[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 106 (Friday, June 2, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 28808-28812]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-13501]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-295 and 50-304]
Commonwealth Edison Company, Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1
and 2; Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206
Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, has acted on a Petition for action under 10 CFR 2.206
received from Mr. Robert K. Rutherford and 43 other security guards,
dated November 3, 1994, regarding the Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units
1 and 2.
The Petitioners requested that the NRC reassess and withdraw its
approval [[Page 28809]] of the new response team member (RTM) security
plan. It also demanded additional justification from both Commonwealth
Edison Company (ComEd, the Licensee) and the security contractor
concerning the reduction of armed guards and the defense of the plant.
The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has
determined that the request should be denied for the reasons stated in
the ``Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-95-09), the complete
text of which follows this notice and which is available for public
inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20555, and at the local
public document room located at the Waukegan Public Library, 128 N.
County Street, Waukegan, Illinois 60085.
A copy of this Decision will be filed with the Secretary of the
Commission for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR
2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations. As provided by this
regulation, this Decision will constitute the final action of the
Commission 25 days after the date of issuance, unless the Commission,
on its own motion, institutes a review of the decision within that
time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day of May 1995.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
William T. Russell,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
I. Introduction
By letter dated November 3, 1994, Mr. Robert K. Rutherford and 43
other security guards at the Zion Nuclear Power Station (Petitioners)
requested that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) rethink and
withdraw its approval of the October 7, 1994, revisions to the Zion
Nuclear Power Station security plan, and demand greater justification
from both Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd or Licensee) and its
security contractor concerning the proposal to reduce the number of
armed guards and the defense of the Zion Nuclear Power Station.
Petitioners also requested that the manning and positioning of armed
guards be reconsidered and increased to a more sound defensive
position.
As the bases for these requests, Petitioners allege that (1) the
revised Response Team Member (RTM) plan degrades actual plant security
to the point of folly; (2) the proposed qualifications for the RTM plan
are causing employee turnover, undue stress, labor problems, and
inconsistency in plant defense; (3) monetary considerations should not
take priority over plant defense and administrative jobs should not
replace front-line security guards; (4) the total disarming of the
owner controlled areas and protected areas is highly detrimental to
plant defense and public safety; and (5) modern armaments and increased
hostility among the general public as well as potential terrorist
threats from either domestic and/or international sources have not
abated. In addition, a copy of the same Petition was sent to United
States Senator Paul Simon of Illinois, who referred it to the
Department of Energy (DOE). The DOE forwarded the copy of the Petition
to the NRC. On this copy of the Petition, a handwritten note stated the
following: ``Low level waste is now being stored in the owner
controlled area with no security patrols except a casual tour once per
eight hour shift.''
By letter dated December 22, 1994, the NRC acknowledged receipt of
the Petition and indicated that the NRC staff would take action within
a reasonable time. Commonwealth Edison Company responded to the
Petition by letter dated February 27, 1995. Petitioner replied to the
ComEd response by letter dated February 28, 1995, supplementing the
Petition with further detail.
The Licensee's letter briefly described the revision to the
security plan contained in its October 7, 1994, letter and explained
that although the total number of guards on-site will be decreased, the
number of armed response personnel at Zion Station has not been changed
and will continue to exceed the minimum requirements of 10 CFR
73.55(h)(3). The Licensee's February 27, 1995, letter also stated that
certain administrative functions such as those performed by x-ray and
metal detector machine operators, security badge issue personnel and
personnel search will be performed by watchmen. It went on to say that
four of the six ComEd nuclear sites implemented the TRM plan in 1994,
another implemented it in January 1995, and Zion is scheduled for
implementation in June 1995. In addition to this general description of
the revision to the security plan, the letter addressed each point in
the Petition.
For the reasons discussed below, I have concluded that the
Petitioners have not raised any substantial safety concern, and I,
therefore, deny the Petition.
II. Background
The Licensee's original security plan, submitted in a letter dated
November 18, 1977, and supplemented in letters dated May 26, 1978, and
June 25, 1978, included an armed response commitment. The NRC staff
reviewed the security plan against the general performance requirements
of 10 C.F.R. 73.55(a) and the specific requirements of 10 C.F.R.
73.55(b) through (h). In particular, the NRC staff concluded that the
physical security organization met the requirements of 10 C.F.R.
73.55(b)(1) regarding the written agreement with the security
contractor and the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Sec. 73.55(b)(2) regarding
the onsite presence of a full time member of the security organization
with the authority to direct physical protection activities of the
security organization. Based on a review, principally of the size of
the site, the location of the vital areas, and the response capability
of the local law enforcement agencies, the NRC staff also concluded
that the security plan met the response requirements of 10 C.F.R.
73.55(h). In particular, the number of guards in the plan substantially
exceeded the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 73.55(h)(3) concerning the
minimum number of guards on-site. As defined in 10 C.F.R. 73.2, a guard
is a uniformed individual armed with a firearm. A watchman is an
individual, not necessarily uniformed or armed with a firearm, who
provides protection for a plant in the course of performing other
duties, and armed response personnel are persons who are uniformed,
whose primary duty in the event of attempted radiological sabotage
shall be to respond, armed and equipped, to prevent or delay such
actions. The NRC staff concluded that Zion facility's security plan was
satisfactory and that it was adequate to protect the Zion facility from
threats, thefts, and radiological sabotage directed from within or
outside the facility. Consequently, the NRC staff issued a Security
Plan Evaluation Report (SPER), dated March 14, 1979, which concluded
that upon full implementation, the security plan would meet the general
performance requirements of 10 C.F.R. 73.55(a) and the specific
requirements of 10 C.F.R. 73.55(b) through (h), and that the security
plan would ensure that the health and safety of the public would not be
endangered from threats, thefts, and radiological sabotage directed at
the Zion facility.
By letter dated October 7, 1994, ComEd submitted a revision to the
security plan for Zion Station pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 50.54(p), which
allows licensees to make changes to their security plans without prior
NRC approval, provided the changes do not [[Page 28810]] reduce the
effectiveness of the plan. The October 7, 1994, revision included use
of watchmen in positions that formerly used guards. The revision
reduced the total number of guards on-site, but did not change the
number of armed response personnel. In its October 7, 1994, submittal,
the licensee stated that the revision did not reduce the effectiveness
of the plan.
III. Discussion
A. Plant Security
Petitioners contend that the revised RTM security plan degrades
actual plant security ``to the point of folly.'' Petitioners'
supplemental letter of February 28, 1995, requests that the NRC
guarantee that ComEd will not reduce the number of armed responders to
five.
The total number of guards immediately available at a nuclear power
plant to fulfill NRC response requirements shall nominally be ten,
unless specifically required otherwise on a case-by-case basis by the
Commission; however, this number may not in any case be reduced to less
than five guards. 10 C.F.R. 73.55(h)(3).
Although the October 7, 1994, revision to the security plan will
reduce the total number of guards on-site, the number of armed response
personnel at the Zion facility will not change and will continue to
exceed the minimum number of armed response personnel required by 10
C.F.R. 735(h)(3). The regulations address the use of both guards and
watchmen in a security force. Historically, most licensees have used a
combination of the two because there are certain job assignments that
do not require use of a guard, i.e., central alarm station and
secondary alarm station operator, personnel escorts in the protected
and vital areas, x-ray and metal detector machine operators, security
badge issue personnel, and personnel searchers. In the past, ComEd far
exceeded the guard requirement, having guards even where they were not
required by regulations. The NRC staff has reviewed the revised RTM
security plan and concluded that it provides sufficient site security,
is not inimical to the common defense and security, and that protection
of the public health and safety does not require the Licensee to
increase the number of its armed response personnel or guards beyond
the levels reflected in the revised plan. Moreover, the NRC staff
concluded that the revisions are acceptable and would not decrease the
effectiveness of the security plan.
In view of the above, Petitioners have not raised a substantial
safety concern regarding the reduction in the number of armed security
personnel.
B. Effects of the Proposed Revision to the Zion Nuclear Power Station
Security Plan on Employees and Plant Defense
Petitioners contend that the new qualifications for armed guard
positions in the revised security plan will cause employee turnover,
undue stress, labor problems, and inconsistency in plant defense.
Petitioners state in their February 28, 1995, supplemental letter
that inconsistencies exist in that: unarmed personnel (watchmen and
inspectors) are permitted to respond to intrusion alarms although they
have had no physical agility testing; unarmed personnel escort vehicles
into a door zone which has direct containment access, although the NRC
has directed that armed personnel be placed at Vertical Pipe Chase
doors to prevent such access; and unarmed personnel intermingle with
armed personnel at the main gate, which could be disastrous in the
event of a firearms exchange.
NRC regulations only require that unarmed personnel such as
watchmen shall have no physical weaknesses or abnormalities that would
adversely affect their performance of assigned security job duties, 10
C.F.R. part 73, appendix B, criterion I.B.1.a., and do not specify
which type of security officer should respond to intrusion alarms. The
regulations also only require that vehicles be escorted in the
protected and vital areas, 10 C.F.R. 73.55(d)(4), and do not specify
whether the escort must be an armed or unarmed officer. Moreover, NRC
regulations do not require control of vital area doors and barriers by
an armed security officer. Finally, there is no prohibition of both
armed and unarmed personnel occupying access control facilities; in
fact it is a common practice at many sites. It should be noted that 10
C.F.R. part 73 is ``performance oriented,'' with the specific
implementation left to the licensee in the site specific security plan.
The details of the specific commitments depend on the specific site
factors. As noted below, the NRC staff review of the Zion security plan
concluded that Zion meets the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 7355(b) through
(h).
In February 1994, NRC inspectors identified security force morale
as poor due to continuing personnel layoffs to reduce security force
shift manning levels to the minimum required to meet security plan
commitments. NRC Inspection Report No. 50-295/94005 and 50-304/94005,
dated March 22, 1994. In April 1994, the NRC staff conducted another
physical security inspection and concluded that overall security
performance was good. In addition, the NRC staff noted that morale had
improved, due to better communication with security staff members
during the backshifts following key personnel changes in the contract
security management organization. However, the NRC staff was concerned
that continued high overtime hours worked by the security force had the
potential to negatively affect performance. Security force staffing
levels were sufficient to meet security plan commitments, but were
strained to support unplanned maintenance work. NRC Inspection Report
No. 50-295/94011 and 50-304/94011, dated May 25, 1994. The NRC staff
continues to monitor the performance of the security staff through
security inspections, and the continued inspections by its resident
inspector staff.
During an NRC staff inspection of the Zion facility in October and
November 1994, tactical response drills were conducted in which the
security force demonstrated a high level of proficiency. NRC Inspection
Report No. 50-295/94021 and 50-304/94021, dated December 12, 1994. The
other five ComEd sites have already implemented their version of the
October 7, 1994, security plan revision. An NRC inspection at LaSalle
County Station in July 1994 did not find any inconsistencies in plant
defense or adverse effects of the revised RTM plan on plant physical
protection and safety. The NRC staff found that ComEd has continued to
meet its armed response personnel commitments to the NRC. NRC
Inspection Report Nos. 50-295/94005 and 50-304/94005, dated March 22,
1994; 50-295/94011 and 50-304/94011, dated May 25, 1994; 50-295/94021
and 50-304/94021, dated December 12, 1994. Accordingly, there is no
reason to expect that implementation of the revised security plan at
the Zion facility will result in inconsistencies in plant defense or
adverse effects on plant physical protection and safety.
The October 7, 1994, revision to the security plan provided for an
improved selection process that would result in the most qualified
personnel performing armed responder duties. The revised selection
criteria are higher objective standards for proficiency in firearms,
physical agility, and knowledge of the security plan. It is ComEd's
plan that security guards who cannot meet the new criteria to be an RTM
member will be reassigned to the administrative duties of watchmen.
Although such a [[Page 28811]] reassignment could conceivably cause
morale problems and turnover for such individuals, use of a process
reasonably designed to select the guards who are best qualified for
armed response personnel duties is in the best interest of the common
defense and security and the public health and safety.
In view of the above, the Petitioners have not raised a substantial
safety concern regarding security force morale or inconsistencies in
plant security.
C. Monetary Considerations and Administrative Jobs
Petitioners assert that monetary considerations should not take
priority over plant defense and administrative jobs should not replace
frontline security guards.
Regardless of any anticipated Licensee savings or increased
expenses that might be associated with the October 7, 1994, revision to
the Licensee's security plan, the NRC staff must review the revised
plan for compliance with 10 C.F.R. 73.55. In particular, the NRC staff
considered whether the Licensee's on-site physical protection system
and security organization include the capabilities to meet the
requirements of 10 C.F.R. 73.55(b) through (h). As explained in Section
III.A above, the NRC staff concluded that the October 7, 1994, security
plan revision to reduce the number of guards does not violate 10 C.F.R.
73.55. Moreover, after review of the October 7, 1994, revisions to the
security plan, the NRC staff found that the revisions are acceptable
and would not decrease the effectiveness of the security plan.
For the reasons stated above, Petitioners have not raised a
substantial safety concern regarding the reduction in the number of
guards at the Zion facility.
D. Disarming of Owner Controlled and Protected Areas
Petitioners assert that the total disarming of the owner controlled
area and the protected area is highly detrimental to plant defense and
public safety.
Contrary to Petitioners' assertions, the Zion facility has not been
totally disarmed. As explained above, at Section II.A., the Zion
security plan meets NRC requirements for armed personnel. The
Commission's regulations do not require any guards in the owner
controlled area. Security of the station is centered around protecting
selected vital equipment situated within the protected area. See 10
C.F.R. 73.55.
Prior to initial plant licensing, the NRC staff evaluated the
Licensee's security plan to ensure that it met the general performance
objective and requirements of 10 C.F.R. 73.55(a) and that it
implemented the more prescriptive requirements of 10 C.F.R. 73.55 (b)
through (h). In addition, the NRC staff observed drills to ensure that
the Licensee could effectively implement its security plan; in
particular, to ensure that the security force could successfully
perform the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 73.55(h)(4), which are to
determine the existence of a threat, assess the extent of the threat,
take immediate concurrent measures to neutralize the threat by
requiring responding guards to interpose themselves between vital areas
and any adversary attempting entry for the purpose of radiological
sabotage and inform local law enforcement agencies of the threat and
request assistance. When a licensee submits a revision to its security
plan, the NRC staff evaluates it to ensure the same general performance
objective and requirements of 10 C.F.R. 73.55(a) and the more
prescriptive requirements of 10 C.F.R. 73.55 (b) through (h) are being
met and implemented. Periodically, the NRC staff also continues to
observe tactical response drills to ensure that the licensee remains
capable of effectively implementing its security plan by demonstrating
threat response as required by 10 C.F.R. 73.55(h)(4).
The staff evaluated the Licenee's October 7, 1994, revision to the
physical security plan and found that it met the requirements of 10
C.F.R. 73.55. Although Zion has not implemented the new RTM plan, an
NRC inspection at LaSalle County Station (which has implemented the new
RTM plan) in July 1994 did not find any inconsistencies in plant
defense or adverse impacts on plant physical protection and safety.
Based on the above, the Petitioners have not raised a substantial
safety concern regarding security of the owner controlled areas and the
protected area.
E. Potential Threats
Petitioners assert that modern armaments and increase hostility
among the general public as well as potential terrorist threats from
either domestic and/or international sources have not abated.
NRC regulations establish a framework for security plans with
respect to such matters as terrorist attacks against licensed nuclear
power plants. 10 C.F.R. part 73. As explained above, although the
October 7, 1994, revision to the Zion security plan will result in a
reduced number of armed guards, the number of armed response personnel
will not decline and the Licensee continues to meet the specific
requirements of 10 C.F.R. 73.55(h)(3) with respect to the number of
armed response personnel. In addition, NRC regulations require that in
designing safeguards systems, licensees shall use the design basis
threats contained in the regulations, including those for the type of
radiological sabotage referred to by Petitioners. 10 C.F.R. 73.1(a)(1).
On a daily basis, the staff threat-related information to ensure the
design basis threat statements in the regulations remain a valid basis
for safeguards system design. On a semi-annual basis, the results of
this staff review are formally documented and forwarded to the
Commission. To date, no credible threat to licensed facilities has been
identified that would warrant a modification to the design basis threat
statements in the regulations. After review of the October 7, 1994,
revision to the Zion facility security plan, the NRC staff concludes
that the revised security plan does not decrease the effectiveness of
the plan in protecting the facility against design basis threats and
that the revised plan meets the requirements of 10 C.F.R. part 73.
In view of the above, the Petitioners have not raised a substantial
safety concern regarding sabotage or theft of special nuclear material
at the Zion facility.
F. Manning and Positioning of Armed Guards
Petitioners asked that both manning and positioning of armed guards
be reconsidered and increased back to a more sound defense posture.
Specifically, Petitioners state in their February 28, 1995,
supplemental letter that, in regard to the protected area, mobile
patrols, armed posts and armed positions have been reduced, and that
there should be at least one continuous armed mobile patrol.
Petitioners also state, with regard to the owner controlled area, that
at least one patrol should be made each 24 hours, and that a minimum of
five armed guards per unit and two armed guards dedicated to the main
gate are necessary, but that ten armed guards per unit (consisting of
two protected area patrols and/or sector guards) is optimum.
Additionally, Petitioners state that there is a post for unarmed
personnel in the vehicle search area, although the NRC has directed
that at least one armed officer be present at an alternate gate entry.
There is no regulatory requirement to have (1) an armed guard at an
entry gate to the protected area, (2) any security activities in the
owner controlled area outside the protected area, or (3) mobile patrols
in the protected area. While [[Page 28812]] checking the protected area
is required, 10 C.F.R. 73.55(c)(4), the type of personnel and patrol
frequency are not specified in the regulations, but are detailed in the
site physical security plan. All changes to the Zion plan are reviewed
against the requirements of the regulations and site specific needs.
The NRC inspects against the commitments contained in the approved plan
to verify that the plan remains effective and that the Licensee
continues to fulfill its commitments. Based on NRC staff review of the
Zion security plan and its associated revisions, and upon onsite
verification of Zion's commitments, Zion continues to meet the
performance objectives of 10 C.F.R. 73.55(a) and its commitments under
its security plan.
As explained above, although the October 7, 1994, revision to the
Zion security plan will result in a reduced number of armed guards, the
number of armed response personnel will not decline and the Licensee
continues to meet the specific requirements of 10 C.F.R. 73.55(h)(3)
with respect to the number of armed response personnel. In regard to
the positioning of armed response personnel, NRC regulations require
that licensees establish a safeguards contingency plan which requires
armed response personnel to interpose themselves between vital areas
and material access areas such that armed response personnel can
prevent entry for the purpose of radiological sabotage. 10 C.F.R.
73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A). If revisions to a licensee's security plan meet
the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 73.55, the NRC staff concludes that the
revisions are consistent with 10 C.F.R. 50.54(p) and that they will not
decrease the effectiveness of the safeguards plan. In this case, the
NRC staff concluded that the October 7, 1994, revision to the Zion
security plan met the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 73.55 and did not
result in decreased effectiveness of the plan.
In view of the above, the Petitioners have not raised a substantial
safety concern regarding manning and positioning of armed guards at
Zion Station.
G. Additional Concern Noted on a Copy of the Petition Sent to Senator
Simon
Petitioners appended an additional concern that low level waste is
now being stored in the owner controlled area with no security patrols
except a casual tour once per eight hour shift, on a copy of the
Petition addressed to United States Senator Paul Simon of Illinois.
Senator Simon referred the concern to the DOE, and DOE subsequently
forwarded it to the NRC. Petitioners' supplemental letter of February
28, 1995, asserts that the interim radwaste storage facility is worthy
of one full 24-hour patrol and alarmed, continuous surveillance
equipment, such as a camera.
Storage and control of NRC-licensed material are governed, in
pertinent part, by 10 CFR 20.1801 of Subpart I to 10 CFR part 20, which
requires licensees to secure from unauthorized removal or unauthorized
access licensed materials that are stored in controlled or unrestricted
areas. The security requirements of 10 CFR part 73 do not apply to the
storage of low level waste. Zion Station maintains an interim radwaste
storage facility (IRSF) for licensed material on-site, within the owner
controlled area to which general access is not permitted. The IRSF is
locked, key access is controlled, and once in each 8 hour shift the
IRSF is patrolled by a security officer. The staff finds that the IRSF
at the Zion facility is in compliance with 10 CFR 20.1801.
For the reasons stated above, Petitioners have not raised a
substantial safety concern regarding security of low level waste in the
owner controlled area at the Zion facility.
IV. Conclusion
The institution of a proceeding in response to a request for action
under 10 CFR 2.206 is appropriate only when substantial health and
safety issues have been raised. See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York
(Indian Point, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-75-8, 2 NRC 173, 176 (1975), and
Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2),
DD-84-7, 19 NRC 899, 923 (1984). I have applied this standard to
determine what action, if any, is warranted in response to the matters
raised by Petitioners. Each of the claims or allegations by Petitioners
has been reviewed, and I conclude that, for the reasons discussed
above, Petitioners have raised no substantial safety concern regarding
the revised security plan for the Zion facility. Petitioners' requests
that the NRC withdraw its approval of the changes to the security plan
and that the NRC require an increase in the number of, or a change in
the positioning of, armed guards at the Zion Nuclear Power Station, are
denied. Petitioners' request that the NRC demand greater justification
for the proposal to reduce the number of armed guards and the defense
of the Zion Nuclear Power Station is denied. Since the NRC has agreed
with the Licensee that the changes to Zion's security plan do not
decrease the effectiveness of the plan, per 10 CFR 50.54(p), NRC
approval to implement the changes to Zion's security plan is not
required.
A copy of this Decision will be filed with the Secretary of the
Commission for the Commission to review in accordance with 10 CFR
2.206(c). As provided by Section 2.206(c), this Decision will
constitute the final action of the Commission 25 days after issuance,
unless the Commission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the
decision within that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day of May 1995.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
William T. Russell,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 95-13501 Filed 6-1-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M