[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 106 (Friday, June 2, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 28808-28812]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-13501]



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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-295 and 50-304]


Commonwealth Edison Company, Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 
and 2; Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

    Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation, has acted on a Petition for action under 10 CFR 2.206 
received from Mr. Robert K. Rutherford and 43 other security guards, 
dated November 3, 1994, regarding the Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 
1 and 2.
    The Petitioners requested that the NRC reassess and withdraw its 
approval [[Page 28809]] of the new response team member (RTM) security 
plan. It also demanded additional justification from both Commonwealth 
Edison Company (ComEd, the Licensee) and the security contractor 
concerning the reduction of armed guards and the defense of the plant.
    The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has 
determined that the request should be denied for the reasons stated in 
the ``Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-95-09), the complete 
text of which follows this notice and which is available for public 
inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20555, and at the local 
public document room located at the Waukegan Public Library, 128 N. 
County Street, Waukegan, Illinois 60085.
    A copy of this Decision will be filed with the Secretary of the 
Commission for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR 
2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations. As provided by this 
regulation, this Decision will constitute the final action of the 
Commission 25 days after the date of issuance, unless the Commission, 
on its own motion, institutes a review of the decision within that 
time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day of May 1995.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
William T. Russell,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
I. Introduction

    By letter dated November 3, 1994, Mr. Robert K. Rutherford and 43 
other security guards at the Zion Nuclear Power Station (Petitioners) 
requested that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) rethink and 
withdraw its approval of the October 7, 1994, revisions to the Zion 
Nuclear Power Station security plan, and demand greater justification 
from both Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd or Licensee) and its 
security contractor concerning the proposal to reduce the number of 
armed guards and the defense of the Zion Nuclear Power Station. 
Petitioners also requested that the manning and positioning of armed 
guards be reconsidered and increased to a more sound defensive 
position.
    As the bases for these requests, Petitioners allege that (1) the 
revised Response Team Member (RTM) plan degrades actual plant security 
to the point of folly; (2) the proposed qualifications for the RTM plan 
are causing employee turnover, undue stress, labor problems, and 
inconsistency in plant defense; (3) monetary considerations should not 
take priority over plant defense and administrative jobs should not 
replace front-line security guards; (4) the total disarming of the 
owner controlled areas and protected areas is highly detrimental to 
plant defense and public safety; and (5) modern armaments and increased 
hostility among the general public as well as potential terrorist 
threats from either domestic and/or international sources have not 
abated. In addition, a copy of the same Petition was sent to United 
States Senator Paul Simon of Illinois, who referred it to the 
Department of Energy (DOE). The DOE forwarded the copy of the Petition 
to the NRC. On this copy of the Petition, a handwritten note stated the 
following: ``Low level waste is now being stored in the owner 
controlled area with no security patrols except a casual tour once per 
eight hour shift.''
    By letter dated December 22, 1994, the NRC acknowledged receipt of 
the Petition and indicated that the NRC staff would take action within 
a reasonable time. Commonwealth Edison Company responded to the 
Petition by letter dated February 27, 1995. Petitioner replied to the 
ComEd response by letter dated February 28, 1995, supplementing the 
Petition with further detail.
    The Licensee's letter briefly described the revision to the 
security plan contained in its October 7, 1994, letter and explained 
that although the total number of guards on-site will be decreased, the 
number of armed response personnel at Zion Station has not been changed 
and will continue to exceed the minimum requirements of 10 CFR 
73.55(h)(3). The Licensee's February 27, 1995, letter also stated that 
certain administrative functions such as those performed by x-ray and 
metal detector machine operators, security badge issue personnel and 
personnel search will be performed by watchmen. It went on to say that 
four of the six ComEd nuclear sites implemented the TRM plan in 1994, 
another implemented it in January 1995, and Zion is scheduled for 
implementation in June 1995. In addition to this general description of 
the revision to the security plan, the letter addressed each point in 
the Petition.
    For the reasons discussed below, I have concluded that the 
Petitioners have not raised any substantial safety concern, and I, 
therefore, deny the Petition.

II. Background

    The Licensee's original security plan, submitted in a letter dated 
November 18, 1977, and supplemented in letters dated May 26, 1978, and 
June 25, 1978, included an armed response commitment. The NRC staff 
reviewed the security plan against the general performance requirements 
of 10 C.F.R. 73.55(a) and the specific requirements of 10 C.F.R. 
73.55(b) through (h). In particular, the NRC staff concluded that the 
physical security organization met the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 
73.55(b)(1) regarding the written agreement with the security 
contractor and the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Sec. 73.55(b)(2) regarding 
the onsite presence of a full time member of the security organization 
with the authority to direct physical protection activities of the 
security organization. Based on a review, principally of the size of 
the site, the location of the vital areas, and the response capability 
of the local law enforcement agencies, the NRC staff also concluded 
that the security plan met the response requirements of 10 C.F.R. 
73.55(h). In particular, the number of guards in the plan substantially 
exceeded the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 73.55(h)(3) concerning the 
minimum number of guards on-site. As defined in 10 C.F.R. 73.2, a guard 
is a uniformed individual armed with a firearm. A watchman is an 
individual, not necessarily uniformed or armed with a firearm, who 
provides protection for a plant in the course of performing other 
duties, and armed response personnel are persons who are uniformed, 
whose primary duty in the event of attempted radiological sabotage 
shall be to respond, armed and equipped, to prevent or delay such 
actions. The NRC staff concluded that Zion facility's security plan was 
satisfactory and that it was adequate to protect the Zion facility from 
threats, thefts, and radiological sabotage directed from within or 
outside the facility. Consequently, the NRC staff issued a Security 
Plan Evaluation Report (SPER), dated March 14, 1979, which concluded 
that upon full implementation, the security plan would meet the general 
performance requirements of 10 C.F.R. 73.55(a) and the specific 
requirements of 10 C.F.R. 73.55(b) through (h), and that the security 
plan would ensure that the health and safety of the public would not be 
endangered from threats, thefts, and radiological sabotage directed at 
the Zion facility.
    By letter dated October 7, 1994, ComEd submitted a revision to the 
security plan for Zion Station pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 50.54(p), which 
allows licensees to make changes to their security plans without prior 
NRC approval, provided the changes do not [[Page 28810]] reduce the 
effectiveness of the plan. The October 7, 1994, revision included use 
of watchmen in positions that formerly used guards. The revision 
reduced the total number of guards on-site, but did not change the 
number of armed response personnel. In its October 7, 1994, submittal, 
the licensee stated that the revision did not reduce the effectiveness 
of the plan.
III. Discussion

A. Plant Security

    Petitioners contend that the revised RTM security plan degrades 
actual plant security ``to the point of folly.'' Petitioners' 
supplemental letter of February 28, 1995, requests that the NRC 
guarantee that ComEd will not reduce the number of armed responders to 
five.
    The total number of guards immediately available at a nuclear power 
plant to fulfill NRC response requirements shall nominally be ten, 
unless specifically required otherwise on a case-by-case basis by the 
Commission; however, this number may not in any case be reduced to less 
than five guards. 10 C.F.R. 73.55(h)(3).
    Although the October 7, 1994, revision to the security plan will 
reduce the total number of guards on-site, the number of armed response 
personnel at the Zion facility will not change and will continue to 
exceed the minimum number of armed response personnel required by 10 
C.F.R. 735(h)(3). The regulations address the use of both guards and 
watchmen in a security force. Historically, most licensees have used a 
combination of the two because there are certain job assignments that 
do not require use of a guard, i.e., central alarm station and 
secondary alarm station operator, personnel escorts in the protected 
and vital areas, x-ray and metal detector machine operators, security 
badge issue personnel, and personnel searchers. In the past, ComEd far 
exceeded the guard requirement, having guards even where they were not 
required by regulations. The NRC staff has reviewed the revised RTM 
security plan and concluded that it provides sufficient site security, 
is not inimical to the common defense and security, and that protection 
of the public health and safety does not require the Licensee to 
increase the number of its armed response personnel or guards beyond 
the levels reflected in the revised plan. Moreover, the NRC staff 
concluded that the revisions are acceptable and would not decrease the 
effectiveness of the security plan.
    In view of the above, Petitioners have not raised a substantial 
safety concern regarding the reduction in the number of armed security 
personnel.

B. Effects of the Proposed Revision to the Zion Nuclear Power Station 
Security Plan on Employees and Plant Defense

    Petitioners contend that the new qualifications for armed guard 
positions in the revised security plan will cause employee turnover, 
undue stress, labor problems, and inconsistency in plant defense.
    Petitioners state in their February 28, 1995, supplemental letter 
that inconsistencies exist in that: unarmed personnel (watchmen and 
inspectors) are permitted to respond to intrusion alarms although they 
have had no physical agility testing; unarmed personnel escort vehicles 
into a door zone which has direct containment access, although the NRC 
has directed that armed personnel be placed at Vertical Pipe Chase 
doors to prevent such access; and unarmed personnel intermingle with 
armed personnel at the main gate, which could be disastrous in the 
event of a firearms exchange.
    NRC regulations only require that unarmed personnel such as 
watchmen shall have no physical weaknesses or abnormalities that would 
adversely affect their performance of assigned security job duties, 10 
C.F.R. part 73, appendix B, criterion I.B.1.a., and do not specify 
which type of security officer should respond to intrusion alarms. The 
regulations also only require that vehicles be escorted in the 
protected and vital areas, 10 C.F.R. 73.55(d)(4), and do not specify 
whether the escort must be an armed or unarmed officer. Moreover, NRC 
regulations do not require control of vital area doors and barriers by 
an armed security officer. Finally, there is no prohibition of both 
armed and unarmed personnel occupying access control facilities; in 
fact it is a common practice at many sites. It should be noted that 10 
C.F.R. part 73 is ``performance oriented,'' with the specific 
implementation left to the licensee in the site specific security plan. 
The details of the specific commitments depend on the specific site 
factors. As noted below, the NRC staff review of the Zion security plan 
concluded that Zion meets the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 7355(b) through 
(h).
    In February 1994, NRC inspectors identified security force morale 
as poor due to continuing personnel layoffs to reduce security force 
shift manning levels to the minimum required to meet security plan 
commitments. NRC Inspection Report No. 50-295/94005 and 50-304/94005, 
dated March 22, 1994. In April 1994, the NRC staff conducted another 
physical security inspection and concluded that overall security 
performance was good. In addition, the NRC staff noted that morale had 
improved, due to better communication with security staff members 
during the backshifts following key personnel changes in the contract 
security management organization. However, the NRC staff was concerned 
that continued high overtime hours worked by the security force had the 
potential to negatively affect performance. Security force staffing 
levels were sufficient to meet security plan commitments, but were 
strained to support unplanned maintenance work. NRC Inspection Report 
No. 50-295/94011 and 50-304/94011, dated May 25, 1994. The NRC staff 
continues to monitor the performance of the security staff through 
security inspections, and the continued inspections by its resident 
inspector staff.
    During an NRC staff inspection of the Zion facility in October and 
November 1994, tactical response drills were conducted in which the 
security force demonstrated a high level of proficiency. NRC Inspection 
Report No. 50-295/94021 and 50-304/94021, dated December 12, 1994. The 
other five ComEd sites have already implemented their version of the 
October 7, 1994, security plan revision. An NRC inspection at LaSalle 
County Station in July 1994 did not find any inconsistencies in plant 
defense or adverse effects of the revised RTM plan on plant physical 
protection and safety. The NRC staff found that ComEd has continued to 
meet its armed response personnel commitments to the NRC. NRC 
Inspection Report Nos. 50-295/94005 and 50-304/94005, dated March 22, 
1994; 50-295/94011 and 50-304/94011, dated May 25, 1994; 50-295/94021 
and 50-304/94021, dated December 12, 1994. Accordingly, there is no 
reason to expect that implementation of the revised security plan at 
the Zion facility will result in inconsistencies in plant defense or 
adverse effects on plant physical protection and safety.
    The October 7, 1994, revision to the security plan provided for an 
improved selection process that would result in the most qualified 
personnel performing armed responder duties. The revised selection 
criteria are higher objective standards for proficiency in firearms, 
physical agility, and knowledge of the security plan. It is ComEd's 
plan that security guards who cannot meet the new criteria to be an RTM 
member will be reassigned to the administrative duties of watchmen. 
Although such a [[Page 28811]] reassignment could conceivably cause 
morale problems and turnover for such individuals, use of a process 
reasonably designed to select the guards who are best qualified for 
armed response personnel duties is in the best interest of the common 
defense and security and the public health and safety.
    In view of the above, the Petitioners have not raised a substantial 
safety concern regarding security force morale or inconsistencies in 
plant security.

C. Monetary Considerations and Administrative Jobs

    Petitioners assert that monetary considerations should not take 
priority over plant defense and administrative jobs should not replace 
frontline security guards.
    Regardless of any anticipated Licensee savings or increased 
expenses that might be associated with the October 7, 1994, revision to 
the Licensee's security plan, the NRC staff must review the revised 
plan for compliance with 10 C.F.R. 73.55. In particular, the NRC staff 
considered whether the Licensee's on-site physical protection system 
and security organization include the capabilities to meet the 
requirements of 10 C.F.R. 73.55(b) through (h). As explained in Section 
III.A above, the NRC staff concluded that the October 7, 1994, security 
plan revision to reduce the number of guards does not violate 10 C.F.R. 
73.55. Moreover, after review of the October 7, 1994, revisions to the 
security plan, the NRC staff found that the revisions are acceptable 
and would not decrease the effectiveness of the security plan.
    For the reasons stated above, Petitioners have not raised a 
substantial safety concern regarding the reduction in the number of 
guards at the Zion facility.

D. Disarming of Owner Controlled and Protected Areas

    Petitioners assert that the total disarming of the owner controlled 
area and the protected area is highly detrimental to plant defense and 
public safety.
    Contrary to Petitioners' assertions, the Zion facility has not been 
totally disarmed. As explained above, at Section II.A., the Zion 
security plan meets NRC requirements for armed personnel. The 
Commission's regulations do not require any guards in the owner 
controlled area. Security of the station is centered around protecting 
selected vital equipment situated within the protected area. See 10 
C.F.R. 73.55.
    Prior to initial plant licensing, the NRC staff evaluated the 
Licensee's security plan to ensure that it met the general performance 
objective and requirements of 10 C.F.R. 73.55(a) and that it 
implemented the more prescriptive requirements of 10 C.F.R. 73.55 (b) 
through (h). In addition, the NRC staff observed drills to ensure that 
the Licensee could effectively implement its security plan; in 
particular, to ensure that the security force could successfully 
perform the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 73.55(h)(4), which are to 
determine the existence of a threat, assess the extent of the threat, 
take immediate concurrent measures to neutralize the threat by 
requiring responding guards to interpose themselves between vital areas 
and any adversary attempting entry for the purpose of radiological 
sabotage and inform local law enforcement agencies of the threat and 
request assistance. When a licensee submits a revision to its security 
plan, the NRC staff evaluates it to ensure the same general performance 
objective and requirements of 10 C.F.R. 73.55(a) and the more 
prescriptive requirements of 10 C.F.R. 73.55 (b) through (h) are being 
met and implemented. Periodically, the NRC staff also continues to 
observe tactical response drills to ensure that the licensee remains 
capable of effectively implementing its security plan by demonstrating 
threat response as required by 10 C.F.R. 73.55(h)(4).
    The staff evaluated the Licenee's October 7, 1994, revision to the 
physical security plan and found that it met the requirements of 10 
C.F.R. 73.55. Although Zion has not implemented the new RTM plan, an 
NRC inspection at LaSalle County Station (which has implemented the new 
RTM plan) in July 1994 did not find any inconsistencies in plant 
defense or adverse impacts on plant physical protection and safety.
    Based on the above, the Petitioners have not raised a substantial 
safety concern regarding security of the owner controlled areas and the 
protected area.

E. Potential Threats

    Petitioners assert that modern armaments and increase hostility 
among the general public as well as potential terrorist threats from 
either domestic and/or international sources have not abated.
    NRC regulations establish a framework for security plans with 
respect to such matters as terrorist attacks against licensed nuclear 
power plants. 10 C.F.R. part 73. As explained above, although the 
October 7, 1994, revision to the Zion security plan will result in a 
reduced number of armed guards, the number of armed response personnel 
will not decline and the Licensee continues to meet the specific 
requirements of 10 C.F.R. 73.55(h)(3) with respect to the number of 
armed response personnel. In addition, NRC regulations require that in 
designing safeguards systems, licensees shall use the design basis 
threats contained in the regulations, including those for the type of 
radiological sabotage referred to by Petitioners. 10 C.F.R. 73.1(a)(1). 
On a daily basis, the staff threat-related information to ensure the 
design basis threat statements in the regulations remain a valid basis 
for safeguards system design. On a semi-annual basis, the results of 
this staff review are formally documented and forwarded to the 
Commission. To date, no credible threat to licensed facilities has been 
identified that would warrant a modification to the design basis threat 
statements in the regulations. After review of the October 7, 1994, 
revision to the Zion facility security plan, the NRC staff concludes 
that the revised security plan does not decrease the effectiveness of 
the plan in protecting the facility against design basis threats and 
that the revised plan meets the requirements of 10 C.F.R. part 73.
    In view of the above, the Petitioners have not raised a substantial 
safety concern regarding sabotage or theft of special nuclear material 
at the Zion facility.

F. Manning and Positioning of Armed Guards

    Petitioners asked that both manning and positioning of armed guards 
be reconsidered and increased back to a more sound defense posture.
    Specifically, Petitioners state in their February 28, 1995, 
supplemental letter that, in regard to the protected area, mobile 
patrols, armed posts and armed positions have been reduced, and that 
there should be at least one continuous armed mobile patrol. 
Petitioners also state, with regard to the owner controlled area, that 
at least one patrol should be made each 24 hours, and that a minimum of 
five armed guards per unit and two armed guards dedicated to the main 
gate are necessary, but that ten armed guards per unit (consisting of 
two protected area patrols and/or sector guards) is optimum. 
Additionally, Petitioners state that there is a post for unarmed 
personnel in the vehicle search area, although the NRC has directed 
that at least one armed officer be present at an alternate gate entry.
    There is no regulatory requirement to have (1) an armed guard at an 
entry gate to the protected area, (2) any security activities in the 
owner controlled area outside the protected area, or (3) mobile patrols 
in the protected area. While [[Page 28812]] checking the protected area 
is required, 10 C.F.R. 73.55(c)(4), the type of personnel and patrol 
frequency are not specified in the regulations, but are detailed in the 
site physical security plan. All changes to the Zion plan are reviewed 
against the requirements of the regulations and site specific needs. 
The NRC inspects against the commitments contained in the approved plan 
to verify that the plan remains effective and that the Licensee 
continues to fulfill its commitments. Based on NRC staff review of the 
Zion security plan and its associated revisions, and upon onsite 
verification of Zion's commitments, Zion continues to meet the 
performance objectives of 10 C.F.R. 73.55(a) and its commitments under 
its security plan.
    As explained above, although the October 7, 1994, revision to the 
Zion security plan will result in a reduced number of armed guards, the 
number of armed response personnel will not decline and the Licensee 
continues to meet the specific requirements of 10 C.F.R. 73.55(h)(3) 
with respect to the number of armed response personnel. In regard to 
the positioning of armed response personnel, NRC regulations require 
that licensees establish a safeguards contingency plan which requires 
armed response personnel to interpose themselves between vital areas 
and material access areas such that armed response personnel can 
prevent entry for the purpose of radiological sabotage. 10 C.F.R. 
73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A). If revisions to a licensee's security plan meet 
the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 73.55, the NRC staff concludes that the 
revisions are consistent with 10 C.F.R. 50.54(p) and that they will not 
decrease the effectiveness of the safeguards plan. In this case, the 
NRC staff concluded that the October 7, 1994, revision to the Zion 
security plan met the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 73.55 and did not 
result in decreased effectiveness of the plan.
    In view of the above, the Petitioners have not raised a substantial 
safety concern regarding manning and positioning of armed guards at 
Zion Station.

G. Additional Concern Noted on a Copy of the Petition Sent to Senator 
Simon

    Petitioners appended an additional concern that low level waste is 
now being stored in the owner controlled area with no security patrols 
except a casual tour once per eight hour shift, on a copy of the 
Petition addressed to United States Senator Paul Simon of Illinois. 
Senator Simon referred the concern to the DOE, and DOE subsequently 
forwarded it to the NRC. Petitioners' supplemental letter of February 
28, 1995, asserts that the interim radwaste storage facility is worthy 
of one full 24-hour patrol and alarmed, continuous surveillance 
equipment, such as a camera.
    Storage and control of NRC-licensed material are governed, in 
pertinent part, by 10 CFR 20.1801 of Subpart I to 10 CFR part 20, which 
requires licensees to secure from unauthorized removal or unauthorized 
access licensed materials that are stored in controlled or unrestricted 
areas. The security requirements of 10 CFR part 73 do not apply to the 
storage of low level waste. Zion Station maintains an interim radwaste 
storage facility (IRSF) for licensed material on-site, within the owner 
controlled area to which general access is not permitted. The IRSF is 
locked, key access is controlled, and once in each 8 hour shift the 
IRSF is patrolled by a security officer. The staff finds that the IRSF 
at the Zion facility is in compliance with 10 CFR 20.1801.
    For the reasons stated above, Petitioners have not raised a 
substantial safety concern regarding security of low level waste in the 
owner controlled area at the Zion facility.

IV. Conclusion

    The institution of a proceeding in response to a request for action 
under 10 CFR 2.206 is appropriate only when substantial health and 
safety issues have been raised. See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York 
(Indian Point, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-75-8, 2 NRC 173, 176 (1975), and 
Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2), 
DD-84-7, 19 NRC 899, 923 (1984). I have applied this standard to 
determine what action, if any, is warranted in response to the matters 
raised by Petitioners. Each of the claims or allegations by Petitioners 
has been reviewed, and I conclude that, for the reasons discussed 
above, Petitioners have raised no substantial safety concern regarding 
the revised security plan for the Zion facility. Petitioners' requests 
that the NRC withdraw its approval of the changes to the security plan 
and that the NRC require an increase in the number of, or a change in 
the positioning of, armed guards at the Zion Nuclear Power Station, are 
denied. Petitioners' request that the NRC demand greater justification 
for the proposal to reduce the number of armed guards and the defense 
of the Zion Nuclear Power Station is denied. Since the NRC has agreed 
with the Licensee that the changes to Zion's security plan do not 
decrease the effectiveness of the plan, per 10 CFR 50.54(p), NRC 
approval to implement the changes to Zion's security plan is not 
required.
    A copy of this Decision will be filed with the Secretary of the 
Commission for the Commission to review in accordance with 10 CFR 
2.206(c). As provided by Section 2.206(c), this Decision will 
constitute the final action of the Commission 25 days after issuance, 
unless the Commission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the 
decision within that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day of May 1995.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
William T. Russell,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 95-13501 Filed 6-1-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M