[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 114 (Wednesday, June 14, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 31325-31330]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-14501]



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[[Page 31326]]


NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Proposed Generic Communication; 10 CFR 50.54(p) Process for 
Changes to Security Plans Without Prior NRC Approval

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Notice of opportunity for public comment.

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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to issue 
a generic letter to clarify the process for changes to security plans 
under the provisions of Section 54(p) of Part 50 of Title 10 of the 
Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50.54(p)). The NRC is seeking 
comment from interested parties regarding both the technical and 
regulatory aspects of the proposed generic letter presented under the 
Supplementary Information heading. This proposed generic letter was 
endorsed by the Committee to Review Generic Requirements (CRGR) to be 
published for comment. The relevant information that was sent to the 
CRGR to support their review of the proposed generic letter will be 
made available in the NRC Public Document Room. The NRC will consider 
comments received from interested parties in the final evaluation of 
the proposed generic letter. The NRC's final evaluation will include a 
review of the technical position and, when appropriate, an analysis of 
the value/impact on licensees. Should this generic letter be issued by 
the NRC, it will become available for public inspection in the NRC 
Public Document Room.

DATES: Comment period expires on July 14, 1995. Comments submitted 
after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but 
assurance of consideration cannot be given except for comments received 
on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Submit written comments to Chief, Rules Review and 
Directives Branch, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555. Written comments may also be delivered to 11545 Rockville Pike, 
Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m., Federal workdays. 
Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public 
Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert Skelton at (301) 415-3208.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

NRC Generic Letter 95-XX: 10 CFR 50.54(p) Process for Changes to 
Security Plans Without Prior NRC Approval

Addressees

    All holders of operating licenses and construction permits for 
nuclear power plants.

Purpose

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this 
generic letter to notify you of a clarification of the procedures used 
by licensees to process 10 CFR 50.54(p) changes to security plans. It 
is expected that recipients will review the information for 
applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate. 
However, suggestions contained in this generic letter are not NRC 
requirements; therefore, no specific actions or written response is 
required.

Description of Circumstances

    On January 4, 1993, the Executive Director for Operations 
established a Regulatory Review Group (RRG). The RRG conducted a review 
of power reactor regulations and related processes, programs, and 
practices. One RRG recommendation was to change the current practice to 
enable licensees to make changes to their security plans without prior 
NRC approval (i.e., using the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(p)). The plan 
developed by the staff for implementing RRG recommendations (SECY 94-
003, January 4, 1994) was not to change the regulations, but to clarify 
the process by providing a screening criterion that would ensure 
consistency of security plan changes without prior NRC approval.

Discussion

    Some confusion and inconsistencies have apparently occurred in the 
past regarding implementation of 10 CFR 50.54(p) by licensees without 
NRC approval. This generic letter restates the original criterion for 
judging the acceptability of changes made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(p). 
That criterion has allowed that the ``test'' for determining if a 
change decreases the effectiveness of the plan has been the 
determination that the overall effectiveness of the plan is not 
decreased. This generic letter clarifies the language in 10 CFR 
50.54(p) that licensees shall ``make no change which would decrease the 
effectiveness of a security plan, or guard training and qualification, 
* * * or safeguards contingency plan.''
    The following is a clarification of this language. Changes that 
meet the following screening criteria may be made without prior NRC 
approval.
     A change in any of the three security plans is deemed not 
to decrease the effectiveness of the plan if the change does not 
decrease the ability of the onsite physical protection system and 
security organization, as described in paragraphs (b) through (h) of 10 
CFR 73.55, or equivalent measures approved under 10 CFR 73.55(a), to 
protect with high assurance against the design basis threat as stated 
in 10 CFR 73.1(a). The change cannot delete or replace any of the 
regulatory capabilities, as described in paragraphs (b) through (h) or 
in Appendixes B and C to 10 CFR Part 73.
     A change that increases the effectiveness of any plan.
    Use of these screening criteria would allow licensees to reduce 
certain commitments that have exceeded regulatory requirements or 
published guidance if the overall effectiveness of the plan is not 
reduced. Each issue is reviewed against the overall assurance levels 
contained in the plan and not against the specific individual changes. 
Latitude has always existed in that improvements in one area of the 
program may offset reductions in other areas. Overall assurance levels 
of the plans must be maintained, and this clarification is not intended 
to reduce plan commitments to levels less than the overall high-
assurance objectives stated in 10 CFR 73.55(a).
    NRC has expected that licensees would judiciously make the proper 
determination regarding 10 CFR 50.54(p) changes and implement those 
changes as permitted by the regulations. This position was the original 
intent of the Commission and remains so today. The NRC believes that, 
with the use of these screening criteria and expertise of the licensee 
staff, licensees should implement changes made pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.54(p) without prior NRC approval.
    Licensees should note that some of the safeguards-related 
regulatory guidance has become dated and superseded in recent years, 
and caution should be exercised by licensees when screening changes, 
particularly regarding specific guidance issues. The original intent of 
10 CFR 50.54(p) has been to screen changes in terms of their overall 
impact on the security program. Guidance specified in NRC publications 
are not requirements and should not be interpreted as the only possible 
method for satisfying regulatory requirements. The screening criteria 
contained herein are the fundamental criteria necessary for determining 
the acceptability of a change made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(p). NUREG-
0908, ``Acceptance 

[[Page 31327]]
Criteria for the Evaluation of Nuclear Power Reactor Security Plans,'' 
is an example of a document that should not be used verbatim to make 
individual acceptability determines.
    The screening criteria presented herein are not applicable to plan 
changes that would eliminate or replace security plan commitments to 
specific security measures stated in 10 CFR 73.55 (b) through (h). NRC 
approval of such changes may need to be submitted as exemption or 
license amendment (i.e., 10 CFR 50.90) requests.
    A suggested outline for applying the screening criteria for the 
evaluation of a proposed security plan change is presented in 
Attachment 1. An evaluation of any proposed security plan change using 
the suggested outline should lead to a determination as to whether or 
not the change can be made without prior NRC approval.
    Changes made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(p) and this generic letter 
may be made to physical security plans, guard training and 
qualification plans, and contingency plans. Licensees that successfully 
meet the screening criteria in Attachment 1 should conclude that a 
particular change would be acceptable without NRC approval. Use of the 
screening criteria format, while strictly voluntary, would document the 
licensees determination of no decrease in effectiveness as described in 
10 CFR 50.54(p)(2). The burden for the submittal of information 
associated with the use of 10 CFR 50.54(p) is included in OMB Clearance 
3150-0011. This generic letter does not increase that burden.
    Changes must be appropriate for particular site programs, and use 
of the screening criteria does not guarantee acceptance by the NRC or 
applicability to all sites. The licensee bears the responsibility for 
changes made without NRC approval.
    The three security plans remain the ``enforceable documents,'' and 
inspections will be based upon the commitments contained within those 
plans. It is incumbent upon licensees to keep their plans accurate and 
meet the timing requirements for updating plans as stated in 10 CFR 
50.54(p).
    As in the past, the NRC regional staff will continue to screen all 
changes and will refer policy-related changes to the Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation (NRR). In the future the NRC regional staff will 
forward all questionable changes to NRR for review and disposition to 
ensure staff consistency.
    Attachment 2 contains 10 examples of previously accepted changes 
made by licensees without NRC approval pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(p), and 
Attachment 3 contains a list of 10 changes that have been found to be 
unacceptable for inclusion in security related plans unless approved by 
the NRC on a case by case basis pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90 or as an 
exemption request to 10 CFR 73.55.

Attachment 1--Screening Criteria Outline (Assessment of 
Acceptability of 10 CFR 50.54(p) Plan Change)

Section/Title

    List the section and title of where the change is proposed.

Proposed Commitment

    Specify the relevant existing and revised commitments. Address 
any offsetting provisions.

Impact on Effectiveness on a Generic Plan

    This section of the outline asks a series of questions. If the 
response to each question is ``no'' and the rationale supports a 
``no'' response, the change may be processed using the provisions of 
10 CFR 50.54(p) without NRC prior approval. The questions are as 
follows:

1. {time}  Yes {time}  No Does this change delete or contradict any 
regulatory requirement?
2. {time}  Yes {time}  No Would the change decrease the overall 
level of security system performance as described in paragraphs (b) 
through (h) of 10 CFR 73.55 to protect with the objective of high 
assurance against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage 
as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a)?

    Rationale: Explain the rationale.

3. {time}  Yes {time}  No Does this change any unique site-specific 
commitments?

    Rationale: (Explain why the change does not decrease the overall 
effectiveness of the plan while taking into consideration existing 
unique site-specific security features. Consider historical reasons 
why specific commitments were included in the security plans. Were 
there specific counterbalancing commitments and has that 
counterbalance been changed negatively?)

Attachment 2--Acceptable 10 CFR 50.54(p) Changes

Screening Criteria Form

(Assessment of Acceptability of 10 CFR 50.54(p) Plan Change)

Example I

Weapons Training

Section/Title

    This is an example. In an actual 50.54(p) determination, this 
section would give specific references to the parts of the security 
plan the licensee proposes to change.
Proposed Commitment

    Currently, some licensees train each security officer on all 
types of weapons maintained at their site. The licensee would now 
require individual security officer training only for the specific 
weapon types (i.e., shotguns and handguns or rifles and handguns) 
that individual security officers would use for assigned duties. 
Weapons training would be more specific to weapons used to carry out 
the specific assigned duties which would reduce training costs. 
Training of security officers on weapons that are not assigned to or 
used by them in routine or response duties wastes training resources 
and funding that could be used for additional training on assigned 
weapons. Response weaponry and training would remain unchanged.

Impact on Effectiveness on a Generic Plan

1. {time} Yes {time} No Does this change delete or contradict any 
regulatory requirement?
2. {time} Yes {time} No Would the change decrease the overall level 
of security system performance as described in paragraphs (b) 
through (h) of 10 CFR 73.55 to protect with the objective of high 
assurance against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage 
as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a)?

    Rationale: Training security officers in use of weapons not 
deployed in routine or response activities provides no benefit to 
their responsive capability.

3. {time} Yes {time} No Does this change any unique site-specific 
commitments?

    Rationale: (Explain why the change does not decrease the overall 
effectiveness of the plan while taking into consideration existing 
unique site-specific security features. Consider historical reasons 
why specific commitments were included in the security plans. Were 
there specific counterbalancing commitments and has that 
counterbalance been changed negatively?)

Screening Criteria Form

(Assessment of Acceptability of 10 CFR 50.54(p) Plan Change)

Example II

Vehicle Entry and Search

Section/Title

    This is an example. In an actual 50.54(p) determination, this 
section would give specific references to the parts of the security 
plan the licensee proposes to change.

Proposed Commitment

    Currently, two armed security officers are required by the 
security plan to be present when a protected area barrier is opened. 
Allow one armed officer to open the protected area barrier for 
vehicle access and search of that vehicle. This would be acceptable 
if that portal is under observation by closed circuit television 
(CCTV) from the central alarm station (CAS) or secondary alarm 
station (SAS). If CCTV is not available, two security officers are 
required, but only one of the two needs to be armed. This change 
would allow more efficient use of security force resources. If the 
CAS or SAS were to witness an incident at the vehicle gate, they 
would be in the best position to dispatch armed responders.

Impact on Effectiveness on a Generic Plan

1. {time} Yes {time} No Does this change delete or contradict any 
regulatory requirement?
2. {time} Yes {time} No Would the change decrease the overall level 
of security system performance as described in paragraphs (b) 
through (h) of 10 CFR 73.55 to protect with the objective of high 
assurance against the 

[[Page 31328]]
design basis threat of radiological sabotage as stated in 10 CFR 
73.1(a)?

    Rationale: This change would allow better utilization of 
security force resources and would help maintain current levels of 
assurance. Having a second armed security officer present during a 
vehicle search provides little, if any, additional deterrence to a 
potential adversary. CCTV coverage of vehicle access control and 
searches has a deterrence similar to the presence of the second 
officer.

3. {time} Yes {time} No Does this change any unique site-specific 
commitments?

    Rationale: (Explain why the change does not decrease the overall 
effectiveness of the plan while taking into consideration existing 
unique site-specific security features. Consider historical reasons 
why specific commitments were included in the security plans. Were 
there specific counterbalancing commitments and has that 
counterbalance been changed negatively?)

Screening Criteria Form

(Assessment of Acceptability of 10 CFR 50.54(p) Plan Change)

Example III

Safeguards Information

Section/Title

    This is an example. In an actual 50.54(p) determination, this 
section would give specific references to the parts of the security 
plan the licensee proposes to change.

Proposed Commitment

    Currently, all lists of vital equipment are controlled as 
safeguards information (SGI). The following criterion defines what 
information needs to be controlled as SGI.
    The following three elements must be present before ``documents 
or other matter'' are designated SGI in accordance with 10 CFR 
73.21(b)(1)(vii):
    (1) the safety-related equipment must be designated as vital 
equipment or be specified as being located in a vital area in either 
the licensee's physical security plan (PSP), the safeguards 
contingency plan (SCP) or, if applicable, any licensee-generated 
plant-specific safeguards analyses; and
    (2) the equipment or area must be specifically designated as 
``vital'' in the ``documents or other matter'' being reviewed; and
    (3) the physical protection measures (other than any general 
regulatory requirement stated in 10 CFR 73.55) afforded the 
equipment or area, as described in either a licensee's PSP, a SCP, 
or a plant-specific safeguards analysis,* must also be specifically 
described in the ``documents or other matter.''

*Plant-specific sabotage scenarios or vulnerabilities in the 
physical protection system are considered SGI.

Impact on Effectiveness on a Generic Plan

1. {time}  Yes {time}  No Does this change delete or contradict any 
regulatory requirement?
2. {time}  Yes {time}  No Would the change decrease the overall 
level of security system performance as described in paragraphs (b) 
through (h) of 10 CFR 73.55 to protect with the objective of high 
assurance against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage 
as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a)?

    Rationale: This change allows the licensee to include a list of 
vital areas in training documents for licensee operations personnel 
without treating the documents as SGI. This change would also reduce 
the amount of SGI generated, handled, and stored. A non-SGI list 
does not decrease the effectiveness of the plan due to the absence 
of the above criteria and the fact that safety equipment lists are 
available from other sources.

3. {time}  Yes {time}  No Does this change any unique site-specific 
commitments?

    Rationale: (Explain why the change does not decrease the overall 
effectiveness of the plan while taking into consideration existing 
unique site-specific security features. Consider historical reasons 
why specific commitments were included in the security plans. Were 
there specific counterbalancing commitments and has that 
counterbalance been changed negatively?)

Screening Criteria Form

(Assessment of Acceptability of 10 CFR 50.54(p) Plan Change)

Example IV

Protected Area Patrols

Section/Title

    This is an example. In an actual 50.54(p) determination, this 
section would give specific references to the parts of the security 
plan the licensee proposes to change.

Proposed Commitment

    Reduce frequency of protected area (PA) patrols. Patrol 
frequency would be reduced to a minimum of two patrols per shift (8 
hours) or no less than once every 4 hours. Additional patrols 
contribute minimally to security effectiveness. Reduction of number 
of patrols would provide for more effective use of personnel 
resources. The consideration that all employees, as well as security 
force members, are trained to report any suspicious individuals or 
materials in the protected area decreases the importance of more 
frequent patrols.

Impact on Effectiveness on a Generic Plan

1. {time}  Yes {time}  No Does this change delete or contradict any 
regulatory requirement?
2. {time}  Yes {time}  No Would the change decrease the overall 
level of security system performance as described in paragraphs (b) 
through (h) of 10 CFR 73.55 to protect with the objective of high 
assurance against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage 
as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a)?

    Rationale: Previously issued guidance states that a patrol at 
least every 4 hours meets the performance requirements of the 
regulation.

 {time}  Yes {time}  No Does this change any unique site-specific 
commitments?

    Rationale: (Explain why the change does not decrease the overall 
effectiveness of the plan while taking into consideration existing 
unique site-specific security features. Consider historical reasons 
why specific commitments were included in the security plans. Were 
there specific counterbalancing commitments and has that 
counterbalance been changed negatively?)

Screening Criteria Form

(Assessment of Acceptability of 10 CFR 50.54(p) Plan Change)

Example V

Security Organizational Changes

Section/Title

    This is an example. In an actual 50.54(p) determination, this 
section would give specific references to the parts of the security 
plan the licensee proposes to change.

Proposed Commitment

    Two levels of management would be eliminated, reducing the 
number of vertical layers of security staff organization. The change 
provides for more efficient management and possible savings in 
manpower resources. The number of guards for each shift directly 
involved in implementing the security plan would not be affected. 
Historically the NRC staff has not specified organizational or 
managerial structures. Published guidance is silent on the number of 
managers and the type of organizational structure for the security 
operation. Security management is judged by its performance and not 
by the number or type of managers.

Impact on Effectiveness on a Generic Plan

1. {time}  Yes {time}  No Does this change delete or contradict any 
regulatory requirement?
 {time}  Yes {time}  No Would the change decrease the overall level 
of security system performance as described in paragraphs (b) 
through (h) of 10 CFR 73.55 to protect with the objective of high 
assurance against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage 
as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a)?

    Rationale: With the actual number of on-duty security force 
members remaining unchanged, the implementation of the security plan 
should remain unchanged.

3. {time}  Yes {time}  No Does this change any unique site-specific 
commitments?

    Rationale: (Explain why the change does not decrease the overall 
effectiveness of the plan while taking into consideration existing 
unique site-specific security features. Consider historical reasons 
why specific commitments were included in the security plans. Were 
there specific counterbalancing commitments and has that 
counterbalance been changed negatively?)

Screening Criteria Form
(Assessment of Acceptability of 10 CFR 50.54(p) Plan Change)

Example VI

Armed Responder Duties

Section/Title

    This is an example. In an actual 50.54(p) determination, this 
section would give specific references to the parts of the security 
plan the licensee proposes to change.

Proposed Commitment

    Assign duties other than armed response to security officers 
designated as members of the response team. Armed responders would 

[[Page 31329]]
be assigned additional duties that would not interfere with their 
contingency response. Assigned duties would be only ones that could 
be immediately abandoned for response purposes. This change allows 
for more efficient resource management. This change should not 
affect the security officers' ability to perform their duties as 
members of the response team. Use of response officers to perform 
additional duties has been an acceptable practice under current 
guidance. What has not been acceptable, as discussed in IN 86-88, is 
assigning responders to routine duties that cannot be abandoned 
during a security event when response is necessary.

Impact on Effectiveness on a Generic Plan

1. {time}  Yes {time}  No Does this change delete or contradict any 
regulatory requirement?
2. {time}  Yes {time}  No Would the change decrease the overall 
level of security system performance as described in paragraphs (b) 
through (h) of 10 CFR 73.55 to protect with the objective of high 
assurance against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage 
as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a)?

    Rationale: Ability to abandon duties and respond will be 
demonstrated and documented. The number of armed responders is not 
reduced and their ability to respond is not affected.

3. {time}  Yes {time}  No Does this change any unique site-specific 
commitments?

    Rationale: (Explain why the change does not decrease the overall 
effectiveness of the plan while taking into consideration existing 
unique site-specific security features. Consider historical reasons 
why specific commitments were included in the security plans. Were 
there specific counterbalancing commitments and has that 
counterbalance been changed negatively?)

Screening Criteria Form

(Assessment of Acceptability of 10 CFR 50.54(p) Plan Change)

Example VII

Requalification Schedule

Section/Title

    This is an example. In an actual 50.54(p) determination, this 
section would give specific references to the parts of the security 
plan the licensee proposes to change.

Proposed Commitment

    The current plan specifies that security audits and weapons 
training (required by Appendix B to 73.55) be completed 1 year or 
less after the audit or training was last accomplished. This results 
in the due date of audits and training being adjusted each year and 
the audits and training, over a period of years, being completed 
more than once each 12 months. This change provides scheduling 
latitude in performing annually required security audits and weapons 
training. It allows use of a ``tech spec'' formula to provide 
flexibility in meeting audit and weapons training commitments. The 
revised commitment would allow fixed dates in the plan with a 
provision for extending the audit or training interval beyond 1 year 
(e.g., a maximum allowable extension not to exceed 25% of the 
surveillance interval, but the combined time interval for any 3 
consecutive surveillance intervals shall not exceed 3.25 time the 
specific surveillance interval).

Impact on Effectiveness on a Generic Plan

1. {time}  Yes {time}  No Does this change delete or contradict any 
regulatory requirement?
2. {time}  Yes {time}  No Would the change decrease the overall 
level of security system performance as described in paragraphs (b) 
through (h) of 10 CFR 73.55 to protect with the objective of high 
assurance against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage 
as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a)?

    Rationale: There would be no impact on performance capabilities 
of the security program or security officer weapons proficiency. 
Audits and security training would still be conducted on an annual 
basis with only minor variations.
3. {time}  Yes {time}  No Does this change any unique site-specific 
commitments?

    Rationale: (Explain why the change does not decrease the overall 
effectiveness of the plan while taking into consideration existing 
unique site-specific security features. Consider historical reasons 
why specific commitments were included in the security plans. Were 
there specific counterbalancing commitments and has that 
counterbalance been changed negatively?)

Screening Criteria Form

(Assessment of Acceptability of 10 CFR 50.54(p) Plan Change)

Example VIII

Guard/Watchman Duties

Section/Title
    This is an example. In an actual 50.54(p) determination, this 
section would give specific references to the parts of the security 
plan the licensee proposes to change.

Proposed Commitment

    Some security plans list numerous positions within the security 
organization and specifically identify whether a position is filled 
by an armed guard or unarmed watchman. For example, a plan may 
specify that operators of search equipment in the gatehouse and SAS/
CAS officers will be armed. This change would allow certain security 
officer positions to be filled by unarmed watchmen rather than armed 
guards. Watchmen would be allowed to operate search equipment in the 
gatehouse, to man the CAS and SAS, and to escort individuals in the 
protected and vital areas.

Impact on Effectiveness on a Generic Plan

1. {time}  Yes {time}  No Does this change delete or contradict any 
regulatory requirement?
2. {time}  Yes {time}  No Would the change decrease the overall 
level of security system performance as described in paragraphs (b) 
through (h) of 10 CFR 73.55 to protect with the objective of high 
assurance against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage 
as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a)?

    Rationale: This change does not involve any of the armed 
response force members. Consequently the response to security 
contingencies would remain the same.

3. {time}  Yes {time}  No Does this change any unique site-specific 
commitments?

    Rationale: (Explain why the change does not decrease the overall 
effectiveness of the plan while taking into consideration existing 
unique site-specific security features. Consider historical reasons 
why specific commitments were included in the security plans. Were 
there specific counterbalancing commitments and has that 
counterbalance been changed negatively?)

Screening Criteria Form

(Assessment of Acceptability of 10 CFR 50.54(p) Plan Change)

Example IX

Vital Area Door Controls

Section/Title

    This is an example. In an actual 50.54(p) determination, this 
section would give specific references to the parts of the security 
plan the licensee proposes to change.

Proposed Commitment

    Some licensees have committed to placement of vital areas within 
vital areas. This arrangement results in doors, identified as vital 
area doors, being located within other vital areas. This change 
would allow the number of doors controlled as vital to be reduced. 
Vital area doors located within vital areas (with the exception of 
the control room and the alarm stations) would no longer be 
designated as vital.

Impact on Effectiveness on a Generic Plan

1. {time}  Yes {time}  No Does this change delete or contradict any 
regulatory requirement?
2. {time}  Yes {time}  No Would the change decrease the overall 
level of security system performance as described in paragraphs (b) 
through (h) of 10 CFR 73.55 to protect with the objective of high 
assurance against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage 
as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a)?

    Rationale: Unless the current response strategy to an external 
threat relies on delay or detection at internal vital area doors, 
elimination of their vital designation would not affect licensee 
response to a design basis external threat.

3. {time}  Yes {time}  No Does this change any unique site-specific 
commitments?

    Rationale: (Explain why the change does not decrease the overall 
effectiveness of the plan while taking into consideration existing 
unique site-specific security features. Consider historical reasons 
why specific commitments were included in the security plans. Were 
there specific counterbalancing commitments and has that 
counterbalance been changed negatively?)

Screening Criteria Form

(Assessment of Acceptability of 10 CFR 50.54(p) Plan Change)

Example X

Security Vehicles

Section/Title

    This is an example. In an actual 50.54(p) determination, this 
section would give specific references to the parts of the security 
plan the licensee proposes to change.

[[Page 31330]]


Proposed Commitment

    Eliminate a requirement that a 4-wheel drive vehicle be used as 
a patrol and response vehicle. This reduction would need to be 
balanced by a commitment to verify that the response strategy to 
address the design basis threat did not rely on the use of a 4-wheel 
drive vehicle. This change would eliminate the costs of purchasing 
and maintaining 4-wheel drive vehicles that are not required for 
protection against the design basis external threat.

Impact on Effectiveness on a Generic Plan

1. {time}  Yes {time}  No Does this change delete or contradict any 
regulatory requirement?
2. {time}  Yes {time}  No Would the change decrease the overall 
level of security system performance as described in paragraphs (b) 
through (h) of 10 CFR 73.55 to protect with the objective of high 
assurance against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage 
as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a)?

    Rationale: The demonstration of protective strategies that do 
not require the use of a 4-wheel drive vehicle would confirm the 
ability of a site's protection strategy to protect the facility 
against the design basis threat.

3. {time}  Yes {time}  No Does this change any unique site-specific 
commitments?

    Rationale: (Explain why the change does not decrease the overall 
effectiveness of the plan while taking into consideration existing 
unique site-specific security features. Consider historical reasons 
why specific commitments were included in the security plans. Were 
there specific counterbalancing commitments and has that 
counterbalance been changed negatively?)

Attachment 3--Unacceptable 10 CFR 50.54(p) Changes

    The following is a listing of 10 CFR 50.54(p) changes that have 
been proposed or submitted but were determined to decrease the 
effectiveness of their respective plans. Changes would be reviewed 
on a case-by-case basis if submitted as noted for amendments or 
exemptions.
    1. A change was submitted that would allow a ``designated 
vehicle'' to be stored outside the protected area in an unsecured 
manner. This change is considered to be decrease in overall 
effectiveness of the plan and would require an exemption request 
since it is contrary to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(4).
    2. A change was submitted by which any vehicle entering the 
protected area that is driven by an individual with unescorted 
access would not have to be escorted by an armed member of the 
security force. This change would decrease the overall effectiveness 
of the plan and require an exemption request since it is contrary to 
the provisions of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(4) and specific implementation 
guidance provided to the staff in SECY 93-326.
    3. A change was submitted that would allow materials destined 
for the protected area to be searched and stored in an unsecured, 
owner-controlled warehouse. This change is considered a decrease in 
overall effectiveness of the plan and would require an exemption 
request since it is contrary to the provisions of 10 CFR 
73.55(d)(3).
    4. A change was submitted that requested that security officers 
be qualified on other than assigned weapons or ``duty'' ammunition. 
The change would be considered a decrease in overall effectiveness 
of the plan. This change could be submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.90.
    5. A generic change was proposed during public meetings that 
would eliminate the secondary alarm station. This change would 
decrease the overall effectiveness of the plan and require an 
exemption request since it is contrary to the provisions of 10 CFR 
73.55(e)(1).
    6. A generic change was proposed during public meetings that 
would reduce the number of armed responders below the minimum 
required by the regulation. This change would decrease that overall 
effectiveness of the plan and require an exemption request since it 
is contrary to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.55(h)(3).
    7. A change was submitted that did not specify which positions 
within the security organization would be armed or unarmed. As 
written, the staff had to assume the overall effectiveness of the 
plan was decreased. The licensee would need to resubmit this change 
to clarify which positions would be armed to confirm that regulatory 
requirements were being met.
    8. A generic change was proposed during public meetings that 
would allow visitor escorting to be determined at the licensee's 
discretion. No specifics were provided regarding how this change was 
to be implemented. This change would decrease the overall 
effectiveness of the plan and require an exemption request since it 
is contrary to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(6).
    9. A generic change was proposed during public meetings that 
would give an alarm station operator the discretion to determine the 
need for compensatory measures for failed intrusion detection 
equipment. This change would decrease the overall effectiveness of 
the plan and require an exemption request since it is contrary to 
the provisions of 10 CFR 73.55(g)(1). Compensatory measures for 
vital area doors are contained in proposed rulemaking currently 
being processed by the staff.
    10. A generic change was proposed during public meetings that 
would not require compensatory measures for 72 hours on a vital area 
door that had only a functional lock. This change would decrease the 
overall effectiveness of the plan and require an exemption request 
since it is contrary to the provisions of 73.55(g)(1).

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of June 1995.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Brian K. Grimes,
Director, Division of Project Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation.
[FR Doc. 95-14501 Filed 6-13-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M