scheduled to commence on October 13, 1995. The current 2-year interval ends on July 17, 1995, when the plant is expected to be at power. The current operating cycle for the CNS commenced on August 1, 1993, and has included an extended, unplanned outage of nearly nine months (May 25, 1994, through February 21, 1995). This factor, along with the anticipated load demand and fuel capacity, have resulted in the rescheduling of the next refueling outage to October 1995.

During the unplanned outage, the licensee evaluated the schedule for performing the required Type B and C local leak rate tests (LLRTs) to ensure that all of these tests would be performed within the Technical Specification and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix J 2-year maximum surveillance interval. As a result of this evaluation, the licensee determined that only two LLRTs would come due when anticipated plant conditions could prohibit performance of the test. These are the Type B LLRTs required for both the drywell head and manport (penetrations DWH and X–4 respectively), which are currently due July 17, 1995. During reactor power operation, the extreme radiation environment prohibits personnel from performing the subject LLRTs or any of the activities (removal and replacement of the shield blocks on the refueling floor) associated with these tests. The subject LLRTs are normally performed during refueling outages. Therefore, the licensee would have to initiate a reactor shutdown solely for the purpose of conducting the subject Type B tests in order to comply with the current schedular requirement.

The licensee provided additional information to support the requested exemption and to address the requirements of 10 CFR 50.12, ''Specific Exemptions.'' With respect to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.12(a)(1), the licensee states that the exemption will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety based on the following reasons:

The drywell head and manport (X–4) have never failed an as found LLRT.

The drywell head seal is made from a 45 ± 5 durometer silicone rubber compound. Environmental conditions such as heat and radiation cause degradation in silicone compounds. It is reasonable to conclude that less degradation can be expected due to the extended shutdown and subsequent lower temperature and radiation levels experienced by the seals.

The drywell head and manport penetrations are not active components, and therefore, are not subject to active failure criteria.

With respect to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), the licensee states that application of the regulation in this particular circumstance is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. The licensee indicates that the rule states that testing be conducted during reactor shutdown for refueling or other convenient intervals. The extend forced outage was not a convenient interval for performing the two Type B tests, as it was not a scheduled refueling outage and the significant effort in preparing for and performing the tests normally done in concert with other refueling activities was not planned for. The licensee also states that the intent of the regulation is to assure performance of LLRTs after every two years of full power operation, and that, due to the extended forced outage, CNS will not have operated at full power for two years between the performance of the LLRTs. Therefore, the licensee maintains that the time extension for performing the tests does not conflict with the intent of the regulation.

The NRC staff has evaluated the licensee's exemption request and has determined that the licensee has provided adequate technical justification for the requested exemption and has demonstrated that special circumstances exist, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2). Specifically, the two subject penetrations have never failed their Type B tests since CNS commenced commercial operation in 1974; therefore there is a high degree of confidence in the leak tight integrity of those penetrations. Based on the licensee's schedule, the requested exemption would allow continued power operation without leak testing the penetrations for less than three months until the plant is shut down for refueling; in the cold shutdown condition, primary containment integrity is not required. The subject tests would then be performed prior to startup from the refueling outage. Based on the test history of these penetrations and the brief period of operation anticipated before shutdown, the staff concludes that the exemption request is justified.

In addition, the staff concludes that the licensee has demonstrated that special circumstances exist in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii). Application of the regulation is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. The underlying purpose of conducting Type B tests is to detect local leaks and to measure leakage across each pressure-containing or leakage-limiting boundary for certain reactor containment penetrations. Type B tests on the subject penetrations will be performed in successive refueling outages not significantly beyond the 2-year interval and a convenient opportunity to conduct the testing was not otherwise available.

IV

Accordingly, the Commission has determined that pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public interest and that the special circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present. An exemption is hereby granted from the requirement of Section III.D.2(a) of Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50, which requires that Type B tests be performed during each reactor shutdown for refueling but in no case at intervals greater than two years, for the drywell head and manport (penetrations DWH and X–4 respectively) at the CNS. The exemption allows a one-time extension for the Type B testing of these penetrations from July 17, 1995, until the next refueling outage, scheduled to commence on October 13, 1995.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the granting of this exemption will have no significant effect on the quality of the human environment (60 FR 36312). This exemption is effective upon issuance.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 17th day of July 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Jack W. Roe,

Director, Division of Reactor Projects III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95–17996 Filed 7–20–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

[Docket No. STN 50–456]

In the Matter: Commonwealth Edison Company (Braidwood Station, Unit 1); Exemption

I

Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd, the licensee) is the holder of Facility operating License No. NPF–72, which authorizes operation of Braidwood Station, Unit 1. The facility is a pressurized water reactor located at the licensee's site in Will County, Illinois. The license provides, among other things, that the licensee is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect.

II

In 10 CFR 50.60, ''Acceptance Criteria for Fracture Prevention Measures for Light-Water Nuclear Power Reactors for

Normal Operation,'' it states that all light-water nuclear power reactors must meet the fracture toughness and material surveillance program requirements for the reactor coolant pressure boundary as set forth in Appendices G and H to 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix G to 10 CFR 50 defines pressure/temperature (P/T) limits during any condition of normal operation, including anticipated operational occurrences and system hydrostatic tests to which the pressure boundary may be subjected over its service lifetime. In 10 CFR 50.60(b) it specifies that alternatives to the described requirements in Appendices G and H to 10 CFR Part 50 may be used when an exemption is granted by the Commission under 10 CFR 50.12.

To prevent low temperature overpressure transients that would produce pressure excursions exceeding the Appendix G P/T limits while the reactor is operating at low temperatures, the licensee installed a low temperature overpressure (LTOP) system. The system includes pressure-relieving devices called Power-Operated Relief Valves (PORVs). The PORVs are set at a pressure low enough so that if an LTOP transient occurred, the mitigation system would prevent the pressure in the reactor vessel from exceeding the Appendix G P/T limits. To prevent the PORVs from lifting as a result of normal operating pressure surges (e.g., reactor coolant pump starting, and shifting operating charging pumps) with the reactor coolant system in a water solid condition, the operating pressure must be maintained below the PORV setpoint. In addition, in order to prevent cavitation of a reactor coolant pump, the operator must maintain a differential pressure across the reactor coolant pump seals. Hence, the licensee must operate the plant in a pressure window that is defined as the difference between the minimum required pressure to start a reactor coolant pump and the operating margin to prevent lifting of the PORVs due to normal operating pressure surges. Braidwood, Unit 1, is expected to exceed the 5.37 effective full power years on August 2, 1995; therefore, operating with the current LTOP limits may result in encroachment of the P/T limit curves of the reactor vessel during normal operation of the plant after August 2, 1995.

The licensee proposed that in determining the design setpoint for LTOP events for Braidwood Unit 1, the allowable pressure be determined using the safety margins developed in an alternate methodology in lieu of the safety margins currently required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G. The proposed alternate methodology, Code Case N–514, is consistent with guidelines developed by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Working Group on Operating Plant Criteria to define pressure limits during LTOP events that avoid certain unnecessary operational restrictions, provide adequate margins against failure of the reactor pressure vessel, and reduce the potential for unnecessary activation of pressure-relieving devices used for LTOP. Code Case N–514, ''Low Temperature Overpressure Protection,'' has been approved by the ASME Code Committee. The content of this code case has been incorporated into Appendix G of Section XI of the ASME Code and published in the 1993 Addenda to Section XI. The NRC staff is revising 10 CFR 50.55a, which will endorse the 1993 Addenda and Appendix G of Section XI into the regulations.

An exemption from 10 CFR 50.60 is required to use the alternate methodology for calculating the maximum allowable pressure for the LTOP setpoint. By application dated November 30, 1994, as supplemented on May 11, 1995, the licensee requested an exemption from 10 CFR 50.60 for this purpose.

III

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon is own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 when (1) the exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and (2) when special circumstances are present. Special circumstances are present whenever, according to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), ''Application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule * * *.

The underlying purpose of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G, is to establish fracture toughness requirements for ferritic materials of pressure-retaining components of the reactor coolant pressure boundary to provide adequate margins of safety during any condition of normal operation, including anticipated operational occurrences, to which the pressure boundary may be subjected over its service lifetime. Section IV.A.2 of this Appendix requires that the reactor vessel be operated with P/T limits at least as conservative as those obtained by following the methods of analysis and the required margins of safety of Appendix G of the ASME Code.

Appendix G of the ASME Code requires that the P/T limits be calculated: (a) using a safety factor of two on the principal membrane (pressure) stresses, (b) assuming a flaw at the surface with a depth of one-quarter (¼) of the vessel wall thickness and a length of six (6) times its depth, and (c) using a conservative fracture toughness curve that is based on the lower bound of static, dynamic, and crack arrest fracture toughness tests on material similar to the Braidwood reactor vessel material.

In determining the setpoint for LTOP events, the licensee proposed to use safety margins based on an alternate methodology consistent with the proposed ASME Code Case N–514 guidelines. ASME Code Case N–514 allows determination of the setpoint for LTOP events such that the maximum pressure in the vessel would not exceed 110 percent of the P/T limits of the existing ASME Appendix G. This results in a safety factor of 1.8 on the principal membrane stresses. All other factors, including assumed flaw size and fracture toughness, remain the same. Although this methodology would reduce the safety factor on the principal membrane stresses, the proposed criteria will provide adequate margins of safety to the reactor vessel during LTOP transients and will satisfy the underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.60 for fracture toughness requirements.

Using the licensee's proposed safety factors instead of Appendix G safety factors to calculate the LTOP setpoint will permit a higher LTOP setpoint than would otherwise be required and will provide added margin to prevent normal operating surges from lifting the PORVs or cavitating the reactor coolant pumps.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the NRC staff has concluded that the licensee's proposed use of the alternate methodology in determining the acceptable setpoint for LTOP events will not present an undue risk to pubic health and safety and is consistent with the common defense and security. The NRC staff has determined that there are special circumstances present, as specified in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2), such that application of 10 CFR 50.60 is not necessary in order to achieve the underlying purpose of this regulation.

Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a), this exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or common defense and

security, and is, otherwise, in the public interest. Therefore, The Commission hereby grants Commonwealth Edison Company an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.60 such that in determining the setpoint for LTOP events, the Appendix G curves for P/T limits are not exceeded by more than 10 percent in order to be in compliance with these regulations. This exemption is applicable only to LTOP conditions during normal operation.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that granting this exemption will not have a significant impact on the human environment (60 FR 35570).

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 13th day of July 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Jack W. Roe,

Director, Division of Reactor Projects—III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95–17976 Filed 7–20–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

Proposed Generic Communication Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits; Extension of Comment Period

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Proposed generic communication: Extension of comment period.

SUMMARY: On May 22, 1995, (60 FR 27141), the NRC published for public comment a proposed generic letter which discusses problems with the testing of safety-related logic circuits and requests addressees to review surveillance procedures to determine whether any of the procedures fail to test all required portions of the logic circuitry and, if any problems are found, to correct the problems. The comment period for this proposed generic letter was to have expired on July 21, 1995. In a letter dated July 6, 1995, the Nuclear Energy Institute requested a 30-day extension of the comment period to allow the industry to prepare more comprehensive and detailed comments with respect to the proposed generic letter provisions and impact. In response to this request, the NRC has decided to extend the comment period 30 days.

DATES: The comment period has been extended and now expires August 21, 1995. Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so but assurance of consideration cannot be given except for comments received on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Submit written comments to Chief, Rules Review and Directives Branch. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555. Written comments may also be delivered to 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m., Federal workdays. Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Hukam Garg, (301) 415–2929.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 12th day of July 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Brian K. Grimes,

Director, Division of Project Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95–17975 Filed 7–20–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

Entity and Display Concepts Statement

AGENCY: Office of Management and Budget.

ACTION: Notice of document availability.

SUMMARY: This Notice indicates the availability of the second Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Concepts, ''Entity and Display,'' adopted by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The concept statement was recommended by the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board and adopted in its entirety by OMB.

ADDRESSES: Copies of the Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, ''Entity and Display,'' may be obtained for $3.75 each from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402–9325 (telephone: 202–783–3238), Stock No. 041–001–00456–1.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ronald Longo (telephone: 202–395–3993), Office of Federal Financial Management, Office of Management and Budget, 725–17th Street, N.W.—Room 6025, Washington, DC 20503.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This Notice indicates the availability of the second Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Concepts, ''Entity and Display.'' The concept statement was recommended by the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB) in April 1995, and adopted in its entirety by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

Under a Memorandum of Understanding among the General Accounting Office, the Department of the Treasury, and OMB on Federal Government Accounting Standards, the Comptroller General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of OMB decide upon principles and standards after considering the recommendations of FASAB. After agreement to specific principles and standards, they are to be published in the **Federal Register** and distributed throughout the Federal Government.

G. Edward DeSeve,

Controller.

[FR Doc. 95–18043 Filed 7–20–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3110–01–P

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Notice of Request for Clearance of a Revised Information Collection Form SF 3104 and SF 3104B

AGENCY: Office of Personnel Management.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (title 44, U.S. Code, chapter 35), this notice announces a request for a clearance of a revised information collection. SF 3104, Application for Death Benefits/ Federal Employees Retirement System, is used to apply for benefits under the Federal Employees Retirement System based on the death of an employee, former employee or retiree who was covered by FERS at the time of his/her death or separation from Federal Service. SF 3104B, Documentation and Elections in Support of Application for Death Benefits when Deceased was an Employee at the Time of Death, is used by applicants for death benefits under FERS if the deceased was a Federal Employee at the time of death.

Approximately 4,054 SF 3104s are completed annually. We estimate that it takes 60 minutes to fill out the form. The annual burden is 4,054 hours. Approximately 2,920 SF 3104Bs are completed annually. We estimate that it takes 60 minutes to fill out the form. The annual burden is 2,920 hours. The combined total annual burden is 6,974 hours.

For copies of this proposal, contact Doris R. Benz on (703) 908–8564.

DATES: Comments on this proposal should be received by August 20, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Send or deliver comments to—

Daniel A. Green, Retirement and Insurance Service, FERS Division,