[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 114 (Wednesday, June 14, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 31290-31296]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-14544]



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[[Page 31291]]


DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental 
Impact Statement

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of intent.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) announces its intent to prepare 
a Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental 
Impact Statement (SSM PEIS). The end of the Cold War has brought about 
significant changes in the requirements for the nation's nuclear 
deterrent, including substantial reductions in the nuclear weapons 
stockpile. To fulfill its responsibilities for ensuring the safety and 
reliability of the stockpile without underground nuclear testing, DOE 
proposes the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program.
    Stockpile Stewardship includes activities required to maintain a 
high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear 
weapons in the absence of underground nuclear testing, and to be 
prepared to resume nuclear testing if so directed by the President. 
Stockpile Management activities include dismantlement, maintenance, 
evaluation, and repair or replacement of weapons and their components 
in the existing stockpile.
    This Notice of Intent, the initial step in the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, informs the public of the PEIS 
proposal, announces the schedule for scoping meetings, and solicits 
public input. Following the scoping period, the Department will prepare 
and issue an Implementation Plan (IP) to describe the scope of the 
PEIS, the alternatives that will be analyzed, and the schedule for 
completing the PEIS.

DATES: Comments on the proposed scope of the SSM PEIS are invited from 
the public. To ensure consideration in the preparation of the IP, 
comments must be postmarked by August 11, 1995. Late comments will be 
considered to the extent practicable. DOE will hold interactive public 
scoping meetings at sites that may be affected by the proposed action 
to discuss issues and receive oral and written comments on the scope of 
the PEIS. These meetings will provide the public with an opportunity to 
present comments, ask questions, and discuss concerns with DOE 
officials regarding SSM activities. The locations, dates, and times for 
these public meetings are included in the Supplementary Information 
section of this notice, and will be announced by additional appropriate 
means.
    The Department is also requesting federal agencies that desire to 
be designated as cooperating agencies on the SSM PEIS to contact the 
Office of Reconfiguration at the address listed below by August 11, 
1995.

ADDRESSES: General questions concerning the SSM program can be asked by 
calling the toll-free telephone number at 1-800-776-2765, or by writing 
to: Stephen M. Sohinki, Director, Office of Reconfiguration, U.S. 
Department of Energy, P.O. Box 3417, Alexandria, VA 22302.
    As an alternative, comments can also be submitted electronically by 
using the Federal Information Exchange bulletin board and following the 
instructions listed below:

Modem: Dial Toll Free (800) 783-3349. Local (301) 258-0953. (Modem 
parameters set at: '8' data bits, '1' stop bit and 'N' parity at 1200, 
2400 or 9600 baud.)
InterNet: Telnet or Gopher to: fedix.fie.com or 192.111.228.33
Hours: Available 24 hours a day. A Help Line, (301) 975-0103, is 
available weekdays between 8:30 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. EST, except Federal 
holidays.
Costs: Free, no cost to users. No telephone, registration, access, or 
downloading fees.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general information on the DOE 
NEPA process, please contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of 
NEPA Policy and Assistance, EH-42, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 
Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4600 or 1-800-
472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    In January 1991, the then-Secretary of Energy announced that the 
Department would prepare a PEIS examining alternatives for the 
reconfiguration of the Department's nuclear weapons complex (the 
Complex). The framework for the Reconfiguration PEIS was described in 
the January 1991 Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Study 
(Reconfiguration Study), a detailed examination of alternatives for the 
future Complex. Because of significant changes in the world since 
January 1991, especially with regard to projected future requirements 
for the United States' nuclear weapons stockpile, the Department 
concluded in October 1994 that the framework described in the 
Reconfiguration Study no longer fit current circumstances or supported 
any realistic proposal for reconfiguration of the Complex (59 FR 54175, 
October 28, 1994). Contributing factors to that conclusion included 
public comments at the September-October 1993 Reconfiguration PEIS 
scoping meetings, the fact that no production of new nuclear weapons 
types was required for the foreseeable future, budget constraints, and 
the Department's decision to prepare a separate PEIS on Storage and 
Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Nuclear Materials (Notice of 
Intent published June 21, 1994, 59 FR 17344).
    As a result of these changed circumstances, the Department 
separated the previously planned Reconfiguration PEIS into two new 
PEISs: (1) a Tritium Supply and Recycling PEIS; and (2) a Stockpile 
Stewardship and Management PEIS. The Draft PEIS for Tritium Supply and 
Recycling was issued in March 1995 (60 FR 14433, March 17, 1995), 
public hearings were held in April 1995, and a Final PEIS for Tritium 
Supply and Recycling is expected in October 1995.
    With regard to the SSM PEIS, during the past six months the 
Department has been developing the new framework to support the SSM 
program. That resulting framework, described in a DOE report entitled 
``The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program'' (May 1995), is 
available on the Internet under DOE's Home Page for Defense Programs 
(www.dp.doe.gov). That document was mailed to individuals who had 
previously requested information on the SSM program. Other individuals 
who would like to receive that document can contact the Office of 
Reconfiguration at the address listed above or by calling the program's 
toll free number at 1-800-776-2765.
    On May 19, 1995, the Department held a pre-scoping workshop with 
interested members of the public to discuss the framework of the SSM 
program and the information contained in ``The Stockpile Stewardship 
and Management Program''. While a wide range of specific issues were 
discussed during that meeting, general concerns centered on: Future 
stockpile planning, including the basis for selecting the baseline 
stockpile size of the future; whether the Department would evaluate a 
range of stockpile sizes in the PEIS; the relationship between the SSM 
PEIS and the Department's other Programmatic and Site-Wide EISs; and 
whether the Department would evaluate underground nuclear testing in 
the PEIS. Comments received from that pre-scoping workshop have been 
taken into account in developing this NOI.
    Purpose and Need for the SSM Program. Under the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954, as amended (42 USC 2011 et seq.), DOE is charged with 
providing 

[[Page 31292]]
nuclear weapons to support the United States' nuclear deterrent policy. 
The mission of the DOE nuclear weapons complex is to provide the nation 
with safe and reliable nuclear weapons and components so that an 
effective nuclear deterrent can be maintained into the foreseeable 
future, and to accomplish this in a way that protects the environment 
and the health and safety of workers and the public.
    Recent changes in national security needs have necessitated 
corresponding changes in the way the Department must meet its 
responsibilities regarding the nation's nuclear weapons. As a result of 
international arms-control agreements (the START I treaty and the START 
II protocol) and unilateral decisions by the United States, the 
nation's stockpile will be significantly reduced by the year 2003. 
Consequently, the nation has halted the development of new nuclear 
weapons, has begun closing portions of the Complex, and is considering 
further consolidation or downsizing of the remaining elements in the 
Complex. In addition, the nation is observing a moratorium on nuclear 
testing and is pursuing a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
    However, international dangers remain and, as the President has 
emphasized, nuclear deterrence will continue to be a cornerstone of the 
United States' national security policy. Thus, the Department's 
responsibilities for ensuring the safety and reliability of the 
nation's nuclear weapons stockpile will also continue for the 
foreseeable future.
    Because of the moratorium on nuclear testing, the termination of 
new nuclear weapons development and production, and the closure of 
several production facilities, a new approach to ensure confidence in 
the stockpile is needed. In announcing the indefinite extension of the 
nuclear testing moratorium (July 1993), President Clinton reaffirmed 
the importance of maintaining confidence in the enduring United States 
nuclear stockpile and the need to ensure that the nation's nuclear 
deterrent remains unquestioned during a test ban. By Presidential 
Decision Directive and Act of Congress (Pub. L. 103-160), the 
Department of Energy was directed to establish a stewardship program to 
ensure the preservation of the core intellectual and technical 
competencies of the United States in nuclear weapons in the absence of 
nuclear testing.
    Without nuclear testing, this new approach must rely on scientific 
understanding and expert judgment to predict, identify, and correct 
problems affecting the safety and reliability of the stockpile. This 
program is essential if the nation is to properly safeguard its nuclear 
weapons and maintain an unquestioned nuclear deterrent.
    The SSM program is being developed to meet the challenges involved 
in ensuring the safety and reliability of the stockpile. Three 
particular challenges must be met:
     Fully supporting, at all times, the nation's nuclear 
deterrent with safe and reliable nuclear weapons, while transforming 
the nuclear weapons complex (laboratories and production facilities) to 
one that is more appropriate for the smaller stockpile.
     Preserving the core intellectual and technical 
competencies of the weapons laboratories. Without nuclear testing, 
confidence in the nation's nuclear deterrent will depend largely on the 
continued competency of the people who must make the scientific and 
technical judgments related to the safety and reliability of nuclear 
weapons.
     Ensuring that the activities needed to maintain the 
nation's nuclear deterrent are consistent with the nation's arms-
control and nonproliferation objectives.
    DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex: The current DOE nuclear weapons 
complex consists of 8 major facilities located in 7 states. Currently, 
the Complex maintains a limited capability to design and manufacture 
nuclear weapons; provides surveillance of and maintains nuclear weapons 
in the stockpile; and retires and disposes of nuclear weapons. Major 
facilities and their primary responsibilities within the Complex are 
listed below:
    Pantex Plant (Amarillo, Texas)--Dismantles retired weapons; 
fabricates high explosives components; assembles high explosives, 
nuclear components, and nonnuclear components into nuclear weapons; 
repairs and modifies weapons; evaluates and performs nonnuclear testing 
of nuclear weapons.
    Savannah River Site (SRS) (Aiken, South Carolina)--Tritium loading/
unloading and surveillance of tritium reservoirs.
    Y-12 Plant (Oak Ridge, Tennessee)--Maintains the capability to 
produce and assemble uranium and lithium components; recovers uranium 
and lithium materials from the component fabrication process and 
retired weapons; produces nonnuclear weapon components.
    Kansas City Plant (KCP) (Kansas City, Missouri)--Manufactures 
nonnuclear weapons components.
    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) (Livermore, 
California)--Conducts research and development of nuclear weapons; 
designs and tests advanced technology concepts; maintains a weapons 
design program; maintains a limited capability to fabricate plutonium 
components; provides safety and reliability assessments of the 
stockpile.
    Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) (Los Alamos, New Mexico)--
Conducts research and development of nuclear weapons; designs and tests 
advanced technology concepts; maintains a weapons design program; 
maintains a limited capability to fabricate plutonium components; 
provides safety and reliability assessments of the stockpile.
    Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) (Albuquerque, New Mexico)--
Conducts system engineering of nuclear weapons; designs and develops 
nonnuclear components; conducts field and laboratory nonnuclear 
testing; manufactures nonnuclear weapons components; and provides 
safety and reliability assessments of the stockpile.
    Nevada Test Site (NTS) (Las Vegas, Nevada)--Maintains capability to 
conduct underground nuclear testing and nonnuclear experiments.
    SSM Program Foundational Framework. In the SSM program and SSM 
PEIS, DOE will:
     Emphasize compliance with applicable laws and regulations, 
and accepted practices regarding industrial and weapons safety; 
safeguarding the health of Complex workers and the general public; 
protecting the environment; and ensuring the security of nuclear 
materials and weapons components.
     Safely and reliably maintain the nuclear weapons stockpile 
as directed by the President and mandated by Congress.
     Analyze alternatives for configuration of the nuclear 
weapons complex that are reflective of, and consistent with, policy 
direction from the Nuclear Posture Review.
     Maximize efficiency and minimize costs associated with the 
maintenance of the weapons stockpile.
     Maximize the transfer of nonnuclear materials production 
activities to the private sector.
     Maintain core intellectual and technical competencies in 
nuclear weapons.
     Sustain confidence in safety and reliability of the 
stockpile in the absence of underground nuclear testing.
     Minimize the use of hazardous materials and the number and 
volume of waste streams.
    PEIS Decisions. In addition to the PEIS, supporting cost, 
technical, and schedule studies will be prepared for the SSM program. 
The PEIS and these other studies will be balanced with 

[[Page 31293]]
policy and strategic objectives to support the Record of Decision 
(ROD). The ROD will:
     Identify the future missions of the SSM program; and
     Determine the configuration (facility locations) of the 
nuclear weapons complex to accomplish the SSM program missions.
    Project-specific NEPA documents will be prepared as necessary to 
implement any programmatic alternatives chosen in the ROD.
    An analysis of the sensitivity of the proposed SSM program 
configuration to a range of hypothetical stockpile sizes will also be 
performed. DOE expects to use the stockpile size consistent with the 
START II protocol (approximately 3,500 weapons) as the baseline for the 
PEIS analysis since this is the current planning guidance for the 
Department and is consistent with the recently completed Nuclear 
Posture Review. Upper and lower excursion cases are also expected to be 
analyzed.

The SSM Program

    Stockpile Management. Stockpile Management activities include 
dismantlement, maintenance, evaluation, and repair or replacement of 
weapons and weapons components in the existing stockpile. In the past, 
a large weapons production complex provided the capability and capacity 
to rapidly fix any problems found in the stockpile. However, the 
existing production complex may be inefficient and ineffective for a 
much smaller stockpile. Therefore, one of the primary goals of the 
Stockpile Management proposal will be to downsize and/or consolidate 
functions to provide an effective and efficient production capability 
for the smaller stockpile. The capabilities needed by the Department to 
carry out its Stockpile Management responsibilities are described 
below:
    Weapons Assembly/Disassembly. Provides the capability to: dismantle 
retired weapons; assemble high explosives, nuclear components, and 
nonnuclear components into nuclear weapons; repair and modify weapons; 
perform weapons surveillance; and store strategic reserves of nuclear 
components (pits and secondaries).
    Nonnuclear Components. Provides the capability to: fabricate 
nonnuclear components and perform nonnuclear component surveillance.
    Nuclear Components. Provides the capability to: fabricate nuclear 
components; perform nuclear component surveillance; stage and store 
nuclear materials and components. Alternatives will be assessed for:
    Pit Reuse (minor). Nonintrusive modification and recertification of 
existing pits.
    Replacement Pit Fabrication and Reuse (major). Fabrication of 
replacement pits and/or intrusive modification and recertification of 
existing pits.
    Secondaries and Cases. Fabrication of replacement secondaries and 
cases.
    High Explosives. Provides the capability to fabricate high 
explosives components and perform high explosives component 
surveillance.
    Stockpile Stewardship. Stockpile Stewardship includes activities 
required to maintain a high level of confidence in the safety and 
reliability of nuclear weapons in the absence of underground nuclear 
testing, and to be prepared to resume testing if so directed by the 
President. While the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile is currently 
judged to be safe, secure, and reliable, the average age of the 
stockpile has never significantly exceeded the current age of 12 to 13 
years. Furthermore, very few data exist for weapons older than 25 
years. Because the Department cannot predict with certainty when age-
related changes affecting weapon safety or reliability will occur, a 
conservative assumption would be that problems will arise more 
frequently as the weapons age beyond their original 20- to 25-year 
design lifetimes.
    Historically, nuclear testing has provided unambiguous confidence 
in the safety and performance of weapons in the stockpile. Without 
underground nuclear testing, the Department must rely on experimental 
and computational capabilities, especially in weapons physics, to 
predict the consequences of the complex problems that are likely to 
occur in an aging stockpile.
    Enhanced aboveground experimental and computational capabilities 
are needed to assess and predict the consequences of these problems. An 
improved science-based program with enhanced experimental and 
computational capabilities is necessary to maintain confidence in the 
safety and reliability of the nation's stockpile without nuclear 
testing. This program must be of sufficient technical challenge to 
attract the high-quality scientific and technical talent needed for 
future stewardship of the stockpile.
    Substantial advances in experimental and computational capabilities 
are needed to fill in those areas of nuclear weapon science that are 
incomplete, particularly gaps in our understanding of physics and gaps 
in the data needed for computational simulations of weapons performance 
and model-based assessments of safety and reliability. Upgraded or new 
experimental capabilities are required to validate improved or new 
computational models.
    Without these enhanced capabilities, the Department will lack the 
ability to evaluate some safety and reliability issues, which could 
significantly affect the stockpile. It is also possible that, without 
these enhanced capabilities, the Department would not be able to 
certify the acceptability of weapons components that had been repaired 
or modified to address future safety or reliability issues.
    The capabilities needed by the Department to carry out its 
Stockpile Stewardship responsibilities are described below, along with 
a brief description of proposed facilities for each capability.
    Primary Physics Issues. The study of issues related to the safety 
and reliability of the primary portion of nuclear weapons. Issues 
include physics validation, material behavior, improved understanding 
of implosion, and ability to assess age-related defects. The facilities 
proposed or under consideration are:
    Contained Firing Facility. An addition to the Flash X-Ray 
hydrodynamic test facility at LLNL, this facility would provide 
hydrodynamic test capabilities and new diagnostics for improved studies 
of the behavior of weapons material. The PEIS will contain a full 
evaluation for site-specific construction and operational impacts.
    Advanced Hydrotest Facility. If proposed, this facility would 
provide up to eight radiographic views of the primary's implosion 
symmetry. In the longer term, this facility may be essential for 
assuring weapon reliability and safety without nuclear testing.
    Secondary Physics Issues. The study of issues related to the safety 
and reliability of the secondary portion of nuclear weapons. Issues 
include physics validation, material behavior, improved understanding 
of thermonuclear ignition, and ability to assess age-related defects. 
Some of these facilities may also investigate physics phenomena that 
relate to primaries. The facilities proposed or under consideration 
are:
    National Ignition Facility (NIF). This facility would make it 
possible in the laboratory, for the first time ever, to study radiation 
physics in a regime close to that of nuclear weapon detonations. The 
PEIS will contain a full evaluation for site selection, and for site-
specific construction and operational impacts.
    High Explosive Pulsed-Power Facility (HEPPF). If proposed, the 
HEPPF would provide experimental capabilities for 

[[Page 31294]]
studying secondary physics issues at shock pressures and velocities 
approaching those of actual weapon conditions.
    Atlas Facility. The Atlas Facility at LANL would be used for 
hydrodynamic experiments to resolve issues related to boost-gas mixing 
and other primary physics, and improving the predictive capabilities 
related to the aging, reliability, and performance of secondaries. The 
facility builds on special existing equipment at LANL. The PEIS will 
contain a full evaluation for site-specific construction and 
operational impacts.
    X-Ray Hardness. The study of radiation-effects science and 
materials certification. The facility under consideration is:
    Jupiter Facility. If proposed, Jupiter would provide an x-ray 
environment to enhance the ability to certify that critical weapon 
components meet military requirements for x-ray hardness.
    Computational Capabilities. To handle simulations of weapon 
performance and assessments of weapons safety without underground 
nuclear testing, improved computational capabilities are needed. 
However, because there are not expected to be any environmental impacts 
from this activity, the PEIS is not expected to provide any assessment 
of these capabilities.
    PEIS Alternatives. Preliminary Stockpile Management and Stockpile 
Stewardship alternatives have been developed for public comment and are 
described below.
    Stockpile Management. The PEIS will assess the alternatives for 
conducting the Stockpile Management mission. Based upon the 
capabilities and facilities that already exist in the Complex, no major 
new production facilities are currently proposed. Instead, the PEIS 
will evaluate upgrading and/or downsizing facilities at the sites where 
the Stockpile Management capabilities are currently located, as well as 
transferring the functions to other sites which have existing 
facilities that could be modified to perform the capability. Based upon 
an evaluation of the existing capabilities and facilities at the sites 
in the Complex, the following matrix of proposed alternatives has been 
developed for Stockpile Management:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                         Site alternatives                                              
               Capability                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                               KCP          LANL          LLNL           NTS          Y-12           PX            SNL           SRS    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weapons assembly/disassembly............  ............  ............  ............            X   ............            X   ............  ............
Nonnuclear components...................            X             X             X   ............  ............  ............            X   ............
Nuclear components:                                                                                                                                     
    --Pit reuse (minor).................  ............            X   ............            X   ............            X   ............            X 
    --Replacement pit fabrication and                                                                                                                   
     reuse (major)......................  ............            X   ............  ............  ............  ............  ............            X 
    --Secondaries and cases.............  ............            X             X   ............            X   ............  ............  ............
High explosives components..............  ............            X             X   ............  ............            X   ............  ............
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the PEIS will also evaluate the no action alternative. 
For Stockpile Management, no action is described by the following 
matrix:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                               Sites                                                    
               Capability                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                               KCP          LANL          LLNL           NTS          Y-12           PX            SNL           SRS    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weapons assembly/disassembly............  ............  ............  ............  ............  ............            X   ............  ............
Nonnuclear components...................            X             X   ............  ............  ............  ............            X   ............
Nuclear components:                                                                                                                                     
    --Replacement pit fabrication and                                                                                                                   
     reuse (major)......................  ............            X             X   ............  ............  ............  ............  ............
    --Secondaries and cases.............  ............  ............  ............  ............            X   ............  ............  ............
High explosives components..............  ............  ............  ............  ............  ............            X   ............  ............
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Stockpile Stewardship. The PEIS will assess the alternatives for 
conducting the Stockpile Stewardship mission. New facilities and 
upgraded facilities that will enable the Department to maintain 
confidence in the safety and reliability of the stockpile in the 
absence of underground nuclear testing will be assessed in the PEIS. 
Because the nuclear weapons testing mission has always been a primary 
responsibility of the weapons laboratories and the NTS, the Department 
does not believe it is reasonable to expand the stockpile stewardship 
mission to other sites. Therefore, only the three weapons laboratories 
(LANL, LLNL, and SNL) and the NTS are expected to be considered for new 
Stockpile Stewardship facilities. This is also consistent with one of 
the Stockpile Stewardship program's main purposes to preserve the core 
intellectual and technical competencies of the weapons laboratories. 
Because there is currently a moratorium on underground nuclear testing, 
and because the nation is pursuing a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the 
Department has not made a decision whether it is reasonable to include 
underground nuclear testing as an alternative in the SSM PEIS to 
fulfill the Stockpile Stewardship mission. Comments on this issue are 
specifically invited during the scoping period.
    The following matrix of proposed alternatives and facilities under 
consideration for proposal has been developed for Stockpile 
Stewardship:

                                                                                                                                                        

[[Page 31295]]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                             Site alternatives                  
         Capability                    Facility          -------------------------------------------------------
                                                              LANL          LLNL           NTS           SNL    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Primary physics issues.....  Contained firing facility..  ............            X   ............  ............
Primary physics issues.....  Advanced hydrotest facility            X             X             X             X 
Secondary physics issues...  National ignition facility.            X             X             X             X 
Secondary physics issues...  High explosive pulsed-power            X             X             X             X 
                              facility.                                                                         
Secondary physics issues...  Atlas facility.............            X   ............  ............  ............
X-Ray hardness.............  Jupiter facility...........            X             X             X             X 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Of these facilities, the Advanced Hydrotest Facility, the High 
Explosive Pulsed-Power Facility, and the Jupiter Facility are under 
consideration for proposal in the SSM PEIS. The Department may elect to 
proceed with only some of the facilities in this matrix.
    The PEIS will also evaluate the no action alternative of not 
constructing new facilities or upgrading existing facilities. For 
Stockpile Stewardship, no action is described by the following matrix:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                   Sites                        
         Capability                    Facility          -------------------------------------------------------
                                                              LANL          LLNL           NTS           SNL    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Primary physics issues.....  Hydrotest facilities.......            X             X             X   ............
Secondary physics issues...  NOVA.......................  ............            X   ............  ............
Secondary physics issues...  Pegasus....................            X   ............  ............  ............
Radiation hardness.........  Test facilities............  ............  ............  ............            X 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Site-Specific NEPA Reviews. The SSM PEIS will provide a 
programmatic assessment of environmental impacts to support 
programmatic decisions to: (1) identify the future missions of the SSM 
program; and (2) determine the facility locations. More detailed 
project-specific and site-specific NEPA analyses for individual 
activities and facilities generally would tier from the PEIS as 
necessary to implement the PEIS decisions. However, for the NIF, the 
Contained Firing Facility (CFF), and the Atlas Facility, the PEIS will 
include both a programmatic assessment, and a site-specific assessment 
of the construction and operation impacts at the reasonable candidate 
sites. The programmatic assessment will consider the cumulative and 
synergistic impacts associated with siting these facilities, and will 
provide a basis for deciding whether to proceed with the facilities. 
For NIF, the programmatic assessment will also provide a basis for 
selecting a site for NIF since there are four candidate sites for that 
facility. However, for the CFF at LLNL, which is an upgrade to an 
existing facility, and for the Atlas Facility at LANL, which builds on 
special existing equipment at LANL, there are no alternative sites. If 
a decision is made to proceed with the NIF, CFF, or the Atlas Facility, 
the site-specific analyses in the SSM PEIS would provide the necessary 
NEPA analysis to decide where on the selected site to construct the 
facility, if relevant, and how to operate it.
    Relationship to Other DOE NEPA Activities. In addition to the SSM 
PEIS, the Department is currently conducting NEPA reviews of other 
activities. The relationship between the SSM PEIS and other relevant 
major NEPA documents is discussed below.
    Site-Wide EISs. DOE is currently preparing site-wide EISs for the 
Pantex Plant, NTS, and LANL. The site-wide EISs will address continued 
operations for current and reasonably foreseeable program missions at 
these sites. Programmatic issues such as what long-term capabilities 
are required to carry out DOE's Stockpile Stewardship and Management 
program, and the location for these long-term capabilities, will be 
addressed in the SSM PEIS.
    Waste Management PEIS. This PEIS is analyzing alternatives for the 
long-term management and safe treatment, storage, and disposal of 
radioactive, hazardous, and mixed wastes. The SSM PEIS will assure that 
all wastes generated as a result of SSM activities are compatible with 
treatment, storage, and disposal decisions resulting from the Waste 
Management PEIS.
    Storage and Disposition of Weapons Usable Fissile Material PEIS. 
This PEIS is analyzing alternatives for the long-term storage of all 
weapons-usable fissile materials, primarily plutonium and highly 
enriched uranium (HEU), and the disposition of excess plutonium. There 
is a potential overlap with the SSM PEIS regarding storage of strategic 
reserves of plutonium and HEU. Preparation of these PEISs will be 
closely coordinated to prevent conflicting analysis and to ensure that 
an appropriate decision on strategic reserve storage is reached.
    Interim Actions. Two proposals that are within the scope of the SSM 
PEIS will proceed to separate Records of Decision, in accordance with 
Council on Environmental Quality regulations for interim actions (40 
CFR 1506.1). These are the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test 
(DARHT) Facility EIS, and the Tritium Supply and Recycling PEIS. In the 
case of the DARHT EIS, DOE will continue with its ongoing hydrodynamic 
testing program and has proposed to provide an enhanced hydrodynamic 
test capability in the near term regardless of the decisions to be made 
following this SSM PEIS. In the case of the Tritium Supply and 
Recycling PEIS, DOE needs to establish a long-term tritium supply 
regardless of the decisions to be made following this SSM PEIS. Thus, 
the DOE's decisions regarding these two proposals would not prejudice 
the outcome of the SSM PEIS.
    Scoping Meetings. Public scoping meetings will be held at each site 
that may be affected by the proposed action. The interactive scoping 
meetings will provide the public with an opportunity to present 
comments, ask questions, and discuss concerns regarding SSM activities 
with DOE officials, and for the Department to receive oral and written 
comments on the scope of the PEIS. Input from the scoping meetings will 
assist DOE in formulating the Implementation Plan for the SSM PEIS and 
refining PEIS alternatives. The locations, dates, and starting times 
for these public meetings are as follows:

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory--June 29, 12:00 noon and 6:00 
p.m., Villa 

[[Page 31296]]
Tassajara, 6363 Tassajara Road, Pleasanton, CA 94566.
Sandia National Laboratory--July 11, 12:00 noon and 6:00 p.m., 
Albuquerque Convention Center, 401 Second Street, N.W., Albuquerque, 
NM 87102.
Los Alamos National Laboratory--July 13, 12:00 noon and 6:00 p.m., 
Fuller Lodge, 2132 Central Avenue, Los Alamos, NM 87544.
Kansas City Plant--July 18, 9:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m., Rockhurst 
College, Massman Hall, 1100 Rockhurst Road, 53rd & Troost, Kansas 
City, MO 64110.
Pantex--July 20, 12:00 noon and 7:00 p.m., Sunset Convention Center, 
3601 West 15th, Amarillo, TX 79102.
Y-12, Oak Ridge--July 25, 12:00 noon and 6:00 p.m., Pollard 
Auditorium, Badger Avenue, Oak Ridge, TN 37830.
Savannah River Site--July 27, 12:00 noon and 6:00 p.m., The Aiken 
Municipal Center, 214 Park Avenue, S.W., Aiken, SC 29801.
Nevada Test Site--August 3 & 4, August 3: 6:00 p.m. and August 4: 
8:30 a.m., Community College of Southern Nevada/Cheyenne Campus, 
3200 East Cheyenne Avenue, North Las Vegas, NV 89030.

    Scoping Meeting Format. The Department intends to hold a plenary 
session at the beginning of each scoping hearing in which DOE officials 
will more fully explain the framework for the proposed SSM program, 
including preliminary alternatives for Stockpile Management, Stockpile 
Stewardship, and the NIF project. Following the plenary session, the 
Department intends to discuss relevant issues in more detail. Each 
scoping meeting is expected to last approximately three to four hours.

    Issued in Washington, D.C. this 9th day of June 1995, for the 
United States Department of Energy.
Peter N. Brush,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Environment, Safety and Health.
[FR Doc. 95-14544 Filed 6-13-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P