

for the meeting includes the following topics:

- Overview of Astrophysics Division Status
- Status of NASA HQ Streamlining/Reorganization
- Branch Reports
- Mission Reports
- Update on Recent Proposal Reviews
- Update on Educational Strategic Planning
- Discussion and Formulation of Recommendations/Action Items

It is imperative that the meeting be held on these dates to accommodate the scheduling priorities of the key participants. Visitors will be requested to sign a visitor's register.

Dated: June 20, 1995.

Danalee Green,

Chief, Management Controls Office.

[FR Doc. 95-15663 Filed 6-26-95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7510-01-M

[Notice 95-043]

**NASA Advisory Council (NAC),
Minority Business Resource Advisory
Committee; Meeting**

AGENCY: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

SUMMARY: In accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act, Public Law 92-463, as amended, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration announces a forthcoming meeting of the NASA Advisory Council, Minority Business Resource Advisory Committee.

DATES: July 20, 1995, 9 a.m. to 4 p.m.

ADDRESSES: NASA, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Building 180, Room 101, Pasadena, California 91109-8099.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Ralph C. Thomas, III, Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Room 9K70, 300 E Street SW., Washington, DC 20546, (202) 358-2088.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The meeting will be open to the public up to the seating capacity of the room. The agenda for the meeting is as follows:

- Call to Order
- Reading of Minutes
- Overview of Jet Propulsion Laboratory SDB Program
- Report on Supreme Court Decision
- Subcommittee Reports
- Update on NASA SDB Program
- Report on Action Items from Last Meeting
- Public Comment
- Adjournment

It is imperative that the meeting be held on this date to accommodate the scheduling priorities of the key participants.

Dated: June 20, 1995.

Danalee Green,

Chief, Management Controls Office.

[FR Doc. 95-15662 Filed 6-26-95; 8:45 am]

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[Notice 95-045]

**Notice of Intent To Grant a Partially
Exclusive Patent License**

AGENCY: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

ACTION: Notice of intent to grant a patent license.

SUMMARY: NASA hereby gives notice of intent to grant Photo Emission Technology, Inc., 766 Lakefield Road, Suite H, Westlake Village, CA 91361, a license to practice the invention protected by U.S. Patent No. 5,393,980, entitled "Quality Monitor And Monitoring Technique Employing Optically Stimulated Electron Emission," which was issued on February 28, 1995, to the United States of America as represented by the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The partially exclusive license will contain appropriate terms and conditions to be negotiated in accordance with "Licensing of Government Owned Inventions," (37 CFR 404.1 *et seq.*). NASA will negotiate the final terms and conditions and grant the license unless, within 60 days of the date of this notice, the cognizant Patent Attorney receives written objections to the grant, together with supporting documentation. The Patent Attorney will review all written responses to this notice and then recommend to the Associate General Counsel for Intellectual Property whether to grant the license.

DATES: Responses to the notice must be received by August 28, 1995.

ADDRESSES: NASA Langley Research Center, 3 Langley Boulevard, Mail Stop 212, Hampton, VA 23681-0001.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Kimberly A. Chasteen, Patent Attorney, 804-864-3227.

Dated: June 20, 1995.

Edward A. Frankle,

General Counsel.

[FR Doc. 95-15664 Filed 6-26-95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7510-01-M

**NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION**

**Proposed Generic Communication;
Relocation of Selected Technical
Specifications Requirements Related
to Instrumentation**

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Notice of opportunity for public comment.

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to issue a generic letter regarding the relocation of selected technical specifications requirements related to instrumentation. The NRC is seeking comment from interested parties regarding both the technical and regulatory aspects of the proposed generic letter presented under the Supplementary Information heading. This proposed generic letter and supporting documentation were endorsed for publication in the **Federal Register** by the Committee to Review Generic Requirements (CRGR) on June 15, 1995. The relevant information that was sent to the CRGR to support their review of the proposed generic letter is available in the NRC Public Document Room under accession number 9506160308. The NRC will consider comments received from interested parties in the final evaluation of the proposed generic letter. The NRC's final evaluation will include a review of the technical position and, when appropriate, an analysis of the value/impact on licensees. Should this generic letter be issued by the NRC, it will become available for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room.

DATES: Comment period expires July 27, 1995. Comments submitted after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given except for comments received on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Submit written comments to Chief, Rules Review and Directives Branch, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555. Written comments may also be delivered to 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 am to 4:15 pm, Federal workdays. Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: William D. Reckley, (301) 415-1314.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:**NRC Generic Letter 95-XX: Relocation of Selected Technical Specifications Requirements Related to Instrumentation***Addressees*

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power reactors except Crystal River, Grand Gulf, Clinton, and Hatch, Units 1 and 2.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this generic letter to advise those licensees that have not converted or are not in the process of converting to the improved Standard Technical Specifications that they may request a license amendment to relocate selected instrumentation requirements from their Technical Specifications (TS).

Description of Circumstances

This line-item TS improvement was developed in response to TS amendments proposed by licensees and ongoing NRC TS improvement programs. The intent of this generic letter is to reduce the time and costs spent by licensees and the NRC staff in amending requirements related to the selected instrumentation-related TS. Licensees will reduce cost by relocating requirements to a licensee-controlled document or program so that future changes to those requirements would not necessarily involve a license amendment. The time and cost of NRC staff review is reduced by the use of internal guidance for the review of generic letter-related amendments and the reduction in the number of plant-specific changes to the affected TS.

Discussion

Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act (the Act) requires applicants for nuclear power plant operating licenses to include TS as part of the license. In Section 50.36 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50.36), the Commission established the regulatory requirements related to the content of TS. That regulation requires that the TS include items in five specific categories, including (1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings and limiting control settings; (2) limiting conditions for operation; (3) surveillance requirements; (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls. However, the regulation does not specify the particular requirements to be included in TS.

The NRC developed criteria, as described in the "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications

Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors" (58 FR 39132), to determine which of the design conditions and associated surveillances should be located in the TS as limiting conditions for operation. The four criteria provided in the Final Policy Statement are:

(1) Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary;

(2) a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a Design Basis Accident or Transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier;

(3) a structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a Design Basis Accident or Transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier;

(4) a structure, system, or component which operating experience or probabilistic safety assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

The Commission recently promulgated a proposed change to 10 CFR 50.36 pursuant to which the rule would be amended to codify and incorporate these criteria (see Proposed Rule, "Technical Specifications," 59 FR 48180 (September 20, 1994)).

The Commission's Final Policy Statement acknowledged that its implementation may cause some requirements presently in TS to be moved out of existing TS to documents and programs controlled by licensees. This generic letter addresses the relocation of selected TS requirements related to instrumentation as a result of the consideration of the final policy statement criteria. Upon review of typical TS for nuclear power reactors, the staff determined that, in accordance with the policy statement criteria, several specifications did not warrant inclusion in TS. The staff also concluded that the instrumentation addressed by these specifications are not related to dominant contributors to plant risk. The following typical TS are among the candidates for relocation to licensee-controlled documents:

- Incore Detectors (Movable Incore Detectors, Transversing Incore Probe).
- Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation.
- Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation.
- Chlorine Detection System.
- Loose-Part Detection System.
- Explosive Gas Monitoring Instrumentation.

- Turbine Overspeed Protection.

Requested Information

Licensees who voluntarily choose to use the guidance in this generic letter will need to submit license amendment requests in order to relocate the affected technical specifications. These licensees are encouraged to propose TS changes consistent with the guidance in Attachment 1 to this generic letter.

Licensees who do not wish to amend technical specifications are not expected to submit any response to this generic letter.

Required Response

Licensees who voluntarily choose to use the guidance in this generic letter are required to submit license amendment requests in order to relocate affected technical specification requirements.

Licensee requests should be submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555, under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90.

Backfit Discussion

This generic letter only requests information under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90 from addressees who voluntarily choose to use the contained guidance to seek an amendment of an operating license. Any action by licensees to propose TS changes in accordance with the guidance of this generic letter is voluntary and, therefore, not a backfit under 10 CFR 50.109. Therefore, the staff has not performed a backfit analysis.

Attachment 1—Guidance for a Proposed License Amendment to Relocate Selected Technical Specifications Requirements Related to Instrumentation*Introduction*

The NRC is issuing the following guidance for preparing a proposed license amendment to relocate from Technical Specifications (TS) selected requirements related to instrumentation. As discussed in the Final Policy Statement, licensees submitting amendment requests should identify the location of and controls for the relocated requirements. It is expected that most of the TS addressed by this generic letter will be relocated to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and changes to those provisions will be performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, "Changes, tests and experiments." If requirements are relocated to other documents (e.g., the emergency plan), controls may be

provided by regulatory requirements such as 10 CFR 50.54, "Conditions of licenses." The adequacy of controls for relocated provisions which do not fit in the above categories will be reviewed and approved by the NRC staff on a case-by-case basis.

License amendment requests should contain a commitment to relocate each selected requirement to a particular licensee-controlled document or program, (e.g., the UFSAR or the emergency plan). The commitment should also address the submittal of the revised documents to the NRC in accordance with the applicable regulation (e.g., 10 CFR 50.71(e)). In the amendment request, the licensee should clearly describe the program it will use to control changes to relocated provisions (e.g., 10 CFR 50.59 or 50.54(q)). Control of the relocated provisions in accordance with the applicable regulation ensures that NRC review and approval will be requested for changes exceeding the stated regulatory threshold (e.g., unreviewed safety question or decrease in effectiveness).

Licensees should note that this generic letter supersedes TS-related guidance contained in several previously issued NRC documents, such as regulatory guides and the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800). Commitments contained in the UFSAR or other docketed correspondence may need to be revised to reflect the deviations from these NRC documents. However, this generic letter addresses only the need to include requirements related to the affected systems in TS. Staff positions on matters other than TS content that are contained in the regulatory guides or other documents are not affected by the issuance of this generic letter.

The NRC has approved the relocation of most of these specific instrumentation requirements in various amendments issued to specific licensees. The improved standard TS also reflect the staff position that these requirements do not satisfy the final policy statement criteria for inclusion in TS. The staff has also concluded that these provisions are not related to dominant contributors to plant risk. Additional discussions follow for each of the selected relocated instrumentation requirements.

Incore Detectors

The relocation of requirements related to incore neutron detectors affects the TS sections entitled "Incore Detectors" or "Movable Incore Detectors," for pressurized water reactors (PWRs), or "Transversing Incore Probe," for boiling

water reactors (BWRs). Incore instrumentation is used periodically to calculate power peaking factors in order to verify nuclear design predictions, ensure operation within established fuel performance limits, and to calibrate other nuclear instrumentation. The measurements are used in a confirmatory manner and do not provide direct input to reactor protection system or engineered safety features actuation system functions.

These instruments are neither used for, nor capable of, detecting a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary prior to a design basis accident nor do they function as a primary success path to mitigate events which assume the failure of or challenge the integrity of fission product barriers. Although the core power distributions (measured by the incore detectors) constitute an important initial condition to design basis accidents and therefore need to be addressed by TS, the detectors themselves are not an active design feature needed to preclude analyzed accidents or transients. The staff has determined therefore, that the incore detector requirements do not satisfy the criteria of the Final Policy Statement for inclusion in TS. Licensees may propose to relocate the incore detector requirements to the UFSAR and control changes to those provisions in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.

Relocation of the incore detector requirements from the TS to the UFSAR does not imply any reduction in their importance in confirming that core power distributions are bounded by safety analysis limits. It is expected that licensees will continue to maximize the number of available incore detectors. Evaluations related to changes in incore detector requirements are expected to consider such factors as the need to identify the inadvertent loading of a fuel assembly into an improper location, the calibration of protection systems using incore measurements, and the allowances for measurement and nuclear design uncertainties. Should these or other considerations lead to the identification of a proposed change as an unreviewed safety question, the licensee should request NRC review and approval in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(c).

Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation

Section VI(a)(3) of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 requires that seismic monitoring instrumentation be provided to promptly determine the response of those nuclear power plant features important to safety in the event of an earthquake. This capability is required

to allow for a comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for the unit. Comparison of such data is needed to (1) determine whether the plant can continue to be operated safely, and (2) permit such timely action as may be appropriate. However, seismic instrumentation does not actuate any protective equipment or serve any direct role in the mitigation of an accident.

The capability of the plant to withstand a seismic event or other design-basis accident is determined by the initial design and construction of systems, structures, and components. The instrumentation is used to alert operators to the seismic event and evaluate the plant response. The Final Policy Statement explained that instrumentation to detect precursors to reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage, such as seismic instrumentation, is not included in the first criterion. As discussed above, the seismic instrumentation does not serve as a protective design feature or part of a primary success path for events which challenge fission product barriers. The staff has concluded that the seismic monitoring instrumentation does not satisfy the final policy statement criteria and need not be included in the TS. Licensees may propose to relocate the seismic monitoring instrumentation requirements to the UFSAR and control changes to those provisions in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.

Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation

In 10 CFR 50.47, "Emergency Plans," and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities," the Commission requires power plant licensees to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. Timely access to accurate local meteorological data is important for estimating potential radiation doses to the public and for determining appropriate protective measures. In 10 CFR 50.36a(a)(2), the Commission requires nuclear power plant licensees to submit annual reports specifying the quantity of each of the principal radionuclides released to unrestricted areas in liquid and airborne effluents and such other information as may be required by the NRC to estimate maximum potential annual radiation doses to the public. A knowledge of meteorological conditions in the vicinity of the reactor is important in providing a basis for estimating annual radiation doses resulting from

radioactive materials released in airborne effluents. Accordingly, the meteorological monitoring instrumentation serves a useful function in estimating radiation doses to the public from either routine or accidental releases of radioactive materials to the atmosphere.

The meteorological monitoring instrumentation does not serve a primary protective function as to warrant inclusion in the TS in accordance with the criteria of the final policy statement. The instrumentation does not serve to ensure that the plant is operated within the bounds of initial conditions assumed in design basis accident and transient analyses or that the plant will be operated to preclude transients or accidents. Likewise, the meteorological instrumentation does not serve as part of the primary success path of a safety sequence analysis used to demonstrate that the consequences of these events are within the appropriate acceptance criteria. Accordingly, the staff has concluded that the meteorological instrumentation does not satisfy the final policy statement criteria and need not be included in TS. The staff has determined that requirements related to the meteorological monitoring instrumentation can be moved from the TS to the UFSAR, and that any subsequent changes to the provisions would be controlled pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59. Licensees may alternately choose to relocate the meteorological monitoring instrumentation requirements from the TS to the facility's emergency plan. In this case, subsequent changes would be made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q).

Chlorine Detection System

Chlorine detection systems ensure that sufficient capability is available to promptly detect and initiate protective action to isolate the control room in the event of an accidental chlorine release. Some plants may also have systems to detect other toxic gases which have the potential to hamper plant operation in the case of their accidental release from onsite or offsite sources. The relocation of TS related to other toxic gas detection systems is included in this discussion for the typical chlorine detection systems. Staff positions regarding the relationship of the chlorine detection systems to the general design criteria (GDC) appear in NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan" (SRP); Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.78, "Assumptions for Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release"; and RG 1.95, "Protection of Nuclear Power Plant

Control Room Operators Against an Accidental Chlorine Release."

As discussed above, chlorine detection systems may serve an important role in the protection of control room personnel from internal or external hazards related to toxic gases. However, the release of chlorine or other hazardous chemicals is not part of an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis that assumes a failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. Since the release of toxic gases is not assumed to initiate or occur simultaneously with design basis accidents or transients involving challenges to fission product barriers, the chlorine detection system is not part of a success path for the mitigation of those accidents or transients. The staff has, therefore, concluded that requirements for this system do not satisfy the final policy statement criteria and need not be included in TS. Licensees may propose to relocate the chlorine detection system requirements to the UFSAR and control changes to those provisions in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.

Loose-Part Detection System

The loose-part detection system identifies the existence of possible loose parts in the reactor coolant system. Early detection can provide operators time to take corrective actions and avoid or mitigate damage to or malfunctions of primary system components. However, as discussed in the final policy statement, the loose-part detection system does not function to detect significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. The loose-part detection system does not serve as an active design feature for establishing initial conditions or mitigation of design basis accidents or transients. The staff has concluded that requirements for this system do not satisfy the final policy statement criteria and need not be included in TS.

Licensees may propose to relocate the requirements related to the loose-part detection system from the TS to the UFSAR and control changes to those provisions in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.

Explosive Gas Monitoring Instrumentation

The relocation of most of the instrumentation related to radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring was addressed in Generic Letter 89-01, "Implementation of Programmatic Controls for Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications [RETS] in the Administrative Controls Section of the

Technical Specifications and the Relocation of Procedural Details of RETS to the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual or the Process Control Program." Relocation of the requirements for explosive gas monitoring instrumentation was not addressed in the guidance provided by Generic Letter 89-01. Staff positions regarding the monitoring of explosive gases within the radioactive waste management systems are outlined in SRP Section 11.3 and Branch Technical Position ETSB-11-5, "Postulated Radioactive Releases Due to a Waste Gas System Leak or Failure."

The actions required by existing TS typically require alternate sampling, limited operation of the gaseous waste system, and submittal of a special report if the explosive gas monitoring instrumentation does not conform to the limiting condition for operation. The explosive gas monitoring instrumentation requirements address detection of possible precursors to the failure of a waste gas system but do not prevent or mitigate design basis accidents or transients which assume a failure of or present a challenge to a fission product barrier. Acceptable concentrations of explosive gases are actually controlled by other limiting conditions for operation (e.g., Gaseous Effluents, Explosive Gas Mixture) or by programs described in the "Administrative Controls" section of TS. The requirements related to explosive gas monitoring instrumentation do not conform to the final policy statement criteria for inclusion in the TS. Therefore, licensees may propose to relocate the explosive gas monitoring instrumentation requirements to the UFSAR and control changes to those provisions in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.

Turbine Overspeed Protection

Existing TS typically include limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for the turbine overspeed protection system. The turbine is equipped with control valves and stop valves which control turbine speed during normal plant operation and protect it from overspeed during abnormal conditions. The turbine overspeed protection system consists of separate mechanical and electrical sensing mechanisms which are capable of initiating fast closure of the control and stop valves. Current TS may require particular operability and surveillance requirements for these steam control and stop valves to minimize the potential for fragment missiles that might be generated as the result of a turbine overspeed event.

General Design Criterion 4 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 requires that structures, systems, and components important to safety be appropriately protected from the effects of missiles that may result from equipment failures. Application of the design criteria to turbine missiles is described in SRP Section 10.2 and in subsequent safety evaluations related to probabilities of turbine failures, turbine orientations, and surveillance requirements for turbine overspeed protection systems. In NUREG-1366, "Improvements to Technical Specifications Surveillance Requirements," the staff discusses the benefits, resultant costs, and the safety impact of performing turbine overspeed protection surveillances.

Although the design basis accidents and transients include a variety of system failures and conditions which might result from turbine overspeed events and potential missiles striking various plant systems and equipment, the system failures and plant conditions are much more likely to be caused by events other than turbine failures. In view of the low likelihood of turbine missiles, assumptions related to the turbine overspeed protection system are not part of an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. The turbine overspeed protection system is not relied upon in the design basis accident or transient analyses as a primary success path which functions or actuates to mitigate such events.

Probabilistic safety assessments and operating experience have demonstrated that proper maintenance of the turbine overspeed control valves is important to minimize the potential for overspeed events and turbine damage; however that experience has also demonstrated that there is low likelihood of significant risk to public health and safety because of turbine overspeed events. Further, the potential for and consequences of turbine overspeed events are diminished by factors such as the orientation of the turbine relative to plant structures and equipment, licensee inservice testing programs, which must comply with 10 CFR 50.55(a), and surveillance programs for the turbine control and stop valves derived from the manufacturer's recommendations.

Accordingly, the staff has concluded that the turbine overspeed protection system does not satisfy the final policy statement criteria and need not be included in TS. Licensees may propose to relocate the turbine overspeed protection requirements to the UFSAF

requirements to the UFSAR and control changes to those provisions in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 20th day of June 1995.

Brian K. Grimes,

Director, Division of Project Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95-15677 Filed 6-26-95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

[Docket 70-1257]

Finding of No Significant Impact and Notice of Opportunity for a Hearing Renewal of Special Nuclear Material License SNM-1227 Siemens Power Corporation Richland Engineering and Manufacturing Facility Richland, Washington

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is considering the renewal of Special Nuclear Material License SNM-1227 for the continued operation of the Siemens Power Corporation's (SPC) Engineering and Manufacturing Facility located in Richland, Washington. The facility manufactures low-enriched uranium fuel for commercial nuclear power reactors.

Summary of the Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

The proposed action is the renewal of SPC's special nuclear material license for 10 years. With this renewal, SPC will continue to operate the Richland Engineering and Manufacturing Facility to fabricate fuel assemblies for commercial nuclear power reactors. SPC is authorized to possess and use up to 25,000 kilograms of uranium-235 in compounds enriched up to 5 weight percent in the U-235.

The facility converts low-enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) to uranium dioxide (UO₂) powder, presses the UO₂ into pellets, loads the pellets into rods, and assembles the rods into final fuel assemblies. Most of the UF₆-to-UO₂ conversion is performed using the ammonium diuranate (ADU) process; however, with this license renewal, SPC will significantly expand its existing dry conversion capacity and shut down most of the ADU process capacity. The environmental assessment considers both the impacts of continued operation of the ADU process and the impacts of the expanded dry conversion capacity, which are expected to be significantly reduced.

The Need for the Proposed Action

SPC performs a necessary service for the commercial nuclear power industry

by fabricating fuel assemblies. Currently, the SPC facility is one of four such producers of low-enriched uranium fuel that operates within the United States. Denial of the license renewal application is an alternative available to the NRC but would result in either the expansion of production capacity or transfer of fuel production activities at another facility.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

The continued operation of the SPC facility will result in the continued release of low levels of hazardous and radioactive constituents. Under accident conditions, the facility could release higher concentrations over a short period of time. The facility uses a number of controls to reduce the release of hazardous and radioactive materials to the environment and performs monitoring of effluents and the environment. These controls and the monitoring program are described below.

The radiological environmental impacts of normal operations and postulated accidents were evaluated for the SPC facility. These impacts are summarized following the description of controls and monitoring.

Effluent Controls and Monitoring

The SPC facility produces gaseous, liquid, and solid effluent streams. Gaseous effluents are controlled by minimizing the amount of airborne radioactive materials within the plant and by the use of stack scrubbers and High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters. Liquid effluents are controlled by the use of waste water retention lagoons and treatment systems that reduce the concentration of radioactive materials prior to discharge to the Richland city sewer system. Solid effluents are controlled by segregation of radioactive wastes from trash and hazardous wastes; containment of wastes in drums or boxes on site; treatment by decontamination, compaction, or incineration, as appropriate; and final disposal off site.

SPC monitors these effluents at or just prior to the points of release. Gaseous stack effluents are sampled continuously at isokinetic flow conditions, and the samples are analyzed for radioactivity. Liquid effluents are sampled at the lift station at the point of discharge to the sewer, and the samples are analyzed for uranium and other constituents. Solid wastes are surveyed prior to treatment or off-site disposal.

Action levels have been selected for each of these effluents, in accordance