[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 120 (Thursday, June 22, 1995)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 32430-32442]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-15285]



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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 72

RIN 3150-AE17


Emergency Planning Licensing Requirements for Independent Spent 
Fuel Storage Facilities (ISFSI) and Monitored Retrievable Storage 
Facilities (MRS)

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its 
regulations, in accordance with the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 
for the emergency planning licensing requirements for Independent Spent 
Fuel Storage Facilities (ISFSI) and Monitored Retrievable Storage 
Facilities (MRS). The amendments are necessary to ensure that local 
authorities will be notified in the event of an accident so that they 
may take appropriate action. The regulation will provide a level of 
preparedness at these facilities that is consistent with NRC's defense-
in-depth philosophy.

EFFECTIVE DATE: September 20, 1995.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael T. Jamgochian, Office of 
Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555, Telephone (301-415-6534).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    On May 27, 1986 (51 FR 19106), following Commission approval, the 
proposed revision to 10 CFR part 72 relating to licensing requirements 
for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facilities (ISFSI) and Monitored 
Retrievable Storage Facilities (MRS), including requirements for 
emergency planning, was published in the Federal Register for comment.
    On November 30, 1988 (53 FR 31651), the Commission published the 
final rule outlining the licensing requirements for ISFSI and MRS but 
reserved the emergency planning licensing requirements for a later 
date.
    On May 24, 1993 (58 FR 29795), the Commission published for public 
comment the proposed emergency planning licensing requirements for 
ISFSI and MRS. This final rule codifies the emergency planning 
licensing requirements.

Discussion

    On April 7, 1989 (54 FR 14051), the Commission published in the 
Federal Register the final regulations relating to Emergency 
Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Material Licensees 
(10 CFR parts 30, 40, and 70).
    These regulations require certain NRC fuel cycle and other 
radioactive materials licensees that engage in activities that may have 
the potential for a significant accidental release of NRC licensed 
materials to establish and maintain approved emergency plans for 
responding to such accidents.
    Although applicable to those licensed under different parts of the 
Commission's regulations, the requirements for emergency plans in parts 
30, 40, and 70 contain similar provisions because they are designed to 
protect the public against similar radiological hazards. The proposed 
revision of 10 CFR part 72 as published for comment on May 24, 1993 (58 
FR 29795), would also require applicants for an ISFSI and MRS license 
to submit an emergency plan. Although the texts of the Fuel Cycle final 
emergency planning requirements and the parallel provisions of the 
proposed Emergency Preparedness licensing requirements for ISFSI and 
MRS are not identical, these provisions have the same purpose and use 
the same approach. In both cases, the proposed regulations require 
onsite emergency planning with provisions for offsite emergency 
response in terms of coordination and communication with offsite 
authorities and the public. It is therefore appropriate that in both 
cases these requirements should be expressed in the same manner.
    The Commission has determined that the emergency planning licensing 
requirements for 10 CFR part 72 licensees should be similar to those 
requirements already codified in Sec. 70.22 for part 70 licensees. 
Nonetheless, the Commission wishes to establish unique provisions in 
the emergency planning requirements for MRS facilities (and certain 
more complex ISFSIs) versus typical ISFSI facilities. The Commission 
anticipates a potential need for enhanced emergency planning 
requirements appropriate to the entire range of operations which may be 
conducted at an MRS facility (or ISFSI that may be repackaging or 
handling spent fuel). The Commission acknowledges that, to date, 
accidents that have been postulated and analyzed for either an ISFSI or 
MRS would result in similar offsite doses. The analysis of potential 
onsite and offsite consequences of accidental releases associated with 
the operation of an ISFSI is contained in NUREG-1140. This evaluation 
shows that the maximum dose to a member of the public offsite due to an 
accidental release of radioactive materials would not exceed 1 rem 
effective dose equivalent, which is within the EPA Protective Action 
Guides or an intake of 2 milligrams of soluble uranium (due to chemical 
toxicity).
    Thus, the consequences of worst-case accidents involving an ISFSI 
located on a reactor site would be inconsequential when compared to 
those involving the reactor itself. Therefore, current reactor 
emergency plans cover all at- or near-reactor ISFSI's. An ISFSI that is 
to be licensed for a stand-alone operation will need an emergency plan 
established in accordance with the requirements in this rulemaking. 
NUREG-1140 concluded that the postulated worst-case accident involving 
an ISFSI has insignificant consequences to the public health and 
safety. Therefore, the final requirements to be imposed on most ISFSI 
licensees reflect this fact, and do not mandate formal offsite 
components to their onsite emergency plans.
    Similarly, the Commission has conducted an analysis of potential 
onsite and offsite consequences of accidental release associated with 
the operation of an MRS. The analysis is contained in NUREG-1092. This 
evaluation shows that the maximum dose to a member of the public 
offsite due to an accidental release of radioactive materials would 
likely not exceed 1 rem effective dose equivalent which is within the 
EPA Protective Action Guides or an intake of 2 milligrams of soluble 
uranium (due to chemical toxicity).
    In the final NRC Generic Environmental Impact Statement on the 
handling and storage of light water reactor fuel,1 it is stated 
that

    [[Page 32431]] \1\ NUREG-0575 Vol. 1 sec. 4.2.2 Safety and 
Accident Considerations.
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    * * * To be a potential radiological hazard to the general 
public, radioactive materials must be released from a facility and 
dispersed offsite. For this to happen:
     The radioactive material must be in a dispersible form
     There must be a mechanism available for the release of 
such materials from the facility, and
     There must be a mechanism available for offsite 
dispersion of such released material.
    Although the inventory of radioactive material contained in 1000 
MTHM of aged spent fuel may be on the order of a billion curies or 
more, very little is available in a dispersible form; there is no 
mechanism available for the release of radioactive materials in 
significant quantities from facility; and the only mechanism 
available for offsite dispersion is atmosphere dispersion * * *.

    Furthermore, NRC has conducted Safety Evaluations on many different 
storage systems. Those studies included evaluations of the effects of 
corrosion, handling accidents such as cask drops and tipovers, 
explosions, fires, floods, earthquakes, and severe weather conditions. 
As documented in each of those Safety Evaluation Reports (SER), NRC was 
not able to identify any design basis accident that would result in the 
failure of a confinement boundary. However, to provide a conservative 
bounding analysis of the threat to the public health and safety, the 
failure of the confinement barrier was postulated. As discussed in each 
of the SERs and again in the response to Issue 48 the consequences of 
this postulated failure do not result in an increased risk to the 
public health and safety.
    In the environmental assessment for 10 CFR Part 72,2 the 
accident judged the most severe was the failure of a packaged fuel 
element. In this analysis, the accident involves the failure of a 
storage system containing 1.7 MTHM. The postulated individual doses are 
presented in Table 1.3

    \2\ NUREG-1092 Environmental Assessment for Part 72 ``Licensing 
Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel and High-Level Radioactive 
Waste.''
    \3\ NUREG-1092 Table 2.2.4-2

[[Page 32432]]
   Table 1.--Total Dose to an Individual as a Result of a Fuel Canister Failure Accident at a Surface Storage   
                                               Installation (mrem)                                              
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Pathway                        Skin           Total Body          Thyroid            Lung      
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Submersion..........................  1.0  x  10-\1\    1.1  x  10-\3\    1.1  x  10-\3\    1.1  x  10-\3\  
Inhalation..............................                    1.2  x  10-\5\    1.1  x  10-\2\    7.3  x  10-\5\  
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      Total.............................  1.0  x  10-\1\    1.1  x  10-\3\    1.2  x  10-\2\    1.1  x  10-\3\  
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Note: The maximum individual is defined as a permanent resident at a location 1600 meters southeast of the stack
  with a time-integrated atmospheric dispersion coefficient (E/Q of 1.5 x 10-4 sec/m\3\). The accident involves 
  failure of a fuel canister containing approximately 1.7 MTHM.                                                 

  Since the time these calculations were performed, the storage 
canisters have increased in capacity, and today the capacity of the 
largest approved design is approximately 9 MTHM. However, because dose 
varies directly with inventory, when the totals are increased by a 
factor of ten, they are still a very small fraction of the 300 mrem/yr 
4 an individual receives from natural background radiation, and is 
below the EPA protective action guides.

    \4\ NRCP Report No. 94.
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    Nonetheless, the Commission believes it appropriate to require 
enhanced offsite emergency planning at an MRS (as well as any ISFSI 
that conducts similar operations) because of the broader scope of 
activities which could be performed at such a facility.
    In addition to the handling and repackaging for storage of large 
numbers of individual fuel bundles, which involves the receipt, 
inspection, and transfer of several thousand transport casks, MRS 
operations may also encompass the consolidation of the stored fuel into 
casks for subsequent geological disposal after interim storage. At this 
time, a final MRS design has not been selected. The MRS may be a large 
industrial facility equipped to handle the loading, unloading, and 
decontaminating of a large number of spent fuel shipping containers 
arriving by both truck and rail. It could also include facilities to 
disassemble the fuel bundles and consolidate that fuel into special 
storage/transport containers, and facilities to handle solidified high-
level waste. These facilities would require the equipment necessary to 
process low- and high-level waste that would be associated with the 
above operations. It is also possible, however, for an MRS facility to 
serve primarily as a warehouse operation, limited solely to accepting, 
sorting and later transhipping a large number of multi-purpose canister 
(MPC) systems of the type being considered by DOE.
    The Multi-Purpose-Canister (MPC) being considered by the DOE would 
be used to store and transport spent fuel. The MPC system provides a 
sealed canister into which spent fuel would be loaded. After loading, 
the MPC is evacuated, backfilled with an inert gas, and then 
permanently sealed. At this point the MPC concept offers several 
options: the sealed canister could be placed into a storage overpack at 
the reactor site, or it could be placed in a transportation overpack 
for movement to an ISFSI or MRS. After arriving at the ISFSI or MRS the 
MPC would most likely be placed in the storage configuration awaiting 
transport to the geological repository. When the repository is ready to 
accept fuel, several options would exist. The canisters could be placed 
into the transport overpack for movement to the geological repository. 
Once there, the canister could be transferred directly into the 
disposal overpack for emplacement into the repository. An option to 
repackage the spent fuel into disposal canisters allowing the optimum 
configuration required at the repository remains possible. This could 
take place at either the repository or MRS. Because the canister may 
only be opened once during its entire storage life and individual fuel 
elements only handled under a controlled environment, the MPC concept 
appears to reduce the overall risk to public health and safety.
    Given the uncertainties in the design and operation of an MRS, the 
Commission believes it prudent to plan and provide for an enhanced 
level of emergency planning to include some offsite preparedness should 
operation of a MRS (or any ISFSI conducting similar operations) present 
accident risks that exceed those analyzed in NUREGs 1140 and 1092. 
Because the level of risk to the public health and safety from such an 
MRS (or ISFSI) may exceed that from a typical ISFSI, the relevant 
emergency planning requirements should be enhanced to include an 
offsite component. To achieve this goal, the final enhanced emergency 
plan requirements are modeled after 10 CFR 50.47(d). The intent of 10 
CFR 50.47(d) was to mandate a minimum level of offsite response 
capability during initial reactor licensing and low power operations. 
This same level of response capability is considered appropriate to MRS 
(and any comparable ISFSI) operations. Because much of the language 
needed to achieve this level of offsite protection has already been 
codified in 10 CFR Part 50, similar language is included within the 
final emergency planning requirements for an MRS (and ISFSI) (10 CFR 
72.32(b)(15)(i-vi)).
    The Commission notes that, for both types of facilities, this 
rulemaking is not required in order to provide adequate safety and may 
not be justified based solely on a comparison of the anticipated costs 
of implementing these regulations to the increase in public health and 
safety. Rather, the Commission believes that it is justified in terms 
of safety enhancement such as the intangible benefit of being able to 
assure the public that local authorities will be notified in the event 
of an accident so that they may take appropriate actions. The NRC feels 
that such preparedness is prudent and consistent with the NRC's 
philosophy of defense-in-depth.
Public Comments

    The NRC received a total of 25 comment letters. Five were from 
utilities, two were from organizations representing utilities, eight 
were from State and/or local emergency management agencies, three were 
from the Mescalero Indian Tribe, five were from environmental/
intervener groups, one was from a private citizen, and one was from the 
Department of Energy.
    One of the letters that opposed the proposed regulation came from a 
member of the Mescalero Indian Tribe and included the signatures of 40 
other tribal members who agreed with opposition to the proposed rule 
change. Opposition also came from the private citizen, all of the 
intervener/environmental groups, and a local governmental official.
    Letters that were generally in agreement with the proposed rule 
change were submitted by the Mescalero Tribal MRS Program Manager, the 
Department of Energy, all of the utilities, all of the State 
governmental [[Page 32433]] agencies, and from the industry groups 
(though the industry group letters expressed a preference for deferring 
the MRS portion of the regulation (10 CFR 72.32(b)) because the 
industry groups considered it premature).
    The comment letters that were received provided many thought-
provoking and constructive comments. The Commission's evaluation of and 
response to these comments is presented in the following section.
    Issue 1. The frequency for conducting offsite communication checks 
(quarterly) and onsite exercises (annually) for MRS should not be more 
conservative than for ISFSI communications checks (semiannually) and 
onsite exercises (biennially). The increase in frequency is not 
justified by experience or analysis.
    Response. The Commission agrees that the onsite exercise 
requirements should be biennial rather than annual. Nonetheless, the 
quarterly communication checks will remain unchanged due to the obvious 
importance of reliable communications capabilities.
    Issue 2. The proposed rule, 10 CFR 72.32(a)(15) states that the 
review shall include certain ``arrangements'' and ``other 
organizations.'' Those items are not listed as specific elements to be 
included in the plan. It is inferred that they do not need to be 
addressed other than in the information regarding offsite interface 
activities required by paragraphs (a)(7), (a)(8), (a)(9), (a)(10), 
(a)(12), and (a)(14). As written, the paragraph imposes a review 
requirement upon the NRC and is merely informational to the applicant.
    Response. The Commission agrees and has rewritten 
Secs. 72.32(a)(15) and 72.32(b)(15) in the final regulations.
    Issue 3. The discussion section and the proposed rule regarding the 
frequency of communications checks should be consistent. The discussion 
section indicates quarterly checks (page 29796, Section xii) and the 
proposed rule in 10 CFR 72.32(a)(12)(i) indicates semiannual checks. 
Semiannual checks are appropriate.
    Response. The Commission disagrees. The discussion section referred 
to relates to a Final Rulemaking for Fuel Cycle and Material licensees 
published on April 7, 1989 (54 FR 14051). The requirement for quarterly 
communication checks is identical to that requirement for an MRS (and 
comparable ISFSI). The semiannual communication checks are for a 
typical, storage only ISFSI. There is no inconsistency.
    Issue 4. At a site where the affected ISFSI site could be 
contiguous to a Part 50 licensed site, the 10 CFR 50.47 emergency plans 
should apply automatically. This would preclude the unnecessary 
expenditure of limited utility, State, local and Federal resources; 
avoid duplication in emergency preparedness; and minimize confusion 
offsite. In order to limit confusion, change the existing proposed 
first sentence of 10 CFR 72.32(a) to read: ``For an ISFSI that is 
located on (or immediately adjacent to) the site of a nuclear power 
reactor * * *''
    Response. The Commission agrees and has incorporated this concept 
into the final regulation by referencing the exclusion area as defined 
in 10 CFR part 100.
    Issue 5. The following areas of the proposed rule introduce 
inconsistencies that require clarification: Paragraphs (a)(1) through 
(a)(13) of 10 CFR 72.32 list specific information to be included in the 
emergency plan. Paragraph (a)(16) also appears to list specific 
information to be included. However, it is unclear whether paragraphs 
(a)(14) and (a)(15) are intended to be specific information included in 
the emergency plan or review and comment requirements related to the 
submittal of the emergency plan which do not have to be included as 
specific information in the plan. The discussion contained in the 
supplementary information section of the Federal Register notice 
implies that these paragraphs are review and comment requirements only. 
``* * * the proposed requirements to be imposed on ISFSI licensee * * * 
do not mandate formal offsite components to their onsite emergency 
plans.'' (58 FR 29797, May 24, 1993.)
    Response. The Commission agrees and has clarified paragraphs 
(a)(14) and (a)(15).
    Issue 6. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(15), Offsite Arrangement: The wording ``* 
* * arrangements to accommodate State local staff at the licensee's 
near-site emergency facility have been made, * * *,'' should be deleted 
from Sec. 72.32(a)(15). The nature of potential emergency events at 
ISFSIs do not require personnel from State and local governments to 
respond in a staff capacity, and do not require near-site emergency 
facilities to be available. The proposed rule already requires that the 
emergency facilities at the site, and the emergency response staff for 
the facility, be adequate for emergency planning purposes.
    Response. The Commission agrees and has incorporated this comment 
in the final regulation.
    Issue 7. 10 CFR 72.32(b)(14), Offsite Review: The request for the 
offsite response organization to comment as to whether an offsite 
component to emergency preparedness at an MRS is reasonable, 
appropriate, or premature at this time. We believe that it is, in fact, 
premature at this time. The analyses that have already been done 
undoubtedly contain a considerable amount of conservatism. It is far 
easier to add requirements later, should they be found to be 
recommended, than to remove them when they are confirmed to be 
excessive later.
    Response. See Commission Response to Issue 18.
    Issue 8. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(13), Hazardous Chemicals: The 
certification deals with hazardous materials at the facility. The last 
phrase of the statement does not clearly convey this message. To 
clarify, the commenters suggest replacing the phase, ``if applicable to 
the applicant's activities at the proposed place of use of special 
nuclear material,'' with ``with respect to hazardous materials at the 
facility.''
    Response. The Commission agrees and has clarified the final rule 
accordingly.
    Issue 9. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(14), Offsite Review: The proposed rule 
should only require the 60-day comment period for offsite response 
organizations prior to the initial plan submittal to the NRC. 
Subsequent plan changes should not have this 60-day time restriction 
built into the submittal process unless the plan changes involve 
offsite response organizations.
    Response. The Commission agrees and has changed the final rule 
accordingly.
    Issue 10. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(12)ii, Offsite Participation: 
``Participation of offsite response organizations in biennial 
exercises, although recommended, is not required,'' sends a message to 
State and local agencies that they may need extensive planning to 
accommodate the facility. There is nothing unique to a potential 
release from an ISFSI that is not enveloped by the utility and 
associated State and local emergency plans to support an operating 
plant or one with a possession only license. State and local agencies 
should be provided a copy of the facility's plan and be asked to take 
part in ``table-top'' exercises to help them understand their role.
    Response. The Commission disagrees, because offsite response 
organizations should also become familiar with the facility.
    Issue 11. 10 CFR 73.32(a)(12)(i), Exercises: The listed drills are 
capitalized, creating the impression that they are specific types of 
drills, such as those described in NUREG-0654, for the conduct of 
similar type drills for [[Page 32434]] operating power reactors. 
Furthermore, ISFSIs, in view of the relatively passive nature of the 
facility and the potential consequence of a release as compared to 
operating power reactors, do not warrant this frequency. Drills should 
be held biennially.
    Response. See the Commission's Response to Issue 12. Additionally, 
the frequency of these drills have been changed from semiannual to 
annual.
    Issue 12. It is recommended that the existing wording, ``* * * 
Radiological/Health Physics, Medical, and Fire Drills should be 
conducted semiannually * * *,'' be reworded in a manner similar to 10 
CFR 50.47(b)(14) as follows: ``Periodic drills shall be conducted to 
develop and maintain key skills.''
    Response. The Commission disagrees because it believes that it is 
beneficial to specify the types of drills necessary.
    Issue 13. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(12)(i), Exercises: Semiannual fire drills 
may not be appropriate for an ISFSI because there are no flammable 
materials associated with the facility.
    Response. The frequency of these drills has been changed and will 
be required annually.
    Issue 14. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(8), Notification and Coordination: The 
means to promptly notify offsite response organizations should be 
limited to using commercial telephones. Ring-down systems should not be 
necessary to meet this requirement.
    Response. Ring-down systems are not mentioned in the proposed or 
final regulations.
    Issue 15. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(6), Assessment of Releases: Extensive 
dose assessment methodology is not necessary to implement the emergency 
plans.
    Response. The proposed rule did not suggest requiring and the final 
regulation does not require ``Extensive'' dose assessment.
    Issue 16. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(8), Notification and Coordination: The 
Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) provides for the automated 
transmission of a limited data set of selected onsite parameters (e.g., 
system pressure, temperature, radiation monitoring). The activation of 
the ERDS does not apply to nuclear power facilities that are shut down 
permanently or indefinitely. The activation of ERDS should not apply to 
ISFSI incidents even located at operating plant sites.
    Response. The proposed rule did not suggest requiring and the final 
regulation does not require the use of ERDS.
    Issue 17. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(3), Classification Requirements: The 
implementation guidance for the rule should provide for the simplest 
and easiest understood classification, notification, and reporting 
system for non-emergency events. NUREG-1140 ``A Regulatory Analysis on 
Emergency Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Material 
Licenses,'' August 1991 Section 2.27 (Spent Fuel Storage) supports the 
discussion that EPA's protective action guides would not be exceeded 
during an accident. Therefore, both classifications for a site and 
general emergency should not be considered. Redundant classifications, 
notifications and reports for non-emergency events, such as 
Notifications of Unusual Events (NOUEs), 1-hour non-emergency event 
reports, and four-hour non-emergency event reports used for operating 
reactors, should not apply to ISFSIs and MRSs. These conclusions are 
based on the magnitude, duration, and energy involved in an incident 
involving spent fuel storage facilities. These analyses have been 
docketed as part of submittals to the NRC to license individual ISFSIs. 
For actual ISFSI and MRS emergencies, the emergency classification, 
``Alert,'' should be sufficient. A ``NOUE'' classification for ISFSI 
and MRS emergency planning should not be necessary.
    Response. The proposed rule did not suggest requiring and the final 
regulation does not require the use of notification of unusual events 
``NOUE'' or ``general'' emergency classification.
    Issue 18. EEI/WASTE supports adoption of proposed Sec. 72.32(a) 
that would establish emergency planning requirements for ISFSI. EEI/
WASTE recommends that NRC defer proposed Sec. 72.32(b) that would 
establish emergency planning requirements for MRSs. Because no final 
design for MRS facilities has been selected, there is no rational basis 
to determine the level of radiological hazards for which emergency 
planning requirements are designed. It is therefore premature for the 
NRC to establish emergency planning requirements for MRS facilities.
    Response. The Commission disagrees. The proposed emergency planning 
licensing requirements for an MRS as published in the Federal Register 
on May 24, 1993 (58 FR 29795), have provided to the public some insight 
as to what the Commission now feels would be appropriate and reasonable 
emergency planning licensing requirements for an MRS. One comment 
stated that, ``We have concluded that minimum requirements, such as 
those currently proposed by the NRC rulemaking process, should serve as 
guidance for the starting point from which Emergency Planning and 
Licensing Requirements can be fully developed.'' Also, the Department 
of Energy stated that it ``* * * intends to work closely with the host 
community to develop a comprehensive emergency response plan with 
offsite components that will not only encompass the requirements 
contained in 10 CFR 72.32(b)(15), but likely will exceed them.''
    Issue 19. The proposed rule does not require MRS operators to 
notify local residents of any increased exposure, nor does it require 
MRS operators to develop a plan for evacuation. This rule is an unfair 
burden on local emergency responders with little or no training for 
these type of emergencies. There is specialized training and equipment 
for radiation accidents and exposure; therefore, the proposed rules 
should provide for the training and obtaining equipment for the local 
responders.
    Response. The Commission disagrees. The emergency planning 
regulations specifically require in 10 CFR 72.32(b)(8), ``Notification 
and coordination. A commitment to and a brief description of the means 
to promptly notify offsite response organizations * * *'' In 10 CFR 
72.32(b)(9), (10), and (12), the licensee is required to provide:

    Information to be communicated: A brief description of the types 
of information on facility status; radioactive releases; and 
recommended protective actions, if necessary, to be given to offsite 
response organizations and to the NRC. ``Training. A brief 
description of the training the licensee will provide workers on how 
to respond to an emergency and any special instructions and 
orientation tours the licensee would offer to fire, police, medical 
and other emergency personnel.'' * * * The licensee shall invite 
offsite response organizations to participate in the annual 
exercises.

    Additionally, in 10 CFR 72.32(b)(15) and (b)(16) the licensee is 
required to identify:

    (ii) Provisions that exist for prompt communications among 
principal response organizations to offsite emergency personnel who 
would be responding onsite.
    (iii) Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the 
emergency response onsite are provided and maintained.
    (iv) Adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and 
monitoring actual or potential consequences of a radiological 
emergency condition are available.
    (v) Arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated 
and injured onsite individuals.
    (vi) Radiological Emergency Response Training has been made 
available to those off site who may be called to assist in an 
emergency on site. [[Page 32435]] 
    (16) Arrangements made for providing information to the public.

    Issue 20. Although it is true that emergency plans for ISFSI and 
MRS need not be equivalent to emergency plans for reactors due to the 
relatively passive natures of the ISFSI and MRS, offsite emergency 
planning should not be eliminated for either type of facility. The 
proposed rule indicates that the maximum offsite dose due to an 
accidental release of radioactive material from either type of facility 
would probably not exceed 1 rem. However, 1 rem is within the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides of 1-5 
rem whole body, and it is the lower limit of these guides which is to 
be used as the basis for taking protective actions in emergency 
response. The commenter would also question whether worst-case 
scenarios have been considered in the evaluation of potential offsite 
doses. Worst-case scenarios would include acts of radiological 
sabotage, such as terrorist attacks employing explosives. Offsite 
emergency planning is a prudent measure to take against such 
uncertainties. Offsite plans may not be needed for a 10-mile radius, as 
is the case for power reactors, but they should not be eliminated for 
ISFSI and MRS. Reducing the radius of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) 
(perhaps to 1-5 miles, as appropriate) is the proper response to the 
reduced hazard posed by the ISFSI and MRS. A reduced zone will provide 
the basis and flexibility for an enhanced offsite response in those 
events where this is necessary.
    Response. Emergency planning requirements for power reactors, fuel 
cycle facilities, ISFSIs and MRSs are all based on a spectrum of 
accidents, including worst-case severe accidents. Emergency planning 
focuses on the detection of accidents and the mitigation of their 
consequences. Emergency planning does not focus on the initiating 
events. Therefore, based on the potential inventory of radioactive 
material, potential driving forces for distributing that amount of 
radioactive material, and the probability of the initiation of these 
events, the Commission concludes that the offsite consequences of 
potential accidents at an ISFSI or a MRS would not warrant establishing 
Emergency Planning Zones.
    Issue 21. In the interest of protecting public health and safety, 
appropriate offsite agencies should be notified immediately of any 
classifiable accident at an ISFSI or MRS. Section 72.32(a)8 should 
specify that the agency(ies) with responsibility to respond to 
accidents receive the notifications. In Illinois, IDNS should be 
notified of all such accidents. Consequently, we request that any 
licensee submitting a plan for approval under 10 CFR part 72 for an 
ISFSI or MRS in Illinois specifically provide in its emergency plan for 
timely notifications to IDNS. The notifications are important to ensure 
that emergency response actions are not unduly or unnecessarily 
delayed.
    Response. The Commission agrees. This comment focuses on the 
rationale that was used in proposing the following requirements:

    A commitment to, and a brief description of, the means to 
promptly notify offsite response organizations and request offsite 
assistance, including medical and ``The licensee shall allow the 
offsite response organizations expected to respond in case of an 
accident 60 days to comment on the initial submittal of the 
license's emergency plan before submitting it to NRC.'' * * * The 
licensee shall provide any comments received within the 60 days to 
the NRC with the emergency plan.

    Issue 22. The requirements for exercises are appropriate for the 
facilities involved. We do believe, however, that offsite participation 
in these exercises should be an integral, not perfunctory, part of the 
exercise process. Invitations to participate should be both timely and 
informative, maximizing the opportunity for productive interaction 
between licensee and offsite personnel. The rule should require that 
licensees document timely invitations to offsite agencies to 
participate in annual or biennial exercises, and offsite participation 
actually resulting from these invitations.
    Response. The Commission does not believe that it is necessary for 
the rule to require licensees to document timely invitations for 
offsite participation in exercises. NRC expects licensees will do so on 
their own initiative. Experience has shown that cooperative 
interactions between licensee and offsite authorities generally are 
quite productive.
    Issue 23. Proposed 10 CFR 72.32(a)(12)(ii) and (b)(12)(ii): 
Participation of offsite response organizations in exercises should be 
required.
    Response. The Commission believes that this requirement would be 
unnecessary in that experience shows almost all offsite authorities 
that are invited to participate in exercises do participate without 
being required to do so.
    Issue 24. Proposed 10 CFR 72.32(a)(12)(i): For the ISFSI, 
communications checks with offsite response organizations should be 
conducted quarterly, not semiannually, and onsite exercises conducted 
annually, not biennially.
    Response. The Commission disagrees due to the very low probability 
of offsite consequences resulting from potential accidents at these 
facilities in conjunction with the low probability of a significant 
accident occurring.
    Issue 25. Proposed 10 CFR 72.32(a)(3) and (b)(3): These provisions 
limit the accident classification levels to an alert for the ISFSI and 
a site area emergency for the MRS. For both facilities, the accident 
classification system should include the general emergency. This might 
be necessary in cases of radiological sabotage.
    Response. The Commission disagrees. An essential element of a 
General Emergency is that ``A release can be reasonably expected to 
exceed EPA Protective Action Guidelines exposure levels off site for 
more than the immediate site area.'' As previously discussed, NRC 
studies have concluded that the maximum offsite dose would be less than 
1 rem which is within the EPA Protective Action Guides.
    Issue 26. Proposed 10 CFR 72.32(a)(8) and (b)(8): Time limits ought 
to be established for notifying offsite response organizations and the 
NRC. An appropriate time limit is 15 minutes.
    Response. The Commission has established a reasonable time limit 
for notification which has proven to be adequate in the past. ``The 
licensee shall also commit to notify the NRC operations center 
immediately after notifications of the appropriate offsite response 
organizations and not later than one hour after the licensee declares 
an emergency.''
    Issue 27. Proposed 10 CFR 72.32(a)(15) and (b)(15)(i): The phrase, 
``and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned onsite 
response have been identified'' should be modified to include the 
requirement that arrangements should be made (such as letters of 
agreement) with any organizations so identified.
    Response. The Commission believes that offsite response 
organizations will respond in the event of an actual emergency in order 
to protect the health and safety of the public. Therefore, the 
Commission does not believe that this requirement would be necessary.
    Issue 28. On page 29797 of the proposed rule, first column, the 
statement is made: ``As a result of the above evaluation, the 
Commission is proposing that the emergency planning licensing 
requirements for part 72 licensees be similar to those requirements 
already codified in 10 CFR 70.22 for other part 70 licensees.'' Should 
this statement also include 10 [[Page 32436]] CFR 70.24 (Criticality 
Accident requirements)? Because the racking arrangement of spent fuel 
storage is changing in a manner that places spent fuel assemblies 
closer than in the past because of storage space needs, criticality 
accidents possibilities might increase, especially in the dry cell 
storage.
    Response. The Commission disagrees. Criticality is only a concern 
during a wet loading and unloading evolution. Additionally, such 
activities would not be expected to occur under a 10 CFR part 72 ISFSI 
license and, therefore, there is no basis to change 10 CFR part 72 
criticality requirements.
    Issue 29. Because 10 CFR part 72 contains no language that 
parallels 10 CFR 50.54(x), we recommend that something similar to it be 
considered as part of this rulemaking. During the operating life of an 
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility or Monitored Retrievable 
Storage Facility, it is possible that an unanticipated situation may 
arise where the most correct action would be one that is not allowed by 
the license or technical specifications. The writers of 10 CFR part 50 
foresaw this eventuality and allowed a licensee to:

    Take reasonable action that departs from license condition or a 
technical specification in an emergency when this action is 
immediately needed to protect the public health and safety and no 
action consistent with license conditions and technical 
specifications that can provide adequate or equivalent protection is 
immediately apparent.

    Although we never expect to invoke this option, prudence dictates 
that we should thoughtfully plan and develop procedures that allow for 
the possibility of low probability events where deviating from a 
technical specification or any other license condition is the most 
correct action. Adding this provision to the part 72 rule gives us a 
legal basis to include it in our procedures. As a licensee under both 
10 CFR parts 50 and 72, we feel that similar language has been useful 
under 10 CFR part 50 for developing procedures, and that it would be 
equally useful under 10 CFR part 72.
    Response. The Commission agrees. The final rule reflects this 
comment.
    Issue 30. In Sec. 72.32(a)(12)(ii), the proposed rule states that 
the licensee shall critique each exercise using individuals not having 
direct implementation responsibility for the plan. We disagree with 
this provision since it excludes our emergency planning (EP) staff from 
the critique. The individuals who develop the plans are EP experts. 
These are exactly the individuals that should critique the exercises. 
As the rule is written, we would have to maintain an EP expert on staff 
whose only EP job function would be to critique exercises. At all other 
times, this individual would have to remain at arms length from the EP 
program. A better use of resources would be to allow individuals from 
the EP staff to be a part of the team that critiques exercises.
    Response. The Commission agrees and has modified the final 
regulation to state ``the licensee shall critique each exercise using 
individuals not having direct implementation responsibility for 
conducting the exercise.''
    Issue 31. In Sec. 72.32(a)(14), NRC has proposed that an applicant 
for an ISFSI submit the proposed emergency plan to offsite response 
organizations (which are expected to respond in case of an onsite 
accident) 60 days in advance of submittal to NRC. Comments would then 
be forwarded to the NRC upon submittal of the ISFSI application. This 
requirement should be deleted as the current licensing process for 
review and approval of an ISFSI license affords all parties a 
sufficient amount of time to review and comment on the licensee's 
entire application to include the emergency plan. Furthermore, 
licensees have gained sufficient experience from the operating nuclear 
power plant environment to recognize the benefits of working with the 
offsite authorities in order to ensure adequacy of an emergency plan 
and its implementation. A requirement to instruct applications to do as 
much is unnecessary.
    Response. The Commission disagrees. The Commission believes that 
requiring participation by offsite organizations in the development of 
the emergency plan significantly helps establish coordination and 
working relationships between the principals.
    Issue 32. In Sec. 72.32(a)(15), NRC proposed to require that the 
licensee of an ISFSI provide for a ``near-site emergency facility'' for 
State and local staff. This requirement should be deleted as it implies 
that an offsite emergency response facility is needed, when in fact 
NRC's own studies in NUREG-1140 demonstrate that the consequences of an 
accident at an ISFSI are insignificant in terms of the public health 
and safety. Furthermore, NRC has generally affirmed this conclusion 
through its evaluation of Defueled Emergency Plans for nuclear power 
plants which are permanently defueled but continue to store spent fuel 
on site (Possession Only License). The emergency plans for these 
facilities are appropriately focused on the onsite aspects of emergency 
response, while maintaining the ability to notify offsite authorities 
such as the fire, police, and medical personnel who play a role in 
addressing onsite emergency response. No licensee-provided ``near-
site'' facility is needed for such offsite authorities to implement 
their onsite emergency planning responsibilities.
    Response. The Commission agrees. This change is incorporated in the 
final regulation.
    Issue 33. Mitigation of consequences (Sec. 72.32(a)(5)): The NRC 
proposes that the licensee describe those actions which would be taken 
to mitigate the consequences of each type of accident. This requirement 
should be revised to require that the licensee describe the response 
actions for each classification of emergency.
    Response. The regulation already requires, ``Information to be 
communicated. A brief description of the types of information on 
facility status; radioactive releases; and recommended protective 
actions, if necessary, to be given to offsite response organizations 
and to the NRC.''
    Issue 34. Responsibilities (Sec. 72.32(a)(7)): The term ``offsite 
response organizations'' should be revised to ``offsite authorities'' 
in recognition of the findings of NUREG-1140, i.e., the consequences of 
accidental releases associated with the operation of an ISFSI would not 
exceed the EPA Protective Action Guidelines. The term ``offsite 
response organizations'' connotes a need for formal offsite components 
to the onsite emergency plan and thus, an offsite emergency response 
plan. This interpretation would be inconsistent with the conclusions of 
NUREG-1140 which postulated the worst-case accidents involving an ISFSI 
and found that the consequences were insignificant in terms of public 
health and safety. To preclude misinterpretation, the term ``offsite 
authorities'' should be used.
    Response. The Commission disagrees that the term ``offsite response 
organizations'' connotes the need for ``formal offsite components'' to 
the onsite emergency plan. The term simply refers to those offsite 
organizations that may be needed to respond to an emergency (medical, 
fire department, police, etc.)
    Issue 35. Information to be communicated (Sec. 72.32(a)(9)): As 
concluded by the NRC in NUREG-1140, the consequences of the postulated 
worst-case accident involving an ISFSI are insignificant in terms of 
public health and safety. Therefore, because no offsite protective 
actions are needed, this requirement should be revised to require that 
the licensee communicate [[Page 32437]] only onsite facility status to 
offsite authorities.
    Response. The Commission disagrees with the suggestion to delete 
the requirement that licensees notify offsite organizations of 
recommended protective actions. The Commission acknowledges that the 
consequences of a postulated worst-case accident involving an ISFSI are 
insignificant in terms of public health and safety. Nonetheless, the 
Commission also recognizes the need for offsite organizations to be 
informed by licensees so that, in the event of an accident, protective 
actions may or may not need to be taken.
    Issue 36. Notification and coordination (Sec. 72.32(a)(8)): As 
recommended for Sec. 72.32(a)(7), the term ``offsite response 
organizations'' should be revised to ``offsite authorities.''
    Response. See Commission Response to Issue 34.
    Issue 37. Types of accident (Sec. 72.32(a)(2): The NRC has proposed 
that the licensee identify the ``types of accidents'' that could occur 
at an ISFSI installation ``for which protective actions may be 
needed.'' This requirement should be deleted because the analysis of 
potential accidents and their consequences, as documented in NUREG-
1140, demonstrates that there are no accidents for which protective 
actions for the public may be needed. Furthermore, even if there were 
such accidents, the emergency plan is not the appropriate document for 
a description of the types of accidents that could occur. As is 
similarly done for operating reactors, any discussion on types of 
accidents is contained in the ISFSI Safety Analysis Report that 
supports the license application. Therefore, the licensee should be 
required only to identify the classification of accidents in 10 CFR 
72.32(a)(3) and, in general, response to those classifications, as is 
similarly required for operating plants.
    Response. The Commission agrees to delete the words ``* * * for 
which protective action may be needed.'' Nonetheless, the Commission 
believes that licensees should identify the types of accidents in the 
emergency plan in the same manner as part 30, 40, and 70 licensees have 
done since 1989.
    Issue 38. At a minimum, NRC should revise the term ``protective 
actions'' to ``protective measures.'' The term ``protective actions,'' 
as used by operating reactors, connotes the need for an offsite 
emergency response plan. In the case of an ISFSI, there is no need for 
an offsite emergency response plan because the consequences of 
potential accidents which can occur will not exceed the EPA Protective 
Action Guidelines. Furthermore, the term ``protective measures'' is now 
commonly used by Possession Only License holders to distinguish between 
onsite and offsite needs. Therefore, to preclude misinterpretation, we 
recommend that the term ``protective measures'' be used.
    Response. The Commission disagrees. There is nothing in the 
emergency planning licensing regulations for ISFSI that requires, 
implies, specifies or connotes the need for a formal offsite emergency 
response plan.
    Issue 39. Changing the proposed 10 CFR part 72 to require local 
involvement in the creation of the emergency response plan and require 
funding of local emergency planning and preparedness activities 
directly attributable to the additional and above ordinary risk of 
Spent Fuel Storage Facilities and Monitored Retrievable Storage 
Facilities is appropriate, given the above ordinary risk such 
facilities present to the local government units in their vicinity.
    Response. In view of the requirements in this rule, regarding the 
potential involvement by local governments, a licensee may have an 
incentive based on its own self-interest to assist in providing 
manpower, items of equipment, or other resources that the local 
governments may need but are themselves unable to provide. The 
Commission believes that the question of whether the NRC should or 
could require a licensee to contribute to the expenses incurred by 
local governments in assisting in emergency planning and preparedness 
is beyond the scope of the rule.
    Issue 40. Provisions should be included in the proposed rule to 
exempt Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSI) with very 
limited radionuclide inventories from the emergency planning 
requirements. This is best accomplished by establishing certain 
threshold values for the radiological consequences of potential 
accidents below which exemption can be granted.
    Response. The Commission does not agree. An ISFSI is licensed to 
store specific inventories of radionuclides. The requirements focus on 
the emergency planning licensing requirements of an ISFSI, not the 
amount of fuel that may or may not be stored in an individual ISFSI 
during a specific time period.
    Issue 41. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(12)(ii) specifies that the licensee 
critique each exercise using individuals not having direct 
responsibility for the plan. This regulation, while well intentioned, 
is burdensome, costly, and does not allow the personnel with emergency 
preparedness knowledge to identify and correct potential weaknesses. 
This statement seems to satisfy the requirements for independent 
review, not exercise performance (i.e., similar to Sec. 50.54(t)).
    Response. See Commission Response to Issue 30.
    Issue 42. 10 CFR 72.32(a) does not define the term, ``site of a 
nuclear power reactor.'' Does the term mean the owner controlled area, 
the site boundary, or protected area? Based on the definition of the 
term, the regulations could require some licensees that build ISFSI 
near their nuclear power plants but not on the site to have two 
emergency plans established. Consideration should be given to 
clarifying terms in order to avoid this problem especially since 
nuclear power plant emergency plans are substantially more extensive 
than ISFSI emergency plans.
    Response. The Commission agrees. The final regulations states ``not 
located within the exclusion areas as defined in 10 CFR Part 100 of a 
nuclear power reactor.''
    Issue 43. The 10 CFR Part 70 emergency planning requirements 
(Sec. 70.22), which served as the model for the proposed rule, includes 
a provision for relief based on potential radioactive consequences. It 
contains the option of demonstrating that the consequences of an 
accidental release are below certain levels and thereby eliminated the 
need for emergency preparedness. We recommend that a parallel provision 
be included in the proposed rule for the ISFSI. This would enable ISFSI 
with minimal radioactive sources to avoid the substantial costs 
associated with emergency preparedness which would far outweigh the 
negligible benefit to the safety of the public.
    Response. See Commission Response to Issue 40.
    Issue 44. Unfortunately, the public is not very reassured by the 
idea that the only offsite emergency planning that the discussion on 
the MRS cites is that the operators of the facility should have current 
phone numbers of offsite emergency services. Nor is the public very 
reassured that the NRC asserts that the maximum off-site exposure from 
an MRS would be 1 rem. If this were true, there is a legitimate concern 
about being subjected to radiation equivalent to 50 additional chest x-
rays--presumably without any notification or disclosure, let alone 
opportunity to avoid such irradiation. However, it does not seem 
credible that one could gather together the highest concentration of 
radioactivity on the planet and assert that there will be virtually no 
risk of exposure. This overlooks, at the very least, the potential for 
malicious attack on the facility from the air, such as the United 
States has engaged in wiping out ``strategic targets'' in other 
countries.
    Response. A more accurate characterization of the offsite emergency 
planning component for an MRS is as follows: ``(7) Responsibilities. A 
brief description of the responsibilities of licensee personnel should 
an accident occur, including identification of personnel responsible 
for promptly notifying offsite response organizations and the NRC;'' 
and ``(9) Information to be communicated. A brief description of the 
types of information on facility status; radioactive release; and 
recommended protective actions, if necessary, to be given to offsite 
response organizations and to the NRC.'' and ``(10) * * *  special 
instructions and orientation tours the licensee would offer to fire, 
police, medical and other emergency personnel;'' and ``(12) * * * The 
licensee shall invite offsite response organizations to participate in 
the annual exercises.''
    Additionally, the offsite emergency planning component for an MRS 
includes:

    (i) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using offsite 
assistance on site have been made.
    (ii) Provisions exist for prompt communications among principal 
response organizations to offsite emergency personnel who would be 
responding onsite.
    (iv) Adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and 
monitoring actual potential consequence of a radiological emergency 
condition are available.
    (vi) Radiological Emergency Response Training has been made 
available to those offsite who may be called to assist in an 
emergency onsite.
    (16) Arrangements made to provide information to the public.

    Also, see the Commission's response to Issue 46.
    Issue 45. The discussion of MRS emergency planning indicates the 
dependence upon offsite emergency responders. The fact that individuals 
would be called upon to respond to radiological crises without any 
special training, without protective gear and equipment is deeply 
disturbing to local community officials with whom we have reviewed this 
proposal. The full liability for dealing with emergency situations 
should reside with the operators of such a facility and those who are 
specially trained and understand that they are at risk, and are 
compensated on that basis. Dependence upon untrained local responders 
in a true emergency would amount to human sacrifice, and is not 
acceptable.
    Response. The regulations allow for extensive coordination, 
communication, and training of offsite response organizations. (See 
Commission Response to Issue 19.)
    Issue 46. Although the MRS will represent the largest concentration 
of irradiated fuel, to date, in one location, the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission has recently proposed a rule that would waive any 
offsite emergency planning or evacuation, in direct contradiction to 
the promises of safety to prospective host communities.
    Response. In the final NRC Generic Environmental Impact Statement 
on the handling and storage of light water reactor fuel,5 it is 
stated that [[Page 32438]] 

    \5\ NUREG-0575 Vol. 1 sec. 4.2.2 Safety and Accident 
Considerations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    * * * To be a potential radiological hazard to the general 
public, radioactive materials must be released from a facility and 
dispersed offsite. For this to happen:
     The radioactive material must be in a dispersible form
     There must be a mechanism available for the release of 
such materials from the facility, and
     There must be a mechanism available for offsite 
dispersion of such released material.

    Although the inventory of radioactive material contained in 1000 
MTHM of aged spent fuel may be on the order of a billion curies or 
more, very little is available in a dispersible form; there is no 
mechanism available for the release of radioactive materials in 
significant quantities from facility; and the only mechanism available 
for offsite dispersion is atmosphere dispersion * * *.
    Furthermore, NRC has conducted Safety Evaluations on many different 
storage systems. Those studies included evaluations of the effects of 
corrosion, handling accidents such as cask drops and tipovers, 
explosions, fires, floods, earthquakes, and severe weather conditions. 
As documented in each of those Safety Evaluation Reports (SER), NRC was 
not able to identify any design basis accident that would result in the 
failure of a confinement boundary. However, to provide a conservative 
bounding analysis of the threat to the public health and safety, the 
failure of the confinement barrier was postulated. As discussed in each 
of the SERs and again in the response to Issue 48 the consequences of 
this postulated failure do not result in an increased risk to the 
public health and safety.
    In the environmental assessment for 10 CFR part 72,6 the 
accident judged the most severe was the failure of a packaged fuel 
element. In this analysis, the accident involves the failure of a 
storage system containing 1.7 MTHM. The postulated individual doses are 
presented in Table 1.7

    \6\ NUREG-1092 Environmental Assessment for part 72 ``Licensing 
Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel and High-Level Radioactive 
Waste.''
    \7\ NUREG-1092 Table 2.2.4-2

   Table 1.--Total Dose to an Individual as a Result of a Fuel Canister Failure Accident at a Surface Storage   
                                               Installation (mrem)                                              
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Pathway                        Skin           Total body          Thyroid            Lung      
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Submersion..........................  1.0  x  10-1      1.1  x  10-3      1.1  x  10-3      1.1  x  10-3    
Inhalation..............................  ................  1.2  x  10-5      1.1  x  10-2      7.3  x  10-5    
                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------
      Total.............................  1.0  x  10-1      1.1  x  10-3      1.2  x  10-2      1.1  x  10-3    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The maximum individual is defined as a permanent resident at a location 1600 meters southeast of the stack
  with a time-integrated atmospheric dispersion coefficient (E/Q of 1.5  x  10-4 sec/m3). The accident involves 
  failure of a fuel canister containing approximately 1.7 MTHM.                                                 

    Since the time these calculations were performed, the storage 
canisters have increased in capacity, and today the capacity of the 
largest approved design is approximately 9 MTHM. However, because dose 
varies directly with inventory, when the totals are increased by a 
factor of ten, they are still a very small fraction of the 300 mrem/yr 
8 an individual receives from natural background radiation, and is 
below the EPA protective action guides.

    \8\ NRCP Report No. 94.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Also see the Commission's response to Issues 19 and 48.
    Issue 47. It is premature for the Commission to make a rule with 
regard to emergency planning for an MRS. We also agree with others who 
point out [[Page 32439]] that the MRS is a significantly different 
facility than an ISFSI--for two reasons. The first is the difference in 
the amount of irradiated fuel that would be present at the site: it is 
four orders of magnitude greater at an MRS than a single reactor site's 
load. The second is the fact that the MRS, according to the most common 
model described, would be a repackaging center for the waste. This 
industrial scale handling of high-level waste and irradiated fuel 
raises many safety and release concerns.
    Response. See the Commission's response to Issues 18 and 48.
    Issue 48. The commenter believes that the massive concentration of 
irradiated fuel at the reactor sites should have been the occasion for 
revisiting the emergency planning for each nuclear power plant. The 
irradiated fuel inventory on site far exceeds the amount of radioactive 
material contained within the reactor core at any one time. The fact 
that irradiated fuel has been forced to accumulate at reactor sites is 
no reason to now dismiss that greater radiological hazard that it poses 
to the populace and the environment. A rulemaking on the ISFSI in our 
view should include; ``at reactor site facilities'' and examine the 
current emergency planning with regard to the potential for much 
greater releases in the event of sabotage or natural disaster.
    Response. For there to be a significant environmental impact 
resulting from an accident involving the dry storage of spent nuclear 
fuel, a significant amount of the radioactive material contained within 
a cask must escape its packaging and enter the biosphere. There are two 
primary factors that protect the public health and safety from this 
event. The first is the design requirements for the cask that are 
imposed by regulation. The regulatory requirements, as codified in the 
10 CFR part 72, have sufficient safety margins so that, during normal 
storage cask handling operations, off-normal events, adverse 
environmental conditions, and severe natural phenomena, the casks will 
not release a significant part of its inventory to the biosphere. 
Furthermore, the cask must be designed to provide confinement safety 
functions during the unlikely but credible design basis events, as 
required in Sec. 72.122(b). In addition, Sec. 72.122(h)(i) requires 
that the fuel clad be protected against degradation that leads to gross 
rupture, and Sec. 72.122(1) requires that the fuel be retrievable. 
During the design evaluation process, these provisions received careful 
consideration. These general design criteria place an upper bound on 
the energy a cask can absorb before the fuel is damaged. No credible 
dynamic events have been identified that could impart such significant 
amounts of energy to a storage cask after that cask is placed at the 
ISFSI.
    Additionally, there is a second factor which does not rely upon the 
cask itself but considers the age of the spent fuel and the lack of 
dispersal mechanisms. There exists no significant dispersal mechanism 
for the radioactive material contained within a storage cask. In the 
case of an operating nuclear power plant, the dispersal mechanism for 
radioactive material in the spent fuel is either derived from the heat 
produced during the fission process or the decay heat which exists in 
the short period immediately following shutdown. During these times, 
the potential exists for an accident that could cause the fuel cladding 
to fail. However, emergency systems exist at every power plant to 
protect against just such an occurrence. On the other hand, spent fuel 
stored in an ISFSI is required to be cooled for at least 1 year. Based 
on the design limitations, the majority of spent fuel is cooled greater 
than 5 years. At this age, spent fuel has a heat generation rate that 
is too low to cause significant particulate dispersal in the unlikely 
event of a cask confinement boundary failure. Therefore, the 
consequences of worst-case accidents involving an ISFSI located on a 
reactor site would be significantly less than those accidents involving 
the reactor. Therefore, current reactor emergency plans adequately 
provide for the protection of the public from the ISFSI located at or 
near reactor sites.
    Issue 49. An ISFSI not at a reactor warrants site-specific 
emergency planning that includes evacuation of surrounding population 
at least as stringent as nuclear reactor licensing. For example, 
specific provisions should be included requiring: (1) Coordination of 
the on-site plan with the off-site local and state emergency management 
agencies; (2) training of the potential off-site responders; and (3) 
public information/education for local populations.
    Response. The Commission does not agree that as a general matter 
emergency plans for an ISFSI must include evacuation planning. 
Nonetheless the Commission agrees that the specific provisions 
mentioned in the comment should be and are specifically included in the 
proposed and final emergency planning licensing requirements for ISFSI 
and MRS. See 10 CFR 72.32(a) (10), (12), (14), and (16) and 10 CFR 
72.32(b) (10), (12), (14), (15), and (16).
    Issue 50. There is no mention of financing the affected 
jurisdictions to provide the requisite resources to support the 
planning, operations, response, exercises, recovery and equipment 
requirements defined as necessary in the plan for off-site agency 
response.
    Response. See the Commission's response to Issue 39.
    Issue 51. The NRC should defer as premature the proposed 
Sec. 72.32(b), which would establish emergency planning requirements 
for MRS's, until a final MRS design has been selected. Until it is 
decided whether such facilities would be equivalent, in the 
Commission's words, to ``a large industrial facility'' or merely to ``a 
warehouse operation,'' there is no rational basis to determine the 
appropriate level of emergency planning requirements.
    Response. See Commission Response to Issue 18.
    Issue 52. NRC should prepare a full environmental impact statement 
before issuing any emergency response guidelines. The potential for 
environmental damage from accidents during the transportation, storage 
and repackaging of spent fuel rods cannot even be calculated until DOE 
determines whether to develop a universal cask or a dual purpose cask 
for transportation/storage/disposal of spent fuel rods. Until this very 
preliminary decision is made, there is no way of determining what level 
of activity (or the dangers from that activity) will actually take 
place at an MRS facility. NRC's response to this uncertainty, ``to 
mandate a minimum level of offsite response capability'' does not 
address potential and very real risks to the public.
    Response. The Commission disagrees. The Commission stated the 
following in the preamble to the proposed rule:

    The Commission has determined under the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, as amended, the Commission's regulations in 
subpart A of 10 CFR part 51, that this rule, if adopted, would not 
be a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment; and therefore, an environmental impact statement 
is not required. The rule would not affect the probability or the 
size of accidental radioactive releases. It might in some cases 
reduce the doses people near the facility site could receive. The 
environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact on 
which this determination is based are available for inspection at 
the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW. (Lower Level), 
Washington, DC. The environmental assessment and finding of no 
significant impact are contained in Section 4.3 of NUREG-1140, ``A 
Regulatory Analysis on Emergency Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and 
[[Page 32440]] Other Radioactive Material Licensees.'' 9 Single 
copies are available upon written request from NRC Distribution 
Section, Office of Administration, USNRC, Washington, DC 20555.

    \9\ Copies of NUREGs may be purchased from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Mail Stop SSOP, 
Washington, DC 20402-9328. Copies are also available from the 
National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, 
Springfield, VA 22161. A copy is also available for inspection and 
copying for a fee in the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, 
NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC 20555-0001.
    Issue 53. An MRS facility poses far greater potential risk to the 
public than even a nuclear power plant simply by virtue of the quantity 
of spent fuel rods to be stored. For example, a nuclear power plant 
stores no more than 1 metric ton of spent fuel while the MRS facility 
is authorized to store from 10,000 to 15,000 metric tons of spent fuel. 
Therefore, licensing procedures and requirements for an MRS facility 
must be more strict than even those required for a nuclear power plant.
    Response. See the Commission's Response to Issue 48.
    Issue 54. The NRC must require off-site evacuation planning for MRS 
facilities. NRC estimates that ``the maximum dose to a member of the 
public offsite due to an accidental release of radioactive materials 
would likely not exceed 1 rem effective dose equivalent'' cannot be 
defended because of the uncertainties. Without an EIS, NRC must at a 
minimum assume that an MRS facility poses an equal danger to the public 
as a nuclear reactor does. CCNS therefore recommends that NRC minimally 
require a 10-mile radius evacuation plan for MRS facilities.
    Response. See the Commission's Response to Issue 48.
    Issue 55. The NRC's requirement to ``notify offsite response 
organizations and request offsite assistance, including medical 
assistance for the treatment of contaminated injured onsite workers'' 
is completely unrealistic. The current applicants for MRS facilities 
are all Indian Nations whose reservations are located in rural areas 
with no emergency response training, equipment or expertise for 
handling nuclear emergencies. At a minimum, NRC's proposed rule must 
require training and equipment for both emergency response personnel as 
well as hospital facilities.
    Response. See the Commission's Response to Issue 19.
    Additionally, the Commission received 21 suggested editorial 
changes to the wording of the proposed regulations. Those changes that 
improved or clarified the proposed regulations were incorporated into 
the final regulations. Those suggested changes in wording that departed 
from the Commission's original intent were not incorporated into the 
final regulations.

Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability

    The Commission has determined under the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, as amended, the Commission's regulations in subpart 
A of 10 CFR part 51, that this rule is not a major Federal action 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment and 
therefore, an environmental impact statement is not required. The rule 
does not affect the probability or the size of accidental radioactive 
releases. It might in some cases reduce the doses people near the 
facility site could receive. The environmental assessment and finding 
of no significant impact on which this determination is based are 
available for inspection at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L 
Street, NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. The environmental assessment 
and finding of no significant impact are contained in 4.3 of NUREG-
1140, ``A Regulatory Analysis on Emergency Preparedness for Fuel Cycle 
and Other Radioactive Material Licensees.''

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

    This final rule amends information collection requirements that are 
subject to the Paperwork Reduction Action 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et 
seq.). These requirements were approved by the Office of Management and 
Budget approval number 3150-0132.
    Public reporting burden for this collection of information is 
estimated to average 625 hours per response, including the time for 
reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and 
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the 
collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate 
or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for further reducing reporting burden to the Information 
and Records Management Branch, T-6F33, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and to the Desk Officer, Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0132), Office 
of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

Regulatory Analysis

    The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis on this final 
regulation. The analysis examines the accident scenarios considered by 
the Commission as well as the costs and benefits of actions considered. 
The analysis is available by contacting Michael T. Jamgochian, Office 
of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555, Telephone (301-415-6534).
Regulatory Flexibility Certification

    As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 
6059b), the Commission certifies that this rule does not have a 
significant economic impact upon a substantial number of small 
entities.
    The final rule requires the development and implementation of 
emergency plans by licensees who are authorized to possess significant 
amounts of radioactive material. These companies do not fall within the 
definition of a small business found in the Small Business Act, 15 
U.S.C. 632, or within the small business size standards set forth in 13 
CFR part 121. The final rule will affect three (3) licensees. Two 
licensees hold 10 CFR part 50 licenses and are required to comply with 
the provisions respecting emergency plans set out in part 50. Thus, the 
final rule does not impose a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities, as defined in the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act of 1980.

Backfit Analysis

    The NRC has determined that the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109 and 10 
CFR 72.62, do not apply to this rule change because these amendments do 
not involve any provisions which would impose backfits as defined in 
Sec. 50.109(a)(1) or in 10 CFR 72.62. The final rule does not change or 
impose additional requirements on any ISFSI currently licensed under 10 
CFR part 72. For existing ISFSIs at reactor sites, the final rule 
continues the current option to comply with 10 CFR 50.47. For G.E. 
Morris, the only ISFSI licensed under 10 CFR part 72 for operation away 
from a reactor site, the licensee currently is required to have 
emergency response capabilities that will comply with this rule. 
Therefore, inasmuch as the rule imposes no requirements on any part 50 
facility and imposes no new or different requirements on any part 72 
facility after a license has been issued, a backfit analysis is, 
therefore, not required for this final rule.

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 72

    Manpower training programs, Nuclear materials, Occupational safety 
and health, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security 
measures, Spent fuel.

     [[Page 32441]] For the reasons set out in the preamble, and under 
the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy 
Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C 552, and 553, the 
NRC is adopting the following amendments to 10 CFR part 72:

PART 72--LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF 
SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE

    1. The authority citation for part 72 is revised to read as 
follows:

    Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 57, 62, 63, 65, 69, 81, 161, 182, 183, 
184, 186, 187, 189, 68 Stat. 929, 930, 932, 933, 934, 935, 948, 953, 
954, 955, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 
2071, 2073, 2077, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2099, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233, 
2234, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2282); sec. 274, Pub. L. 86-373, 73 Stat. 
688, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2021); sec. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88 
Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846); 
Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 295 as amended by Pub. L. 102-486, 
sec 7902, 106 Stat. 3123 (42 U.S.W. 5851); sec. 102, Pub. L. 91-190, 
83 Stat. (42 U.S.C. 4332); secs. 131, 132, 133, 135, 137, 141, Pub. 
L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2229, 2230, 2232, 2241, sec. 148, Pub. L. 100-
203, 101 Stat. 1330-235 (42 U.S.C. 10151, 10152, 10153, 10155, 
10157, 10161, 10168).
    Section 72.44(g) also issued under secs. 142(b) and 148(c), (d), 
Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-232, 1330-236 (42 U.S.C. 10162(b), 
10168(c), (d). Section 72.46 also issued under sec. 189, 68 Stat. 
935 (42 U.S.C. 2239); sec. 134, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2230 (42 
U.S.C. 10154). Section 72.96(d) also issued under sec. 145(g), Pub. 
L. 100-203; 101 Stat. 1330-235 (42 U.S.C. 10165(g)). Subpart J also 
issued under secs. 2(2), 2(15), 2(19), 117(a), 141(h), Pub. L. 97-
425, 96 Stat. 2202, 2203, 2204, 2222, 2244 (42 U.S.C. 10101, 
10137(a), 10161(h). Subparts K and L are also issued under sec. 133, 
96 Stat. 2230 (42 U.S.C. 10153) and 218(a), 96 Stat. 2252 (42 U.S.C. 
10198).

    2. Section 72.32 is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 72.32  Emergency Plan.

    (a) Each application for an ISFSI that is licensed under this part 
which is: Not located on the site of a nuclear power reactor, or not 
located within the exclusion area as defined in 10 CFR part 100 of a 
nuclear power reactor, or located on the site of a nuclear power 
reactor which does not have an operating license, or located on the 
site of a nuclear power reactor that is not authorized to operate must 
be accompanied by an Emergency Plan that includes the following 
information:
    (1) Facility description. A brief description of the licensee's 
facility and area near the site.
    (2) Types of accidents. An identification of each type of 
radioactive materials accident.
    (3) Classification of accidents. A classification system for 
classifying accidents as ``alerts.''
    (4) Detection of accidents. Identification of the means of 
detecting an accident condition.
    (5) Mitigation of consequences. A brief description of the means of 
mitigating the consequences of each type of accident, including those 
provided to protect workers onsite, and a description of the program 
for maintaining the equipment.
    (6) Assessment of releases. A brief description of the methods and 
equipment to assess releases of radioactive materials.
    (7) Responsibilities. A brief description of the responsibilities 
of licensee personnel should an accident occur, including 
identification of personnel responsible for promptly notifying offsite 
response organizations and the NRC; also responsibilities for 
developing, maintaining, and updating the plan.
    (8) Notification and coordination. A commitment to and a brief 
description of the means to promptly notify offsite response 
organizations and request offsite assistance, including medical 
assistance for the treatment of contaminated injured onsite workers 
when appropriate. A control point must be established. The notification 
and coordination must be planned so that unavailability of some 
personnel, parts of the facility, and some equipment will not prevent 
the notification and coordination. The licensee shall also commit to 
notify the NRC operations center immediately after notifications of the 
appropriate offsite response organizations and not later than one hour 
after the licensee declares an emergency.10

    \10\ These reporting requirements do not supersede or release 
licensees of complying with the requirements under the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Title III, Pub. L. 
99-499 or other State or Federal reporting requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (9) Information to be communicated. A brief description of the 
types of information on facility status; radioactive releases; and 
recommended protective actions, if necessary, to be given to offsite 
response organizations and to the NRC.
    (10) Training. A brief description of the training the licensee 
will provide workers on how to respond to an emergency and any special 
instructions and orientation tours the licensee would offer to fire, 
police, medical and other emergency personnel.
    (11) Safe condition. A brief description of the means of restoring 
the facility to a safe condition after an accident.
    (12) Exercises. (i) Provisions for conducting semiannual 
communications checks with offsite response organizations and biennial 
onsite exercises to test response to simulated emergencies. 
Radiological/Health Physics, Medical, and Fire drills shall be 
conducted annually. Semiannual communications checks with offsite 
response organizations must include the check and update of all 
necessary telephone numbers. The licensee shall invite offsite response 
organizations to participate in the biennial exercise.
    (ii) Participation of offsite response organizations in biennial 
exercises, although recommended, is not required. Exercises must use 
scenarios not known to most exercise participants. The licensee shall 
critique each exercise using individuals not having direct 
implementation responsibility for conducting the exercise. Critiques of 
exercises must evaluate the appropriateness of the plan, emergency 
procedures, facilities, equipment, training of personnel, and overall 
effectiveness of the response. Deficiencies found by the critiques must 
be corrected.
    (13) Hazardous chemicals. A certification that the applicant has 
met its responsibilities under the Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Title III, Pub. L. 99-499, with respect to 
hazardous materials at the facility.
    (14) Comments on Plan. The licensee shall allow the offsite 
response organizations expected to respond in case of an accident 60 
days to comment on the initial submittal of the licensee's emergency 
plan before submitting it to NRC. Subsequent plan changes need not have 
the offsite comment period unless the plan changes affect the offsite 
response organizations. The licensee shall provide any comments 
received within the 60 days to the NRC with the emergency plan.
    (15) Offsite assistance. The applicant's emergency plans shall 
include a brief description of the arrangements made for requesting and 
effectively using offsite assistance on site and provisions that exist 
for using other organizations capable of augmenting the planned onsite 
response.
    (16) Arrangements made for providing information to the public.
    (b) Each application for an MRS that is licensed under this part 
and each application for an ISFSI that is licensed [[Page 32442]] under 
this part and that may process and/or repackage spent fuel, must be 
accompanied by an Emergency Plan that includes the following 
information:
    (1) Facility description. A brief description of the licensee 
facility and area near the site.
    (2) Types of accidents. An identification of each type of 
radioactive materials accident.
    (3) Classification of accidents. A classification system for 
classifying accidents as ``alerts'' or ``site area emergencies.''
    (4) Detection of accidents. Identification of the means of 
detecting an accident condition.
    (5) Mitigation of consequences. A brief description of the means of 
mitigating the consequences of each type of accident, including those 
provided to protect workers on site, and a description of the program 
for maintaining the equipment.
    (6) Assessment of releases. A brief description of the methods and 
equipment to assess releases of radioactive materials.
    (7) Responsibilities. A brief description of the responsibilities 
of licensee personnel should an accident occur, including 
identification of personnel responsible for promptly notifying offsite 
response organizations and the NRC; also responsibilities for 
developing, maintaining, and updating the plan.
    (8) Notification and coordination. A commitment to and a brief 
description of the means to promptly notify offsite response 
organizations and request offsite assistance, including medical 
assistance for the treatment of contaminated injured onsite workers 
when appropriate. A control point must be established. The notification 
and coordination must be planned so that unavailability of some 
personnel, parts of the facility, and some equipment will not prevent 
the notification and coordination. The licensee shall also commit to 
notify the NRC operations center immediately after notifications of the 
appropriate offsite response organizations and not later than one hour 
after the licensee declares an emergency.11

    \11\ These reporting requirements do not supersede or release 
licensees of complying with the requirements under the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Title III, Pub. L. 
99-499 or other State or Federal reporting requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (9) Information to be communicated. A brief description of the 
types of information on facility status; radioactive releases; and 
recommended protective actions, if necessary, to be given to offsite 
response organizations and to the NRC.
    (10) Training. A brief description of the training the licensee 
will provide workers on how to respond to an emergency and any special 
instructions and orientation tours the licensee would offer to fire, 
police, medical and other emergency personnel.
    (11) Safe condition. A brief description of the means of restoring 
the facility to a safe condition after an accident.
    (12) Exercises. (i) Provisions for conducting quarterly 
communications checks with offsite response organizations and biennial 
onsite exercises to test response to simulated emergencies. 
Radiological/Health Physics, Medical, and Fire Drills shall be held 
semiannually. Quarterly communications checks with offsite response 
organizations must include the check and update of all necessary 
telephone numbers. The licensee shall invite offsite response 
organizations to participate in the biennial exercises.
    (ii) Participation of offsite response organizations in the 
biennial exercises, although recommended, is not required. Exercises 
must use scenarios not known to most exercise participants. The 
licensee shall critique each exercise using individuals not having 
direct implementation responsibility for conducting the exercise. 
Critiques of exercises must evaluate the appropriateness of the plan, 
emergency procedures, facilities, equipment, training of personnel, and 
overall effectiveness of the response. Deficiencies found by the 
critiques must be corrected.
    (13) Hazardous chemicals. A certification that the applicant has 
met its responsibilities under the Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Title III, Pub. L. 99-499, with respect to 
hazardous materials at the facility.
    (14) Comments on Plan. The licensee shall allow the offsite 
response organizations expected to respond in case of an accident 60 
days to comment on the initial submittal of the licensee's emergency 
plan before submitting it to NRC. Subsequent plan changes need not have 
the offsite comment period unless the plan changes affect the offsite 
response organizations. The licensee shall provide any comments 
received within the 60 days to the NRC with the emergency plan.
    (15) Offsite assistance. The applicant's emergency plans shall 
include the following:
    (i) A brief description of the arrangements made for requesting and 
effectively using offsite assistance on site and provisions that exist 
for using other organizations capable of augmenting the planned onsite 
response.
    (ii) Provisions that exist for prompt communications among 
principal response organizations to offsite emergency personnel who 
would be responding onsite.
    (iii) Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the 
emergency response onsite are provided and maintained.
    (iv) Adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and 
monitoring actual or potential consequences of a radiological emergency 
condition are available.
    (v) Arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated and 
injured onsite individuals.
    (vi) Radiological Emergency Response Training has been made 
available to those offsite who may be called to assist in an emergency 
onsite.
    (16) Arrangements made for providing information to the public.
    (c) For an ISFSI that is:
    (1) located on the site, or
    (2) located within the exclusion area as defined in 10 CFR part 
100, of a nuclear power reactor licensed for operation by the 
Commission, the emergency plan required by 10 CFR 50.47 shall be deemed 
to satisfy the requirements of this section.
    (d) A licensee with a license issued under this part may take 
reasonable action that departs from a license condition or a technical 
specification (contained in a license issued under this part) in an 
emergency when this action is immediately needed to protect the public 
health and safety and no action consistent with license conditions and 
technical specifications that can provide adequate or equivalent 
protection is immediately apparent.

    Dated at Rockville, MD, this 16th day of June 1995.

    For the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Andrew L. Bates,
Acting Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 95-15285 Filed 6-21-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P