[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 88 (Monday, May 8, 1995)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 22501-22503]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-10835]



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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 95-NM-73-AD; Amendment 39-9218; AD 95-10-01]


Airworthiness Directives; Raytheon Model Hawker 1000 and BAe 125-
1000A Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

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SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that 
is applicable to certain Raytheon Model Hawker 1000 and BAe 125-1000A 
series airplanes. This action requires inspections to detect various 
discrepancies of the fuel hose assemblies on the auxiliary power unit 
(APU), and correction of any discrepancy found. This amendment is 
prompted by several reports of heat damage to the fuel hose assembly on 
the APU. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent 
failure of a fuel hose due to heat damage caused by incorrect routing 
or bleed air leakage; such failure could result in a malfunction of the 
APU, a fuel fire in the fuselage rear equipment bay, and reduced 
structural integrity of the surrounding structure.

DATES: Effective May 23, 1995.
    The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in 
the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as 
of May 23, 1995.
    Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or 
before July 7, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-103, 
Attention: Rules Docket No. 95-NM-73-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 
Washington 98055-4056.
    The service information referenced in this AD may be obtained from 
Raytheon Corporate Jets, Inc., Customer Support Department, Adams 
Field, P.O. Box 3356, Little Rock, Arkansas 72203. This information may 
be examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind 
Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal 
Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: William Schroeder, Aerospace Engineer, 
Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone (206) 
227-2148; fax (206) 227-1320.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), which is 
the airworthiness authority for the United Kingdom, recently notified 
the FAA that an unsafe condition may exist on certain Raytheon Model 
Hawker 1000 and BAe 125-1000A series airplanes. The CAA advises that it 
has received recent reports of heat damage to the fuel feed hose 
assemblies on the auxiliary power unit (APU) installed on several Model 
BAe 125-1000A airplanes. In one case, the outer sheath was charred due 
to a suspected leak of the bleed air. In another case, while performing 
a pre-flight inspection, the flight crew found [[Page 22502]] a fuel 
hose that was damaged by heat. Subsequently, an inspection of ten more 
airplanes revealed five airplanes with hoses damaged by heat. These 
airplanes had accumulated between 540 and 1,054 total hours time-in-
service. Failure of a fuel hose, if not corrected, could result in a 
malfunction of the APU, a potential fuel fire in the fuselage rear 
equipment bay, and reduced structural integrity of the surrounding 
structure.
    The subject assemblies installed on Model BAe 125-1000A series 
airplanes are similar to those installed on Model Hawker 1000 series 
airplanes. Therefore, both airplane models are subject to this same 
unsafe condition.
    Raytheon has issued Service Bulletin SB 49-44, dated January 20, 
1995, which describes procedures for a visual inspection of both fuel 
hose assemblies (inlet and outlet from the fuel pump box) on the APU to 
detect certain discrepancies, as follows:
    1. Signs of overheating of hose assemblies (scorching or 
discoloration);
    2. Correct routing of the fuel feed hose assembly on the APU;
    3. Minimum clearance of 0.5 inch between the hose assembly and the 
left-hand mixer valve/left-hand main air valve assemblies and 
associated hot air ducting;
    4. Signs of leakage of bleed air from the left-hand mixer valve 
and/or left-hand main air valve and bellows; and
    5. Correct positioning of the air leak detection system elements 
adjacent to the left-hand main air valve and mixer valve flange 
(including the auxiliary air supply branch).
    These airplane models are manufactured in the United Kingdom and is 
type certificated for operation in the United States under the 
provisions of Sec. 21.29 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 
21.29) and the applicable bilateral airworthiness agreement. Pursuant 
to this bilateral airworthiness agreement, the CAA has kept the FAA 
informed of the situation described above. The FAA has examined the 
findings of the CAA, reviewed all available information, and determined 
that AD action is necessary for products of this type design that are 
certificated for operation in the United States.
    Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to 
exist or develop on other airplanes of the same type design registered 
in the United States, this AD is being issued to prevent failure of a 
fuel feed hose assembly on the APU, which could result in a malfunction 
of the APU, a potential fuel fire the fuselage rear equipment by, and 
reduced structural integrity of the surrounding structure. This AD 
requires inspections to detect discrepancies of the fuel feed hose 
assemblies on the APU; inspection for proper positioning of the rear 
equipment bay air leak detection system; inspection of the bleed air 
system for signs of leakage; and, under certain conditions, repetitive 
inspections of one hose assembly to detect discoloration of that 
assembly. This AD also requires the correction of any discrepancies 
found during the inspections. The actions are required to be 
accomplished in accordance with the service bulletin described 
previously.
    Since a situation exists that requires the immediate adoption of 
this regulation, it is found that notice and opportunity for prior 
public comment hereon are impracticable, and that good cause exists for 
making this amendment effective in less than 30 days.

Comments Invited

    Although this action is in the form of a final rule that involves 
requirements affecting flight safety and, thus, was not preceded by 
notice and an opportunity for public comment, comments are invited on 
this rule. Interested persons are invited to comment on this rule by 
submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. 
Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted 
in triplicate to the address specified under the caption ADDRESSES. All 
communications received on or before the closing date for comments will 
be considered, and this rule may be amended in light of the comments 
received. Factual information that supports the commenter's ideas and 
suggestions is extremely helpful in evaluating the effectiveness of the 
AD action and determining whether additional rulemaking action would be 
needed.
    Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, 
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the rule that might 
suggest a need to modify the rule. All comments submitted will be 
available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the 
Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report that 
summarizes each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this 
AD will be filed in the Rules Docket.
    Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments 
submitted in response to this rule must submit a self-addressed, 
stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: ``Comments 
to Docket Number 95-NM-73-AD.'' The postcard will be date stamped and 
returned to the commenter.
    The regulations adopted herein will not have substantial direct 
effects on the States, on the relationship between the national 
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in 
accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this final 
rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the 
preparation of a Federalism Assessment.
    The FAA has determined that this regulation is an emergency 
regulation that must be issued immediately to correct an unsafe 
condition in aircraft, and that it is not a ``significant regulatory 
action'' under Executive Order 12866. It has been determined further 
that this action involves an emergency regulation under DOT Regulatory 
Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979). If it is 
determined that this emergency regulation otherwise would be 
significant under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures, a final 
regulatory evaluation will be prepared and placed in the Rules Docket. 
A copy of it, if filed, may be obtained from the Rules Docket at the 
location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of 
the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. App. 1354(a), 1421 and 1423; 49 U.S.C. 
106(g); and 14 CFR 11.89.


Sec. 39.13  [Amended]

    2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new 
airworthiness directive:

95-10-01  Raytheon Corporate Jets, Inc. (Formerly de Havilland; 
Hawker Siddeley; British Aerospace, plc): Amendment 39-9218. Docket 
95-NM-73-AD.

    Applicability: Model Hawker 1000 and BAe 125-1000A series 
airplanes, post modification 259722C, certificated in any category.

    [[Page 22503]] Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane 
identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of 
whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area 
subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been 
modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the 
requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must use the 
authority provided in paragraph (b) to request approval from the 
FAA. This approval may address either no action, if the current 
configuration eliminates the unsafe condition; or different actions 
necessary to address the unsafe condition described in this AD. Such 
a request should include an assessment of the effect of the changed 
configuration on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no 
case does the presence of any modification, alteration, or repair 
remove any airplane from the applicability of this AD.

    Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished 
previously.
    To prevent failure of a fuel hose assembly on the auxiliary 
power unit (APU), which could result in a malfunction of the APU, a 
potential fuel fire in the fuselage rear bay, and reduced structural 
integrity of the surrounding structure, accomplish the following:
    (a) Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, perform 
inspections to detect discrepancies of the fuel feed hose assemblies 
on the APU; an inspection to assure proper positioning of the air 
leak detection system; and an inspection of the bleed air system for 
signs of leakage; in accordance with paragraph 2.B. of the 
Accomplishment Instructions of Raytheon Service Bulletin SB 49-44, 
dated January 20, 1995.
    (1) If no discrepancy is found: Thereafter, following the last 
flight of each day, perform an inspection to detect discoloration of 
the fuel hose assembly (outlet from the fuel pump box) on the APU, 
in accordance with paragraph 2.B.(2) and 2.C. of the Accomplishment 
Instructions of the service bulletin.
    (2) If any discrepancy is found, prior to further flight, 
correct the discrepancy in accordance with paragraph 2.B. of the 
Accomplishment Instructions of the service bulletin.
    (b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the 
compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be 
used if approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, 
FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their 
requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, 
who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, 
Standardization Branch, ANM-113.

    Note 2: Information concerning the existence of approved 
alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be 
obtained from the Standardization Branch, ANM-113.

    (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with 
Secs. 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 
21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the 
requirements of this AD can be accomplished.
    (d) The actions shall be done in accordance with Raytheon 
Service Bulletin SB 49-44, dated January 20, 1995. This 
incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the 
Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 
51. Copies may be obtained from Raytheon Corporate Jets, Inc., 
Customer Support Department, Adams Field, P.O. Box 3356, Little 
Rock, Arkansas 72203. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport 
Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or 
at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, 
NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.
    (e) This amendment becomes effective on May 23, 1995.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 27, 1995.
James V. Devany,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 95-10835 Filed 5-5-95; 8:45 am]
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