[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 87 (Friday, May 5, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 22373-22376]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-11162]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Notice of Pre-Scoping Workshop for the Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Notice of Pre-Scoping Workshop for the Stockpile Stewardship
and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement.
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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) announces that it will conduct
a pre-scoping workshop for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management
(SS&M) Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS). The purpose
of the pre-scoping workshop is to provide the public with an
opportunity to present comments, ask questions, and discuss concerns
regarding SS&M activities with DOE officials. An interactive format
will be used for the workshop. Input from the pre-scoping workshop will
assist DOE in formulating the notice of intent (NOI) for the SS&M PEIS,
and refining alternatives for consideration in the PEIS.
The primary goal of the SS&M program is to provide high confidence
in the safety, security, and reliability of the nation's stockpile and
to ensure the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent while supporting
arms-control and nonproliferation policy. Stockpile Stewardship
includes activities required to maintain a high level of confidence in
the safety, reliability, and performance of nuclear weapons in the
absence of underground nuclear testing, and to be prepared to resume
nuclear testing if so directed by the President. Stockpile Management
activities include dismantlement, maintenance, evaluation, and repair
or replacement of weapons in the existing stockpile.
The workshop will afford interested parties the opportunity to
offer suggestions regarding the appropriate alternatives for performing
the functions necessary to carry out the Department's stockpile
stewardship and management missions. Through the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) review process, DOE proposes to develop a
comprehensive strategy to establish a long-range plan for Stockpile
Stewardship and Management.
DATES: The workshop will be held on May 19, 1995, in the Main
Auditorium of the DOE Forrestal Building (1000 Independence Ave, S.E.,
Washington D.C.) from 9:00 a.m.-4:00 p.m. Members of the public who
would like to attend the pre-scoping workshop are asked to call the
Office of Reconfiguration's toll-free telephone number at 1-800-776-
2765 to pre-register.
ADDRESSES: General questions concerning the SS&M program can be asked
by calling the toll-free telephone number, or by writing to: Stephen
Sohinki, Director, Office of Reconfiguration, U.S. Department of
Energy, P.O. Box 3417, Alexandria, VA 22302.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general information on the DOE
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, please contact: Carol
M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Assistance, EH-42,
U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington,
D.C. 20585, (202) 586-4600 or 1-800-472-2756.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
In January 1991, the Secretary of Energy announced that the
Department would prepare a PEIS examining alternatives for the
reconfiguration of the Department's nuclear weapons complex (the
Complex). The framework for the Reconfiguration PEIS was described in
the January 1991 Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Study
(Reconfiguration Study), a detailed examination of alternatives for the
future Complex. Because of the significant changes in the world since
January 1991, especially with regard to projected future requirements
for the United States' nuclear weapons stockpile, the Department
concluded in October 1994 that the framework described in the
Reconfiguration Study no longer fit current circumstances or supported
any realistic proposal for reconfiguration of the Complex (see 59 FR
54175 (October 28, 1994)). Contributing factors to that conclusion
included public comments at the September-October 1993 Reconfiguration
PEIS scoping meetings, the fact that no production of new nuclear
weapons was required for the foreseeable future, budget constraints,
and the Department's decision to prepare a separate PEIS on Storage and
Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Nuclear Materials (Notice of
Intent published June 21, 1994, 59 FR 17344). [[Page 22374]]
As a result of these changed circumstances, the Department
separated the Reconfiguration PEIS into two PEISs: (1) a Tritium Supply
and Recycling PEIS to be completed by November 1995; and (2) a
Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS. The Draft PEIS for Tritium
Supply and Recycling has been completed and issued to the public (60 FR
14433 (March 17, 1995)), public hearings were held in April 1995, and a
Final PEIS is expected in October 1995.
With regard to the SS&M PEIS, during the past six months the
Department has been developing the new framework to support the SS&M
program. That preliminary framework, which is described in a document
entitled ``The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program'', is now
available on the internet under DOE's Home Page for Defense Programs.
That document is also being mailed to those individuals who had
previously requested information on the SS&M program. Other individuals
who would like to receive that document can contact the Office of
Reconfiguration at the address listed above or by calling the program's
toll free number. At the pre-scoping workshop, the framework contained
in ``The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program'' will be
presented by DOE officials, and the public will be provided the
opportunity to present comments, ask questions, and discuss concerns
with DOE officials. Some general information regarding the SS&M
framework is provided below, along with a description of the format
envisioned for the interactive pre-scoping workshop.
Purpose and Need for the SS&M Program
By law [the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 USC 2011 et
seq.], DOE is charged with providing nuclear weapons to support the
United States nuclear deterrent policy. The mission of the DOE nuclear
weapons complex is to provide the nation with safe, secure, and
reliable nuclear weapons and components so that an effective nuclear
deterrent can be maintained into the foreseeable future, and to
accomplish this in a way that protects the environment as well as the
health and safety of workers and the public.
Recent changes in national security needs have necessitated
corresponding changes in the way the Department must meet its
responsibilities regarding the nation's nuclear weapons. As a result of
international arms-control agreements (in particular the START I treaty
and the START II protocol) and unilateral decisions by the United
States, the nation's stockpile will be significantly reduced by the
year 2003. Consequently, the nation has halted the development of new
nuclear weapons, has begun closing portions of the Complex, and is
considering further consolidation or downsizing of its remaining
elements. In addition, the nation is observing a moratorium on nuclear
testing and is pursuing a comprehensive test ban treaty.
However, international dangers remain and, as the President has
emphasized, nuclear deterrence will continue to be a cornerstone of
United States national security policy. Thus, the Department's
responsibilities for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of
the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile will also continue for the
foreseeable future.
Because of the moratorium on nuclear testing, the termination of
new weapons development, and the closure of production facilities, a
new approach to ensuring confidence in the stockpile is needed. In
announcing the extension of the nuclear testing moratorium (July 1993),
President Clinton reaffirmed the importance of maintaining confidence
in the enduring U.S. nuclear stockpile and the need to assure that the
nation's nuclear deterrent remains unquestioned during a test ban. By
Presidential Decision Directive and act of Congress (P.L. 103-160), the
Department of Energy was directed to ``establish a stewardship program
to ensure the preservation of the core intellectual and technical
competencies of the U.S. in nuclear weapons.''
This new approach must more heavily rely on scientific
understanding and expert judgment to predict, identify, and correct
problems affecting the safety and reliability of the stockpile. This
program is essential if the nation is to properly safeguard its nuclear
weapons and maintain an unquestioned nuclear deterrent.
The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program is being developed
to meet the challenges involved in ensuring the safety, reliability,
and performance of the enduring stockpile. Three particular challenges
must be met:
Fully supporting, at all times, the nation's nuclear
deterrent with safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapons, while
transforming the nuclear weapons complex (laboratories and production
facilities) to one that is more appropriate for the smaller enduring
stockpile.
Preserving the core intellectual and technical
competencies of the weapons laboratories. Without nuclear testing,
confidence in the nation's nuclear deterrent will rest in large part
with confidence in the competency of the people who must make the
scientific and technical judgments related to the safety and
reliability of nuclear weapons.
Ensuring that the activities needed to maintain the
nation's nuclear deterrent are consistent with the nation's arms-
control and nonproliferation objectives.
DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex
The current DOE nuclear weapons complex consists of 8 major
facilities located in 7 states. Major facilities, and their primary
responsibilities within the Complex, are listed in Table 1. Currently,
the Complex maintains the capabilities to design and manufacture
nuclear weapons; provides surveillance of and maintains nuclear weapons
in the stockpile; and retires and disposes of nuclear weapons.
Table 1--The DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex
Pantex Plant (Amarillo, Texas)--Dismantles retired weapons; fabricates
high explosives components; assembles high explosives, nuclear
components, and nonnuclear components into nuclear weapons; repairs and
modifies weapons; and evaluates and performs nonnuclear testing of
nuclear weapons.
Savannah River Site (SRS) (Aiken, South Carolina)--Tritium loading/
unloading and surveillance of reservoirs.
Y-12 Plant (Oak Ridge, Tennessee)--Maintains the capability to produce
and assemble uranium and lithium components; recovers materials from
fabrication process and retired weapons; produces nonnuclear weapon
components.
Kansas City Plant (KCP) (Kansas City, Missouri)--Manufactures
nonnuclear weapons components.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) (Livermore, California)--
Research and development of nuclear weapons; designs and tests advanced
technology concepts; maintains weapons design program; maintains the
capability to produce nuclear components.
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) (Los Alamos, New Mexico)--
Research and development of nuclear weapons; designs and tests advanced
technology concepts; maintains weapons design program; maintains the
capability to produce nuclear components. [[Page 22375]]
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) (Albuquerque, New Mexico)--System
engineering of nuclear weapons; designs and develops nonnuclear
components; field and laboratory nonnuclear testing; and manufactures
nonnuclear weapons components.
Nevada Test Site (NTS) (Las Vegas, Nevada)--Maintains capability to
conduct underground nuclear testing.
PEIS Alternatives
The Department's preliminary views concerning consideration of
alternatives for both the Stockpile Management and the Stockpile
Stewardship program elements are described below:
Stockpile Management
Stockpile Management activities include dismantlement, maintenance,
evaluation, and repair or replacement of weapons in the existing
stockpile. In the past, a large weapons production complex provided the
capability and capacity to rapidly fix problems in the stockpile.
However, the existing production complex may be inefficient and
ineffective for a much smaller enduring stockpile. Therefore, one of
the primary goals of the Stockpile Management proposal will be to
downsize and/or consolidate functions to provide an effective and
efficient production capability for the smaller stockpile.
To ensure that the Department will be able to carry out its
stockpile management responsibilities, the following general functional
capabilities are needed and are expected to be addressed in the SS&M
PEIS:
Nuclear weapons assembly/disassembly and surveillance.
High explosives fabrication and surveillance.
Nonnuclear component fabrication and surveillance.
Nuclear component fabrication and surveillance.
Reasonable alternatives for each of the functional capabilities
will be developed from the list of sites in Table 1. Under the no-
action alternative, the functions would remain at the locations
identified in Table 1. In addition to the no-action alternative, the
PEIS is also expected to assess the alternatives of downsizing (and
upgrading if necessary) facilities at the no-action sites, and evaluate
transferring or consolidating the functions to other sites listed in
Table 1 that have existing facilities which could be used for that
functional capability.
Stockpile Stewardship
Stockpile Stewardship includes activities required to maintain a
high level of confidence in the safety, reliability, and performance of
nuclear weapons in the absence of underground nuclear testing, and to
be prepared to resume testing if so directed by the President. While
the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile is currently judged to be safe,
secure, and reliable, the average age of the stockpile has never
significantly exceeded the current age of 12 to 13 years. Because the
Department cannot predict with certainty when age-related changes
affecting weapon safety or reliability will occur, a conservative
assumption would be that problems will arise more frequently as the
weapons age beyond their original 20- to 25-year design lifetimes.
Historically, nuclear testing has provided unambiguous confidence
in the safety and performance of weapons in the stockpile. Without
underground nuclear testing, the Department must rely on aboveground
experimental and computational capabilities, especially in weapons
physics, to predict the consequences of the complex problems that are
likely to occur in an aging stockpile.
Currently, enhanced aboveground experimental and computational
capabilities are needed to assess and predict the consequences of these
problems. An improved science-based program with enhanced experimental
and computational capabilities is necessary to maintain confidence in
the safety and performance of the nation's stockpile without nuclear
testing. This program must be technically challenging so that it will
attract the high-quality scientific and technical talent needed for
future stewardship of the stockpile.
Substantial advances in experimental and computational capabilities
are needed to fill in those areas of nuclear weapon science that are
incomplete, particularly gaps in our understanding of physics and gaps
in the data needed for computational simulations of weapons performance
and model-based assessments of safety and reliability. Upgraded or new
experimental capabilities are required to validate improved or new
computational models.
Without these enhanced capabilities, the Department will lack the
ability to evaluate some safety and performance issues, which could
significantly affect the stockpile. Consequently, desired improvements
in weapon safety and security might be sacrificed because of an
inability to certify their performance. It is also possible that,
without these enhanced capabilities, some nuclear components exhibiting
changes in composition or structure would have to be retired because
the Department would not be able to certify the acceptability of
repaired or modified components.
Stockpile stewardship can be broken down into three broad
functional areas:
Weapons Physics
Materials Surveillance
Computational Capabilities
In addition to the no-action alternative of relying on existing
capabilities in each of these functional areas, the PEIS will assess
new or upgraded facilities in each functional area to carry out the
Stockpile Stewardship mission. Only the three weapons laboratories
(LANL, LLNL, and SNL) and the NTS are expected to be considered in the
development of reasonable Stockpile Stewardship site alternatives. The
existing configuration of these sites and any potential new facilities
or significant upgrades to facilities will be discussed.
SS&M Program Foundational Framework
In the SS&M program, DOE will:
Emphasize compliance with applicable laws and regulations,
and accepted practices regarding industrial and weapons safety;
safeguarding the health of Complex workers and the general public;
protecting the environment; and ensuring the security of nuclear
materials and weapons components.
Safely and reliably maintain the nuclear weapons stockpile
as directed by the President and mandated by Congress.
Minimize costs associated with the weapons stockpile.
Minimize the number and/or size of weapons production
sites.
Maximize the transfer of nonnuclear materials production
activities to the private sector.
Maintain core intellectual and technical competencies in
nuclear weapons.
Sustain confidence in safety, reliability, and performance
of the stockpile in the absence of underground nuclear testing.
Minimize the use of hazardous materials and the number and
volume of waste streams.
Provide for proper disposal of hazardous, non-hazardous,
and radioactive waste.
PEIS Decisions
The PEIS and supporting cost, technical, and schedule studies will
be prepared for the SS&M program. The PEIS and the other studies will
support the following decisions:
Identify the future components of the SS&M program; and
[[Page 22376]]
Determine the configuration of the nuclear weapons complex
to accomplish the SS&M program requirements.
Pre-Scoping Workshop Format
The Department intends to hold a plenary session at the beginning
of the workshop in which DOE officials will more fully explain the
framework for the proposed SS&M program, including preliminary
alternatives for both Stockpile Management and Stockpile Stewardship.
Following the plenary session and any clarification and discussion that
results, the Department intends for the participants to break out into
two smaller groups-- one for Stockpile Stewardship and one for
Stockpile Management-- to allow for more specific discussion.
Arrangements will be made so that interested members of the public may
attend both break out sessions if they desire.
Next Steps
Following the pre-scoping workshop, DOE will refine, as necessary,
the SS&M framework and proposed alternatives, prepare a Notice of
Intent for the SS&M PEIS, and hold public scoping meetings (to be
conducted as interactive workshops) regarding the alternatives to be
evaluated in the SS&M PEIS. DOE intends to announce the location, date
and time for these scoping meetings/workshops in a Notice in the
Federal Register, and by other means as appropriate. The announcement
will be at least two weeks prior to any meetings.
Issued in Washington, D.C. this 2nd day of May, 1995, for the
United States Department of Energy.
Victor H. Reis,
Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs.
[FR Doc. 95-11162 Filed 5-4-95; 8:45 am]
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