[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 86 (Thursday, May 4, 1995)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 22023-22034]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-11010]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------


FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Part 90

[PR Docket No. 89-553, GN Docket No. 93-252, PP Docket No. 93-253, FCC 
95-159]


Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act--900 
MHz SMR

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Commission adopted a Second Further Notice of Proposed 
Rule Making seeking comment on proposed licensing and auction rules to 
complete the licensing of the 900 MHz Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR) 
service. This Order implements the Commission's decision in the Third 
Report & Order in GN Docket No. 93-252, 59 FR 59,945 (Nov. 21, 1994) 
(CMRS Third Report & Order), to license the 900 MHz band on a Major 
Trading Area (MTA) basis, and to use competitive bidding to select from 
among mutually exclusive applicants. This Second Further Notice 
requests comment on proposed new licensing rules and auction procedures 
for the service, including special provisions for small businesses, 
minority-owned and women-owned entities, and rural telephone companies.

DATES: Comments must be filed on or before May 24, 1995, and reply 
comments must be filed on or before June 1, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Federal Communications Commission, 1919 M Street, N.W., 
Washington, D.C. 20554.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Amy Zoslov, (202) 418-0620, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, 
Commercial Wireless Division.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a synopsis of the Commission's 
Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, in PR Docket No. 89-553, 
FCC 95-159, adopted April 14, 1995, and released April 17, 1995. The 
complete text of this Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making is 
available for inspection and copying during normal business hours in 
the FCC Dockets Branch, Room 239, 1919 M Street, N.W., Washington, 
D.C., and also may be purchased from the Commission's copy contractor, 
International Transcription Service, at (202) 857-3800, 2100 M Street, 
N.W., Suite 140, Washington, D.C. 20037.

Synopsis of the Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making

I. Introduction

    1. When the Commission established the 900 MHz SMR service in 1986, 
it elected to use a two-phase licensing process. In Phase I, licenses 
were assigned in 46 ``Designated Filing Areas'' (DFAs) comprised of the 
top 50 markets. Phase II licensing, for facilities outside the DFAs, 
was frozen after 1986, when the Commission opened its filing window for 
the DFAs. In 1989, the Commission adopted a Notice of Proposed Rule 
Making in PR Docket 89-553, 55 FR 00744, proposing to begin Phase II 
licensing of SMR facilities nationwide. In 1993, the Commission adopted 
a First Report & Order & Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making in PR 
Docket 89-553, 58 FR 12176 (March 3, 1993) (Phase II First R&O & 
Further Notice), modifying its Phase II proposal and seeking comment on 
whether to license the 900 MHz SMR band to a combination of nationwide, 
regional and local systems. 8 FCC Rcd 1469 (1993). Shortly thereafter, 
Congress amended the Communications Act to reclassify most SMR 
licensees as Commercial Mobile Radio Service (CMRS) providers and 
establish the authority to use competitive bidding to select from among 
mutually exclusive applicants for certain services. The Commission 
deferred further consideration of Phase II and incorporated the 900 MHz 
SMR docket into its CMRS proceeding.
    2. In the CMRS Third Report & Order, FR 59,945 (Nov. 21, 1994), the 
Commission further revised its Phase II proposals and established the 
broad outlines for the completion of licensing in the 900 MHz SMR band. 
The Commission left the specific auction rules for the Phase II 
proceeding.
    3. The Commission seeks comment on the following proposals: 
adoption of a single simultaneous multiple round auction; establishment 
of upfront payment requirements; adoption of the Milgrom-Wilson 
activity rule; adoption of application procedures; adoption of 
procedures governing timing and duration of auction rounds, stopping 
rules and bid increments; adoption of bid withdrawal and default rules; 
adoption of procedures governing down payment and full payment for 
winning bidders; adoption of anti-collusion rules for bidders; and 
adoption of transfer disclosure and performance requirements for 
winning bidders.
    4. With respect to rules for designated entities (i.e. small 
businesses, women-owned and minority-owned entities, and rural 
telephone companies), the Commission seeks comment on the following 
proposals: insulating certain spectrum blocks from large bidders; 
providing small businesses bidding credits, reduced down payment 
requirements, and installment payment options; whether reduced upfront 
payments are necessary; adoption of partitioning rule for rural 
telephone companies; adoption of eligibility standards for small 
business and rural telephone companies; and for small businesses, 
adoption of restrictions on transfer or assignment of their licenses.
II. Discussion

A. Competitive Bidding
    5. In the CMRS Third Report & Order, 59 FR 59,945 (Nov. 21, 1994), 
the Commission determined that it would use competitive bidding to 
select from among mutually exclusive applicants in [[Page 22024]] the 
900 MHz SMR service. Accordingly, under the Commission's auction 
authority, if mutually exclusive applications for an MTA 10-channel 
block are accepted for filing, the Commission will award that license 
through competitive bidding. The Commission requests comment on 
specific bidding procedures, as set forth below.
    6. Competitive Bidding Design. In the Second Report & Order, PP 
Docket No. 93-253, 59 FR 22980 (May 4, 1994) (Auctions Second Report 
and Order), the Commission stated that (1) licenses with strong value 
interdependencies should be auctioned simultaneously; and (2) multiple 
round auctions generally will yield more efficient allocations of 
licenses and higher revenues by providing bidders with information 
regarding other bidders' valuations of licenses, especially where there 
is substantial uncertainty as to value. Thus, where the licenses to be 
auctioned are interdependent and their value is expected to be high, 
simultaneous multiple round auctions would best achieve the 
Commission's goals for competitive bidding. Based on these factors, the 
Commission tentatively concluded that simultaneous multiple round 
auctions are appropriate for the 900 MHz SMR service. The expected 
value of 900 MHz SMR licenses is high, the licenses are interdependent, 
and licensees will likely aggregate across spectrum blocks and 
geographic regions. Because, however, the presence of incumbents on 
certain channels could affect the relative desirability and value of 
otherwise identical MTA licenses, the Commission proposes to delegate 
authority to the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau to revisit the 
issue of whether another auction design would be more appropriate. The 
Commission seeks comments on this tentative conclusion and proposal.
    7. License Grouping. The Commission determined in the Auctions 
Second Report & Order, 59 FR 22980 (May 4, 1994), that in a multiple 
round auction, highly interdependent licenses should be grouped 
together and put up for bid at the same time because such grouping 
provides bidders with the most information about the prices of 
complementary and substitutable licenses during the course of an 
auction. The Commission also determined that the greater the degree of 
interdependence among the licenses, the greater the benefit of 
auctioning a group of licenses together in a simultaneous multiple 
round auction. The Commission tentatively concludes that all 51 MTAs in 
the 900 MHz band should be auctioned simultaneously. While this may 
entail more administrative costs than breaking the licenses into 
groups, the added cost will be outweighed by the informational and 
bidding flexibility advantages afforded by a single auction. Moreover, 
the 1020 MTA licenses to be auctioned are less than half the number of 
broadband PCS licenses to be auctioned in Blocks A through F, and all 
licenses will be for the same amount of spectrum and use a single 
service area definition. The Commission also proposes to reserve the 
discretion to inform applicants by Public Notice if the Commission 
determines to hold more than one auction, on the basis that a single 
auction proves administratively unworkable.
B. Bidding Issues
    8. Bid Increments. The bid increment is the amount or percentage by 
which a bid must be raised above the previous round's high bid in order 
to be accepted as valid in the current bidding round. The Commission 
proposes to start the 900 MHz auction with relatively large increments, 
and adjust the increments as bidding activity indicates. In Stage I of 
the auction, the minimum bid increment would be five percent of the 
high bid in the previous round or $.02 per MHz-pop, whichever is 
greater. In Stage II, the Commission would reduce the minimum bid 
increment to the greater of five percent of $.01 per MHz-pop, and in 
Stage III, the greater of five percent of $.01 per MHz-pop. The 
Commission also proposes to retain the discretion to vary the minimum 
bid increments for individual license or groups of licenses at any time 
before or during the course of the auction, based on the number of 
bidders, bidding activity, and the aggregate high bid amounts. Finally, 
the Commission proposes to retain the discretion to keep an auction 
open if there is a round in which no bids are submitted.
    9. Stopping Rules. In the CMRS Third Report & Order, 59 Fed. Reg. 
59,945 (Nov. 21, 1994), the Commission noted that in multiple round 
auctions, a stopping rule must be established for determining when the 
auction is over. The Commission proposes to adopt a simultaneous 
stopping rule for 900 MHz SMR. Under this approach, bidding remains 
open on all licenses until there is no new acceptable bid for any 
license. This approach also provides full flexibility to bid for any 
license as more information becomes available during the course of the 
auction. MTA licenses are expected to have relatively high values 
because of the substantial amount of clear spectrum that remains 
available, the high valuation of SMR spectrum in secondary market 
transactions, the substitutability between licenses within the same MTA 
and the ability to pursue back-up strategies. Likewise, the use of 
MTAs, rather than BTAs or more numerous service areas, should reduce 
complexity of a simultaneous stopping rule. Because the Commission 
proposes to impose an activity rule, this approach will not lead to 
excessively long auctions while affording bidders flexibility to pursue 
back-up strategies.
    10. The Commission also proposes to retain the discretion to 
announce at any time during the auction that the auction will end after 
a specified number of additional rounds. Bids would only be accepted on 
licenses where the high bid has increased in the last three rounds. 
This would deter bidders from continuing to bid on a few low value 
licenses solely to delay the closing of the auction. It would also 
enable the Commission to end the auction when it determines that the 
benefits of terminating the auction and issuing licenses exceed likely 
benefits of continuing to allow bidding. The Commission proposes that 
this mechanism be used only in case of extremely dilatory bidding and 
that final bidding procedures would be announced by public notice. The 
Commission also proposes to retain the discretion to conduct market by 
market closings, if circumstances so warrant, to be announced during 
the auction. Finally, the Commission proposes to retain discretion to 
keep an auction open in a round in which no new acceptable bids are 
submitted if the Commission receives a ``proactive'' waiver of the 
activity rules, and to retain discretion to keep an auction open even 
if no proactive waivers are filed.
    11. Duration of Bidding Rounds. The Commission reserves the 
discretion to vary the duration of bidding rounds or the interval at 
which bids are accepted (e.g. run more than one round per day) in order 
to move the auction toward closure more quickly. The Commission will 
announce any changes to the duration of and intervals between bidding 
rounds either by public notice prior to the auction or by announcement 
during the auction.
    12. Activity Rules. The Milgrom-Wilson activity rule encourages 
bidders to participate in early rounds by limiting their maximum 
participation to some multiple of their minimum participation level. 
The Commission tentatively concludes that the Milgrom-Wilson activity 
rule should be used in conjunction with the simultaneous stopping rule 
to award 900 MHz SMR [[Page 22025]] licenses. Under this approach, the 
minimum activity level increases during the course of the auction. 
Absent waivers, a bidder's eligibility in the current round is 
determined by the bidder's activity level and eligibility in the 
previous round; in the first round, however, eligibility is determined 
by the bidder's upfront payment and is equal to the upfront payment 
divided by $.02 per MHz-pop. Bidders are required to declare their 
maximum eligibility in terms of MHz-pops, and made an upfront payment 
equal to $0.02 per MHz-pop. In each round, bidders are limited to 
bidding on licenses encompassing no more than the number of MHz-pops 
covered by their upfront payment, and licenses on which a bidder is the 
high bidder from the previous round count toward this bidding limit. 
Bidders have flexibility to shift their bids among any license for 
which they have applied so long as, within each round, the total MHz-
pops encompassed by those licenses does not exceed the total number of 
MHz-pops on which they are eligible to bid. This approach would best 
achieve the Commission's goals of affording bidders flexibility to 
pursue backup strategies, while at the same time ensuring that 
simultaneous auctions are concluded within a reasonable period of time. 
The Commission seeks comment on these issues.
    13. During Stage I, the Commission tentatively concludes that a 
bidder must be active on licenses encompassing one-half of the MHz-pops 
for which it is eligible. In Stage II and Stage III, the Commission 
tentatively concludes that the bidder must be active on 75 and 95 
percent, respectively, of the MHz-pops for which it is eligible. The 
penalty for falling below the minimum activity level at any stage would 
be a reduction in maximum eligibility to bid in future rounds. The 
transition from one stage of the auction to the next would be 
determined by the aggregate level of bidding activity, subject to the 
Commission's discretion. Once an auction proceeds from one stage to the 
next, it could not revert to any previous stage. Moreover, the 
Commission proposes to reserve the discretion to increase or decrease 
these activity levels as well as to vary the timing of stages and 
activity levels for each stage through public notices issued after 
applications are filed and before the auction begins, as circumstances 
warrant. The Commission seeks comment on these proposals.
    14. In the Fourth Memorandum Opinion & Order, PP Docket No. 93-253, 
59 FR 53364 (October 24, 1994), the Commission clarified that it 
retained the discretion to modify the method and timing of submitting 
waivers and to allow for both ``proactive'' and ``automatic'' waivers. 
Proactive waivers are submitted by the bidder, while automatic waivers 
would be submitted automatically for a bidder whenever its eligibility 
would be reduced because of insufficient bidding activity and a waiver 
is available unless the bidder specifically chooses not to have the 
automatic waiver apply. The Commission proposes to use these waiver 
procedures with respect to the 900 SMR auctions.
    15. Specifically, the Commission proposes to implement a waiver 
procedure permitting each bidder to request and automatically receive a 
certain number of waivers of the activity rule during the auction. The 
Commission would announce by Public Notice how many waivers bidders 
will receive. A waiver would permit a bidder to maintain its 
eligibility at the same level as in the round for which the waiver is 
submitted; it could not, however, be used to correct an error in the 
amount bid. Under this proposal, a bidder may request a waiver either 
in the round in which its bidding falls below the minimum required 
level or prior to submitting a bid in the next round. If an activity 
rule waiver is proactively requested in a round in which no other 
bidding activity occurs, the auction would remain open. The Commission 
seeks comment on these proposals. Finally, the Commission retains 
discretion to use an alternative activity rule for 900 MHz SMR if it 
determines that the Milgrom-Wilson rule is too complicated or costly to 
administer. Any such change would be announced by public notice before 
commencement of the auction.
    16. Rules Prohibiting Collusion. Section 1.2105(c) of the 
Commission's Rules, 47 CFR 1.2105(c) prohibits collusive conduct in the 
context of competitive bidding. This rule prohibits bidders from 
communicating with one another after short-form applications have been 
filed regarding the substance of their bids or bidding strategies, and 
also prohibits bidders from entering into consortium arrangements or 
joint bidding agreements after the deadline for short-form applications 
has passed. 47 C.F.R. 1.2105(c)(1)-(2). The Commission proposes to 
apply Section 1.2105(c) to 900 MHz SMR auctions. Bidders who have not 
filed form 175 applications for any of the same MTA licenses would be 
permitted enter into such discussions, consortia, or arrangements, or 
add equity partners, during the course of an auction. Also, 
communications among bidders concerning matters unrelated to the 
auctions would be permitted. The Commission seeks comment on this 
proposal.
    17. Under the collusion rules, bidders would also identify on their 
Form 175 applications parties with whom they have entered into any 
agreements relating to the competitive bidding process, and certify 
that they will not enter into any such agreements with any parties 
other than those identified. 47 CFR 1.2105(a)(2). Furthermore, winning 
bidders in the 900 MHz SMR auctions would attach as an exhibit to the 
Form 600 long-form application a detailed explanation of the terms and 
conditions and parties involved in any such agreement entered into 
prior to the close of bidding. All such arrangements would have been 
entered into prior to filing of short-form applications to comply with 
the Commission's rules. 47 CFR 1.2107. Allegations of specific 
instances of collusion in violation of these rules would be 
investigated by the Commission or referred to the Department of 
Justice. The Commission also proposes that bidders found to have 
violated the Commission's rules or the antitrust laws may be subject to 
forfeiture of their down payment or their full bid amount, revocation 
of their licenses, and prohibition from participation in future 
auctions. The Commission seeks comment on these proposals.
C. Procedural, Payment and Penalty Issues
    18. Pre-Auction Application Procedures. The Commission proposes to 
follow generally the processing and procedural rules established in 47 
CFR Part 1, Subpart Q with certain modifications designed to address 
the particular characteristics of the 900 MHz SMR service. Unlike 
incumbent 900 MHz SMR licensees that are essentially confined to the 
smaller DFA region, MTA licensees will gain use of a large geographic 
area and the freedom to locate base stations anywhere within that 
larger geographic region. Thus, the Commission proposes to treat MTA 
applicants as initial applicants for public notice, application 
processing, and auction purposes, regardless of whether they are 
already incumbent operators.
    19. The 1993 Budget Act expressly provides the Commission authority 
to require that bidders' applications contain all information and 
documentation sufficient to demonstrate that the application is not in 
violation of Commission rules, and to dismiss applications not meeting 
those requirements prior to the competitive [[Page 22026]] bidding. 47 
U.S.C. 309(j)(5). See also H. R. Rep. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 28 
(1993). In furtherance of this policy, the Commission decided to 
require only a short-form application prior to competitive bidding, and 
determined that only winning bidders should be required to submit a 
long-form license application after the auction. 47 CFR 1.2104, 1.207. 
Because this procedure fulfills the statutory requirements and 
adequately protects the public interest here, the Commission proposes 
to extend application of these rules to the competitive bidding process 
for 900 MHz SMR.
    20. Under this proposal, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau 
would release an initial Public Notice announcing the auction. The 
Public Notice would specify the following: licenses to be auctioned; 
time and place of the auction method of competitive bidding to be used; 
applicable bid submission procedures; stopping rules; activity rules; 
the deadline by which short-form applications must be filed; and the 
amounts and deadlines for submitting the unfront payment. Applications 
submitted before the release of the Public Notice would be returned as 
premature. Likewise, applications submitted after the deadline 
specified by Public Notice would be dismissed, with prejudice, as 
untimely.
    21. All bidders would be required to submit short-form applications 
on FCC Form 175 (and FCC Form 175-S, if applicable), by the date 
specified in the initial Public Notice. See CFR 1.2105(a)(2). 
Applications could be filed manually or electronically. Each applicant 
would specify on its applications certain information, including its 
status as a designated entity (if applicable), its classification 
(i.e., individual, corporation, partnership, trust, or other), the 
markets and frequency blocks for which it is applying, and the names of 
persons authorized to place or withdraw a bid on its behalf. If there 
is no mutual exclusivity for a particular license, and no petitions to 
deny are filed, the application would be grantable after 30 days. The 
Commission seeks comment on the proposals discussed above.
    22. Amendments and Modifications. To encourage maximum bidder 
participation, the Commission proposes to provide 900 MHz SMR 
applicants with an opportunity to correct minor defects in their short 
form applications prior to the auction. The Commission also proposes to 
waive the ex parte rules as they apply to submission of amended short-
form applications to maximize applicants' opportunities to seek 
Commission staff advice on making such amendments. Also, applicants 
would be permitted to modify their applications to reflect formation of 
consortia or changes in ownership at any time before or during an 
auction, provided that (1) such changes do not result in a change in 
control of the applicant, and (2) parties forming consortia or entering 
into ownership agreements have not applied for licenses in any of the 
same geographic licenses. Applicants would not, however, be permitted 
to make major modifications to their applications, including changes in 
markets, changes in control of the applicant, or additions of the other 
bidders into the bidding consortia, until after the auction. 
Applications that are not signed would be dismissed as unacceptable. 
The Commission seeks comment on these proposals.
    23. Applications with defects, minor or otherwise, would be listed 
in a public notice. After reviewing corrected applications, the 
Commission would release a second public notice announcing applicants 
whose applications have been accepted or filing. This second public 
notice would announce the date by which applicants must submit an 
upfront payment to the Commission, generally no later than 14 days 
before the scheduled auction. The Commission would release a third 
public notice announcing the names of all applicants that have been 
determined as qualified to bid. An applicant who fails to submit a 
sufficient upfront payment to qualified it to bid on any license being 
auctioned would not be identified on this Public Notice as a qualified 
bidder. The Commission seeks comment on these proposals.
    24. Upfront Payments. The Commission tentatively concludes that 
applicants that have been determined as qualified to bid should be 
required to submit a payment of $0.02 per MHz-pop, based on the number 
of 10-channel blocks in each MTA identified by an applicant on its Form 
175. This requirement would help ensure that only serious and qualified 
bidders participate and that any bid withdrawal or default penalties 
are paid. See Auctions Second Report & Order at para.171. This formula 
would also afford bidders the flexibility to change their strategy 
during an auction and bid on a larger number of smaller licenses or a 
smaller number of larger licenses, so long as the total MHz-pops 
combination does not exceed that amount covered by the upfront payment. 
Population information for each license would be announced in the 
initial Public Notice released prior to the auction. The Commission 
seeks comment on these proposals.
    25. Down payment and Full Payment. The Commission tentatively 
concludes that winning bidders in 900 MHz SMR auctions should be 
required to supplement their upfront payments with a down payment 
sufficient to bring their total deposits up to 20 percent of their 
winning bid(s). Under this proposal, if the upfront payment already 
tendered by a winning bidder, after deducting any bid withdrawal and 
default penalties due, amounts to 20 percent or more of its winning 
bids, no additional deposit would be required. If the upfront payment 
amount on deposit is greater than 20 percent of the winning bid amount 
after deducting any bid withdrawal and default penalties due, the 
additional monies would be refunded. If a bidder has withdrawn a bid or 
defaulted but the amount of the penalty cannot yet be determined, the 
bidder would be required to make a deposit of 20 percent of the amount 
bid on such licenses. When it becomes possible to calculate and assess 
the penalty, any excess deposit would be refunded. Upfront payments 
would be applied to such deposits and to bid withdrawal and default 
penalties due before being applied toward the bidder's down payment on 
licenses the bidder has won and seeks to acquire. The Commission seeks 
comment on these proposals.
    26. The Commission proposes to require winning bidders to submit 
the required down payment by cashier's check or wire transfer to its 
lock-box bank by a date to be specified by Public Notice, generally 
within five business days following the close of bidding. The balance 
of their winning bids would be made within five business days following 
public notice that the Commission is about to award the license, and 
grant of the license would be conditioned on this payment. An auction 
winner that is eligible to make payments through an installment plan, 
however, would be required to submit a deposit up to five percent of 
its winning bid, and would submit an additional five percent of its 
winning bid after the license granted. This would ensure that auction 
winners have the necessary financial capabilities to complete payment 
for the license and pay for the costs of constructing a system, without 
hindering growth or diminishing access to the auctions. The Commission 
seeks comment on this proposal.
    27. Bid Withdrawal, Default, and Disqualification. The Commission 
proposes that bidders who withdraw a high bid, are found unqualified to 
hold licenses, or default on payment of a [[Page 22027]] balance due, 
would be assessed a substantial penalty. Any bidder that withdraws a 
high bid during an auction before the Commission declares bidding 
closed would be required to reimburse the Commission in the amount of 
the difference between its high bid and the amount of the winning bid 
the next time the license is offered by the Commission, if this 
subsequent winning bid is lower than the withdrawn bid. If a license is 
re-offered by auction, the ``winning bid'' would refer to the high bid 
in the auction in which the license is re-offered. If a license is re-
offered in the same auction, the ``winning bid'' would refer to the 
high bid amount, made subsequent to the withdrawal, in that auction. If 
the subsequent high bidder also withdraws its bid, that bidder would be 
required to pay a penalty equal to the difference between its withdrawn 
bid and the amount of the subsequent willing bid the next time the 
license is offered by the Commission. If a license which is the subject 
of withdrawal or default is not re-auctioned, but is instead offered to 
the highest losing bidders in the initial auction, the ``winning bid'' 
would refer to the bid of the highest bidder who accepts the offer. 
Losing bidders would not be required to accept the offer, and therefore 
may decline without penalty. The Commission seeks comment on these 
proposals.
    28. The Commission also proposes that after bidding closes, a 
defaulting winner would be assessed an additional penalty of three 
percent of the subsequent winning bid or three percent of the amount of 
the defaulting bid, whichever is less. See 47 CFR 1.2104(g), 1.2109. If 
a default or disqualification involves an applicant's gross misconduct, 
misrepresentation, or bad faith, the Commission would be able to 
declare the applicant ineligible to bid in future auctions or take 
other action. These penalties would adequately discourage default and 
ensure that bidders have adequate financing and meet all eligibility 
and qualification requirements.
    29. Finally, the Commission proposes that if the MTA winner 
defaults, is otherwise disqualified after having made the required down 
payment, or the license is terminated or revoked, then the Commission 
would re-auction the license. If the default occurs within five days 
after bidding has closed, the Commission would retain the discretion to 
offer the license to the second highest bidder at its final bid level, 
and thereafter to other bidders (in descending order of their bid 
amounts). If only a small number of relatively low-value licenses were 
to be re-auctioned and only a short time has passed since the initial 
auction, the Commission would have authority to choose to offer the 
license to the highest losing bidders if the cost of running another 
auction exceed the benefits. The Commission seeks comment on these 
proposals.
    30. Long-Form Applications. If the winning bidder makes the down 
payment in a timely manner, the Commission proposes the following 
procedures: A long-form application filed on FCC Form 600 must be filed 
by a date specified by Public Notice, generally within ten business 
days after the close of bidding. Designated entities must also submit 
evidence to support their claim to any special provision, such as 
bidding credits or installment payment options. Once the long-form is 
accepted for filing, the Commission will issue a Public Notice 
announcing this fact, triggering the filing window for petitions to 
deny. If the Commission denies all petitions to deny, and is otherwise 
satisfied that the applicant is qualified, the license(s) will be 
granted to the auction winner. See generally 47 CFR 90.163-90.166. The 
Commission seeks comment on this proposal.
    31. Petitions to Deny and Limitations on Settlements. A party 
filing a petition to deny will be required to demonstrate standing and 
meet all other applicable filing requirements. 47 CFR 90.163. The 
Commission also adopted ``greenmail'' restrictions to prevent filing of 
speculative applications and pleadings (or threats of the same) 
designed to extract money from 900 MHz SMR applicants. 47 CFR 90.162. 
Thus, the consideration than an applicant or petitioner is permitted to 
receive for agreeing to withdraw an application or petition to deny is 
limited to the legitimate and prudent expenses of the withdrawing 
party. Finally, the Commission need not conduct a hearing before 
denying an application if it determines that an applicant is not 
qualified and no substantial issue of fact exists concerning that 
determination.
    32. Transfer Disclosure Requirements. In the 1993 Budget Act 
amendments to the Communications Act, Congress directed the Commission 
to ``require such transfer disclosures and anti-trafficking 
restrictions and payment schedules as may be necessary to prevent 
unjust enrichment as a result of the methods employed to issue licenses 
and permits. 47 U.S.C. 309(j)(4)(E)). To ensure that these statutory 
requirements are met, the Commission concluded in the Auctions Second 
Report & Order, 59 FR 22980 (May 4, 1994), that transfer disclosure 
requirements will enable the Commission to accumulate the necessary 
data to evaluate auction designs and judge whether licenses have been 
issued for bids that fall short of the true market value of the 
license. The Commission tentatively concludes to apply these same 
requirements to all 900 MHz SMR licenses obtained through the 
competitive bidding process. See 47 CFR 1.2111(a). Generally, licensees 
transferring their licenses within three years after the initial 
license grant would be required to file, together with their transfer 
applications, the associated contracts for sale, option agreements, 
management agreements, and all other documents disclosing the total 
consideration received in return for the transfer of the license. The 
Commission would give particular scrutiny to auction winners who have 
not yet begun commercial service and who seek approval for a transfer 
of control or assignment of their licenses, so it may determine if any 
unforeseen problems relating to unjust enrichment have arisen outside 
the small business context. The Commission seeks comment on this 
proposal.
    33. Performance Requirements. The Communications Act requires the 
Commission to ``include performance requirements, such as appropriate 
deadlines and penalties for performance failures, to ensure prompt 
delivery of service to rural areas, to prevent stockpiling or 
warehousing of spectrum by licensees or permittees, and to promote 
investment in and rapid deployment of new technologies and services. 47 
U.S.C. 309(j)(4)(B). The Commission tentatively concludes that 
additional performance requirements, beyond those already provided in 
the service rules, and that coverage requirements adopted in this Order 
will sufficiently prevent warehousing of spectrum. The Commission seeks 
comment on this proposal.
D. Treatment of Designated Entities
    34. Overview and Objectives. Congress provided that in establishing 
eligibility criteria and bidding methodologies, the Commission shall 
``promot[e] economic opportunity and competition and ensur[e] that new 
and innovative technologies are readily accessible to the American 
people by avoiding excessive concentration of licenses and by 
disseminating licenses among a wide variety of applicants, including 
small businesses, rural telephone companies, and businesses owned by 
members of minority groups and women.'' 47 U.S.C. 309(j)(3). Congress 
also provided that to promote these objectives, the Commission shall 
``consider alternative payment schedules and methods of calculation, 
including lump sums or [[Page 22028]] guaranteed installment payments, 
with or without royalty payments, or other schedules or methods * * * 
and combinations of such schedules and methods.'' 47 U.S.C. 
309(j)(3)(B). The statute also requires the Commission to ``ensure that 
small businesses rural telephone companies, and businesses owned by 
members of minority groups and women are given the opportunity to 
participate in the provision of spectrum-based services. Id. 
Sec. 309(j)(4)(D). To achieve this goal, the statute indicates that the 
Commission should ``consider the use of tax certificates, bidding 
preferences, and other procedures.'' Id.
    35. Congress was particularly concerned that difficulties in 
accessing capital would prevent designated entities from meaningful 
participation in auctions and spectrum-based services. See H.R. Rep. 
No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 254-55 (1993). In other services, the 
Commission has employed a wide range of special provisions and 
eligibility criteria designed to meet this statutory objective. See, 
e.g., Third Report & Order. PP Docket No. 93-253, 59 FR 26741 (May 24, 
1994). The Commission states its intention to meet this objective in 
the 900 MHz SMR service, and tentatively concludes that it should 
provide for bidding credits, installment payments and reduced down 
payments to promote opportunities for small businesses, including small 
businesses owned by women and minorities--on all channel blocks in each 
MTA. These provisions would reduce barriers to accessing capital faced 
by all small businesses. In addition, to facilitate the introduction of 
service to rural areas, the Commission proposes to allow rural 
telephone companies to obtain geographically partitioned 900 MHz SMR 
licenses in areas where they provide telephone service.
    36. Bidding Credits. Bidding credits allow eligible designated 
entities to receive a payment discount (or credit) for their winning 
bid in an auction. In the Auctions Second Report & Order, 59 FR 22980 
(May 4, 1994), the Commission determined that competitive bidding rules 
applicable to individual services would specify the designated entities 
eligible for bidding credits and the amounts of the available bidding 
credits for that particular service. The Commission has since adopted 
bidding credits for narrowband PCS, broadband PCS, and Interactive 
Video and Data Service. See Third Memorandum Opinion & Order & Further 
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, PP Docket No. 93-253, 59 FR 44058 
(August 26, 1994); Fifth Report & Order, PP Docket No. 93-253, 59 FR 
37566 (July 22, 1994); Fourth Report & Order, PP Docket No. 93-253, 59 
FR 24947 (May 13, 1994). For 900 MHz SMR service, the Commission 
proposes to offer a 10 percent bidding credit to small businesses 
bidding on any of the ten-channel blocks within each MTA. These bidding 
credit designations would help achieve the objectives of the Budget Act 
and provide small businesses with a meaningful opportunity to 
participate in the 900 MHz SMR auction, while taking into account the 
concerns of incumbents within the DFAs. Because of the large number of 
licenses available in this service, the Commission states that a higher 
bidding credit would be unnecessary.
    37. The Commission seeks comment on this proposal. Specifically, is 
a 10 percent credit sufficient to enhance bidding opportunities? Also, 
how should the presence of incumbents on all channel blocks affect the 
availability of bidding credits on all blocks? In previous auctions 
where bidding credits for women and minorities have been available, 
varying degrees of participation in spectrum-based services has 
resulted, and the Commission's auction experience to date has not 
included a small business bidding credit available on all blocks. Also, 
the Commission proposes to limit eligibility for bidding credits to 
small businesses. The Commission seeks comment on whether eligibility 
should be expanded to include businesses owned by minorities and/or 
women, even if they do not fall within the Commission's small business 
size standards for 900 MHz SMRs.
    38. In the event that the Commission modifies the bidding credit 
eligibility proposal for minority- and women-owned entities, the 
Commission also seeks comment on a second bidding credit alternative, 
which would entitle small businesses and minority- and women-owned 
entities to receive bidding credits on the five least encumbered blocks 
in each MTA. In the event the Commission adopts a proposal to limit 
bidding credits to small businesses, should it also limit availability 
of the credit to the channel blocks with the fewest incumbents, or 
would this limitation dilute the effectiveness of a small business 
credit as a means of attracting broad designated entity participation 
in the 900 MHz SMR service? What bidding credit amounts should apply to 
women and minority-owned businesses and small businesses? Should women-
owned and minority-owned businesses that are also small businesses 
receive an aggregate bidding credit? The Commission seeks comment on 
the ramifications of each proposal for incumbents in each block. 
Finally, the Commission seeks comment on any possible alternative 
bidding credit schemes.
    39. Reduced Down Payments/Installment Payments. The Commission 
proposes to adopt an installment payment option for small businesses 
that are winning bidders in the 900 MHz SMR auction. Under this 
proposal, small businesses that are winning bidders in the 900 MHz SMR 
auction would be entitled to pay their bid in installments over the 
term of the license, with interest charges to be fixed at the time of 
licensing at a rate equal to the rate for ten-year U.S. Treasury 
obligations plus 2.5 percent. Under this proposed rule, qualified 
licensees would make interest-only payments during the first two years 
of the remaining license term. Timely payment of all installments would 
be a condition of the license grant and failure to make such timely 
payment would be grounds for revocation of the license. Additionally, 
the Commission tentatively concludes that small businesses that are 
eligible for installment payments also would be allowed to pay a 
reduced down payment (five percent of the winning bid) five days after 
the auction closes, with the remaining five percent down payment due 
five days after Public Notice that the license is ready for grant. This 
proposal would mitigate the effect of limited access to capital by 
small businesses, especially those owned by minorities and/or women.
    40. The Commission seeks comment on these payment procedures. If 
the Commission expands its installment payment eligibility proposal for 
women- and minority-owned entities, should those entities also receive 
reduced down payment and installment payment provisions and, if so, on 
what terms? In the event the Commission adopts provisions for minority- 
and women-owned applicants, should enhanced installment payments be 
made available?
    41. Eligibility for Bidding Credits, Installment Payments and 
Reduced Down Payments. The Commission proposes to limit eligibility for 
bidding credits, installment payments and reduced down payments to 
small businesses, including those owned by members of minority groups 
and women and those rural telephone companies that meet the small 
business size standards. The Commission proposes to define small 
businesses as those entities with less than $3 million in average gross 
revenues for each of the preceding [[Page 22029]] three years. The 
Commission states that it is unnecessary to propose different 
eligibility criteria for minority- and women-owned entities that do not 
meet the small business size standards in order to achieve the goals of 
Section 309(j) in the 900 MHz SMR service. Broadening the scope of 
opportunities for very small businesses in all channel blocks still has 
the potential to result in substantial participation by women and 
minorities in the provision of 900 MHz SMR service. Moreover, the 
Commission expects that because capital entry requirements are lower 
than PCS, minority- and women-owned businesses will have greater 
opportunities to participate.
    42. To enhance the Commission's understanding, however, of the 
capital requirements the 900 MHz service is likely to entail, the 
Commission seeks comment on the projected costs associated with 
acquisition, construction and operation of 900 MHz MTA licenses. In 
addition, to gain insight into which the degree of small business 
participation has resulted in opportunities for women and minority-
owned businesses, the Commission seeks comment on the composition of 
existing 900 MHz SMR operators as well as providers in other similar 
services such as 800 MHz SMR. For example, what proportion of existing 
900 MHz SMR businesses are owned by women or minorities? To what extent 
have participants in 900 MHz SMR networks been small businesses owned 
by women and minorities? What is the likelihood that management 
agreements are likely to serve as a vehicle for participation in the 
900 MHz SMR service by minority and women-owned businesses? Finally, 
regardless of whether the Commission adopts its proposal for small 
businesses, the Commission proposes to request bidder information on 
the short-form filings as to minority and/or women-owned status in 
order to monitor the applicant pool and monitor participation by women 
and minorities. The Commission seeks comment on this monitoring 
proposal.
    43. Small Business Definition. The Commission defines eligibility 
requirements for small businesses on a service-specific basis, taking 
into account capital requirements and other characteristics of each 
particular service. Second Memorandum Opinion & Order, PP Docket No. 
93-253, 59 FR 44272 (August 26, 1994). Because 900 MHz SMR is expected 
to be less capital-intensive than PCS, a much lower gross revenue 
threshold is warranted. Therefore, the Commission proposes to define a 
small business as an entity that, together with affiliates and 
attributable investors, has average gross revenues for the three 
preceding years of less than $3 million. This standard appropriately 
accounts for build-out costs, abundant license supply, and low 
acquisition costs. The Commission seeks comment on this proposal. For 
example, is it an appropriate threshold? Should it be higher or lower, 
based on the types of companies that are likely to benefit from the 
special provisions proposed here? The Commission also tentatively 
concludes that it will consider the revenues of affiliates and certain 
investors and it proposes to apply the 25 percent attribution threshold 
and affiliation rules similar to those used in the PCS auction rules. 
See 47 CFR 24.320(b)(2)(iv), 24.720(j)(1). The Commission seeks comment 
on these issues.
    44. Finally, if the Commission adopts separate provisions for 
minority-owned and women-owned entities, it also seeks comment on 
whether it should adopt the definition of minority-owned and women 
owned businesses contained in Section 1.2110(b)(2) of the Commission's 
rules, 47 CFR 1.2110(b)(2), i.e., businesses in which minorities and/or 
women who control the applicant have at least 50.1 percent equity 
ownership and, in the case of a corporate applicant, a 50.1% voting 
interest. Every general partner in a partnership either must be a 
minority and/or a woman who individually or together own at least 50.1 
percent of the partnership equity.
    45. Transfer Restrictions and Unjust Enrichment Provisions. In the 
Fifth Report & Order, PP Docket No. 93-253, 59 FR 37566 (July 22 1994), 
the Commission adopted restrictions on the transfer or assignment of 
licenses to ensure that designated entities do not take advantage of 
special provisions by immediately assigning or transferring control of 
their licenses. The Commission proposes to adopt these restrictions on 
transfer and assignment of 900 MHz SMR licenses won by designated 
entities. Under this proposal, a designated entity would be prohibited 
from voluntarily assigning or transferring control of its license to 
any other entity during the three years after license grant. In the 
fourth and fifth years of the license term, the designated entity would 
only be able to assign or transfer control of its license to another 
qualified designated entity, and no unjust enrichment could be gained 
through the transfer. Thus, if the entity to which the designated 
entity transfers or assigns the license were not eligible for the same 
provisions, the difference would have to be paid back to the U.S. 
Treasury as a condition of approval of the transfer or assignment. The 
Commission seeks comment on these proposals.
    46. For the remainder of the license term, the Commission proposes 
to continue to impose unjust enrichment rules on designated entities. 
These unjust enrichment provisions would deter speculation and 
participation in the licensing process by those who do not intend to 
offer service to the public, or who intend to use the Commission's 
provisions to obtain a license at a lower cost than they otherwise 
would have to pay, and later to sell it at the market price. Under this 
proposal, licensees seeking to transfer their licenses for profit must, 
within a specified time, remit to the government a penalty equal to a 
portion of the total value of the benefit conferred by the government. 
Therefore, if a designated entity making installment payments sells its 
license to an entity that does not qualify as a designated entity, the 
Commission would require payment of the remaining principal and any 
interest accrued through the date of assignment as a condition of the 
license assignment or transfer. If a transfer is made to another 
eligible designated entity, no penalty would be assessed against the 
original designated entity license holder. If bidding credits were 
awarded to a licensee, the Commission would require a designated entity 
approval for a transfer of control or an assignment of license to a 
non-designated entity, or who proposes to take any other action 
relating to ownership or control that will result in loss of status as 
an eligible designated entity, to reimburse the government for the 
amount for the amount of the bidding credit before transfer of the 
license will be permitted. The Commission proposes to apply these 
payment requirements for the entire license term. The Commission seeks 
comment on this proposal.
    47. Rural Telephone Company Partitioning. Congress directed the 
Commission to ensure that rural telephone companies have the 
opportunity to participate in the provision of spectrum-based services. 
Rural areas tend to be less profitable to serve than more densely 
populated urban areas. Therefore, service to these areas may not be a 
priority or feasible for many licensees. Rural telephone companies, 
however, are well positioned to serve these areas because of their 
existing infrastructure. Therefore, the Commission proposes a 
geographic partitioning scheme to encourage participation by rural 
telephone companies.
    48. Under this proposal, rural telephone companies would be 
[[Page 22030]] permitted to acquire partitioned 900 MHz SMR licenses 
either by: (1) forming bidding consortia consistent entirely of rural 
telephone companies to participate in auctions, and then partition the 
licenses won among consortia participants; or (2) acquiring partitioned 
900 MHz SMR licenses from other licenses through private negotiation 
and agreement either before or after the auction. The Commission would 
require that partitioned areas conform to established geopolitical 
boundaries and include all portions of the wireline service area of the 
rural telephone company applicant that lies within the service area. 
This partitioning scheme would prevent rural telephone companies from 
having to bid on the entire MTA license to obtain licenses covering 
their wireline service areas. In addition, rural telephone companies 
would have the flexibility to serve areas in which they already provide 
service, while the remainder of the service area could be served by 
other providers. The Commission also proposes to use the definition for 
rural telephone companies implemented in the Fifth Report & Order, PP 
Docket No. 93-253, 59 FR 37566 (July 22, 1994), for broadband PCS. 
Rural telephone companies would be defined as local exchange carriers 
having 100,000 or fewer access lines, including all affiliates. The 
Commission seeks comment on this proposal.
E. Other Provisions
    49. Reduced Upfront Payments. The Commission proposes not to adopt 
a reduced upfront payment option in the 900 MHz SMR service for 
designated entities. The other provisions adopted here render a reduced 
upfront payment option unnecessary and, in the absence of an 
entrepreneurs' block, may be too costly to administer in the 900 MHz 
SMR service. The Commission seeks comment on this proposal. Also, if 
the Commission adopts provisions for minority and women-owned entities, 
should the Commission apply a reduced upfront payment provision to 
those entities only?
    50. Set-aside Spectrum. In the Fifth Report & Order, PP Docket No. 
93-253, 59 FR 37566 (July 22, 1994), the Commission established 
entrepreneurs' blocks on which only qualified entrepreneurs, including 
designated entities, could bid. See also 47 CFR 24.709. The Commission 
tentatively concludes not to adopt an entrepreneurs' block for the 900 
MHz SMR auction. First, the large numbers of licenses available and 
relatively small spectrum allocations in the 900 MHz SMR service should 
allow for extensive small business participation. Second, the 
effectiveness of bidding credits and other provisions will be diluted, 
due to the smaller capital outlay anticipated for this service. Third, 
it may be impractical to choose particular blocks to set aside for 
bidding solely by entrepreneurs due to incumbent 900 MHz SMR operators 
in 19 of the 46 DFAs. The Commission seeks comment on this proposal. 
Are the capital requirements of this service anticipated to be so 
substantial that the Commission should insulate certain blocks from 
very large bidders in order to provide meaningful opportunities for 
designated entities?

III. Procedural Matters

    Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. As required by Section 603 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the Commission has prepared an 
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) of the expected impact 
on small entities of the policies and rules proposed in this Further 
Notice of Proposed Rule Making. Written public comments are requested 
on the IRFA.
    Reason for Action: This rule making proceeding was initiated to 
secure comment on proposals for establishing a flexible regulatory 
scheme for the 900 MHz Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR) service that 
would promote efficient licensing and enhance the service's competitive 
potential in the commercial mobile radio marketplace. The proposals 
advanced in the Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making are also 
designed to implement Congress's goal of regulatory symmetry in the 
regulation of competing commercial mobile radio services as described 
in Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 153(n), 
332, as amended by Title VI of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993 (Budget Act). The Commission also seeks to adopt rules regarding 
competitive bidding in the 900 MHz SMR service based on Section 309(j) 
of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 309(j), which delegates authority 
to the Commission to use auctions to select among mutually exclusive 
initial applications in certain services, including 900 MHz SMR.
    Objectives: The Commission proposes to adopt rules for the 900 MHz 
SMR service that are intended to promote the growth of incumbent 900 
MHz SMR systems, and emerging MTA SMR licensees, and to enhance the 
ability of all SMR providers to compete in the larger commercial mobile 
services market. The Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making seeks to 
establish competitive bidding procedures and a new licensing mechanism 
for the 900 MHz SMR service that will expedite service to the public 
and promote competition in the CMRS marketplace.
    Legal Basis: The proposed action is authorized under the Budget 
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-66, Title VI, 6002, and Sections 2(a), 3(n), 4(i), 
302, 303(g), 303(r), 309(i), 309(j), 332(a), 332(c), and 332(d) of the 
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 152(a), 153(n), 154(i), 302, 
303(g), 303(r), 309(i), 309(j), 332(a), 332(c) and 332(d), as amended.
    Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements: Under 
the proposal contained in the Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 
SMR licensees who obtain MTA-based licenses may be required to report 
information regarding location of their facilities and coverage of 
their service areas. SMR applicants seeking treatment as ``designated 
entities'' may also be subject to reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements to demonstrate compliance with the Commission's 
competitive bidding rules.
    Federal Rules Which Overlap, Duplicate or Conflict With These 
Rules: None.
    Description, Potential Impact, and Number of Small Entities 
Involved: The Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making potentially 
affects numerous small entities already operating 900 MHz SMR systems 
in Designated Filing Areas that will co-exist with 900 MHz SMR MTA 
licensees. The competitive bidding proposals contained in the Further 
Notice of Proposed Rule Making also could affect small entities seeking 
initial licenses in the 900 MHz SMR service. The Further Notice of 
Proposed Rule Making proposes special provisions in the Commission's 
auction rules to benefit ``designated entity'' applicants, including 
small businesses. After evaluating comments filed in response to the 
Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, the Commission will examine 
further the impact of all rule changes on small entities and set forth 
its findings in the Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis.
    Significant Alternatives Minimizing the Impact on Small Entities 
Consistent with the Stated Objectives: This Further Notice of Proposed 
Rule Making solicits comment on a variety of alternatives. Any 
additional significant alternatives presented in the comments will also 
be considered.
    IRFA Comments: The Commission requests written public comment on 
the foregoing Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. Comments must 
have a separate and distinct heading designating them as responses to 
the IRFA and must be filed by the deadlines provided above.

[[Page 22031]]

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 90

    Radio.

Federal Communications Commission,
William F. Caton,
Acting Secretary.

Amendatory Text

    Part 90 of Chapter I of Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
is proposed to be amended as follows:
    1. The authority citation for Part 90 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 47 U.S.C. 154, 303, 309 and 332.

    2. A new Subpart U consisting of Secs. 90.801 through 90.814 is 
proposed to be added to Part 90 to read as follows:

PART 90--PRIVATE LAND MOBILE RADIO SERVICES

Subpart U--Competitive Bidding Procedures for 900 MHz Specialized 
Mobile Radio

Sec.
90.801  900 MHz SMR subject to competitive bidding.
90.802  Competitive bidding for 900 MHz SMR licensing..
90.803  Competitive bidding mechanisms.
90.804  Aggregation of 900 MHz SMR licenses.
90.805  Withdrawal, default and disqualification payments.
90.806  Bidding application (FCC Form 175 and 175-S Short-form).
90.807  Submission of upfront payments and down payments.
90.808  Long-form applications.
90.809  License grant, denial, default, and disqualification.
90.810  Bidding credits for small businesses.
90.811  Reduced down payment for licenses won by small businesses.
90.812  Installment payments for licenses won by small businesses.
90.813  Procedures for partitioned licenses.
90.814  Definitions.


Sec. 90.801  900 MHz SMR subject to competitive bidding.

    Mutually exclusive initial applications to provide 900 MHz SMR 
service are subject to competitive bidding procedures. The general 
competitive bidding procedures found in 47 CFR Part 1, Subpart Q will 
apply unless otherwise provided in this part.


Sec. 90.802  Competitive bidding design for 900 MHz SMR licensing.

    The Commission will employ a simultaneous multiple round auction 
design when choosing from among mutually exclusive initial applications 
to provide 900 MHz SMR service, unless otherwise specified by the 
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau before the auction.


Sec. 90.803  Competitive bidding mechanisms.

    (a) Sequencing. The Commission will establish and may vary the 
sequence in which 900 MHz SMR licenses will be auctioned.
    (b) Grouping. All 900 MHz SMR licenses for each of the MTAs will be 
auctioned simultaneously, unless the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau 
announces, by Public Notice prior to the auction, an alternative 
auction scheme.
    (c) Minimum Bid Increments. The Commission will, by announcement 
before or during an auction, require minimum bid increments in dollar 
or percentage terms.
    (d) Stopping Rules. The Commission will establish stopping rules 
before or during multiple round auctions in order to terminate an 
auction within a reasonable time.
    (e) Activity Rules. The Commission will establish activity rules 
which require a minimum amount of bidding activity. In the event that 
the Commission establishes an activity rule in connection with a 
simultaneous multiple round auction, each bidder will be entitled to 
request and will be automatically granted a certain number of waivers 
of such rule during the auction.


Sec. 90.804  Aggregation of 900 MHz SMR licenses.

    The Commission will license each 10-channel block in the 900 MHz 
SMR spectrum separately. Applicants may aggregate across spectrum 
blocks within the limitation specified in Sec. 20.6(b) of this Chapter.


Sec. 90.805  Withdrawal, default and disqualification payments.

    (a) During the course of an auction conducted pursuant to 
Sec. 90.802, the Commission will impose payments on bidders who 
withdraw high bids during the course of an auction, who default on 
payments due after an auction closes, or who are disqualified.
    (b) Bid withdrawal prior to close of auction. A bidder who 
withdraws a high bid during the course of an auction will be subject to 
a payment equal to the difference between the amount bid and the amount 
of the winning bid the next time the license if offered by the 
Commission. No withdrawal payment would be assessed if the subsequent 
winning bid exceeds the withdrawn bid. This payment amount will be 
deducted from any upfront payments or down payments that the 
withdrawing bidder has deposited with the Commission.
    (c) Default or disqualification after close of auction. If a high 
bidder defaults or is disqualified after the close of such an auction, 
the defaulting bidder will be subject to the payment in paragraph (a) 
of this section plus an additional penalty equal to three (3) percent 
of the subsequent winning bid. If the subsequent winning bid exceeds 
the defaulting bidder's bid amount, the 3 percent payment will be 
calculated based on the defaulting bidder's bid amount. These amounts 
will be deducted from any upfront payments or down payments that the 
defaulting or disqualified bidder has deposited with the Commission.


Sec. 90.806  Bidding application (FCC Form 175 and 175-S Short-form).

    All applicants to participate in competitive bidding for 900 MHz 
SMR licenses must submit applications on FCC Forms 175 and 175-S 
pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 1.2105 of this Chapter. The Wireless 
Telecommunications Bureau will issue a Public Notice announcing the 
availability of 900 MHz SMR licenses and, in the event that mutually 
exclusive applications are filed, the date of the auction for those 
licenses. This Public Notice also will specify the date on or before 
which applicants intending to participate in a 900 MHz SMR auction must 
file their application in order to be eligible for that auction, and it 
will contain information necessary for completion of the application as 
well as other important information such as the materials which must 
accompany the Forms, any filing fee that must accompany the application 
or any upfront payment that will need to be submitted, and the location 
where the application must be filed. In addition to identifying its 
status as a small business or rural telephone company, each applicant 
must indicate whether it is a minority-owned entity, as defined in 
Sec. 90.814(g) and/or a women-owned entity.


Sec. 90.807  Submission of upfront payments and down payments.

    (a) Bidders in the 900 MHz SMR auction will be required to submit 
an upfront payment of $0.02 per pop per MHz, in accordance with 
Sec. 1.2106 of this Chapter.
    (b) Winning bidders in a 900 MHz SMR auction must submit a down 
payment to the Commission in an amount sufficient to bring their total 
deposits up to 20 percent of their winnings bids, and in accordance 
with Sec. 1.2107(b) of this chapter, except for small businesses that 
are winning bidders, which are governed by Sec. 90.811. [[Page 22032]] 


Sec. 90.808  Long-form applications.

    Each winning bidder will be required to submit a long-form 
application on FCC Form 600 within ten (10) business days after being 
notified by Public Notice that it is the winning bidder. Applications 
on FCC Form 600 shall be submitted pursuant to the procedures set forth 
in 90.119 of this Part and any associated Public Notices. Only auction 
winners (and rural telephone companies seeking partitioned licenses 
pursuant to agreements with auction winners under Sec. 90.813) will be 
eligible to file applications on FCC Form 600 for initial 900 MHz SMR 
licenses in the event of mutual exclusivity between applicants filing 
Form 175.


Sec. 90.809  License grant, denial, default, and disqualification.

    (a) Except with respect to entities eligible for installment 
payments (see Sec. 90.812) each winning bidder will be required to pay 
the balance of its winning bid in a lump sum payment within five (5) 
business days following Public Notice that the license is ready for 
grant. The Commission will grant the license within ten (10) business 
days after receipt of full and timely payment of the winning bid 
amount.
    (b) A bidder who withdraws its bid subsequent to the close of 
bidding, defaults on a payment due, or is disqualified, will be subject 
to the payments specified in Sec. 90.805 or Sec. 1.2109 of this 
Chapter, as applicable.
    (c) MTA licenses pursued through competitive bidding procedures 
will be granted pursuant to the requirements specified in Sec. 90.166.


Sec. 90.810  Bidding credits for small businesses.

    (a) A winning bidder that qualifies as a small business or a 
consortium of small businesses, (as defined in Sec. 90.814) may use a 
bidding credit of 10 percent to lower the cost of its winning bid on 
any of the blocks identified in Sec. 90.617(d), Table 4B.
    (b) Unjust Enrichment. (1) If a licensee that utilizes a bidding 
credit under this section seeks to assign or transfer control of its 
license to an entity not meeting the eligibility standards for bidding 
credits or seeks to make any other change in ownership that would 
result in the licensee no longer qualifying for bidding credits under 
this section, the licensee must seek Commission approval of such 
assignment, transfer or other ownership change.
    (2) If a licensee that utilizes a bidding credit under this section 
seeks to assign or transfer control of its license to an entity meeting 
the eligibility standards for lower bidding credits or seeks to make 
any other change in ownership that would result in the licensee 
qualifying for a lower bidding credit under this section, the licensee 
must seek Commission approval and reimburse the government for the 
difference between the amount of the bidding credit obtained by the 
licensee and the bidding credit for which the assignee, transferee or 
licensee is eligible under this section as a condition of the approval 
of such assignment, transfer or other ownership change.


Sec. 90.811  Reduced down payment for licenses won by small businesses.

    Each winning bidder that qualifies as a small business shall make a 
down payment equal to ten percent of its winning bid (less applicable 
bidding credits); a winning bidder shall bring its total amount on 
deposit with the Commission (including upfront payment) to five percent 
of its net winning bid within five (5) business days after the auction 
closes, and the remainder of the down payment (five percent) shall be 
paid within five (5) business days following Public Notice that the 
license is ready for grant. The Commission will grant the license 
within ten (10) business days after receipt of the remainder of the 
down payment.
Sec. 90.812  Installment payments for licenses won by small businesses.

    (a) Each licensee that qualifies as a small business may pay the 
remaining 90 percent of the net auction price for the license in 
installment payments pursuant to Sec. 1.210(e) of this chapter.
    (b) Interest shall be imposed based on the rate for ten-year U.S. 
Treasury obligations applicable on the date the license is granted, 
plus 2.5 percent; payments shall include interest only for the first 
two years and payments of interest and principal amortized over the 
remaining eight years of the license term.
    (c) Unjust Enrichment. (1) If a licensee that utilizes installment 
financing under this section seeks to assign or transfer control of its 
license to an entity not meeting the eligibility standards for 
installment payments, the licensee must make full payment of the 
remaining unpaid principal and any unpaid interest accrued through the 
date of assignment or transfer as a condition of approval.
    (2) If a licensee that utilizes installment financing under this 
section seeks to make any change in ownership structure that would 
result in the licensee losing eligibility for installment payments, the 
licensee shall first seek Commission approval and must make full 
payment of the remaining unpaid principal and any unpaid interest 
accrued through the date of such change as a condition of approval.


Sec. 90.813  Procedures for partitioned licenses.

    (a) Notwithstanding Sec. 90.661, an applicant that is rural 
telephone company, as defined in Sec. 90.814, may be granted a 900 MHz 
SMR license that is geographically partitioned from a separately 
licensed MTA, so long as the MTA applicant or licensee has voluntarily 
agreed (in writing) to partition a portion of the license to the rural 
telephone company.
    (b) If partitioned licenses are being applied for in conjunction 
with a license(s) to be awarded through competitive bidding 
procedures--
    (1) The applicable procedures for filing short-form applications 
and for submitting upfront payments and down payments contained in this 
Part and Part 1 of this Chapter shall be followed by the applicant, who 
must disclose as part of its short-form application all parties to 
agreement(s) with or among rural telephone companies to partition the 
license pursuant to this section, if won at auction (see 47 CFR 
Sec. 1.2105(a)(2)(viii) of this Chapter);
    (2) Each rural telephone company that is a party to an agreement to 
partition the license shall file a long-form application for its 
respective, mutually agreed-upon geographic area together with the 
application for the remainder of the MTA filed by the auction winner.
    (c) If the partitioned license is being applied for as a partial 
assignment of the MTA license following grant of the initial license, 
request for authorization for partial assignment of a license shall be 
made pursuant to Sec. 90.153.
    (d) Each application for a partitioned area (long-form initial 
application or partial assignment application) shall contain a 
partitioning plan that must propose to establish a partitioned area to 
be licensed that meets the following criteria:
    (1) Conforms to established geopolitical boundaries (such as county 
lines);
    (2) Includes the wireline service area of the rural telephone 
company applicant; and
    (3) Is reasonable related to the rural telephone company's wireline 
service area.

    Note: A partitioned service area will be presumed to be 
reasonably related to the rural telephone company's wireline service 
area if the partitioned service area contains no more than twice the 
population overlap between the rural telephone company's 
[[Page 22033]] wireline service area and the partitioned area.

    (e) Each licensee in each partitioned area will be responsible for 
meeting the construction requirements in its area (see Sec. 90.665).


Sec. 90.814  Definitions.

    (a) Scope. The definitions in this section apply to Secs. 90.810 
through 90.813, unless otherwise specified in those sections.
    (b) Small Business: Consortium of Small Businesses. (1) A small 
business is an entity that, together with its affiliates and persons or 
entities that hold attributable interests in such entity and their 
affiliates, have average gross revenues for the three preceding years 
of less than $3 million.
    (2) A small business consortium is conglomerate organization formed 
as a joint venture between or among mutually-independent business 
firms, each of which individually satisfies the definition of a small 
business in paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) of this section.
    (c) Rural Telephone Company. A rural telephone company is a local 
exchange carrier having 100,000 or fewer access lines, including all 
affiliates.
    (d) Gross Revenues. Gross revenues shall mean all income received 
by an entity, whether earned or passive, before any deductions are made 
for costs of doing business (e.g., cost of goods sold), as evidenced by 
audited financial statements for the relevant number of calendar years 
preceding January 1, 1994, or, If audited financial statements were not 
prepared on a calendar-year basis, of the most recently completed 
fiscal years preceding the filing of the applicant's short-form 
application (Form 175). For applications filed after December 31, 1994, 
gross revenues shall be evidenced by audited financial statements for 
the preceding relevant number of calendar or fiscal years. If an entity 
was not in existence for all or part of the relevant period, gross 
revenues shall be evidenced by the audited financial statements of the 
entity's predecessor-in-interest or, if there is no identifiable 
predecessor-in-interest, unaudited financial statements certified by 
the applicant as accurate.
    (e) Business Owned by Members of Minority Groups and/or Women. A 
business owned by members of minority groups and/or women is one in 
which minorities and/or women who are U.S. citizens control the 
applicant, have at least 50.1 percent equity ownership and, in the case 
of a corporate applicant, a 50.1 percent voting interest. For 
applicants that are partnerships, every general partner either must be 
a minority and/or woman (or minorities and/or women) who are U.S. 
citizens and who individually or together own at least 50.1 percent of 
the partnership equity, or an entity that is 100 percent owned and 
controlled by minorities and/or women who are U.S. citizens. The 
interest of minorities and women are to be calculated on a fully-
diluted basis; agreements such as stock options and convertible 
debentures shall be considered to have a present effect on the power to 
control an entity and shall be treated as if the rights thereunder 
already have been fully exercised. However, upon a demonstration that 
options or conversion rights held by non-controlling principals will 
not deprive the minority and female principals of a substantial 
financial stake in the venture or impair their rights to control the 
designated entity, a designated entity may seek a waiver of the 
requirement that the equity of the minority and female principals must 
be calculated on a fully-diluted basis.
    (f) Members of Minority Groups. Members of minority groups includes 
Blacks, Hispanics, American Indians, Alaskan Natives, Asians, and 
Pacific Islanders.
    (g) Nonattributable Equity. Nonattributable equity shall mean:
    (1) For corporations, voting stock or non-voting stock that 
includes no more than 25 percent of the total voting equity, including 
the right to vote such stock through a voting trust or other 
arrangement;
    (2) For partnerships, joint ventures and other non-corporate 
entities, limited partnership interests and similar interests that do 
not afford the power to exercise control of the entity.
    (h) Affiliate. (1) Basis for Affiliation. An individual or entity 
is an affiliate of an applicant or of a person holding an attributable 
interest in an applicant (both referred to herein as ``the applicant'') 
if such individual or entity:
    (i) Directly or indirectly controls or has the power to control the 
applicant, or
    (ii) Is directly or indirectly controlled by the applicant, or
    (iii) Is directly or indirectly controlled by a third party or 
parties that also controls or has the power to control the applicant, 
or
    (iv) Has an ``identity of interest'' with the applicant.
    (2) Nature of control in determining affiliation.
    (i) Every business concern is considered to have one or more 
parties who directly or indirectly control or have the power to control 
it. Control may be affirmative or negative and it is immaterial whether 
it is exercised so long as the power to control exists.

    Example for paragraph (h)(2)(i). An applicant owning 50 percent 
of the voting stock of another concern would have negative power to 
control such concern since such party can block any action of the 
other stockholders. Also, the bylaws of a corporation may permit a 
stockholder with less than 50 percent of the voting to block any 
actions taken by the other stockholders in the other entity. 
Affiliation exists when the applicant has the power to control a 
concern while at the same time another person, or persons, are in 
control of the concern at the will of the party or parties with the 
power of control.

    (ii) Control can arise through stock ownership; occupancy of 
director, officer or key employee positions; contractual or other 
business relations; or combinations of these and other factors. A key 
employee is an employee who, because of his/her position in the 
concern, has a critical influence in or substantive control over the 
operations or management of the concern.
    (iii) Control can arise through management positions where a 
concern's voting stock is so widely distributed that no effective 
control can be established.

    Example for paragraph (h)(2)(iii). In a corporation where the 
officers and directors own various size blocks of stock totaling 40 
percent of the corporation's voting stock, but no officer or 
director has a block sufficient to give him or her control or the 
power to control and the remaining 60 percent is widely distributed 
with no individual stockholder having a stock interest greater than 
10 percent, management has the power to control. If persons with 
such management control of the other entity are persons with 
attributable interests in the applicant, the other entity will be 
deemed an affiliate of the applicant.

    (3) Identity of interest between and among persons. Affiliation can 
arise between or among two or more persons with an identity of 
interest, such as members of the same family or persons with common 
investments. In determining if the applicant controls or is controlled 
by a concern, persons with an identity of interest will be treated as 
though they were one person.

    Example 1 for paragraph (h)(3) introductory text. Two 
shareholders in Corporation Y each have attributable interests in 
the same SMR application. While neither shareholder has enough 
shares to individually control Corporation Y, together they have the 
power to control Corporation Y. The two shareholders with these 
common investments (or identity of interest) are treated as though 
they are one person and Corporation Y would be deemed an affiliate 
of the applicant.
    Example 2 for paragraph (h)(3) introductory text. One 
shareholder in [[Page 22034]] Corporation Y, shareholder A, has an 
attributable interest in a SMR application. Another shareholder in 
Corporation Y, shareholder B, has a nonattributable interest in the 
same SMR application. While neither shareholder has enough shares to 
individually control Corporation Y, together they have the power to 
control Corporation Y. Through the common investment of shareholders 
A and B in the SMR application, Corporation Y would still be deemed 
an affiliate of the applicant.

    (i) Spousal Affiliation. Both spouses are deemed to own or control 
or have the power to control interests owned or controlled by either of 
them, unless they are subject to a legal separation recognized by a 
court of competent jurisdiction in the United States.
    (ii) Kinship Affiliation. Immediate family members will be presumed 
to own or control or have the power to control interests owned or 
controlled by other immediate family members. In this context 
``immediate family member'' means father, mother, husband, wife, son, 
daughter, brother, sister, father- or mother-in-law, son- or daughter-
in-law, brother- or sister-in-law, step-father, or -mother, step-
brother, or -sister, step-son, or -daughter, half brother or sister. 
This presumption may be rebutted by showing that
    (A) The family members are estranged,
    (B) The family ties are remote, or
    (C) The family members are not closely involved with each in 
business matters.

    Example for paragraph (h)(3)(ii). A owns a controlling interest 
in Corporation X. A's sister-in-law, B, has an attributable interest 
in an SMR application. Because A and B have a presumptive kinship 
affiliation, A's interest in Corporation X is attributable to B, and 
thus to the applicant, unless B rebuts the presumption with the 
necessary showing.

    (4) Affiliation through stock ownership. (i) An applicant is 
presumed to control or have the power to control a concern if he or she 
owns or controls or has the power to control 50 percent or more of its 
voting stock.
    (ii) An applicant is presumed to control or have the power to 
control a concern even though he or she owns, controls or has the power 
to control less than 50 percent of the concern's voting stock, if the 
block of stock he or she owns, controls or has the power to control is 
large as compared with any other outstanding block of stock.
    (iii) If two or more persons each owns, controls or has the power 
to control less than 50 percent of the voting stock of a concern, such 
minority holdings are equal or approximately equal in size, and the 
aggregate of these minority holdings is large as compared with any 
other stock holding, the presumption arises that each one of these 
persons individually controls or has the power to control the concern; 
however, such presumption may be rebutted by a showing that such 
control or power to control, in fact, does not exist.
    (5) Affiliation arising under stock options, convertible 
debentures, and agreements to merge. Stock options, convertible 
debentures, and agreements to merge (including agreements in principle) 
are generally considered to have a present effect on the power to 
control the concern. Therefore, in making a size determination, such 
options, debentures, and agreements will generally be treated as though 
the rights held thereunder had been exercised. However, neither an 
affiliate nor an applicant can use such options and debentures to 
appear to terminate its control over another concern before it actually 
does so.

    Example 1 for paragraph (h)(5). If company B holds an option to 
purchase a controlling interest in company A, who holds an 
attributable interest in an SMR application, the situation is 
treated as though company B had exercised its rights and had become 
owner of a controlling interest in company A. The gross revenues of 
company B must be taken into account in determining the size of the 
applicant.
    Example 2 for paragraph (h)(5). If a large company, BigCo, holds 
70% (70 of 100 outstanding shares) of the voting stock of company A, 
who holds an attributable interest in an SMR application, and gives 
a third party, SmallCo, an option to purchase 50 of the 70 shares 
owned by BigCo, BigCo will be deemed to be an affiliate of company, 
and thus the applicant, until SmallCo actually exercises its options 
to purchase such shares. In order to prevent BigCo from 
circumventing the intent of the rule which requires such options to 
be considered on a fully diluted basis, the option is not considered 
to have present effect in this case.
    Example 3 for paragraph (h)(5). If company A has entered into an 
agreement to merge with company B in the future, the situation is 
treated as though the merger has taken place.

    (6) Affiliation under voting trusts. (i) Stock interests held in 
trust shall be deemed controlled by any person who holds or shares the 
power to vote such stock, to any person who has the sole power to sell 
such stock, and to any person who has the right to revoke the trust at 
will or to replace the trustee at will.
    (ii) If a trustee has a familial, personal or extra-trust business 
relationship to the grantor or the beneficiary, the stock interests 
held in trust will be deemed controlled by the grantor or beneficiary, 
as appropriate.
    (iii) If the primary purpose of a voting trust, or similar 
agreement, is to separate voting power from beneficial ownership of 
voting stock for the purpose of shifting control of or the power to 
control a concern in order that such concern or another concern may 
meet the Commission's size standards, such voting trust shall not be 
considered valid for this purpose regardless of whether it is or is not 
recognized within the appropriate jurisdiction.
    (7) Affiliation through common management. Affiliation generally 
arises where officers, directors, or key employees serve as the 
majority or otherwise as the controlling element of the board of 
directors and/or the management of another entity.
    (8) Affiliation through common facilities. Affiliation generally 
arises where one concern shares office space and/or employees and/or 
other facilities with another concern, particularly where such concerns 
are in the same or related industry or field of operations, or where 
such concerns were formerly affiliated, and through these sharing 
arrangements one concern has control, or potential control, of the 
other concern.
    (9) Affiliation through contractual relationships. Affiliation 
generally arises where one concern is dependent upon another concern 
for contracts and business to such a degree that one concern has 
control, or potential control, of the other concern.
    (10) Affiliation under joint venture arrangements. (i) A joint 
venture for size determination purposes is an association of concerns 
and/or individuals, with interests in any degree or proportion, formed 
by contract, express or implied, to engage in and carry out a single, 
specific business venture for joint profit for which purpose they 
combine their efforts, property, money, skill and knowledge, but not on 
a continuing or permanent basis for conducting business generally. The 
determination whether an entity is a joint venture is based upon the 
facts of the business operation, regardless of how the business 
operation may be designated by the parties involved. An agreement to 
share profits/losses proportionate to each party's contribution to the 
business operation is a significant factor in determining whether the 
business operation is a joint venture.
    (ii) The parties to a joint venture are considered to be affiliated 
with each other.

[FR Doc. 95-11010 Filed 5-2-95; 12:52 pm]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-M