderstanding of performance-based criteria. In 
establishing performance-based criteria for COMET, the Office stated 
its belief that, unlike design standards, ``performance-based criteria 
allow the maximum flexibility in developing a safe and cost-effective 
product. The Office further believes that performance-based criteria 
enhance the public interest by encouraging innovation and technology 
development. This environment promotes safe space transportation 
services at lower cost and helps assure that customers' needs are 
addressed.'' (57 FR 10213, 10215) -
    In its petition, EER asserts, among other things, the difficulty of 
using performance-based standards to demonstrate reliability in the 
absence of flight performance history. EER further maintains that 
satisfying Criteria 2 and 3, without Criterion 1, would be sufficient 
to ensure that public safety is not compromised. EER suggests that 
Criterion 1 affords no additional protection to the public beyond that 
provided by satisfying Criteria 2 and 3.
    Although the Office disagrees with EER's characterization of 
performance-based standards, the Office has evaluated whether Criterion 
1 may be waived for the METEOR reentry mission without jeopardizing 
public safety. The Office undertook this evaluation because it is 
consistent with the Department's statutory mandate to issue a favorable 
payload determination allowing METEOR to be launched for its intended 
reentry mission if the Office finds that the proposed mission can be 
conducted without jeopardizing public safety and U.S. national 
interests. -

[[Page 39478]]

    In conducting its evaluation, the Office considered the 
relationship between accuracy (Criterion 1) and public safety. While 
accuracy contributes significantly to assuring public safety and is 
important to developing public and consumer confidence, the Office 
considered whether there are circumstances in which intentional reentry 
can occur and public safety is assured without the demonstrated level 
of accuracy required by Criterion 1. Next, the Office considered 
whether these circumstances would, in fact, occur in carrying out the 
METEOR reentry mission. Finally, the Office considered whether, if 
Criterion 1 is waived, additional measures are appropriate to ensure 
that public safety is protected.--
    The Office has determined that there are circumstances in which the 
relationship of reentry vehicle accuracy to public safety becomes less 
significant. The three criteria were developed to have a mutually 
reinforcing effect on public safety. Although their objectives are 
interrelated, they were designed so that Criterion 1 can compensate if 
the ability of the reentry vehicle system to meet Criteria 2 and 3 is 
marginal, and vice versa. Stated another way, the probability of a 
casualty is, among other things, a function of the probability of 
missing the landing site. Other contributing factors include the size 
and mass of the vehicle upon impact, its contents, and the population 
distribution in the area where the vehicle could impact if it missed 
the designated landing site. For example, if a reentry vehicle is 
extremely small and contains no hazardous materials, the probability of 
a casualty during a reentry would be quite low, even if the vehicle had 
little probability of landing in the designated site. However, the 
probability of a casualty could be high if that vehicle were quite 
large, contained explosives or hazardous materials, or if the vehicle 
was likely to impact in a densely populated area if it missed the 
designated landing site. Thus, under certain conditions, it may be 
possible to relax or eliminate an accuracy criterion if the risk to 
public safety remains within acceptable levels. They are as follows:-
     If it can be shown that there are well-defined areas 
within which the vehicle is most likely to land if it misses the 
designated landing site, and that the risk to the population within 
these areas is within acceptable limits;-
     If it can be shown that the vehicle, if it misses the 
designated landing site, is unlikely to survive rentry or is likely to 
reenter in a condition that presents little risk to exposed populations 
because it contains little mass, no hazardous materials, or both; or--
     If it can be shown that risk mitigation measures (e.g., 
public notices or warnings, emergency response plans) can be 
implemented to limit the risk to exposed populations to acceptable 
levels in the event the vehicle misses the designated landing site. --
    To determine whether any of these circumstances will exist for 
METEOR, the Office analyzed a broad range of failure scenarios that may 
occur when a human-induced or intentional reentry occurs. In conducting 
risk scenario analyses, the Office used a conservative approach in that 
it did not consider the mitigating effects of a parachute system built 
into the reentry vehicle to soften landing impacts. -
    In the event of a minor system error or failure, such as one that 
alters the aerodynamic characteristics of the vehicle as it descends, 
the Office determined that the dispersion area or ``footprint'' within 
which the vehicle would be expected to land would most likely be 
enlarged, shifted, or both. The vehicle would still land in the general 
vicinity of the landing site, that is, within the 100-mile zone. Given 
EER's designated landing site in the Atlantic Ocean, the 100-mile zone 
around the designated landing site is principally ocean area or some 
sparsely populated land areas. Based on dispersion, vehicle break-up 
and other risk analyses, the Office determined that risk to public 
safety would remain well within the threshold of normal background risk 
identified in Criterion 2.
    In the event of a major system failure which causes a random 
reentry, such as severe misalignment of the vehicle during retroburn 
resulting in insufficient thrust to deorbit along the desired 
trajectory, the Office determined that the only population placed at 
risk would be those persons residing along the orbital path, or ground 
trace, of the final orbit. This area occupies a swath approximately 20 
miles wide and extending approximately 3,000 miles beyond the 
designated landing site. The area is so limited because of the limited 
cross-range capability of the vehicle. Because of the inclination of 
the orbit and the designated landing site, most of this ground trace is 
over uninhabited broad ocean. The effect of alignment or burn errors 
increases very rapidly with the magnitude of the error, so that if the 
METEOR reentry vehicle travels beyond 3,000 miles from the intended 
landing site it will remain in space for more than one orbit. Although 
the ground trace includes some areas of the United States, the 
likelihood of landing on land is small, given that most of the ground 
trace is over ocean. Moreover, the areas of the United States in which 
the reentry vehicle could land are relatively sparsely populated and, 
based on dispersion, vehicle break-up and other risk analyses, the 
Office found that risk to public safety would remain within the 
threshold of normal background risk identified in Criterion 3. -
    A gross failure that causes the vehicle to remain on orbit for more 
than one orbit after the intended reentry need not be considered under 
the vehicle safety criteria. Nevertheless, the Office evaluated the 
risks associated with a gross failure and determined that risk to 
public safety still would remain well within the threshold of normal 
background risk identified in Criterion 3. In fact, the Office 
determined that an intact reentry module that impacted on earth or the 
reentering debris from the reentry of the entire vehicle system (the 
reentry vehicle joined to the service module) would be smaller than, 
and therefore pose less risk than, the debris believed to survive the 
reentry of large abandoned satellites or spent upper stages of Titan, 
Atlas, and Delta launch vehicles. -
    Accordingly, the Office has determined that there are circumstances 
in which intentional reentry of METEOR can occur and public safety will 
be assured without the demonstrated level of accuracy required under 
Criterion 1, and that these circumstances do, in fact, exist for 
METEOR. There are well-defined areas within which the reentry vehicle 
is most likely to land if it misses the designated landing site. The 
risk to the population within these areas falls within acceptable 
limits. The small size and mass of the reentry vehicle and the lack of 
hazardous materials on the vehicle would minimize the potential risk to 
public safety if it misses the designated landing site. Moreover, under 
certain failure scenarios, the reentry vehicle would break up and 
reenter in small bits of debris, much of which would likely burn up as 
it passes through the atmosphere. -
    The Office has concluded that, in light of the performance 
characteristics of the METEOR reentry vehicle, the proposed mission 
including an oceanic landing, the small size of the reentry vehicle and 
the absence of hazardous materials on the reentry vehicle, public 
safety and U.S. national interests would not be jeopardized if the 
landing accuracy (Criterion 1) is waived. However, as a condition of 
the waiver, the Office is requiring that EER implement a public 
information communications plan under which the affected public would 
be informed of 

[[Page 39479]]
the reentry activity, including the estimated time and location. EER 
must also have in place an emergency response plan whereby local 
officials may be notified in the event of an off-site landing and 
vehicle recovery can be conducted effectively. -
    In addition, NASA's Wallops Flight Facility has agreed to provide 
range safety support for the reentry which includes coordination, 
through appropriate Federal agencies, of notices to air and marine 
traffic in the vicinity of the designated landing site to minimize 
risks during the reentry. -
    Accordingly, the Office has determined that, for METEOR, Criterion 
1 may be waived and the relief requested in EER's petition is 
granted.\3\-

    \3\ At the time the COMET Program was suspended, a petition 
submitted by Space Industries, Inc., as applicant for a payload 
determination, was pending. No final action was taken in light of 
the decision to discontinue the COMET Program. In granting the 
petition for METEOR, the Office has made no determination as to 
whether doing so would have been appropriate for COMET or any other 
reentry vehicle system or mission.

    Issued in Washington, DC, this 28th day of July, 1995.--
Frank C. Weaver,
Director, Office of Commercial Space Transportation.
[FR Doc. 95-18997 Filed 7-28-95; 3:05 pm]
BILLING CODE 4910-62-U