[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 108 (Tuesday, June 6, 1995)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 29784-29795]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-13755]



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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 50

[Docket No. PRM-50-61]


Nuclear Energy Institute, Receipt of a Petition for Rulemaking

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; Notice of receipt.

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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has received and 
requests public comment on a petition for rulemaking filed by the 
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) on behalf of the nuclear power industry. 
The petition has been docketed by the Commission and has been assigned 
Docket No. PRM-50-61. The petitioner requests that the NRC amend its 
regulations governing fire protection at nuclear power plants. The 
petitioner believes such an amendment would provide a more flexible 
alternative to the current requirements and permit nuclear power plant 
licensees more discretion in implementing fire protection requirements 
that would be site-specific without adversely affecting a licensee's 
ability to achieve the safe shutdown of a facility in the event of a 
fire.

DATES: Submit comments by September 29, 1995. Comments received after 
this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance 
of consideration cannot be given except as to comments received on or 
before this date.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555. Attention: Docketing and Services 
Branch.
    Deliver comments to 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, 
between 7:45 am and 4:15 pm on Federal workdays.
    For a copy of the petition, write: Rules Review Section, Rules 
Review and Directives Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and 
Publications Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555.
    Comments may be submitted electronically, in either ASCII text or 
WordPerfect format (version 5.1 or later), by calling the NRC 
Electronic Bulletin Board (BBS) on FedWorld. The bulletin board may be 
accessed using a personal computer, a modem, and one of the commonly 
available communications software packages, or directly via Internet. 
Background documents on this rulemaking are also available for 
downloading and viewing on the bulletin board.
    If using a personal computer and modem, the NRC rulemaking 
subsystem on FedWorld can be accessed directly by dialing the toll free 
number (800) 303-9672. Communication software parameters should be set 
as follows: parity to none, data bits to 8, and stop bits to 1 (N,8,1). 
Using ANSI or VT-100 terminal emulation, the NRC rulemaking subsystem 
can then be accessed by selecting the ``Rules Menu'' option from the 
``NRC Main Menu.'' Users will find the ``FedWorld Online User's 
Guides'' particularly helpful. Many NRC subsystems and data bases also 
have a ``Help/Information Center'' option that is tailored to the 
particular subsystem.
    The NRC subsystem on FedWorld can also be accessed by a direct dial 
phone number for the main FedWorld BBS, (703) 321-3339, or by using 
Telnet via Internet: fedworld.gov. If using (703) 321-3339 to contact 
FedWorld, the NRC subsystem will be accessed from the main FedWorld 
menu by selecting the ``Regulatory, Government Administration and State 
Systems,'' then selecting ``Regulatory Information Mall.'' At that 
point, a menu will be displayed that has an option ``U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission'' that will take you to the NRC Online main menu. 
The NRC Online area also can be accessed directly by typing ``/go nrc'' 
at a FedWorld command line. If you access NRC from FedWorld's main 
menu, you may return to FedWorld by selecting the ``Return to 
FedWorld'' option from the NRC Online Main Menu. However, if you access 
NRC at FedWorld by using NRC's toll-free number, you will have full 
access to all NRC systems, but you will not have access to the main 
FedWorld system.
    If you contact FedWorld using Telnet, you will see the NRC area and 
menus, including the Rules Menu. Although you will be able to download 
documents and leave messages, you will not be able to write comments or 
upload files (comments). If you contact FedWorld using FTP, all files 
can be accessed and downloaded but uploads are not allowed; all you 
will see is a list of files without descriptions (normal Gopher look). 
An index file listing all files within a subdirectory, with 
descriptions, is available. There is a 15-minute time limit for FTP 
access.
    Although FedWorld also can be accessed through the World Wide Web, 
like FTP, that mode only provides access for downloading files and does 
not display the NRC Rules Menu.
    For more information on NRC bulletin boards call Mr. Arthur Davis, 
Systems Integration and Development Branch, [[Page 29785]] NRC, 
Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301) 415-5780; e-mail AXD[email protected].

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Monideep K. Dey, Office of Nuclear 
Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555. Telephone: 301-415-6443. Michael T. Lesar, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555. Telephone: 301-415-7163 or Toll Free: 800-368-5642.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) received a petition for 
rulemaking dated February 2, 1995, submitted by the Nuclear Energy 
Institute (NEI). The petition was docketed as PRM-50-61 on February 2, 
1995. The petitioner requests that the NRC amend the regulations in 10 
CFR part 50 that govern fire protection at nuclear power plants. 
Specifically, the petitioner is seeking an amendment to 10 CFR 50.48 
and the addition of a new appendix that it believes will provide a more 
flexible alternative to the current fire protection requirements in 10 
CFR part 50, Appendix R, that the petitioner considers to be overly 
prescriptive.
    The petitioner believes that significant strides have been made in 
the fire sciences and that licensees' fire protection programs have 
matured during the period after the current NRC fire protection 
requirements in 10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, were 
adopted. The petitioner also notes that the NRC has gained nearly two 
decades of experience in reviewing licensee fire protection programs 
and requests that NRC adopt a more current approach to fire protection 
that builds on the defense-in-depth concept used to establish the 
existing requirements.
    NEI cites the ``NRC Program for Elimination of Requirements 
Marginal to Safety,'' published on November 24, 1992 (57 FR 55157), and 
a separate initiative entitled, ``Reducing the Regulatory Burden on 
Nuclear Licensees,'' published on June 18, 1992 (57 FR 27187), as 
examples in which the NRC proposed amending its regulations to continue 
efforts to eliminate requirements that are marginal to safety and to 
reduce the regulatory burden when the benefit realized is not 
commensurate with the resulting cost. The petitioner also notes that 
the NRC's Regulatory Review Group (RRG) identified the existing rule on 
fire protection as one of the regulations that should be improved.
    The NRC's general fire protection requirements for nuclear power 
plants were published on February 20, 1971 (36 FR 3255), and are 
contained in 10 CFR part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 
3. The current fire protection requirements contained in 10 CFR 50.48 
and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, were adopted several years after a 1975 
fire at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant following considerable 
interaction between the NRC staff, the nuclear industry, and other 
interested parties. The petitioner notes that the NRC used a defense-
in-depth approach to fire protection for nuclear power plants that 
includes key elements of protection, detection, and suppression within 
a fire protection program to attain the required objective of 
protecting the safe shutdown capability of the plant. However, the 
petitioner believes that the current requirements are too prescriptive 
because they apply equally in all plant areas without providing a 
mechanism for determining the actual fire hazard in each area.
    NEI acknowledges that a prescriptive rule was necessary in 1980 
because nuclear power plant fire protection technology was relatively 
new at that time. However, the petitioner believes that those fire 
protection standards have been difficult to implement consistently for 
nuclear power plants and notes that the NRC has granted more than 1,200 
exemptions after the inception of the rule. The petitioner believes 
that the difficulty in implementing the standards results not only from 
the prescriptiveness of the current rule but also because fire 
protection standards in other industries are directed primarily toward 
protection of life and property, whereas fire protection at nuclear 
power facilities focuses on preserving the plant's safe shutdown 
capability to adequately protect the public health and safety.
    The petitioner states that the proposed rule is based upon fire 
protection programs already in place at operating power plants and 
recognizes the expertise developed by the NRC staff and the industry 
over the past 20 years. The petitioner notes that other Federal 
agencies, such as the General Services Administration (GSA), have 
enhanced their fire protection regulations based on recent advances in 
fire modeling techniques. GSA uses fire modeling to identify fire 
safety risks and develop performance-based approaches to achieving 
adequate levels of protection.
    The petitioner also notes that the Advisory Committee on Reactor 
Safeguards has briefed the Commission on the development of 
performance-based approaches to fire protection at nuclear power plants 
in the United Kingdom and Canada. NRC is currently participating in a 
Federal interagency task force to assess the potential implementation 
of performance-based regulations, which include fire protection. The 
RRG has specifically recommended that probabilistic safety assessment 
(PSA) techniques be used to develop fire protection regulations that 
are more performance-based. The petitioner believes that the proposed 
rule is consistent with the general philosophy of focusing on key 
objectives related to measurable performance in order to permit 
resources to be applied to and attention centered on activities most 
directly related to protection of the public health and safety.
    The petitioner believes that the overall approach of the proposed 
rule may be characterized as performance-based because its ultimate 
goal is to adequately maintain the safe shutdown equipment function. 
NEI states that the proposed rule, unlike the current requirements, 
requires licensees to establish appropriate measurable parameters to 
ensure that the adequacy of the plant fire protection features in 
protecting the safe shutdown capability can be demonstrated based on 
the actual plant-specific fire risk. The petitioner asserts that rather 
than focusing on the details of the protective features, the criteria 
for assessing acceptable performance would be based on the 
effectiveness of these features in achieving the goal of the current 
fire protection regulation, the successful protection of the safe 
shutdown function.
    The proposed rule is similar to the current rule in that it would 
require licensees to perform a fire hazards analysis (FHA). The 
petitioner states that the proposed rule, however, provides licensees 
with the flexibility to determine the relative value of various 
protective measures by supplementing the FHA with insights derived from 
other sources, such as a fire modeling analysis or a PSA. The 
petitioner believes that the proposed rule would allow licensees to 
implement alternative, more effective fire protection measures without 
compromising plant safety and, therefore, would provide greater 
flexibility than the current requirements while achieving the same 
objective.
    The petitioner claims that the proposed rule would give licensees 
the option of demonstrating that they provide adequate protection 
against postulated fire hazards without having to resort to the more 
costly and time-consuming exemption process. The petitioner states that 
the current [[Page 29786]] language in 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, 
would be retained and an alternative way to meet the requirements in 10 
CFR 50.48 would be provided by the proposed Appendix S. The petitioner 
explains that licensees need not implement the proposed Appendix S in 
its entirety but may substitute, in whole or in part, the specific 
sections corresponding to Appendix R, as appropriate, in order to 
provide an equivalent degree of protection. The petitioner believes 
that the proposed rule provides an alternative means of complying with 
the fire protection requirements contained in GDC 3.
    The proposed rule does not distinguish between older plants and 
those licensed to operate after January 1, 1979. The petitioner 
believes that the revised regulation can be applied equally to all 
plants because the newer plants were licensed pursuant to Branch 
Technical Position (BTP) 9.5-1, which is contained in NUREG-0800, and 
because 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, which applied to older plants, 
reflects BTP 9.5-1.
    The petitioner indicates that the proposed rule amends 10 CFR 50.48 
by removing the schedule requirements that are no longer applicable. 
The proposed rule would also permit licensees to relocate the fire 
protection program from their technical specifications to the Final 
Safety Analysis Report as suggested in Generic Letter 88-12, ``Removal 
of Fire Protection Requirements from Technical Specifications'' (August 
2, 1988). The petitioner envisions that the proposed changes would 
include the development of a new guidance document by the nuclear 
industry concurrent with the proposed promulgation of the rule. NRC 
would accept this guidance and issue a regulatory guide describing 
acceptable methods of compliance. Although the petitioner notes that 
licensees would be able to adopt other approaches to comply with the 
proposed rule, it realizes that the burden of demonstrating the 
adequacy of an alternative approach would be on the licensee.
    The petitioner indicates that many of the prescriptive requirements 
in Appendix R, such as administrative controls, fire barrier 
penetration seals, and fire doors, would be removed. Also, the 
distinction between hot and cold shutdown ability and the requirement 
for 72-hour cold shutdown would be removed because the petitioner 
believes these requirements would no longer be applicable. The term 
``safe shutdown'' as applied in the proposed rule would apply to both 
hot and cold shutdown functions. The petitioner believes that the 
proposed rule provides an opportunity for licensees to incorporate the 
advances in fire protection technology that have occurred after the 
current rule was enacted. As an example, the petitioner provides the 
requirements for fire hose materials and testing that cannot be altered 
under the current rule without a specific exemption granted by the NRC. 
The petitioner believes that the proposed rule provides an opportunity 
to revise fire hose testing to take into account material improvements.
    The petitioner states that under the proposed rule, the licensee 
would maintain, in auditable form, all supporting analyses of 
alternatives to its fire protection programs instead of requiring the 
NRC staff to review and approve the alternatives. The petitioner 
believes that this type of approach would result in substantial 
reduction of required reviews by the NRC staff. The petitioner has 
concluded that under the proposed rule, NRC can effectively satisfy its 
responsibility of ensuring the public health and safety by monitoring 
licensee performance.
    The petitioner has included an appendix entitled ``Supplementary 
Analyses in Support of the Petition for Rulemaking,'' which contains 
analyses of issues that the NRC must consider, including the effect of 
the proposed action on the environment and small business entities, the 
paperwork required of those affected by the change, whether a 
regulatory analysis must be performed, and whether the backfit rule 
applies to this action.
    The NRC is soliciting public comment on the petition submitted by 
NEI that requests the changes to the regulations in 10 CFR part 50 as 
discussed below.

The Petitioner

    The petitioner is the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the 
organization responsible for establishing unified nuclear industry 
policy on matters affecting the nuclear energy industry. NEI's members 
include all utilities licensed to operate commercial nuclear power 
plants in the United States, nuclear plant designers, major architect/
engineering firms, fuel fabrication facilities, materials licensees, 
and other organizations and individuals involved in the nuclear energy 
industry.

Discussion of the Petition

    The petitioner has submitted this petition for rulemaking because 
it believes the current fire protection regulations for nuclear power 
plants are overly burdensome and prescriptive. The petitioner believes 
that the proposed Appendix S is more flexible in its application than 
the current Appendix R and fully meets the requirements in 10 CFR part 
50, Appendix A, GDC 3. Under the proposed rule, rather than a blanket 
requirement for the capability to shut down the plant within 72 hours, 
the licensee is required to have a cold shutdown capability or to 
demonstrate the ability to achieve and maintain hot shutdown until a 
cold shutdown path can be made available. The petitioner believes that 
the intent of the current fire protection requirement has been to 
ensure that plant operators can maintain control during a fire and 
safely shut down the plant. The petitioner states that the proposed 
rule preserves this intent without imposing an unnecessarily 
restrictive time limitation by recognizing the success of operating 
history and accumulated operator training and experience.
    The petitioner states that other prescriptive distinctions in the 
current regulation, such as the distinction between exposure and direct 
fires and between normal, alternate, and dedicated shutdown systems, 
are removed. Under the proposed rule, licensees must consider the plant 
fires that may be credible based on actual plant-specific conditions in 
demonstrating that the plant could be safely shut down in the event of 
a fire. The petitioner believes that this action could be achieved 
through any available means by utilizing either redundancy in safe 
shutdown equipment or diversity of shutdown methods. The petitioner has 
concluded that this approach is more flexible than the current 
requirements and is consistent with the intent of the current 
regulation.
    The petitioner states that the general requirements section of the 
rule remains essentially unchanged because the goals of the licensee's 
fire protection program are the same. The reference to ``alternative or 
dedicated shutdown'' is removed because the petitioner believes that 
the overall intent to provide redundancy or diversity in shutdown 
methods is reflected throughout the revised rule.
    The petitioner states that the proposed rule describes the fire 
main as a ``system'' instead of a ``fire loop.'' The petitioner 
believes that this distinction allows licensees to provide water for 
fire suppression in the most practical manner without a requirement for 
a specific loop design. The petitioner has concluded that as a general 
principal the imposition of specific design requirements is overly 
prescriptive. The petitioner believes that by placing the discussion of 
appropriate design features in a guidance document, the 
[[Page 29787]] licensee will have the flexibility to design new systems 
or modify current systems to more effectively meet the same performance 
criteria. The proposed rule replaces the current 2-hour supply 
requirement with a requirement to demonstrate the availability of a 
water supply sufficient to protect the safe shutdown capability, as 
determined by the fire hazards analysis. The petitioner believes that 
this change provides flexibility in selecting water sources while 
ensuring that these sources are functionally available.
    The petitioner has proposed that the current language describing 
``outside'' hydrants be clarified by replacing the term with ``exterior 
plant'' to reflect the requirement that valves be installed for 
hydrants located outside plant buildings. The petitioner believes that 
this emphasis on performance capability is consistent with NRC staff 
positions in Generic Letter 86-10 and exemptions granted to date, as 
well as the Statement of Consideration in the original rulemaking of 
Appendix R. Also, the limitations of the current rule to ``exposure 
fire hazards'' are removed because the petitioner believes that the 
proposed rule addresses all fires, not just exposure fires. The 
petitioner indicated that specific detailed requirements for testing 
manual fire suppression systems are also removed because they are more 
properly dealt with in the proposed guidance document.
    The petitioner believes that the flexibility provided by the 
proposed alternatives to the current requirements allows licensees to 
direct their resources more efficiently and is expected to result in an 
appreciable economic benefit to licensees while maintaining adequate 
protection. The petitioner claims that accounting for material 
improvements in design and manufacture of fire hoses can substantially 
reduce the frequency of hose testing and will result in a $16,000-per-
year cost reduction at a two-unit plant. The petitioner states that 
because detailed provisions for hydrostatic hose tests are more 
properly included in the proposed guidance document, no need exists for 
an explicit requirement in the proposed rule.
    The petitioner states that the focus of the current regulation on 
automatic detection ``systems'' is made more flexible by specifying 
automatic detection ``capability'' where determined necessary by the 
fire hazards analysis. However, the petitioner also indicates that the 
requirement for detection capability with or without offsite power has 
been retained in the proposed rule. The petitioner indicates that the 
guidance document is expected to identify pertinent National Fire 
Protection Association (NFPA) codes and standards for the design, 
installation, maintenance, testing, and power supplies for automatic 
detection systems.
    The petitioner states that the section on protecting the safe 
shutdown capability from fire in the current rule has been to ensure 
that the safe shutdown capability is not lost as a result of a single 
fire. The petitioner also notes that three alternative requirements in 
the current rule, including physical separation, provision of a 3-hour 
barrier, or provision of a 1-hour barrier with automatic suppression, 
were established to achieve this goal. The petitioner states that the 
focus of fire protection for the safe shutdown capability is broadened 
to the protection of the safety function rather than maintaining the 
narrow focus on prescribed fire barrier ratings. The petitioner 
believes that the proposed language allows a licensee to satisfy 
Section III.G. of Appendix S by demonstrating the adequacy of its 
defense-in-depth program rather than satisfying the prescriptive 
requirements of the current regulation. The prescriptive requirements 
are replaced by the requirement to perform an engineering analysis or 
use the combination of engineering and probabilistic assessments to 
demonstrate that adequate time is available to complete the safety 
function of bringing the facility to a safe shutdown condition.
    The petitioner believes that the net effect of making this type of 
approach part of a licensee's fire protection program is that the 
proposed rule removes the resource demand on licensees and the NRC 
staff to prepare and review, respectively, as an exemption any 
alternative proposed to the 1-hour and 3-hour barrier requirements. 
Under the proposed rule, the licensee would perform the appropriate 
evaluation using current analytical tools to demonstrate functionality 
rather than filing an exemption request based on a deterministic 
evaluation of the installed defense-in-depth features.
    The petitioner states that the original rule adopted the design-
basis protection feature because the initiation and propagation of fire 
was still believed to be so unpredictable at that time that the design-
basis fire approach was considered to be impractical. However, today 
various fire modeling techniques, such as those used in the EPRI FIVE 
methodology and those developed by the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology and by the Factory Mutual Research Center, are available 
to predict the initiation and propagation of fires with a reasonable 
degree of confidence. The petitioner believes that the proposed rule 
allows licensees flexibility in evaluating anticipated fire loadings in 
an area because of the awareness of the existing fire hazards and the 
determination of fire barrier performance requirements by recognized 
competent fire initiation and propagation models. The petitioner claims 
that instead of focusing on a specific aspect such as fire barrier 
rating, under the proposed rule, the licensee will be able to more 
effectively utilize these fire protection features to protect the safe 
shutdown capability. The petitioner has concluded that installing a 1-
hour or 3-hour rated fire barrier becomes less important in terms of 
the effectiveness of the fire protection program because it is only one 
factor that will be considered in a more comprehensive program than 
currently exists.
    The petitioner states that in many circumstances automatic 
suppression, along with 1-hour barriers, may not be necessary in some 
existing plant designs for protection of the safe shutdown capability. 
The petitioner notes that the in situ combustible loading in an area 
might be so low that any fire that might occur would be of limited 
duration, extent, and magnitude. The petitioner believes that existing 
protective features other than automatic suppression might be capable 
of protecting the safe shutdown equipment until a suitable manual 
response could be provided. The proposed rule would permit removal of 
the requirements for surveillance, maintenance, and testing of 
unnecessary suppression systems, which the petitioner believes would 
save approximately $12,000 a year for a typical two-unit plant.
    The petitioner also notes that the probability for core damage as a 
result of various events is being assessed by licensees under the 
Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) programs. 
Under these programs, licensees must address plant vulnerabilities, 
including the detrimental effects of fires. The petitioner believes 
that the current rule severely restricts a licensee's ability to 
effectively address these effects under the IPEEE programs in stating 
that the proposed rule would provide needed flexibility to allow these 
vulnerabilities to be effectively addressed. The petitioner has 
concluded that Section III.G. of Appendix S is not limited to defining 
specific fire barrier [[Page 29788]] effectiveness in isolation from 
the overall consideration of system functional availability. The 
petitioner claims that the proposed rule provides additional measures 
to achieve the overall performance objective of ensuring protection of 
the safe shutdown function in the event of a single fire, consistent 
with the intent of the current regulation.
    The petitioner recognizes that fire brigade training must still 
include initial and routine practical training and drills. However, the 
petitioner believes that the proposed rule removes the detailed 
prescriptive requirements and addresses those matters in the proposed 
guidance document to provide flexibility to licensees in the 
implementation of the proposed rule. The petitioner has concluded that 
the cost savings of using alternative fire brigade training methods 
rather than following the specific training requirements of the current 
rule would be about $12,000 a year at a two-unit plant.
    The petitioner notes that the current requirements for emergency 
lighting specify the same lighting for all areas, no matter how little 
the lighting is used. The proposed rule would require the licensee to 
evaluate what lighting would be necessary for achieving safe shutdown 
and to provide sufficient lighting capacity to support that safe 
shutdown if the postulated fire could credibly result in the loss of 
normal and essential lighting consistent with previously granted 
exemptions. The petitioner believes that implementation of the proposed 
rule would result in appreciable cost savings to licensees of about 
$17,000 a year for a two-unit plant.
    Although the proposed rule does not contain the detailed 
administrative requirements of the current rule, the petitioner states 
that it outlines the scope of the controls to include use, storage, and 
disposal of combustible and flammable materials and ignition sources, 
review of work activities, inspections, and emergency planning. The 
petitioner believes that the proposed rule would provide a more 
resource-efficient method of area monitoring and estimates that the 
cost savings from removing the need for currently required work permits 
would be about $45,000 a year.
    The petitioner states that the proposed rule differs from the 
current rule with respect to shutdown path capability in that it 
permits the licensee to take advantage of the extensive operational 
experience with fire protection, prior NRC determinations, and the 
significant developments in fire sciences in providing appropriate fire 
protection for the equipment. The proposed rule follows the guidance of 
Generic Letter 86-10 and previously granted exemptions to Appendix R in 
order to allow licensees greater flexibility in satisfying 10 CFR Part 
50, Appendix A, GDC 3. The petitioner states that because a licensee 
selecting an alternative under the revised rule must demonstrate the 
adequacy of the alternative selected, the NRC staff would continue to 
evaluate the shutdown path capability through audits of licensee 
programs.
    The petitioner believes that the current requirement to 
categorically assume a loss of offsite power either concurrently with 
or within 72 hours of a fire anywhere in the plant is overly 
conservative and unnecessarily prescriptive. Because the petitioner has 
concluded that only a relatively small set of postulated plant fire 
scenarios could result in or occur with a simultaneous loss of power, 
the proposed rule requires that licensees demonstrate their ability to 
safely shut down the plant without offsite power for only those 
postulated fires. The petitioner claims that the NRC staff has 
acknowledged that the 72-hour requirement is somewhat arbitrary and has 
granted an exemption if a licensee demonstrated the capability to 
achieve cold shutdown in more than 72 hours utilizing only offsite 
power. The petitioner believes that the proposed rule satisfies the 
safe shutdown objective by placing the plant in a controlled and stable 
condition as defined in the technical specifications until cold 
shutdown can be achieved. The petitioner has concluded that the 
flexibility incorporated into the proposed rule would allow a licensee 
to safely shut down the plant in an orderly manner by using familiar, 
tested procedures. The petitioner has also concluded that the revised 
requirements would allow licensees to adopt alternatives that would 
result in potential cost savings.
    The petitioner states that the proposed rule provides an 
alternative to the detailed penetration seal test acceptance criteria 
contained in the current rule. The proposed rule would require 
licensees to demonstrate that the penetration seal either meets the 
same endurance rating as the barrier in which it is contained or is 
adequate to withstand the fire hazards in the area for the time 
necessary for the equipment to perform its safety function. The 
petitioner has also concluded that the current regulation contains an 
unnecessarily prescriptive requirement to inspect fire doors 
semiannually to verify their operability. The proposed rule would 
remove the inspection schedule and criteria from the rule and provide 
licensees the flexibility to choose the most appropriate method for a 
particular fire door. The petitioner believes that although protection 
against fire in the reactor coolant pump lubricating oil system in a 
noninerted containment is to be maintained, even considering the 
possibility of a safe shutdown earthquake, measures to ensure this 
protection should be based on the licensee's hazards assessment.
The Petitioner's Proposed Amendment

    The petitioner requests that 10 CFR Part 50 be amended to overcome 
the problems the petitioner has itemized and recommends the following 
revisions to the regulations:
    1. The petitioner proposes that Sec. 50.48 be amended by deleting 
paragraph (e) and by revising paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) to read as 
follows:

Section 50.48  Fire Protection Requirements

* * * * *
    (b) Appendix R to this part, as promulgated on November 19, 1980, 
and amended May 27, 1988, established fire protection features required 
to satisfy Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part with respect to 
certain generic issues for nuclear power plants licensed to operate 
before January 1, 1979. Except for the requirements of Sections III.G., 
III.J., and III.O., the provisions of Appendix R to this part did not 
apply to nuclear power plants licensed to operate before January 1, 
1979, to the extent that fire protection features proposed or 
implemented by the licensee have been accepted by the NRC staff as 
satisfying the provisions of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position 
BTP APCSB 9.5-1 1 reflected in staff fire protection safety 
evaluation reports issued before the effective date of this rule, or to 
the extent that fire protection features were accepted by the staff in 
comprehensive fire protection safety evaluation reports issued before 
[[Page 29789]] Appendix A to Branch Technical Position BTP APCSB 9.5-1 
was published in August 1976. With respect to all other fire protection 
features covered by Appendix R, all nuclear power plants licensed to 
operate before January 1, 1979, have been required to satisfy the 
applicable requirements of Appendix R to this part, including 
specifically the requirements of Sections III.G., III.J., and III.O.

    \1\ Clarification and guidance with respect to permissible 
alternatives to satisfy Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 has been 
provided in five other NRC documents:
    ``Supplementary Guidance on Information Needed for Fire 
Protection Evaluation,'' dated October 21, 1976.
    ``Sample Technical Specification,'' dated May 12, 1977.
    ``Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, 
Administrative Control and Quality Assurance,'' dated June 14, 1977.
    ``Manpower Requirements for Operating Reactors,'' dated May 11, 
1978.
    ``Generic Letter 85-01, Fire Protection Policy Steering 
Committee Report,'' dated January 9, 1985.
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    (c) Nuclear power plants licensed to operate after January 1, 1979, 
meet the requirements of Appendix R, as promulgated on November 19, 
1980, and amended May 27, 1988, and satisfy Criterion 3 of Appendix A 
to this part by providing fire protection programs in accordance with 
the provisions of their licenses.
    (d) Appendix S to this part provides an alternative method to 
satisfy fire protection requirements. Licensees may continue to comply 
with Appendix R, or they may utilize, in whole or in part, the 
requirements of Appendix S for any matter for which there is a 
corresponding specific topic in the licensee's fire protection program. 
This substitution may be exercised by all licensees regardless of the 
issuance date of their license to operate. Any alteration of a plant's 
existing fire protection program pursuant to this regulation shall be 
documented to demonstrate that the changes adopted do not alter the 
ability of the fire protection program to provide the capability to 
safely shut down and maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition in 
the event of a single fire. The licensee shall document adoption of any 
substitution provided by Appendix S, where applicable, in the 
licensee's fire protection program documentation package. All 
exemptions to Appendix R previously granted to licensees apply in full 
under the terms of Appendix S.
    2. The petitioner proposes that a new Appendix S be added to 10 CFR 
Part 50 to read as follows:

Appendix S to Part 50--Fire Protection Performance at Nuclear Power 
Facilities

I. Introduction and Scope

    This appendix applies to all licensed nuclear power electric 
generating stations as set forth in Sec. 50.48. This appendix sets 
forth the objectives and criteria which constitute a fire protection 
program adequate for meeting GDC 3 of Appendix A to this part. The 
specific paragraphs of this appendix have been formatted to parallel 
those of Appendix R to this part, with corresponding paragraph 
headings. Paragraphs E. and I. have been intentionally left blank and 
are reserved because there is no provision in this appendix that 
corresponds to these sections in Appendix R to Part 50.
    Criterion 3 of Appendix A to Part 50 specifies that ``Structures, 
systems, and components important to safety shall be designed and 
located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the 
probability and effect of fires and explosions.''
    This regulation applies to equipment and functions designated as 
necessary to achieve and maintain safe plant shutdown in the event of a 
single fire in the plant. The terms ``as needed'' and ``as necessary'' 
are used interchangeably throughout this appendix. The phrase ``safe 
shutdown'' will be used throughout this appendix as applying to safely 
shutting the plant down and maintaining it in a safe shutdown condition 
at either a hot or cold shutdown condition.
    Because fire may affect safe shutdown systems, and because the loss 
of function of systems used to mitigate the consequences of design-
basis accidents under post-fire conditions does not per se impact 
public safety, the need to limit fire damage to systems required to 
achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions is greater than the need 
to limit fire damage to those systems required to mitigate the 
consequences of design-basis accidents.
    The licensee shall ensure that a safe shutdown path is or can be 
made available to bring the plant to cold shutdown in the event of a 
single fire in the plant. If a cold shutdown condition cannot be 
reached, it must be demonstrated that a hot shutdown can be achieved 
and maintained until a cold shutdown path is available. The terms 
``trains'' and ``paths'' are used throughout this regulation to signify 
any method of shutdown.
    Repairs and/or replacements may be instituted to either hot or cold 
shutdown paths as long as it can be demonstrated, for example, through 
procedures that such repairs and/or replacements can be conducted 
within a timeframe commensurate with assuring safe shutdown of the 
plant and consistent with the plant's technical specifications. 
Redundant systems used to mitigate the consequences of design-basis 
accidents but not necessary for safe shutdown may be lost to a single 
fire.
II. General Requirements

    A. Fire protection program. A fire protection program shall be 
established at each nuclear power plant to provide reasonable assurance 
that structures, systems, and components necessary to safely shut the 
plant down are capable of fulfilling their intended functions in the 
event of a single fire. The program shall establish the fire protection 
policy for the protection of structures, systems, and components that 
are necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a 
single fire, and the procedures, equipment, and personnel required to 
implement the program at the plant.
    The fire protection program shall be under the direction of an 
individual who has been delegated authority commensurate with the 
responsibilities of the position and who has available personnel 
knowledgeable in both fire protection and nuclear safety. Appropriate 
combinations of fire protection features should be provided to ensure 
the functional availability of the required safe shutdown equipment 
located in a fire area. The fire protection program shall extend the 
concept of defense-in-depth to fire protection areas important to 
safety, with the following objectives:
     To prevent fires from starting;
     To detect rapidly, control, and extinguish promptly those 
fires that do occur; and
     To provide protection for structures, systems, and 
components needed for safe shutdown so that a single fire in the plant 
that is not promptly extinguished by the fire suppression activities 
will not prevent the safe shutdown of the plant.
    B. Fire hazards analysis. A fire hazards analysis shall be 
performed by fire protection and reactor systems engineers, as 
necessary, to:
    1. Consider potential in situ and transient fire hazards;
    2. Determine the consequences of fire in any location in the plant 
on the ability to safely shut down the reactor or on the ability to 
minimize and control the release of radioactivity to the environment; 
and
    3. Specify measures for fire prevention, detection, suppression, 
and containment and shutdown capability as required for each fire area 
containing structures, systems, and components necessary to achieve and 
maintain safe shutdown.
    C. Fire protection features. Fire protection features shall meet 
the following general requirements for all fire areas that contain or 
present a fire hazard to structures, systems, or components that are 
necessary to ensure that safe plant shutdown in the event of a fire can 
be achieved and maintained:
    1. In situ fire hazards shall be identified and suitable protection 
provided. [[Page 29790]] 
    2. Transient fire hazards associated with normal operation, 
maintenance, repair, or modification activities shall be identified and 
eliminated where possible. Those transient fire hazards that cannot be 
eliminated shall be controlled and suitable protection provided.
    3. Surveillance procedures shall be established to ensure that fire 
barriers are in place and that fire suppression systems are capable of 
performing their intended functions, as necessary to support safe plant 
shutdown in the event of a fire.

III. Specific Requirements

    A. Water supplies for fire suppression systems. Two redundant water 
supplies shall be provided to furnish necessary water volume and 
pressure to the fire main system. Either redundant suctions from a 
single large body of water or redundant water storage tanks may be 
employed in meeting this requirement. These supplies shall be situated 
such that a failure of one supply will not result in failure of the 
other supply. Each supply of the fire water distribution system shall 
be capable of providing the maximum expected water demands as justified 
by an assessment of the fire hazards in the area. Other water systems 
used as one of the two fire water supplies shall be permanently 
connected to the fire main system and shall be capable of automatic 
alignment to the fire main system. The use of other water systems for 
fire protection shall not be incompatible with their functions required 
for safe plant shutdown. Failure of the other system shall not degrade 
the fire main system.
    B. Sectional isolation valves. Sectional isolation valves shall be 
installed in the fire main system to permit isolation of portions of 
the fire main system for maintenance or repair without interrupting the 
entire water supply.
    C. Hydrant isolation valves. Valves shall be installed to permit 
isolation of exterior plant hydrants from the fire main for maintenance 
or repair without interrupting the water supply to automatic or manual 
fire suppression systems in any area containing or presenting a fire 
hazard to safe shutdown equipment, to the extent that it can be assured 
that the plant can be safely shut down in the event of a single fire.
    D. Manual fire suppression. Standpipe and hose systems shall be 
installed and maintained so that at least one effective hose stream 
will be able to reach any location that contains or presents a fire 
hazard to structures, systems, or components as necessary to ensure 
safe plant shutdown. Access to permit effective functioning of the fire 
brigade shall be provided to all areas that contain or present a fire 
hazard to structures, systems, or components that could impact 
successful safe plant shutdown.
    E. [Reserved]
    F. Automatic fire detection. Automatic fire detection capability 
shall be installed in areas of the plant that contain or present any 
fire hazard to safe shutdown systems or components, as determined by 
fire hazard analyses of these areas. These fire detection capabilities 
shall be capable of operating with or without offsite power.
    G. Fire protection of safe shutdown capability. A fire protection 
program shall be instituted to ensure the functional availability of 
necessary and sufficient equipment to provide for safe shutdown in the 
event of a single fire in the plant. Engineering analysis or a 
combination of engineering and probabilistic safety assessments should 
be used to provide a technical understanding of fire hazards in a 
particular area. Appropriate combinations of fire barriers, physical 
separation, fire detection, fixed or automatic fire suppression, manual 
actions, repairs or replacements, administrative controls, and other 
means, as necessary, to ensure the functional availability of the 
required safe shutdown equipment located in that fire area should be 
provided. The effects of damage from fire suppression activities or 
rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems shall be 
considered for redundant shutdown paths.
    H. Fire brigade. A site fire brigade trained and equipped for fire 
fighting shall be established to ensure adequate manual fire-fighting 
capability for all areas of the plant containing structures, systems, 
or components important to safety, as necessary, to assure safe plant 
shutdown in the event of a fire. Training shall include initial and 
routine practical training, drills, and demonstrations on how to fight 
live fires.
    I. [Reserved]
    J. Emergency lighting. Emergency lighting units shall be provided 
with sufficient capacity to allow for any necessary manual operation of 
safe shutdown equipment and for access and egress routes thereto, where 
the postulated fire may result in the loss of normal and essential 
lighting.
    K. Administrative controls. Administrative controls shall be 
established to minimize fire hazards in areas containing structures, 
systems, and components necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown 
in the event of a fire. Measures shall be established to govern the 
use, storage, and disposal of in situ and transient combustible and 
flammable materials, control the use of ignition sources, review 
proposed work activities to identify potential fire hazards and assure 
appropriate fire prevention is applied, perform periodic fire 
prevention inspections, and plan for fire emergencies.
    L. Shutdown Path Capability. 1. Shutdown path equipment shall be 
able to (a) Achieve and maintain subcritical reactivity conditions in 
the reactor; (b) maintain reactor coolant inventory; (c) achieve and 
maintain hot standby conditions for a PWR or hot shutdown conditions 
for a BWR, as defined in the plant's Technical Specifications, until 
cold shutdown path equipment can be made available; (d) achieve cold 
shutdown conditions; and (e) maintain cold shutdown conditions 
thereafter. During the post-fire shutdown, the reactor coolant system 
process variables shall be controlled commensurate with parameters in 
the plant's emergency operating procedures, and the fission product 
boundary integrity shall not be affected (i.e., there shall be no fuel 
clad damage, rupture of any primary coolant boundary, or rupture of the 
containment boundary). Support equipment necessary to assure control of 
these capabilities shall also be addressed in the plant's safe shutdown 
analysis.
    2. The shutdown capability shall be demonstrated to provide its 
required function and shall accommodate anticipated post-fire 
conditions. When fire in the area may cause interruption of the offsite 
power supply, safe shutdown capability shall be demonstrated using 
onsite power not affected by the fire in the area. Procedures shall be 
in effect to implement this capability.
    3. If the capability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown will not 
be available because of fire damage, the equipment and systems 
comprising the means to achieve and maintain the hot standby or hot 
shutdown conditions shall be capable of maintaining such conditions 
until cold shutdown can be achieved. If such equipment and systems will 
not be functionally capable of being powered by either onsite or 
offsite electric power systems, as deemed necessary by the specific 
scenarios considered, because of fire damage, an independent onsite 
power system shall be provided. The number of operating shift 
personnel, exclusive of fire brigade members, required to operate such 
equipment and systems [[Page 29791]] shall be available in accordance 
with the site emergency plan.
    4. Equipment and systems comprising the means to achieve and 
maintain cold shutdown conditions shall not be functionally damaged by 
fire; or the fire damage to such equipment and systems shall be limited 
so that the systems can be made operable and cold shutdown can be 
achieved. Materials for such repairs shall be readily available and 
procedures shall be in effect to implement such repairs. If such 
equipment and systems used after the fire will not be capable of being 
powered by either onsite (when conditions warrant) or offsite electric 
power systems because of fire damage, an independent onsite power 
system shall be provided.
    5. Shutdown systems installed to ensure post-fire shutdown 
capability need not be designed to meet seismic Category I criteria, 
single-failure criteria, or other design-basis accident criteria, 
except where required for other reasons (e.g., because of interface 
with or impact on existing safety systems).
    6. The safe shutdown equipment and systems for each fire area shall 
be known to be isolated from associated circuits in the fire area so 
that hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground in the associated 
circuits will not prevent operation of the safe shutdown equipment.
    7. For those fire scenarios that do not result in or from a loss of 
offsite power (LOOP), plant shutdown may rely on available offsite 
power sources. Since a relationship could be defined between fire 
scenarios and a LOOP, the LOOP time duration would reflect appropriate 
repair/replacement times associated with the scenario.
    M. Fire barrier cable penetration seal qualification. Penetration 
seals, when deemed necessary for installation, shall have fire 
resistance duration ratings comparable to that of the fire barriers 
they penetrate or adequate to withstand the fire hazards in the area as 
determined by engineering analysis.
    N. Fire doors. Fire doors shall be ensured to be closed when 
necessary during a fire.
    O. Associated scenarios. Postulated fires or fire protection system 
failures need not be considered concurrent with other plant accidents 
or the most severe natural phenomena. However, the effects of a Safe 
Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) on the reactor coolant pump in a containment 
that is not inerted during normal plant operation shall be addressed in 
accordance with paragraph III.G.

The Petitioner's Conclusion

    The petitioner has concluded that fire protection requirements 
specified in 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R should be modified because the 
current requirements are overly burdensome and prescriptive. The 
petitioner believes that the past 20 years of expertise gained by the 
NRC and the nuclear industry in fire protection for nuclear power 
plants will permit licensees to implement more flexible, site-specific 
alternatives to the current requirements. The petitioner has proposed 
an amendment to the current regulations in 10 CFR Part 50 that it 
believes will permit more flexible and cost-effective fire protection 
requirements at nuclear power plants without adversely affecting the 
ability of the licensee to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition 
in the event of a fire.

Specific Areas for Public Comment

    In addition to commenting on the petition for rulemaking (petition) 
presented above, the NRC staff is soliciting specific comments on the 
issues presented below. Because the NRC staff has not yet developed its 
positions on the petition, it is soliciting these comments to obtain 
information that it will use in to develop its regulatory positions and 
approaches for a performance-oriented, risk-based fire protection 
rulemaking.
1. Scope
    (a) Petition's focus only on the overall safety objective to safely 
shut down the plant in the event of a fire.
    The current safety objective of the NRC's fire protection 
regulations is focused on providing reasonable assurance that damage 
from a single fire is limited such that one train of systems necessary 
to achieve and maintain safe shutdown (hot shutdown) is free from fire 
damage, and damage to other important safety structures, systems, and 
components is minimized. The petitioner has proposed a fire protection 
rule which focuses only on the safety objective to achieve and maintain 
safe plant shutdown in the event of a single fire, and proposed that 
other safety functions not related to safe shutdown in the event of a 
fire be addressed elsewhere in NRC regulations. The NRC staff is 
seeking public comment on the petitioner's proposal to limit the 
proposed rule to provide fire protection to only those systems 
necessary to achieve and maintain safe plant shutdown, and address 
other safety functions for fires (those not addressing safe shutdown) 
elsewhere in NRC regulations or through industrial safety standards and 
requirements from nuclear insurers that provide for protection against 
property loss, or whether the proposed rule should include requirements 
for all safety functions related to fire protection. If other safety 
functions should be addressed elsewhere in NRC regulations, what are 
these safety functions, and where in NRC regulations and how should 
they be addressed? If some safety functions are addressed through 
industrial safety standards, and requirements from nuclear insurers, 
should and how will NRC enforce these requirements?
    The current NRC fire protection regulations are based on extending 
the concept of defense-in-depth to fire protection in areas that 
contain structures, systems, and components not required for safe 
shutdown but are important to safety. The defense-in-depth objectives 
are:
    (1) To prevent fires from starting;
    (2) To detect rapidly, control, and extinguish promptly those fires 
that do occur; and
    (3) To provide protection for structures, systems, and components 
important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by 
the fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe shutdown of 
the plant.
    Current NRC regulations specifies the minimum requirements for each 
of these objectives. These objectives establish diversity in fire 
safety. Strengthening any one of these objectives can compensate for 
known weaknesses or uncertainties in plant fire protection features and 
program controls. The proposed rule limits the defense-in-depth concept 
to only those plant areas needed to shutdown the reactor from full 
power conditions. The NRC staff is seeking public comments whether the 
limitations of the petitioner's proposed rule is justified or if a 
revised regulation should establish a fire protection program based on 
the defense-in-depth concept for all plant areas that are important to 
safety.
    The petitioner states that the proposed rule provides for licensees 
and NRC resources to be better focused to those activities most 
directly related to protection of the public health and safety. This 
can be accomplished by focusing resources toward the objective of 
achieving and maintaining safe shutdown in the unlikely event of a 
fire. Also, the use of a PRA allows the determination of protection 
features in each fire area as opposed to equal treatment of fire areas 
without consideration of risk significance. The NRC staff solicits 
further details, with specific examples, on the extent 
[[Page 29792]] elimination or relaxation of requirements marginal to 
safety in the fire area and if the use of a PRA will result in better 
focus and coherence in NRC's regulations.
    (b) Exclusion of new requirements beyond the scope of the current 
regulations.
    The proposed rule does not consider current fire safety issues that 
are beyond the scope of the current NRC fire protection regulations. 
For example, the proposed rule does not address the lessons learned 
from the results of individual plant external event examinations 
(IPEEE) and research, or concerns regarding personnel life safety, 
resolution of fire protection related generic safety issues (e.g., 
earthquake induced fires), operating experience (nuclear and related 
industries), performance criteria for compensatory measures, quality 
assurance, and consideration of fire-related risks during shutdown 
conditions and plant decommissioning.
    Given the history of difficulty and low success rate for attempts 
to resolve new safety issues simultaneously with improvements to 
regulatory efficiency, the Commission approved an NRC staff policy for 
separating regulatory actions for new safety issues from those for 
improving regulatory efficiency. (See SECY-94-090, 
``Institutionalization of Continuing Program for Regulatory 
Improvement,'' March 31, 1994). Specifically, the Commission approved a 
plan for fire protection rulemaking in which new safety issues that may 
arise as a result of implementing the Fire Protection Task Action Plan, 
would be evaluated, and backfit requirements developed, separate and 
independent from efforts to improve regulatory efficiency in the fire 
protection area. If necessary and appropriate, performance-based 
approaches would be used to promulgate new requirements justified by a 
backfit analysis.
    The NRC staff is soliciting public comment on the above Commission-
approved policy, and whether the policy should be maintained in the 
fire protection area, or if the staff should seek Commission approval 
to deviate from the established policy to simultaneously promulgate 
modifications to improve the efficiency of the regulation, and new 
requirements in the same rulemaking. If the commenter believes the NRC 
should promulgate new requirements, separately or simultaneously with 
modifications to improve regulatory efficiency, which of the areas 
cited above or others should the NRC address? Technical justifications 
or bases that support the recommendation for NRC to address specific 
issues are also requested.
    2. Safety-Neutral: Demonstration that the proposal is ``safety-
neutral.''
    The petitioner claims that the proposed rule will reduce the 
regulatory burden on licensees without in any way reducing the 
protection to the public health and safety that the NRC's regulations 
provide. Because the guidance documents are not yet available, it is 
not clear how the petition, if accepted, would impact risk. The 
petition does not include a demonstration of how the proposed rule 
achieves an equivalent level of fire safety to that currently 
established by plants having a current NRC-approved fire protection 
program that meets the current regulations. The NRC staff is seeking 
public comments on details on the implementation of the proposed rule 
and the mechanism for licensees to demonstrate that alternative fire 
protection approaches allowed by the proposed rule, while reducing 
burden, will have no significant adverse effect on plant risk compared 
to that achieved by current NRC fire protection regulations. 
Specifically, the NRC staff is soliciting a supporting technical 
demonstration, including risk-based analysis, that justifies exclusions 
or relaxations in its fire protection requirements. For example, how 
will the focus of requirements for safe shutdown in the proposed rule 
and exclusion of requirements for structures, systems, and components 
(SSCs) important to safety result in an overall equivalent level of 
safety?
    3. Implementation Guidance: Extent that judgement can be made on 
petition given the absence of an industry guideline, and the 
demonstration of the application of advanced methods in the fire 
sciences and PRA.
    The proposed rule allows the use of fire modeling and risk 
assessment techniques, but does not include regulatory requirements or 
a guidance document that would specify methods and criteria for 
verifying and validating these methods. Experimental data that supports 
models that predict fire growth in large compartments and the 
corresponding potential for damage to nuclear power plant SSCs are not 
cited. In addition, a verification and validation or approval process 
for these fire models for application at nuclear power plants has not 
been proposed as yet by the petitioner.
    The petition contends that the proposed rule would provide an 
opportunity for licensees to incorporate the advances in fire sciences 
and Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) technology that have occurred 
since the current rule was promulgated. The NRC solicits information on 
details and specific examples of these advances in fire sciences and 
PRAs in the nuclear and other industries in the United States and other 
countries, and how these could be utilized in the U.S. nuclear power 
industry to increase innovation and the efficiency of NRC's regulations 
for fire protection. Comments on the applicability of the methods cited 
in the petition, e.g., EPRI FIVE methodology, and information and 
examples of application in specific areas of nuclear power plant fire 
protection regulations is requested. Also, to what extent should prior 
review and approval of these techniques by the NRC staff be required 
before application by a licensee, and to ensure consistent application, 
should a licensee's compliance with these alternatives be reviewed and 
approved by the NRC before implementation? Alternatively, is licensee 
certification of the verification, validation, and applicability of 
these new methods for the intended application sufficient to ensure 
quality of the techniques utilized in the analysis? In view of the fact 
that the proposed rule allows the use of new fire modeling and risk 
assessment techniques, to what extent should the methods and criteria 
for verifying, validating, and applying these models and methods be 
specified in the new performance-oriented, risk-based regulation rather 
than a guidance document?
    4. Process for Burden Relief: Extent to which the rule revision is 
the preferred mechanism for providing the burden relief sought by the 
petitioner compared to moving the fire protection program to a Safety 
Analysis Report.
    Currently, by implementing the guidance provided in Generic Letter 
(GL) 86-10, ``Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements'' (April 
24, 1986), licensees can, under 10 CFR 50.59 accomplish many of the 
items specified in the proposed rule. As examples, licensees who have 
adopted the standard fire protection license condition specified in GL 
86-10, can:
    (1) Change surveillance testing of fire suppression and detection 
systems, fire hose testing, etc., without prior NRC approval provided 
the changes do not have an adverse impact on safety; and
    (2) Evaluate the adequacy of fire area boundaries by assessing the 
fire hazards in the area.
    The NRC staff is seeking public comments regarding the benefits of 
a new fire protection rule to realize the objectives stated by the 
petitioner. Specifically, what would be the benefits [[Page 29793]] and 
advantages of a revised regulation for providing the regulatory relief 
sought by the petitioner when compared to mechanisms such as those 
cited above, that are already available? Detailed and specific 
information on the added flexibility in the different areas of NRC fire 
protection regulations, and the resulting benefits and cost savings as 
a result of a performance-based fire regulation is solicited.
    The petitioner states that no significant NRC staff resources are 
expected to be necessary for the proposed rule to ensure continued 
acceptability of licensee fire protection programs. The proposed rule 
would allow licensees to have the option of demonstrating that they 
provide adequate protection against postulated fire hazards without 
having to submit an exemption and the resultant of consumption of NRC 
staff and licensee resources. The NRC staff is seeking public comments 
regarding if and how this proposed rule will reduce the regulatory 
resources needed to evaluate an alternative approach's safety 
equivalency and ensure its proper implementation.
    5. Content of Performance-Oriented and Risk-Based Regulation: Level 
of detail and the inclusion of risk-based safety objectives in a 
revised regulation.
    The petitioner proposes an alternative 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix S, 
which replaces most of the prescriptive fire protection features 
presently specified in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, with functional 
safety objectives and acceptance criteria in each area of Appendix R 
which would be accompanied with guidance documents. Could the same 
intent be gained by modifying 10 CFR 50.48 to be performance-based with 
higher level safety objectives than those specified in Appendix S, 
providing guidance, and disposing of both Appendix R and Appendix S in 
their entirety, or are the functional safety objectives and acceptance 
criteria proposed in Appendix S accurate and at the right level for a 
performance-based regulation? Is an evolutionary approach which 
maintains the same structure of the regulation as in Appendix R, as 
proposed by the petitioner, preferred to a more comprehensive 
modification of NRC fire protection regulations and a high level 
performance-oriented, risk-based fire protection regulation.
    In SECY-94-090, the NRC staff stated that a performance-oriented 
approach establishes regulatory safety objectives which, to the extent 
feasible, will be risk-based. Petitioner contends that the proposed 
rule is performance-based in that the functionality of the safe 
shutdown equipment is the ultimate goal. Although the proposed rule, 
allows the use of PRA for determining fire protection features, it does 
not appear to have been developed from risk considerations and does not 
contain risk-based objectives which are related to safety goals. 
Implementation of the proposed rule would not explicitly require 
consideration of risk. The NRC staff is seeking public comments 
regarding the need for the proposed rule to establish risk-based safety 
objectives.
    The petitioner states that the overall approach of the proposed 
rule may be appropriately characterized as performance-based. The 
proposed rule would require licensees to establish measurable processes 
or parameters, as appropriate, to ensure that the adequacy of plant 
fire protection features in protecting the safe shutdown capability can 
be demonstrated, based on the plant-specific actual fire risk. The NRC 
solicits further detail and information on the nature of these 
parameters, and how they could be monitored to ensure adequacy of the 
protection features for fire risk.
    In addition, the petitioner contends that all previously granted 
exemptions from current NRC fire protection regulations would remain 
valid and would be exempted from the proposed rule. The NRC staff is 
requesting public comments regarding if and how previously granted 
exemptions should be exempted from the scope of a performance-based 
regulation.
    6. Voluntary Adoption in Whole or in Part: Extent to which 
licensees should be permitted to voluntarily adopt parts of a revised 
regulation.
    The Commission has approved an NRC staff policy (see SECY-94-090) 
in which any proposed revisions to existing regulations developed by 
the Regulatory Improvement Program would not be mandatory but would be 
proposed as alternatives (options) to existing requirements which may 
be voluntarily adopted by licensees. This policy was formulated because 
the main objective of the program is to increase regulatory efficiency 
and to recognize that many licensees have technical programs which they 
may not wish to modify.
    The petitioner has proposed an Appendix S to 10 CFR Part 50 which 
provides an alternative method to satisfy fire protection requirements. 
Licensees may continue to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, or 
they may utilize, in whole or in part, the requirements of Appendix S 
for any matter for which there is a corresponding specific topic in the 
licensee's fire protection program. This would provide licensees 
flexibility to revise its program when it determines it would be cost 
beneficial without modifying the entire fire protection program. The 
NRC staff is soliciting public comment on any challenges this partial 
adoption may present. For example, performance-oriented approaches need 
to ensure that the new regulation can be objectively inspected and 
enforced (SECY-94-090). The NRC staff resources to evaluate the 
licensees implementation of the proposed rule could exceed those 
required currently to enforce 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, and may make 
effective and consistent inspections and enforcement difficult. The NRC 
staff is requesting public comments on the pros and cons for adoption 
of a revised regulation partially, or in its entirety by a licensee.
    7. Allowable Repairs During Fire Events: Extent of allowable fire 
damage and repairs to one train needed for hot shutdown.
    One of the safety objectives of the current NRC fire protection 
regulations is to ensure that one train of systems necessary to achieve 
and maintain hot shutdown conditions will remain free of fire damage. 
The proposed rule would permit both trains of systems necessary to 
achieve and maintain hot shutdown to be damaged by a single fire if the 
functional availability of the required safe shutdown equipment located 
in the fire area is ensured.
    The safety objective of the current regulation is met by protecting 
the safe shutdown capability with the fire protection features 
specified in the rule. When this objective cannot be met, the current 
rule specifies that alternate or dedicated safe shutdown capability 
must be provided. The proposed rule replaces the prescriptive 
requirements to provide fire protection for safe shutdown capability or 
to provide alternative or dedicated safe shutdown capability with the 
requirement to perform an engineering analysis or use the combination 
of engineering and probabilistic assessments to demonstrate that 
adequate time is available to complete the safety function to bring the 
reactor to a safe shutdown condition. This approach would allow fire 
damage to redundant safe shutdown functions provided an analysis 
demonstrates that a sufficient quantity of shutdown equipment could be 
made ``functionally available'' (through repairs) in a time frame 
commensurate with assuring safe shutdown of the plant. The current 
regulations do not allow licensees to perform troubleshooting and make 
repairs in order to achieve and maintain post-fire safe (hot) shutdown 
conditions. Is the [[Page 29794]] petitioner's proposal acceptable or 
should the revised rule retain the performance goals established in the 
current rule for limiting fire damage so that one train of safe 
shutdown systems and components is free from fire damage or to provide 
alternative or dedicated shutdown capability?
    8. Automatic Actuation of Suppression Systems: Means to address 
adverse impacts of inadvertent actuation of suppression systems.
    The petitioner has stated the potential for damage to safety 
equipment and that plant transients from inadvertent actuations of 
automatic suppression systems can contribute to the overall damage risk 
in a facility. The probability for core damage due to various events is 
being assessed by licensees under the Individual Plant Examination for 
External Events (IPEEE) programs. The petitioner claims, given the 
potential for inadvertent actuation of automatic suppression systems, 
the marginal improvement to safety from a defense-in-depth perspective 
may not warrant the increased risk of water damage to safety systems or 
exposure to personnel. Is the petitioner's assertion accurate, and, if 
so, should the proposed rule allow the elimination of some automatic 
suppression systems on the basis of their adverse impact on safety, or 
should other means be employed, e.g. plant modifications, to address 
this issue?
    9. Alternative and Dedicated Shutdown Capability:
    (a) Need for an independent shutdown path.
    For plant areas in which redundant trains of safe shutdown systems 
may be damaged by fire (e.g., control room, cable spreading room, some 
plant specific switchgear rooms and relay rooms), current NRC fire 
protection guidelines and regulations require plants to develop a 
shutdown capability that is physically and electrically independent of 
the fire area of concern. The proposed rule does not specifically 
require this capability, but is stated to be similar to the current 
rule in that it specifies that shutdown path equipment must be able to 
achieve and maintain critical functions; namely, achieve subcritical 
conditions, maintain coolant inventory, achieve and maintain hot 
standby or hot shutdown conditions until cold shutdown equipment can be 
made available, and achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions. The 
proposed rule differs from the current regulation by allowing licensees 
to take advantage of the extensive operational experience with fire 
protection, prior NRC determinations, and the significant developments 
in fire sciences in providing fire protection for the appropriate 
equipment. The NRC staff is seeking public comments regarding details 
of the extensive operational experience, the developments which have 
been made in the fire sciences, and if and how the use of this 
information will ensure that an equivalent level of fire safety to that 
which is currently implemented and incorporated into operating plant 
designs is maintained.
    (b) The need to have abnormal operating procedures that provide 
guidance on which safe shutdown path is free from fire damage and can 
be used to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.
    Post-fire safe shutdown performance criteria established by the 
current regulation requires that the reactor coolant system inventory 
and process variables be maintained within those predicted for a loss 
of normal a.c. power. The proposed rule changes this performance 
criteria to allow the reactor coolant process variables to be 
controlled commensurate with parameters in the plant emergency 
operating procedures (EOP). Because fires can cause rapid and 
widespread damage, this may result in unusual conditions requiring the 
operation of unique plant shutdown equipment in order to meet the 
established performance goals. The use of EOPs may not be adequate to 
address the use of alternative or dedicated shutdown systems. 
Therefore, the NRC is seeking public comments regarding the proposed 
rule's intent to eliminate the need to develop procedures that address 
unique fire damage and shutdown conditions, and provide operators with 
specific guidance on which safe shutdown systems have been properly 
protected from potential fire damage.
    10. 72-Hour Requirement to Achieve Cold Shutdown: Elimination of 
the requirement to allow repairs and provide flexibility.
    The petitioner proposes to eliminate the current 72-hour time 
requirement to achieve cold shutdown with on-site power stating that it 
is an overly conservative and unnecessarily prescriptive requirement. 
Additionally, the petitioner states that inadvertent actuation of 
protective features designed to address postulated simultaneous loss of 
offsite power scenarios in the event of a real fire may create abnormal 
conditions that further unnecessarily challenge operator control of the 
plant. The intent of this requirement is to effectively limit the 
extent of repairs necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown. The 
petitioner justifies the elimination of this requirement on the basis 
that the NRC has granted a number of site-specific exemptions from this 
requirement. The petitioner states that operational experience has 
revealed that the plant is in a more safe condition during deliberate 
and controlled evolutions employing normal and familiar equipment 
configurations as compared to nonroutine responses to transients using 
nonroutine equipment and procedures. The petitioner also recognizes the 
success of operating history and accumulated operator training and 
experience.
    Under the criteria of the proposed rule, the availability of off-
site power would be determined from an analysis of the fire area under 
review and if off-site power could be lost due to fire damage. 
Generally, plant areas in which a fire may cause a loss of off-site 
power typically include the control room, certain cable spreading rooms 
and switchgear rooms, and the turbine building. Therefore, the proposed 
rule appears to be consistent with the intent of current NRC 
regulations.
    The NRC staff is seeking public comments on the justification of 
the petitioners proposal to not impose fire damage limits and allow 
repairs of shutdown equipment that would require more than 72 hours, 
and maintain hot standby or hot shutdown conditions until cold shutdown 
equipment can be made available. The NRC staff specifically solicits 
information on the methods and feasibility of quantifying the risk 
impact for this relaxation, and the operating history and accumulated 
operator training and experience cited in the petition.
    11. Rulemaking Finding: Necessity of finding of compliance with 
current requirements.
    Paragraph (c) of the petitioner's proposed revision to Sec. 50.48 
would include a rulemaking finding that all nuclear power plants 
licensed after January 1, 1979, met the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, 
Appendix R, and satisfy GDC 3. It is not clear why this language is 
necessary in order to provide an alternative to the requirements of 
Appendix R. Furthermore, it is unclear whether this rulemaking finding 
would preclude future NRC determinations (e.g., enforcement action) 
that licensees are not complying with the requirements of Appendix R 
and GDC 3. If this is the intent of the petitioner's proposed rule, it 
is unclear what policy considerations favor adoption of such a 
rulemaking finding. The Commission requests public comment on these 
matters.
    12. Exemptions: Treatment of exemptions from current requirements 
when adopting revised requirements.

[[Page 29795]]

    Paragraph (d) of the petitioner's proposed revision to Sec. 50.48 
provides that all exemptions to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, ``apply in 
full under the terms of Appendix S.'' However, the petition does not 
explain what relevance or effect an exemption to a specific Appendix R 
requirement could have if a licensee instead chose to comply with a 
substitute Appendix S requirement. The language could be interpreted as 
intending to make clear that licensees who choose to comply with a 
specific Appendix S provision should not lose its exemptions to those 
portions of Appendix R for which the licensee continues to be in 
compliance. The Commission requests comments on how exemptions to 10 
CFR Part 50, Appendix R, should be treated if a licensee chooses to 
comply, in full or part, with the alternative requirements in the 
proposed Appendix S.
    13. Regulatory Analysis: The need for regulatory analysis for 
rulemakings that reduce burden.
    The petition proposes that a regulatory analysis does need not to 
be prepared for the proposed rulemaking, because it does not impose a 
new requirement on licensees but instead, provides an alternative means 
of compliance. The petition also argues that because the proposed 
rulemaking is intended to result in cost saving for licensees, there is 
no need for a regulatory analysis. The Commission notes that a 
regulatory analysis could also provide important information when the 
Commission is considering reducing regulatory requirements. For 
example, the regulatory analysis could be utilized to determine whether 
a proposed change in regulatory requirements in fact would be more 
efficient in maintaining the desired level of safety while reducing 
regulatory burden. The regulatory analysis process would also be useful 
in identifying alternatives for reducing regulatory burden with a 
different mix of impacts on licensees and the NRC. Therefore, the 
Commission requests comments on the petition's arguments that a 
regulatory analysis does not need to be prepared for rulemaking 
petitions in which regulatory burdens are proposed to be relaxed.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 31st day of May, 1995.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John C. Hoyle,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 95-13755 Filed 6-5-95; 8:45 am]
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