[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 86 (Thursday, May 4, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 22079-22081]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-11030]



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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362]


Southern California Edison, et al.; San Onofre Nuclear Generating 
Station, Units 2 and 3, Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 
2.206

    Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation, has acted on a Petition for action under 10 CFR 2.206 
received by Ted Dougherty, dated August 10, 1994, for the San Onofre 
Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3.
    The Petitioner requested that the NRC cause the shutdown and 
dismantlement of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station because of 
concerns regarding (1) the vulnerability of the San Onofre Nuclear 
Generating Station to earthquakes because of nearby fault lines and (2) 
a newspaper article concerning the threat of vehicle bombs and the 
Commission's recent rule requiring nuclear generating plants to install 
antiterrorist barriers within 18 months.
    The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has 
determined that the request should be denied for the reasons stated in 
the ``Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-95-06), the complete 
text of which follows this notice, and which is available for public 
inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555, and at the local 
public document room located at the University of California Main 
Library, P.O. Box 19577, Irvine, California 92713.
    A copy of this Decision has been filed with the Secretary of the 
Commission for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR 
2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations. As provided by this 
regulation, this Decision will constitute the final action of the 
Commission 25 days after the date of issuance unless the Commission, on 
its own motion, institutes review of the Decision within that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day of April 1995.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
William T. Russell,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

I. Introduction

    On August 10, 1994, Mr. Ted Dougherty (the Petitioner) submitted a 
letter to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or NRC) 
requesting a shutdown of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station 
(SONGS). The Commission determined to act on this request pursuant to 
10 CFR 2.206. The request was based on concerns regarding the 
vulnerability of SONGS to earthquakes because of the existence of 
nearby fault lines, and concerns regarding the defensibility of SONGS 
to a terrorist threat.
    On September 22, 1994, I informed the Petitioner that the Petition 
had been referred to this Office for action pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of 
the Commission's regulations. I also informed the Petitioner that the 
NRC would take appropriate action within a reasonable time regarding 
the Petitioner's request.
    My Decision in this matter follows.
II. Background

    The Petitioner provided as basis for the request (1) a letter to 
the Governor of California wherein the Petitioner expressed concerns 
regarding the vulnerability of SONGS to earthquakes and (2) a Los 
Angeles Times article concerning the threat of vehicle bombs and the 
Commission's recent rule requiring nuclear generating plants to install 
antiterrorist barriers within 18 months.

III. Discussion

A. Vulnerability of SONGS to Earthquakes

    The Petitioner asserts that SONGS is vulnerable to a deep ocean 
quake as well as a magnitude 8 earthquake (or greater) on the Newport-
Inglewood fault. He asserts that human error following an earthquake of 
this magnitude could result in failure of the plant's safety systems to 
protect the plant, thereby resulting in a meltdown.
    Before licensing SONGS (and all nuclear plants), the NRC reviewed 
the design of the facility including its ability to withstand the 
effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, and 
hurricanes without loss of capability to perform the safety functions. 
Appendix A (Criterion 2) to 10 CFR part 50 states that the design basis 
for the nuclear power plant should reflect the most severe of the 
natural phenomena that have been historically [[Page 22080]] reported 
for the site and surrounding area, the combinations of the effects of 
normal and accident conditions with the effects of the natural 
phenomena, and the importance of the safety functions to be performed. 
Appendix A to 10 CFR part 100, ``Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria 
for Nuclear Power Plants,'' Section III(C), requires that the nuclear 
power plant's design bases for earthquakes be determined through 
evaluation of the geologic and seismic history of the nuclear power 
plant site and surrounding region. The purpose of this determination is 
to estimate the magnitude of the strongest earthquake that might affect 
the site of a nuclear power plant during its operating lifetime. the 
earthquake postulated for the seismic design of a plant, called the 
Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE), defines the maximum ground motion for 
which certain nuclear power plant structures, systems and components 
necessary for safe operation and shutdown are designed to remain 
functional (e.g., for decay heat removal after the reactor is 
shutdown).
    The San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) site had 
undergone geologic and seismic investigations and reviews prior to 
issuance of the construction permits including surveys performed by the 
applicant, the United States Geological Survey, the California Division 
of Mines and Geology, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration. The findings of these investigations were reviewed 
extensively by the staff and were litigated extensively in proceedings 
concerning the issuance of the construction permits\1\ and operating 
licenses\2\ for SONGS Units 2 and 3.

    \1\See Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear 
Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-73-36, 6 AEC 929 (1973), and 
ALAB-248, 8 AEC 957 (1974).
    \2\See Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear 
Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-82-3, 15 NRC 61 (1982); 
ALAB-673, 15 NRC 688 (1982); ALAB-717, 17 NRC 346 (1983); and see 
Carstens v NRC, 742 F.2d 1546 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert denied 471 U.S. 
1136 (1985) (the Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's granting 
of the operating licenses for SONGS Units 2 and 3, noting the 
voluminous record and substantial evidence supporting the seismic 
review).
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    The Petitioner asserts that SONGS is vulnerable to a deep ocean 
quake. There are a number of offshore faults in the coastal waters off 
of Southern California. Of greatest concern to the San Onofre site is 
an offshore structure beginning with the Newport-Inglewood Zone of 
Deformation near Long Beach, passing the site about 8 kilometers 
offshore and extending south to the San Diego area as the Rose Canyon 
Fault Zone.\3\ This entire structure is known as the Offshore Zone of 
Deformation (OZD).\4\ The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board determined, 
during the 1982 operating license proceeding, that, based on historic 
earthquake data, the distinctive geology of the area, and prevailing 
stresses in the earth's crust, the controlling feature for San Onofre 
is the OZD.\5\

    \3\See Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear 
Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-82-3, 15 NRC 61, at 68 
(1982).
    \4\Id.
    \5\Id., at 69.
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    The Petitioner asserts that SONGS is vulnerable to a magnitude 8 or 
greater earthquake on the Newport-Inglewood Fault. The largest 
earthquake known to have occurred on that fault is the 1933 Long Beach 
earthquake which was a magnitude 6.3.\6\ Testimony presented during the 
operating license proceeding concluded that the features of the OZD, 
its geologic strain rate, regional tectonic setting, and absence of 
extensive and/or through-going fault rupture in near-surface strata 
along much of the OZD, all support earthquakes of less than about a 
magnitude 7.\7\ In addition, the NRC staff concluded, based on an 
evaluation of historical seismicity of the OZD and an evaluation of the 
fault parameters, that a maximum magnitude of 7.0 is based upon a 
reasonable and conservative interpretation of all available geological 
and seismological information.\8\ The Atomic Safety and Licensing 
Board\9\ as well as the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board\10\ 
concluded that a magnitude 7 earthquake on the OZD is appropriately 
conservative.\11\ The Petitioner has not provided any basis to support 
the likelihood of magnitude 8 or greater earthquake on the Newport-
Inglewood Fault or call into question the conclusion of the Atomic 
Safety and Licensing Board and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal 
Board.

    \6\Id., at 104.
    \7\Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating 
Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-673, 15 NRC 688, 709 n. 40 (1982).
    \8\NUREG-0712, ``Safety Evaluation Report Related to the 
Operation of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3,'' 
Section 2.5.2.3.4, February 1981.
    \9\See Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear 
Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-82-3, 15 NRC 61, at 86 
(1982).
    \10\Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear 
Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-717, 17 NRC 346, 364-65 
(1983).
    \11\The Petitioner also provided a scenario of the effects on 
the Los Angeles area of a magnitude 6 earthquake on the Newport-
Inglewood Fault followed by a magnitude 8 earthquake. The Petitioner 
has failed to provide any basis to support this scenario. The staff 
reviewed this scenario and determined that, based on the 
investigations and reviews discussed above, it has no basis in 
scientific theory or physical possibility.
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    The Petitioner expresses concern that panic caused by an earthquake 
could result in a meltdown due to human error. The ability of a nuclear 
power plant to resist the forces generated by the ground motion during 
an earthquake is incorporated in the design and construction of the 
plant. Industry codes and practices that govern the design and 
construction of nuclear power plant structures and components are far 
more stringent than those used for residential and commercial 
buildings. As a result, nuclear power plants are able to resist 
earthquake ground motions well beyond their design bases and well 
beyond the ground motion that would result in damage to commercial 
buildings.
    As a safety requirement, nuclear power plants have strong ground 
motion seismic instruments in and near the sites. If the ground motion 
at a site exceeds a specified level, which is one-half or less of the 
Safe Shutdown Earthquake, the plant is required to shut down (10 CFR 
100, Appendix A, V, (a)(2)). As a defense-in-depth design feature, 
SONGS has a automatic seismic scram system to shut down the reactors 
when the ground motion exceeds a conservatively selected threshold 
value.\12\ Prior to resuming operations following plant shutdown as the 
result of an earthquake, the licensee is required to demonstrate to the 
Commission that no functional damage has occurred to those plant 
features necessary for continued safe operation.

    \12\NUREG-0741, ``Technical Specifications San Onofre Nuclear 
Generating Station Unit 2,'' Table 3.3.1 February 1982; and NUREG-
0952, ``Technical Specifications San Onofre Nuclear Generating 
Station Unit 3,'', Table 3.3.1, November 1982.
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    In summary, based on exhaustive seismic and geologic investigations 
performed for the SONGS site, which has been subjected to extensive 
litigation, the seismic design basis for the plant is reasonably 
conservative.
    The Petitioner has failed to provide an adequate basis for his 
concern regarding the seismic adequacy of SONGS and, accordingly, has 
not raised any substantial health or safety issue that would call into 
question the safe operation of SONGS.

B. Threat of Vehicle Bombs

    The Petitioner asserts that SONGS is not defensible from 
terrorists. The Petitioner bases this assertion on a newspaper article 
(Los Angeles Times, August 4, 1994) concerning the threat of vehicle 
bombs at nuclear plants and the Commission's recent rule requiring 
nuclear plants to install anti-terrorist barriers within 18 
months. [[Page 22081]] 
    The Commission's regulations regarding physical protection of 
nuclear plants are set forth in 10 CFR part 73. The regulations require 
a physical protection system designed to protect against acts of 
radiological sabotage or theft of special nuclear material based on 
certain design basis threats. The design basis threats for radiological 
sabotage defined in 10 CFR part 73.1(a)(1) include ``a determined, 
violent, external assault.'' The potential threat posed by malevolent 
use of vehicles as part of a violent external assault and the need to 
protect against it, were the subject of detailed analysis before the 
NRC published its regulations on design basis threat. However, the use 
of a land vehicle bomb was not initially included in the design basis 
threat for radiological sabotage.
    The newspaper article cited by the Petitioner describes two events 
that occurred in February 1993: a forced vehicle entry into the 
protected area at Three Mile Island (TMI), Unit 1, and a van bomb which 
was detonated in a public underground parking garage at the World Trade 
Center in New York City. As a result of these events, the Commission 
directed the NRC staff to reevaluate and, if necessary, update the 
design basis threat for vehicle intrusions and the use of vehicle 
bombs.
    In its subsequent review of the threat environment, the NRC staff 
concluded that there is no indication of an actual vehicle threat 
against the domestic commercial nuclear industry (59 FR 38889, August 
1, 1994). Nonetheless, in light of the above recent events, the NRC 
staff concluded that a vehicle intrusion or bomb threat to a nuclear 
power plant could develop without warning in the future. Therefore, on 
August 1, 1994, the Commission published in the Federal Register (59 FR 
38889), a final regulation to amend its physical protection regulation 
for operating nuclear power reactors. The amendments modified the 
design basis threat for radiological sabotage to include use of a land 
vehicle by adversaries for transporting personnel and their hand-
carried equipment to the proximity of vital areas and to include a land 
vehicle bomb (see 10 CFR 73.1(a)(1)(i)(E) and (iii)).
    All operating commercial nuclear power plants, including SONGS 
Units 2 and 3, must comply with the modified design basis threat. This 
amended rule requires reactor licensees to install vehicle control 
measures, including vehicle barrier systems, to protect against the 
malevolent use of a land vehicle by February 29, 1996 (see 10 CFR 
73.55(c)(9)). A description of the proposed vehicle control measures 
for all operating commercial power reactors was required to be 
submitted to the Commission by February 28, 1995, for review. The 
licensee for SONGS submitted its proposed measures on February 24, 
1995, and they are currently being reviewed by the NRC staff.
    The security program at SONGS has consistently demonstrated 
superior performance and continues to exceed regulatory requirements. 
In addition to the normal NRC inspection activities of the SONGS 
security program, and Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) 
was conducted with the assistance of members of the U.S. Army Special 
Forces. One objective of the OSRE is to evaluate the licensee's 
abilities to respond to an external threat. The OSRE team concluded 
that SONGS had an excellent contingency response capability.
    The Petitioner has failed to provide an adequate basis for 
asserting that the plant is not defensible. The petitioner cited a 
newspaper article as basis for his allegation. The article does not 
provide any information that is new or different than that already 
considered by the Commission. The staff has concluded that the 
Petitioner has not raised a significant health or safety issue.

IV. Conclusion

    The NRC staff has reviewed the basis and justification stated to 
support the Petitioner's request that the NRC take appropriate actions 
to cause the shutdown and dismantling of SONGS. This review did not 
reveal any substantial safety issues that would call into question the 
continued safe operation of SONGS.
    The institution of proceedings in response to a request pursuant to 
Section 2.206 is appropriate only when substantial health and safety 
issues have been raised. See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York 
(Indian Point, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-75-8, 2 NRC 173, (1975), and 
Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2), 
DD-84-7, 19 NRC 899, 923 (1984). This standard has been applied to 
determine whether any action in response to the Petition is warranted. 
For the reasons discussed above, no basis exists for taking any action 
in response to the Petition as no substantial health or safety issues 
have been raised by the Petition. Accordingly, no action pursuant to 
Section 2.206 is being taken in this matter.
    A copy of this Decision will be filed with the Secretary of the 
Commission for the Commission to review in accordance with 10 CFR 
2.206(c). As provided by this regulation, the Decision will constitute 
the final action of the Commission 25 days after issuance, unless the 
Commission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the Decision 
within that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 27th day of April 1995.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
William T. Russell,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 95-11030 Filed 5-3-95; 8:45 am]
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