[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 87 (Friday, May 5, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 22373-22376]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-11162]



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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Notice of Pre-Scoping Workshop for the Stockpile Stewardship and 
Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of Pre-Scoping Workshop for the Stockpile Stewardship 
and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) announces that it will conduct 
a pre-scoping workshop for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management 
(SS&M) Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS). The purpose 
of the pre-scoping workshop is to provide the public with an 
opportunity to present comments, ask questions, and discuss concerns 
regarding SS&M activities with DOE officials. An interactive format 
will be used for the workshop. Input from the pre-scoping workshop will 
assist DOE in formulating the notice of intent (NOI) for the SS&M PEIS, 
and refining alternatives for consideration in the PEIS.
    The primary goal of the SS&M program is to provide high confidence 
in the safety, security, and reliability of the nation's stockpile and 
to ensure the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent while supporting 
arms-control and nonproliferation policy. Stockpile Stewardship 
includes activities required to maintain a high level of confidence in 
the safety, reliability, and performance of nuclear weapons in the 
absence of underground nuclear testing, and to be prepared to resume 
nuclear testing if so directed by the President. Stockpile Management 
activities include dismantlement, maintenance, evaluation, and repair 
or replacement of weapons in the existing stockpile.
    The workshop will afford interested parties the opportunity to 
offer suggestions regarding the appropriate alternatives for performing 
the functions necessary to carry out the Department's stockpile 
stewardship and management missions. Through the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) review process, DOE proposes to develop a 
comprehensive strategy to establish a long-range plan for Stockpile 
Stewardship and Management.

DATES: The workshop will be held on May 19, 1995, in the Main 
Auditorium of the DOE Forrestal Building (1000 Independence Ave, S.E., 
Washington D.C.) from 9:00 a.m.-4:00 p.m. Members of the public who 
would like to attend the pre-scoping workshop are asked to call the 
Office of Reconfiguration's toll-free telephone number at 1-800-776-
2765 to pre-register.

ADDRESSES: General questions concerning the SS&M program can be asked 
by calling the toll-free telephone number, or by writing to: Stephen 
Sohinki, Director, Office of Reconfiguration, U.S. Department of 
Energy, P.O. Box 3417, Alexandria, VA 22302.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general information on the DOE 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, please contact: Carol 
M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Assistance, EH-42, 
U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, 
D.C. 20585, (202) 586-4600 or 1-800-472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    In January 1991, the Secretary of Energy announced that the 
Department would prepare a PEIS examining alternatives for the 
reconfiguration of the Department's nuclear weapons complex (the 
Complex). The framework for the Reconfiguration PEIS was described in 
the January 1991 Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Study 
(Reconfiguration Study), a detailed examination of alternatives for the 
future Complex. Because of the significant changes in the world since 
January 1991, especially with regard to projected future requirements 
for the United States' nuclear weapons stockpile, the Department 
concluded in October 1994 that the framework described in the 
Reconfiguration Study no longer fit current circumstances or supported 
any realistic proposal for reconfiguration of the Complex (see 59 FR 
54175 (October 28, 1994)). Contributing factors to that conclusion 
included public comments at the September-October 1993 Reconfiguration 
PEIS scoping meetings, the fact that no production of new nuclear 
weapons was required for the foreseeable future, budget constraints, 
and the Department's decision to prepare a separate PEIS on Storage and 
Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Nuclear Materials (Notice of 
Intent published June 21, 1994, 59 FR 17344). [[Page 22374]] 
    As a result of these changed circumstances, the Department 
separated the Reconfiguration PEIS into two PEISs: (1) a Tritium Supply 
and Recycling PEIS to be completed by November 1995; and (2) a 
Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS. The Draft PEIS for Tritium 
Supply and Recycling has been completed and issued to the public (60 FR 
14433 (March 17, 1995)), public hearings were held in April 1995, and a 
Final PEIS is expected in October 1995.
    With regard to the SS&M PEIS, during the past six months the 
Department has been developing the new framework to support the SS&M 
program. That preliminary framework, which is described in a document 
entitled ``The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program'', is now 
available on the internet under DOE's Home Page for Defense Programs. 
That document is also being mailed to those individuals who had 
previously requested information on the SS&M program. Other individuals 
who would like to receive that document can contact the Office of 
Reconfiguration at the address listed above or by calling the program's 
toll free number. At the pre-scoping workshop, the framework contained 
in ``The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program'' will be 
presented by DOE officials, and the public will be provided the 
opportunity to present comments, ask questions, and discuss concerns 
with DOE officials. Some general information regarding the SS&M 
framework is provided below, along with a description of the format 
envisioned for the interactive pre-scoping workshop.

Purpose and Need for the SS&M Program

     By law [the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 USC 2011 et 
seq.], DOE is charged with providing nuclear weapons to support the 
United States nuclear deterrent policy. The mission of the DOE nuclear 
weapons complex is to provide the nation with safe, secure, and 
reliable nuclear weapons and components so that an effective nuclear 
deterrent can be maintained into the foreseeable future, and to 
accomplish this in a way that protects the environment as well as the 
health and safety of workers and the public.
    Recent changes in national security needs have necessitated 
corresponding changes in the way the Department must meet its 
responsibilities regarding the nation's nuclear weapons. As a result of 
international arms-control agreements (in particular the START I treaty 
and the START II protocol) and unilateral decisions by the United 
States, the nation's stockpile will be significantly reduced by the 
year 2003. Consequently, the nation has halted the development of new 
nuclear weapons, has begun closing portions of the Complex, and is 
considering further consolidation or downsizing of its remaining 
elements. In addition, the nation is observing a moratorium on nuclear 
testing and is pursuing a comprehensive test ban treaty.
    However, international dangers remain and, as the President has 
emphasized, nuclear deterrence will continue to be a cornerstone of 
United States national security policy. Thus, the Department's 
responsibilities for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of 
the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile will also continue for the 
foreseeable future.
    Because of the moratorium on nuclear testing, the termination of 
new weapons development, and the closure of production facilities, a 
new approach to ensuring confidence in the stockpile is needed. In 
announcing the extension of the nuclear testing moratorium (July 1993), 
President Clinton reaffirmed the importance of maintaining confidence 
in the enduring U.S. nuclear stockpile and the need to assure that the 
nation's nuclear deterrent remains unquestioned during a test ban. By 
Presidential Decision Directive and act of Congress (P.L. 103-160), the 
Department of Energy was directed to ``establish a stewardship program 
to ensure the preservation of the core intellectual and technical 
competencies of the U.S. in nuclear weapons.''
    This new approach must more heavily rely on scientific 
understanding and expert judgment to predict, identify, and correct 
problems affecting the safety and reliability of the stockpile. This 
program is essential if the nation is to properly safeguard its nuclear 
weapons and maintain an unquestioned nuclear deterrent.
    The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program is being developed 
to meet the challenges involved in ensuring the safety, reliability, 
and performance of the enduring stockpile. Three particular challenges 
must be met:
     Fully supporting, at all times, the nation's nuclear 
deterrent with safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapons, while 
transforming the nuclear weapons complex (laboratories and production 
facilities) to one that is more appropriate for the smaller enduring 
stockpile.
     Preserving the core intellectual and technical 
competencies of the weapons laboratories. Without nuclear testing, 
confidence in the nation's nuclear deterrent will rest in large part 
with confidence in the competency of the people who must make the 
scientific and technical judgments related to the safety and 
reliability of nuclear weapons.
     Ensuring that the activities needed to maintain the 
nation's nuclear deterrent are consistent with the nation's arms-
control and nonproliferation objectives.

DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex

    The current DOE nuclear weapons complex consists of 8 major 
facilities located in 7 states. Major facilities, and their primary 
responsibilities within the Complex, are listed in Table 1. Currently, 
the Complex maintains the capabilities to design and manufacture 
nuclear weapons; provides surveillance of and maintains nuclear weapons 
in the stockpile; and retires and disposes of nuclear weapons.

Table 1--The DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex

Pantex Plant (Amarillo, Texas)--Dismantles retired weapons; fabricates 
high explosives components; assembles high explosives, nuclear 
components, and nonnuclear components into nuclear weapons; repairs and 
modifies weapons; and evaluates and performs nonnuclear testing of 
nuclear weapons.
Savannah River Site (SRS) (Aiken, South Carolina)--Tritium loading/
unloading and surveillance of reservoirs.
Y-12 Plant (Oak Ridge, Tennessee)--Maintains the capability to produce 
and assemble uranium and lithium components; recovers materials from 
fabrication process and retired weapons; produces nonnuclear weapon 
components.
Kansas City Plant (KCP) (Kansas City, Missouri)--Manufactures 
nonnuclear weapons components.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) (Livermore, California)--
Research and development of nuclear weapons; designs and tests advanced 
technology concepts; maintains weapons design program; maintains the 
capability to produce nuclear components.
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) (Los Alamos, New Mexico)--
Research and development of nuclear weapons; designs and tests advanced 
technology concepts; maintains weapons design program; maintains the 
capability to produce nuclear components. [[Page 22375]] 
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) (Albuquerque, New Mexico)--System 
engineering of nuclear weapons; designs and develops nonnuclear 
components; field and laboratory nonnuclear testing; and manufactures 
nonnuclear weapons components.
Nevada Test Site (NTS) (Las Vegas, Nevada)--Maintains capability to 
conduct underground nuclear testing.

PEIS Alternatives

    The Department's preliminary views concerning consideration of 
alternatives for both the Stockpile Management and the Stockpile 
Stewardship program elements are described below:

Stockpile Management

    Stockpile Management activities include dismantlement, maintenance, 
evaluation, and repair or replacement of weapons in the existing 
stockpile. In the past, a large weapons production complex provided the 
capability and capacity to rapidly fix problems in the stockpile. 
However, the existing production complex may be inefficient and 
ineffective for a much smaller enduring stockpile. Therefore, one of 
the primary goals of the Stockpile Management proposal will be to 
downsize and/or consolidate functions to provide an effective and 
efficient production capability for the smaller stockpile.
    To ensure that the Department will be able to carry out its 
stockpile management responsibilities, the following general functional 
capabilities are needed and are expected to be addressed in the SS&M 
PEIS:
     Nuclear weapons assembly/disassembly and surveillance.
     High explosives fabrication and surveillance.
     Nonnuclear component fabrication and surveillance.
     Nuclear component fabrication and surveillance.
    Reasonable alternatives for each of the functional capabilities 
will be developed from the list of sites in Table 1. Under the no-
action alternative, the functions would remain at the locations 
identified in Table 1. In addition to the no-action alternative, the 
PEIS is also expected to assess the alternatives of downsizing (and 
upgrading if necessary) facilities at the no-action sites, and evaluate 
transferring or consolidating the functions to other sites listed in 
Table 1 that have existing facilities which could be used for that 
functional capability.

Stockpile Stewardship

    Stockpile Stewardship includes activities required to maintain a 
high level of confidence in the safety, reliability, and performance of 
nuclear weapons in the absence of underground nuclear testing, and to 
be prepared to resume testing if so directed by the President. While 
the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile is currently judged to be safe, 
secure, and reliable, the average age of the stockpile has never 
significantly exceeded the current age of 12 to 13 years. Because the 
Department cannot predict with certainty when age-related changes 
affecting weapon safety or reliability will occur, a conservative 
assumption would be that problems will arise more frequently as the 
weapons age beyond their original 20- to 25-year design lifetimes.
    Historically, nuclear testing has provided unambiguous confidence 
in the safety and performance of weapons in the stockpile. Without 
underground nuclear testing, the Department must rely on aboveground 
experimental and computational capabilities, especially in weapons 
physics, to predict the consequences of the complex problems that are 
likely to occur in an aging stockpile.
    Currently, enhanced aboveground experimental and computational 
capabilities are needed to assess and predict the consequences of these 
problems. An improved science-based program with enhanced experimental 
and computational capabilities is necessary to maintain confidence in 
the safety and performance of the nation's stockpile without nuclear 
testing. This program must be technically challenging so that it will 
attract the high-quality scientific and technical talent needed for 
future stewardship of the stockpile.
    Substantial advances in experimental and computational capabilities 
are needed to fill in those areas of nuclear weapon science that are 
incomplete, particularly gaps in our understanding of physics and gaps 
in the data needed for computational simulations of weapons performance 
and model-based assessments of safety and reliability. Upgraded or new 
experimental capabilities are required to validate improved or new 
computational models.
    Without these enhanced capabilities, the Department will lack the 
ability to evaluate some safety and performance issues, which could 
significantly affect the stockpile. Consequently, desired improvements 
in weapon safety and security might be sacrificed because of an 
inability to certify their performance. It is also possible that, 
without these enhanced capabilities, some nuclear components exhibiting 
changes in composition or structure would have to be retired because 
the Department would not be able to certify the acceptability of 
repaired or modified components.
    Stockpile stewardship can be broken down into three broad 
functional areas:
     Weapons Physics
     Materials Surveillance
     Computational Capabilities
In addition to the no-action alternative of relying on existing 
capabilities in each of these functional areas, the PEIS will assess 
new or upgraded facilities in each functional area to carry out the 
Stockpile Stewardship mission. Only the three weapons laboratories 
(LANL, LLNL, and SNL) and the NTS are expected to be considered in the 
development of reasonable Stockpile Stewardship site alternatives. The 
existing configuration of these sites and any potential new facilities 
or significant upgrades to facilities will be discussed.

SS&M Program Foundational Framework

    In the SS&M program, DOE will:
     Emphasize compliance with applicable laws and regulations, 
and accepted practices regarding industrial and weapons safety; 
safeguarding the health of Complex workers and the general public; 
protecting the environment; and ensuring the security of nuclear 
materials and weapons components.
     Safely and reliably maintain the nuclear weapons stockpile 
as directed by the President and mandated by Congress.
     Minimize costs associated with the weapons stockpile.
     Minimize the number and/or size of weapons production 
sites.
     Maximize the transfer of nonnuclear materials production 
activities to the private sector.
     Maintain core intellectual and technical competencies in 
nuclear weapons.
     Sustain confidence in safety, reliability, and performance 
of the stockpile in the absence of underground nuclear testing.
     Minimize the use of hazardous materials and the number and 
volume of waste streams.
     Provide for proper disposal of hazardous, non-hazardous, 
and radioactive waste.

PEIS Decisions

    The PEIS and supporting cost, technical, and schedule studies will 
be prepared for the SS&M program. The PEIS and the other studies will 
support the following decisions:
     Identify the future components of the SS&M program; and 
[[Page 22376]] 
     Determine the configuration of the nuclear weapons complex 
to accomplish the SS&M program requirements.

Pre-Scoping Workshop Format

    The Department intends to hold a plenary session at the beginning 
of the workshop in which DOE officials will more fully explain the 
framework for the proposed SS&M program, including preliminary 
alternatives for both Stockpile Management and Stockpile Stewardship. 
Following the plenary session and any clarification and discussion that 
results, the Department intends for the participants to break out into 
two smaller groups-- one for Stockpile Stewardship and one for 
Stockpile Management-- to allow for more specific discussion. 
Arrangements will be made so that interested members of the public may 
attend both break out sessions if they desire.

Next Steps

    Following the pre-scoping workshop, DOE will refine, as necessary, 
the SS&M framework and proposed alternatives, prepare a Notice of 
Intent for the SS&M PEIS, and hold public scoping meetings (to be 
conducted as interactive workshops) regarding the alternatives to be 
evaluated in the SS&M PEIS. DOE intends to announce the location, date 
and time for these scoping meetings/workshops in a Notice in the 
Federal Register, and by other means as appropriate. The announcement 
will be at least two weeks prior to any meetings.

    Issued in Washington, D.C. this 2nd day of May, 1995, for the 
United States Department of Energy.
Victor H. Reis,
Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs.
[FR Doc. 95-11162 Filed 5-4-95; 8:45 am]
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