DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice

[OJP (NIJ) No. 1056]

ZRIN 1121–ZA18

National Institute of Justice Solicitation ''Fellowship Opportunities at the National Institute of Justice''

AGENCY: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice.

ACTION: Announcement of the availability of the National Institute of Justice Solicitation ''Fellowship Opportunities at the National Institute of Justice''.

ADDRESSES: National Institute of Justice, 633 Indiana Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20531.

DATES: The deadlines for receipt of proposals are close of business on September 15, 1995 and April 15, August 15 and December 16, 1996.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The following supplementary information is provided:

Authority

This action is authorized under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, §§ 201–03, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 3721–23 (1988).

Background

The National Institute of Justice is soliciting proposals from criminal justice professionals and scholars to undertake studies as part of NIJ's fellowship programs, which include the Visiting Fellowship Program, the Assistant Attorney General's Graduate Research Fellowship Program, the Graduate Research Fellowships at Historically Black Colleges and Universities, the Graduate Law Enforcement Technology Fellowship, the John B. Pickett Fellowships in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, and the NIJ Internship Program. Interested persons should call the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS) at 1–800–851–3420 to obtain a copy of ''Fellowship Opportunities at the National Institute of Justice'' (refer to document No. SL000123). The solicitation is available electronically via the NCJRS Bulletin Board, which can be accessed via Internet. Telnet to ncjrsbbs.aspensys.com, or gopher to ncjrs.aspensys.com 71. Those without Internet access can dial the NCJRS Bulletin Board via modem: dial 301–738–8895. Set modem at 9600 baud, 8–N–1.

Jeremy Travis,

Director, National Institute of Justice.

[FR Doc. 95–18756 Filed 7–31–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410–18–P

National Institute of Justice

[OJP (NIJ) No. 1057]

ZRIN 1121–ZA19

National Institute of Justice Solicitation ''NIJ Requests Proposals for Research in Action Partnerships''

AGENCY: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice.

ACTION: Announcement of the availability of the National Institute of Justice Solicitation ''NIJ Requests Proposals for Research in Action Partnerships''.

ADDRESSES: National Institute of Justice, 633 Indiana Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20531.

DATES: The deadline for receipt of proposals is close of business on September 8, 1995.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John Thomas, National Institute of Justice, at (202) 514–6206.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The following supplementary information is provided:

Authority

This action is authorized under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, §§ 201–03, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 3721–23 (1988).

Background

Through this solicitation the National Institute of Justice is seeking to encourage the development of partnerships with national professional and membership organizations representing the various professional groups within law enforcement and criminal justice or representing elected governmental officials at the State or local levels. Partnerships are sought with two goals in mind—to encourage the understanding and use of research results, and to encourage the use of new communications technologies. Interested persons should call the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS) at 1–800–851–3420 to obtain a copy of ''NIJ Requests Proposals for Research in Action Partnerships'' (refer to document No. SL000128). The solicitation is available electronically via the NCJRS Bulletin Board, which can be accessed via Internet. Telnet to ncjrsbbs.aspensys.com, or gopher to ncjrs.aspensys.com 71. Those without Internet access can dial the NCJRS Bulletin Board via modem: dial 301–738–8895. Set modem at 9600 baud, 8–N–1.

Jeremy Travis,

Director, National Institute of Justice.

[FR Doc. 95–18755 Filed 7–31–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410–18–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 72–8 (50–317/318]

Baltimore Gas and Electric Co.; Issuance of Amendment to Materials License SNM–2505

The U.S. Nuclear Regualtory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 1 to Materials License No. SNM–2505 held by Baltimore Gas and Electric Company for the receipt and storage of spent fuel at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant in an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI), located in Calvert County, Maryland. The amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

The amendment revises the Technical Specifications in the license to exempt the first two dry shielded canisters (DSC) (Serial Nos. BGE 24P–R011 & BGE 24P–R002) from the Technical Specification limits on the vacuum drying process. The safety evaluation report on the amendment demonstrates that the first and second DSC meet the design criterion. The report also demonstrates that there is reasonable assurance that the public health and safety will not be endangered by activities authorized under this amendment and that the amendment will not have a significant impact on the human environment.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. In accordance with 10 CFR 72.46(b)(2), prior public notice of the amendment was not required since the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration. Interested persons may request a hearing on whether the action should be rescinded or modified.

The Commission has determined that the issuance of the amendment will not result in any significant environmental

impact and that, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.21, an environmental assessment need not be prepared in connection with issuaance of the amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated July 29, 1994, and additional information dated September 26 1994, and March 31, 1995, and (2) Amendment No. 1 to Materials License No. SNM–2505, with the Commission's letter to the licensee. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the Local Public Document Room at the Calvert County Public Library, Fourth Street, PO Box 405, Price Frederick, Maryland 20678.

Dated at Rockville, MD., this 21st day of July 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

William D. Travers,

Director, Spent Fuel Project Office, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

[FR Doc. 95–18806 Filed 7–31–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

[Docket Nos. 50–327 and 328]

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2; Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed no Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR–77 and DPR–79 issued to the Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) for operation of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, located in Soddy Daisy, Tennessee.

The proposed amendments would incorporate new requirements associated with steam generator tube inspections and repair in the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications. The new requirements would establish alternate steam generator tube plugging criteria at the tube support plate intersections.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendments, the Commission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendments would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

TVA has evaluated the proposed technical specification (TS) change and has determined that it does not represent a significant hazards consideration based on criteria established in 10 CFR 50.92(c). Operation of Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) in accordance with the proposed amendment will not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Testing of model boiler specimens for free-span tubing (no tube support place restraint) at room temperature conditions shows burst pressures in excess of 5,000 pounds per square inch (psi) for indications of outer diameter stress corrosion cracking with voltage measurements as high as 19 volts. Burst testing performed on intersections pulled from SQN with up to a 1.9-volt indication shows measured burst pressure in excess of 6,600 psi at room temperature. Burst testing performed on pulled tubes from other plants with up to 7.5-volt indications shows burst pressures in excess of 5,200 psi at room temperatures. Correcting for the effects of temperature on material properties and minimum strength levels (as the burst testing was done at room temperature), tube burst capability significantly exceeds the safety-factor requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.121.

Tube burst criteria are inherently satisfied during normal operating conditions because of the proximity of the tube support plate (TSP). Since tube-to-tube support plate proximity precludes tube burst during normal operating conditions, use of the criteria must retain tube integrity characteristics that maintain a margin of safety of 1.43 times the bounding faulted condition steam line break (SLB) pressure differential. During a postulated SLB, the TSP has the potential to deflect during blowdown following a main SLB, thereby uncovering the TSP intersections.

Based on the existing database, the RG 1.121 criterion requiring maintenance of a safety factor of 1.43 times the SLB pressure differential on tube burst is satisfied by $\frac{7}{8}$-inch-diameter tubing with bobbin coil indications with signal amplitudes less than 8.82 volts (WCAP-13990), regardless of the indicated depth measurement. A 2.0-volt plugging criterion (resulting in a projected end-of-cycle [EOC] voltage) compares favorably with the 8.82-volt structural limit considering the extremely slow apparent voltage growth rates and few numbers of indications at SQN. Using the established methodology of RG 1.121, the structural limit is reduced by allowances for uncertainty and growth to develop a beginning of cycle (BOC) repair limit that would preclude indications at EOC conditions that exceed the structural limit. The nondestructive examination (NDE) uncertainty component is 20.5 percent, and is based on the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) alternate repair criteria (ARC).

Test data indicates that tube burst cannot occur within the TSP, even for tubes that have 100 percent throughwall electro-discharge machining notches, 0.75 inch long, provided that the TSP is adjacent to the notched area. Because of the few number of indications at SQN, the EPRI methodology of applying a growth component of 35 percent per effective full power year (EEPY) will be used. Near-term operating cycles at SQN are expected to be bounded by 1.23 years, therefore, a 43 percent growth component is appropriate. When these allowances are added to the BOC alternate plugging criteria (APC) of 2.0 volts in a deterministic bounding EOC voltage of approximately 3.26 volts for a Cycle 7, operation can be established. A 5.56-volt deterministic safety margin exists (8.82 structural limit—3.26-volt EOC equal 5.56-volt margin).

For the voltage/burst correlation, the EOC structural limit is supported by a voltage of 8.82 volts. Using this structural limit of 8.82 volts, a BOC maximum allowable repair limit can be established using the guidance of RG 1.121. The BOC maximum allowable repair limit should not permit the existence of EOC indications that exceed the 8.82-volt structural limit. By adding NDE uncertainty allowances and an allowance for crack growth to the repair limit, the structural limit can be validated. Therefore, the maximum allowable BOC repair limit (RL) based on the structural limit of 8.82 volts can be represented by the expressions:

RL+(0.205×RL)+(0.43×RL)=8.82 volts, or, the maximum allowable BOC repair limit can be expressed as,

RL=8.82-volt structural limit/1.64=5.4 volts.

This RL (5.4 volts) is the appropriate limit for APC implementation to repair bobbin indications greater than 2.0 volts independent of rotating pancake coil (RPC) confirmation of the indication. This 5.4-volt upper limit for non-confirmed RPC calls is consistent with other recently approved APC programs (Farley Nuclear Plan, Unit 2).

The conservatism of the growth allowance used to develop the repair limit is shown by the most recent SQN eddy current data. Two tubes plugged in Unit 1 during the last outage had less than one volt of growth over the past five operating cycles. Only seven tubes in Unit 2 required repair because of outside diameter stress corrosion cracking (ODSCC) at the TSP intersections.

Relative to the expected leakage during accident condition loadings, it has been previously established that a postulated main SLB outside of containment, but upstream of the main steam isolation valve (MSIV), represents the most limiting radiological condition relative to the APC. Implementation of the APC will determine whether the distribution of cracking indications at the TSP intersections is projected to be such that primary-to-