DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

Historically Black Colleges and Universities Capital Financing Advisory Committee; Meeting

AGENCY: Historically Black Colleges and Universities Capital Financing Advisory Committee; Education.

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

SUMMARY: This notice sets forth the schedule and proposed agenda of a forthcoming meeting of the Historically Black Colleges and Universities Capital Financing Advisory Committee. This notice also describes the functions of the Committee. Notice of this meeting is required under Section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act.

DATE AND TIME: May 12, 1995, 9:00 am–12:00 pm.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Historically Black Colleges and Universities Capital Financing Advisory Committee is established under section 727 of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended in 1992 (20 U.S.C. 1132c-6). The Council is established to provide advice and counsel to the Secretary of Education and the designated bonding authority for the Historically Black Colleges and Universities Capital Financing Program as to the most effective and efficient means of implementing construction financing on historically Black college and university campuses and to advise Congress regarding the progress made in implementing the program.

The meeting of the Committee is open to the public. The agenda includes a briefing by members of the designated bonding authority on progress to date in establishing the program.

The public is given less than 15 days notice of the meeting because of the need to brief the members of the Board and the unavailability of other suitable dates.

Records are kept of all Committee proceedings, and are available for public inspection at the office of the Historically Black Colleges and Universities Capital Financing Advisory Committee, U.S. Department of Education, Washington, DC 20202–5139, from the hours of 9:00 am to 4:00 pm.

David A. Longanecker, Assistant Secretary for Postsecondary Education.

[FR Doc. 95–11226 Filed 5–4–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4401–01–M

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Notice of Pre-Scoping Workshop for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement

AGENCY: Department of Energy.


SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) announces that it will conduct a pre-scoping workshop for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management (SS&M) Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS). The purpose of the pre-scoping workshop is to provide the public with an opportunity to present comments, ask questions, and discuss concerns regarding SS&M activities with DOE officials. An interactive format will be used for the workshop. Input from the pre-scoping workshop will assist DOE in formulating the notice of intent (NOI) for the SS&M PEIS, and refining alternatives for consideration in the PEIS.

The primary goal of the SS&M program is to provide high confidence in the safety, security, and reliability of the nation’s stockpile and to ensure the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent while supporting arms-control and nonproliferation policy. Stockpile Stewardship includes activities required to maintain a high level of confidence in the safety, reliability, and mission performance of nuclear weapons in the absence of underground nuclear testing, and to be prepared to resume nuclear testing if so directed by the President. Stockpile Management activities include dismantlement, maintenance, evaluation, and repair or replacement of weapons in the existing stockpile.

The workshop will afford interested parties the opportunity to offer suggestions regarding the appropriate alternatives for performing the functions necessary to carry out the Department’s stockpile stewardship and management missions. Through the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review process, DOE proposes to develop a comprehensive strategy to establish a long-range plan for Stockpile Stewardship and Management.

DATES: The workshop will be held on May 19, 1995, in the Main Auditorium of the DOE Forrestal Building (1000 Independence Ave., S.E., Washington, D.C.) from 9:00 a.m.–4:00 p.m. Members of the public who would like to attend the pre-scoping workshop are asked to call the Office of Reconfiguration's toll-free telephone number at 1–800–776–2765 to pre-register.

ADDRESSES: General questions concerning the SS&M program can be asked by calling the toll-free telephone number, or by writing to: Stephen Sohinki, Director, Office of Reconfiguration, U.S. Department of Energy, P.O. Box 3417, Alexandria, VA 22302.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background

In January 1991, the Secretary of Energy announced that the Department would prepare a PEIS examining alternatives for the reconfiguration of the Department’s nuclear weapons complex (the Complex). The framework for the Reconfiguration PEIS was described in the January 1991 Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Study (Reconfiguration Study), a detailed examination of alternatives for the future Complex. Because of the significant changes in the world since January 1991, especially with regard to projected future requirements for the United States’ nuclear weapons stockpile, the Department concluded in October 1994 that the framework described in the Reconfiguration Study no longer fit current circumstances or supported any realistic proposal for reconversion of the Complex (see 59 FR 54175 (October 28, 1994)).

Contributing factors to that conclusion included public comments at the September–October 1993 Reconfiguration PEIS scoping meetings, the fact that no production of new nuclear weapons was required for the foreseeable future, budget constraints, and the Department’s decision to prepare a separate PEIS on Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Nuclear Materials (Notice of Intent published June 21, 1994, 59 FR 17344).
As a result of these changed circumstances, the Department separated the Reconfiguration PEIS into two PEISs: (1) a Tritium Supply and Recycling PEIS to be completed by November 1995; and (2) a Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS. The Draft PEIS for Tritium Supply and Recycling has been completed and issued to the public (60 FR 14433 (March 17, 1995)), public hearings were held in April 1995, and a Final PEIS is expected in October 1995.

With regard to the SS&M PEIS, during the past six months the Department has been developing the new framework to support the SS&M program. That preliminary framework, which is described in a document entitled “The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program”, is now available on the internet under DOE’s Home Page for Defense Programs. That document is also being mailed to those individuals who had previously requested information on the SS&M program. Other individuals who would like to receive it can contact the Office of Reconfiguration at the address listed above or by calling the program’s toll free number. At the pre-scoping workshop, the framework contained in “The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program” will be presented by DOE officials, and the public will be provided the opportunity to present comments, ask questions, and discuss concerns with DOE officials.

Some general information regarding the SS&M framework is provided below, along with a description of the format envisioned for the interactive pre-scoping workshop.

**Purpose and Need for the SS&M Program**

By law (the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 USC 2011 et seq.), DOE is charged with providing nuclear weapons to support the United States nuclear deterrent policy. The mission of the DOE nuclear weapons complex is to provide the nation with safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapons and components so that an effective nuclear deterrent can be maintained into the foreseeable future, and to accomplish this in a way that protects the environment as well as the health and safety of workers and the public.

Recent changes in national security needs have necessitated corresponding changes in the way the Department must meet its responsibilities regarding the nation’s nuclear weapons. As a result of international arms-control agreements (in particular the START I treaty and the START II protocol) and unilateral decisions by the United States, the nation’s stockpile will be significantly reduced by the year 2003. Consequently, the nation has halted the development of new nuclear weapons, has begun closing portions of the Complex, and is considering further consolidation or downsizing of its remaining elements. In addition, the nation is observing a moratorium on nuclear testing and is pursuing a comprehensive test ban treaty.

However, international dangers remain and, as the President has emphasized, nuclear deterrence will continue to be a cornerstone of United States national security policy. Thus, the Department’s responsibilities for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile will also continue for the foreseeable future.

Because of the moratorium on nuclear testing, the termination of new weapons development, and the closure of production facilities, a new approach to ensuring confidence in the stockpile is needed. In announcing the extension of the nuclear testing moratorium (July 1993), President Clinton reaffirmed the importance of maintaining confidence in the enduring U.S. nuclear stockpile and the need to assure that the nation’s nuclear deterrent remains unquestioned during a test ban. By Presidential Decision Directive and act of Congress (P.L. 103–160), the Department of Energy was directed to “establish a stewardship program to ensure the preservation of the core intellectual and technical competencies of the U.S. in nuclear weapons.”

This new approach must more heavily rely on scientific understanding and expert judgment to predict, identify, and correct problems affecting the safety and reliability of the stockpile. This program is essential if the nation is to properly safeguard its nuclear weapons and maintain an unquestioned nuclear deterrent.

The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program is being developed to meet the challenges involved in ensuring the safety, reliability, and performance of the enduring stockpile. Three particular challenges must be met:

- Fully supporting, at all times, the nation’s nuclear deterrent with safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapons, while transforming the nuclear weapons complex (laboratories and production facilities) to one that is more appropriate for the smaller enduring stockpile.
- Preserving the core intellectual and technical competencies of the weapons laboratories. Without nuclear testing, confidence in the nation’s nuclear deterrent will rest in large part with confidence in the competency of the people who must make the scientific and technical judgments related to the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons.
- Ensuring that the activities needed to maintain the nation’s nuclear deterrent are consistent with the nation’s arms-control and nonproliferation objectives.

**DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex**

The current DOE nuclear weapons complex consists of 8 major facilities located in 7 states. Major facilities, and their primary responsibilities within the Complex, are listed in Table 1. Currently, the Complex maintains the capabilities to design and manufacture nuclear weapons; provides surveillance of and maintains nuclear weapons in the stockpile; and retires and disposes of nuclear weapons.

**Table 1—The DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pantex Plant (Amarillo, Texas)</td>
<td>Dismantles retired weapons; manufactures high explosives components; assembles high explosives, nuclear components, and nonnuclear components into nuclear weapons; repairs and modifies weapons; and evaluates and performs nonnuclear testing of nuclear weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savannah River Site (SRS) (Aiken, South Carolina)</td>
<td>Tritium loading/unloading and surveillance of reservoirs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y-12 Plant (Oak Ridge, Tennessee)</td>
<td>Maintains the capability to produce and assemble uranium and lithium components; recovers materials from fabrication process and retires weapons; produces nonnuclear weapon components.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas City Plant (KCP) (Kansas City, Missouri)</td>
<td>Manufactures nonnuclear weapons components.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) (Livermore, California)</td>
<td>Research and development of nuclear weapons; designs and tests advanced technology concepts; maintains weapons design program; maintains the capability to produce nuclear components.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) (Los Alamos, New Mexico)</td>
<td>Research and development of nuclear weapons; designs and tests advanced technology concepts; maintains weapons design program; maintains the capability to produce nuclear components.</td>
</tr>
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activities required to maintain a high level of confidence in the safety, reliability, and performance of nuclear weapons in the absence of underground nuclear testing, and to be prepared to resume testing if so directed by the President. While the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile is currently judged to be safe, secure, and reliable, the average age of the stockpile has never significantly exceeded the current age of 12 to 13 years. Because the Department cannot predict with certainty when age-related changes affecting weapon safety or reliability will occur, a conservative assumption would be that problems will arise more frequently as the weapons age beyond their original 20- to 25-year design lifetimes.

Historically, nuclear testing has provided unambiguous confidence in the safety and performance of weapons in the stockpile. Without underground nuclear testing, the Department must rely on aboveground experimental and computational capabilities, especially in weapons physics, to predict the consequences of the complex problems that are likely to occur in an aging stockpile.

Currently, enhanced aboveground experimental and computational capabilities are needed to assess and predict the consequences of these problems. An improved science-based program with enhanced experimental and computational capabilities is necessary to maintain confidence in the safety and performance of the nation’s stockpile without nuclear testing. This program must be technically challenging so that it will attract the high-quality scientific and technical talent needed for future stewardship of the stockpile.

Substantial advances in experimental and computational capabilities are needed to fill in those areas of nuclear weapon science that are incomplete, particularly gaps in our understanding of physics and gaps in the data needed for computational simulations of weapons performance and model-based assessments of safety and reliability. Upgraded or new experimental capabilities are required to validate improved or new computational models.

Without these enhanced capabilities, the Department will lack the ability to evaluate some safety and performance issues, which could significantly affect the stockpile. Consequently, desired improvements in weapon safety and security might be sacrificed because of an inability to certify their performance. It is also possible that, without these enhanced capabilities, some nuclear components exhibiting changes in composition or structure would have to be retired because the Department would not be able to certify the acceptability of repaired or modified components.

Stockpile stewardship can be broken down into three broad functional areas:

- Weapons Physics
- Materials Surveillance
- Computational Capabilities

In addition to the no-action alternative of relying on existing capabilities, in each of these functional areas, the PEIS will assess new or upgraded facilities in each functional area to carry out the Stockpile Stewardship mission. Only the three weapons laboratories (LANL, LLNL, and SNL) and the NTS are expected to be considered in the development of reasonable Stockpile Stewardship site alternatives. The existing configuration of these sites and any potential new facilities or significant upgrades to facilities will be discussed.

SS&M Program Foundational Framework

In the SS&M program, DOE will:

- Emphasize compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and accepted practices regarding industrial and weapons safety, safeguarding the health of Complex workers and the general public; protecting the environment; and ensuring the security of nuclear materials and weapons components.
- Safely and reliably maintain the nuclear weapons stockpile as directed by the President and mandated by Congress.
- Minimize costs associated with the weapons stockpile.
- Minimize the number and/or size of weapons production sites.
- Maximize the transfer of nonnuclear materials production activities to the private sector.
- Maintain core intellectual and technical competencies in nuclear weapons.
- Sustain confidence in safety, reliability, and performance of the stockpile in the absence of underground nuclear testing.
- Minimize the use of hazardous materials and the number and volume of waste streams.
- Provide for proper disposal of hazardous, non-hazardous, and radioactive waste.

PEIS Decisions

The PEIS and supporting cost, technical, and schedule studies will be prepared for the SS&M program. The PEIS and the other studies will support the following decisions:

- Identify the future components of the SS&M program; and
• Determine the configuration of the nuclear weapons complex to accomplish the SS&M program requirements.

Pre-Scooping Workshop Format

The Department intends to hold a plenary session at the beginning of the workshop in which DOE officials will more fully explain the framework for the proposed SS&M program, including preliminary alternatives for both Stockpile Management and Stockpile Stewardship. Following the plenary session and any clarification and discussion that results, the Department intends for the participants to break out into two smaller groups— one for Stockpile Management and one for Stockpile Stewardship— to allow for more specific discussion. Arrangements will be made so that interested members of the public may attend both break out sessions if they desire.

Next Steps

Following the pre-scoping workshop, DOE will refine, as necessary, the SS&M framework and proposed alternatives, prepare a Notice of Intent for the SS&M PEIS, and hold public scoping meetings (to be conducted as interactive workshops) regarding the alternatives to be evaluated in the SS&M PEIS. DOE intends to announce the location, date and time for these scoping meetings/workshops in a Notice in the Federal Register, and by other means as appropriate. The announcement will be at least two weeks prior to any meetings.

Issued in Washington, D.C. this 2nd day of May, 1995, for the United States Department of Energy.

Victor H. Reis,
Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs.

[FR Doc. 95–11162 Filed 5–4–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6450–01–P

EERE-Denver Regional Support Office; Notice of Solicitation

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of solicitation for financial assistance applications; DE–PS48–95RB10534 heavy duty state/municipal vehicle alternative fuel demonstration.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is issuing a solicitation to state energy offices, inviting them to apply for the Heavy Duty State/Municipal Vehicle Alternative Fuel Demonstration Program. Only one application will be accepted from each state.

The participating state energy offices will coordinate and conduct a heavy duty municipal vehicle project to introduce alternative fuel original equipment manufacturer (OEM) vehicles for operation by state governments, local school districts, and municipalities. The incremental costs over conventional vehicles for up to four (4) OEM alternative fuel heavy duty vehicles per project will be funded by DOE.

Types of vehicles to be considered are those used directly by the state, a local agency, or for the sole purpose of supporting a state or local agency. Transit buses are excluded. Vehicles will be fueled with ethanol, methanol, natural gas, propane or biodiesel.

The DOE Support Offices will coordinate this program’s activities in conjunction and cooperation with the state energy offices, providing assistance and direction to interested participants. The state energy offices, municipalities, and local school districts will identify refueling facilities. The DOE will make arrangements to invite local utilities or fuel suppliers to participate in initiating in the development of refueling facilities. The award recipients will be responsible for the collection and reporting of data/information as specified by DOE on alternative fuel and “control” vehicles over a five year period. It is the intent of this solicitation is to provide states with practical experience in the use of alternative fuel heavy duty vehicles to promote their use and to increase awareness of the availability and benefits of alternative fuel vehicles.

FUND AVAILABILITY: Up to $1,200,000 is available to fund financial assistance awards. Awards will be limited to $200,000 each. Only one application will be accepted from each state. The initial project and budget period will be nine months from the date of award.

ELIGIBILITY: The DOE, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Office of Alternative Fuels, is requesting applications for a demonstration of heavy duty municipal alternative fuel vehicles from the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory of possession of the United States. Interested municipalities, and local school districts should contact the appropriate state office for applications for subawards. Financial Assistance for this solicitation is authorized by the DOE Reorganization Act, P.L. 95–91, and the DOE Financial Assistance Regulations, 10 CFR 600.

REVIEW, EVALUATION AND AWARD: Initial review for completeness will be performed at the Support Offices. The applications will be evaluated by the Office of Technical Assistance and the Office of Alternative Fuels according to the criteria set forth in the solicitation. It is currently anticipated that the review of applications will begin on or about July 1, 1995. Selections will be made by mid-August, with anticipated award issuance by September 30, 1995.

Awards may be either grants or cooperative agreements, depending on amount of substantial involvement anticipated between the Department of Energy and the recipient during performance of the contemplated activity.


Issued in Golden, Colorado on April 26, 1995.

John W. Meeker,
Chief, Procurement, Go.

[FR Doc. 95–11163 Filed 5–4–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6450–01–P

Office of Fossil Energy

[FE DOCKET NO. 95–22–NG]

ProGas U.S.A., Inc.; Order Granting Blanket Authorization To Import and Export Natural Gas From and To Canada

AGENCY: Office of Fossil Energy, DOE.

ACTION: Notice of order.

SUMMARY: The Office of Fossil Energy of the Department of Energy gives notice that it has issued an order granting ProGas U.S.A., Inc. authorization to import up to 800 Bcf and to export up to 200 Bcf of natural gas from and to Canada. The term of the authorization is