[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 81 (Thursday, April 27, 1995)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 20654-20657]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-10323]



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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Part 213

[Docket No. RST-94-3, Notice No. 1]


Policy on the Safety of Railroad Bridges

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), DOT.

ACTION: Interim statement of policy.

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SUMMARY: FRA issues an interim statement of policy for the safety of 
railroad bridges. FRA establishes suggested criteria for railroads to 
use to ensure the structural integrity of bridges that carry railroad 
tracks. FRA will subsequently make the interim statement of policy part 
of the final rule amending 49 CFR part 213 (See 57 FR 54038, November 
16, 1992). This final rule will reflect any changes that appear 
necessary following public comment on the interim statement of policy.

DATES: Effective Date: The interim statement of policy is effective May 
30, 1995. Written comments must be received no later than June 26, 
1995. Comments received after that date will be considered to the 
extent possible without incurring additional delay or expense.

ADDRESSES: Written comments on this policy should be submitted to the 
Docket Clerk (RCC-30), Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh 
Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590. Persons desiring to be notified that 
their written comments have been received by FRA should submit a 
stamped, self-addressed postcard with their comments. The Docket Clerk 
will indicate on the postcard the date the comments were received and 
return the postcard to the addressee. Written comments will be 
available for examination, both before and after the closing date for 
comments, during regular business hours in Room 8201 of the Nassif 
Building at the above address.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gordon A. Davids, P.E., Bridge 
Engineer, Office of Safety Enforcement, Federal Railroad 
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590, 
(Telephone: 202-366-0507), or Nancy Lummen Lewis, Trial Attorney, 
Office of Chief Counsel, Federal Railroad Administration, 400 Seventh 
Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590, (Telephone 202-366-0635).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Beginning in 1991, FRA conducted a review of 
the safety of railroad bridges. The review was prompted by the agency's 
perception that the bridge population was aging, traffic density and 
loads were increasing on many routes, and the consequences of a bridge 
failure could be catastrophic.

I. Bridge Safety Survey

    FRA counted the approximate number of bridges that carry railroad 
track in the United States, and then surveyed the safety of those 
bridges. The count revealed that
    a. Approximately 100,700 bridges carried railroad tracks in 1991,
    b. Approximately 10 bridges exist for every 14 miles of railroad, 
and
    c. Approximately 120 feet of track per mile is located on a bridge.
    The safety survey accomplished several objectives. It determined 
whether the condition of railroad bridges posed a significant hazard to 
the safety of the public. It documented the methods used by the 
railroad industry for the inspection, management and assurance of 
safety of those bridges. It provided information with which FRA could 
evaluate the need for federal action to improve the safety of railroad 
bridges.
    The survey assessed the policies and practices used by 80 railroads 
to ensure the integrity of their bridges. The railroads surveyed 
included 21 major railroads (including 14 class I railroads and seven 
major passenger or commuter railroads), 20 class II regional railroads, 
and 39 class III shortline railroads. The 21 class I and passenger 
railroads are termed ``major railroads'' because they own most of the 
railroad bridges and handle the majority of freight and passenger 
traffic. In the course of the survey, FRA inspectors observed railroad 
inspections of more than 8,000 bridges.
    The survey showed that all of the 21 major railroads have conducted 
comprehensive, effective bridge inspection programs for several 
decades. The survey demonstrated that these railroads are acting to 
safeguard the integrity of their bridges. The railroad managers know 
the condition of their bridges, and they are taking appropriate action 
to prevent structural failure. The findings for the 20 regional 
railroads were similar to those of the major railroads.
    The survey showed the major and regional railroads use a variety of 
methods to inspect and manage their bridges. The degree to which 
inspectors are supervised, the levels at which certain decisions are 
made, and the methods used to record and report inspections vary 
considerably among railroads. Nevertheless, these programs share 
certain basic principles that characterize effective bridge management 
practices.
    The consistency of findings among the Class I and II railroads, 
passenger operators, and many smaller railroads indicates that 
railroads are following a course of action that corresponds with the 
public interest in prevention of bridge failures. The railroads' 
actions are driven by a need to prevent the significant economic harm 
that result from the loss of a valuable bridge and the cost of 
associated casualties.
    On shortline railroads, however, FRA found considerable variation 
in the quality of bridge management programs and bridge conditions. 
Many shortlines have exemplary programs, well-suited to their size and 
the nature of their structures and traffic. A few, however, did not 
address all of their responsibilities for the safety of their bridges.
    These smaller railroads with minimal bridge management programs 
typically move low levels of traffic over a small number of bridges. 
Nevertheless, the consequences of a bridge failure on one of these 
railroads could be as severe as a failure occurring anywhere. The risk 
of human casualty or environmental damage would be the same for each, 
and the cost of the failure could be ruinous to a railroad with limited 
resources. This finding indicates a situation that FRA must address. 
[[Page 20655]] 

II. The Safety Record of Railroad Bridges

    During the past five decades, not one fatality has been caused by 
the structural failure of a railroad bridge. Train accidents caused by 
the structural failure of railroad bridges have been extremely rare.
    Although the average construction date of railroad bridges predates 
most highway bridges by several decades, the older railroad bridges 
were designed to carry heavy steam locomotives. Design factors were 
generally conservative, and the bridges' functional designs permit 
repairs and reinforcements when necessary to maintain their viability.
    Railroad bridges are most often privately, rather than publicly, 
owned. Their owners seem to recognize the economic consequences of 
neglecting important maintenance. Private ownership enables the 
railroads to control the loads that operate over their bridges. Cars 
and locomotives exceeding the nominal capacity of a bridge are not 
operated without permission from the responsible bridge engineers, and 
then only under restrictions and conditions that protect the integrity 
of the bridge.
    Many railroad bridges display superficial signs of deterioration 
but still retain the capacity to safely carry their loads. Corrosion on 
a bridge is not a safety issue unless a critical area sees significant 
loss of material. Routine inspections are prescribed to detect this 
condition, but determination of its effect requires a detailed 
inspection and analysis of the bridge. In general, timber bridges 
continue to function safely, and masonry structures built as early as 
the 1830's remain functional and safe for their traffic.
    Of the few train accidents that involved bridges, most have not 
been caused by structural failure. FRA accident records for 1982 
through 1993 show 15 train accidents that were caused by bridge 
structural failures, including three that involved improper repair 
procedures. These accidents caused no reportable injuries and a 
reported $856,046 damage to railroad facilities, cars and locomotives.
    During the same period, 29 train accidents on or near bridges were 
caused by track conditions on the bridge or its approaches. These 
accidents caused no reportable injuries, and a reported $4,596,733 
damage to railroad facilities, cars and locomotives.
    The same time period saw 19 train accidents on bridges caused by 
external damage to the bridge, including three fires, 11 floods or 
washouts, four bridges struck by motor vehicles, and one bridge struck 
by a marine vessel. The accident at Mobile, Alabama on September 22, 
1993 alone caused 47 fatalities, 102 non-fatal injuries, and over 
$10,000,000 in property damage. The losses from these 19 accidents 
totaled 47 fatalities, 124 non-fatal injuries, and $22,150,865 damage 
to railroad facilities, cars and locomotives.

IV. Bridge Safety Policy

    The severity of a train accident is usually compounded when a 
bridge is involved, regardless of the cause of the accident. FRA must 
retain its capability to deal effectively with any safety problems 
involving the structural integrity of railroad bridges. At the same 
time, FRA must assure that private and public resources are not 
diverted unnecessarily from other programs that are also critical to 
railroad safety.
    At one extreme, FRA could respond to bridge issues only when 
accidents occur or when someone contacts the agency about particular 
concerns. However, such a reactive policy would inhibit FRA's ability 
to detect impending problems with railroad bridges. At the other 
extreme, FRA could regulate all aspects of railroad bridge management, 
including inspection, rating, construction and maintenance. The expense 
to the railroad industry of such a policy is not justified by the 
findings of the safety survey.
    Because the industry has no apparent systemic bridge safety 
problem, FRA chooses to adopt a policy, rather than issue regulations, 
to carry out its responsibility of protecting bridge safety. The policy 
includes non-regulatory guidelines to inform railroad managers and all 
concerned about current good practices related to bridge inspection and 
management. The guidelines accommodate a wide variety of effective 
bridge inspection and management methods.
    Even without specific bridge safety regulations, FRA maintains 
authority under 49 U.S.C. 20101 et seq. (formerly the Federal Railroad 
Safety Act of 1970) to inspect any railroad facility that affects 
safety and, if necessary, to remove it from service. The guidelines 
represent the general criteria against which FRA will evaluate each 
railroad's bridge inspection and management program.
    FRA does not expect that its policy will unnecessarily divert 
resources away from the functional work of bridge management by forcing 
railroads to change effective bridge management programs. Likewise, the 
policy should not require FRA to divert public resources to employ a 
large staff of bridge specialists.
    FRA will revise the guidelines as necessary to accomplish the 
objectives of the bridge safety program. To that end, FRA will continue 
to monitor and evaluate the railroads' bridge inspection and management 
programs to guarantee that those responsible for the safety of bridges 
continue to meet their responsibilities. FRA will make its findings 
available to the public upon request, excluding any proprietary 
information received and identified as such. Should FRA find through 
its monitoring that widespread bridge structural problems have 
developed, it may use the information it has gathered to commence a 
rulemaking proceeding.

Effect of This Interim Statement of Policy

    The purpose of this notice is to issue an interim statement of 
policy containing guidelines for the proper maintenance of bridge 
structures. It is meant to be advisory in nature; it does not have the 
force of regulations under which FRA ordinarily issues violations and 
assesses civil penalties.
    However, FRA maintains emergency authority to issue emergency, 
compliance, and disqualification orders, as well as authority to seek 
injunctive relief in federal district court, under 49 U.S.C. 20104 
(formerly known as the Federal Rail Safety Act of 1970) and 49 CFR part 
209. FRA will exercise this authority when an unsafe condition or 
improper maintenance of a railroad bridge creates an imminent hazard of 
death or injury to persons. Furthermore, should FRA, in the future, 
find the need to address bridge integrity in a regulatory proceeding, 
it will do so.
    Following the comment period, FRA will issue any necessary changes 
to the interim statement of policy. The notice of changes will appear 
simultaneously with the Notice of Final Rule for the proceeding 
amending the track safety standards in 49 CFR part 213, begun in 
November, 1992. (See 57 FR 54038, November 16, 1992.) Except as 
modified in response to the comments, this interim statement of policy 
will become a final statement of policy at that time.

Public Participation

    Because the interim statement of policy is advisory in nature, 
notice and public participation are not required. However, the public 
is invited to submit comments within 30 days following its publication.
    FRA would appreciate comments about its plan to issue a statement 
of policy rather than regulations governing railroad bridge 
maintenance. FRA would also welcome comments about the value of 
permanently placing the [[Page 20656]] statement of policy in a new 
appendix to 49 CFR part 213. Finally, FRA would like comments about the 
guidelines themselves and their value as criteria in deciding whether 
stronger enforcement action on particular railroad bridges is 
warranted.
    Comments received after the 30-day deadline will be considered if 
it is possible to do so without incurring additional delay or expense.

Regulatory Impact

Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies

    This interim statement of policy has been evaluated in accordance 
with existing regulatory policies. The regulatory document is 
considered to be a nonsignificant regulatory action under E.O. 12866 
and is a nonsignificant rule under section 5(a)(4) of DOT Regulatory 
Policies and Procedures (44 FR. 11034, February 26, 1979) because it is 
advisory only and does not carry with it the force of law or 
regulation. For nonsignificant rules, the DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures ordinarily require an economic evaluation to be placed in 
the public docket. This evaluation should include an analysis of the 
economic consequences of the rule, including (if possible) an 
estimation of the cost and benefits of the rule to the private sector, 
consumers, and all levels of government. However, such an evaluation is 
not required if the expected impact of a rule is deemed minimal. 
Because this interim statement of policy offers only guidelines to be 
followed and does not mandate any actions or establish any 
recordkeeping requirements, the need for a regulatory evaluation is not 
indicated.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) 
requires a review of rules to assess their impact on small entities. In 
reviewing the economic impact of this interim statement of policy, FRA 
concluded that it will not have any measurable impact on small 
entities. There are no direct or indirect economic impacts for small 
units of government, businesses, or other organizations. Therefore, it 
is certified that this rule will not have a significant economic impact 
on a very substantial number of small entities under the provisions of 
the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    There are no information collection requirements contained in this 
interim statement of policy.

Environmental Impact

    FRA has evaluated this interim statement of policy in accordance 
with its procedures for ensuring full consideration of the potential 
environmental impacts of FRA actions, as required by the National 
Environmental Policy Act and related directives. This notice meets the 
criteria that establish this as a non-major action for environmental 
purposes.

Federalism Implications

    Implementation of this interim statement of policy could result in 
a judicial determination that it constitutes FRA's occupation of the 
field of railroad bridge safety regulation. Under 49 U.S.C. 20106, a 
state may enforce its own statute or regulation related to railroad 
safety until the Secretary of Transportation issues an order or 
regulation ``covering the subject matter'' of the state's law. A state 
may adopt or enforce a more stringent law relevant to the subject 
matter as long as it ``(1) is necessary to eliminate or reduce a local 
safety hazard; (2) is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or order 
of the United States Government; and (3) does not unreasonably burden 
interstate commerce.''
    At this time, FRA is aware of only one state that could be affected 
by a court's determination that the Secretary of Transportation, 
through FRA, has covered the subject matter of railroad bridge safety 
by issuing this policy statement. FRA has prepared a Federalism 
Assessment, pursuant to Executive Order 12612 and placed it in the 
docket reserved for this proceeding, to address the federalism 
implications this interim policy could have on that state or any other 
state seeking to regulate railroad bridge safety.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 213

    Penalties, Railroad safety, Railroads.

    Therefore, in consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Railroad 
Administration issues the following:

Interim Statement of Agency Policy on the Structural Integrity of 
Railroad Bridges

    The structural integrity of bridges that carry railroad tracks is 
important to the safety of railroad employees and that the public. The 
responsibility for the safety of railroad bridges rests with the owner 
of the track carried by the bridge, together with any other party to 
whom that responsibility has been assigned by the track owner.
    The capacity of a bridge to safely support its traffic can only be 
determined by intelligent application of engineering principles and the 
laws of physics. Bridge owners should use, as FRA will, those 
principles to assess the integrity of railroad bridges.
    The long term ability of a structure to perform its function is an 
economic issue beyond the intent of this policy. In assessing a 
bridge's structural condition, FRA will focus on the present safety of 
the structure, rather than its appearance or long term usefulness.
    FRA inspectors will conduct regular evaluations of railroad bridge 
inspection and management practices. The objective of these evaluations 
will be to document the practices of the evaluated railroad and to 
disclose any program weaknesses that could affect the safety of the 
public. Should problems be disclosed, FRA will seek a cooperative 
resolution. If public safety is jeopardized by failure to resolve a 
problem, or by the incompetence or dishonorable intentions of any 
bridge owner, FRA will use available legal means, including issuance of 
emergency orders, to protect the safety of railroad employees and the 
public.
    This policy statement addresses the integrity of bridges that carry 
railroad tracks. It does not address the integrity of other types of 
structures on railroad property, i.e., tunnels, or bridges carrying 
highways or other features over railroads, except to the extent that 
position and condition of these structures affects the safe passage of 
trains. Likewise, this policy statement extends its reach beyond the 
narrow issue of bridges carrying railroad tracks only where it is 
necessary to do so for the protection of highway users, pedestrians and 
others lawfully occupying the space under a railroad bridge.
    The guidelines published in this statement are advisory, rather 
than regulatory, in nature. They indicate those elements FRA deems 
essential to successful bridge management programs. FRA will use the 
guidelines when evaluating bridge inspection and management practices.

Guidelines

    1. Responsibility for safety of bridges.
    (a) Track owner. The owner of the track carried by a bridge is 
responsible for ensuring that the bridge will safely support the trains 
which operate over it and the loads imposed upon it.
    (b) Operating railroad. The operating railroad that authorizes 
train movements over a bridge should take whatever steps are necessary 
to verify that the maintenance responsibility for the bridge is being 
fulfilled so as to safeguard trains operated under its authority. 
[[Page 20657]] 
    (c) Assignment of responsibility. The owner of the track carried by 
a bridge may assign responsibility for maintenance of the bridge to 
another party as long as the assignment ensures that responsibility for 
the safety of the bridge is not diminished.
    2. Capacity of bridges.
    (a) Determination. The safe capacity of bridges should be 
determined by competent engineers using accepted principles of 
structural design and analysis.
    (b) Analysis. Proper analysis of a bridge requires knowledge of the 
actual dimensions, materials and properties of the structural members 
of the bridge, their condition, and the stresses imposed in those 
members by the service loads.
    (c) Rating. The factors which were used for the design of a bridge 
can generally be used to determine and rate the load capacity of a 
bridge provided:
    (i) The condition of the bridge has not changed significantly, and
    (ii) The stresses resulting from the service loads can be 
correlated to the stresses for which the bridge was designed or rated.
    3. Bridge loads.
    (a) Control of loads. The operating instructions for each railroad 
operating over bridges should include provisions to restrict the 
movement of cars and locomotives whose weight or configuration exceed 
the nominal capacity of the bridges.
    (b) Authority for exceptions. Equipment exceeding the nominal 
weight restriction on a bridge should be operated only under conditions 
determined by a competent engineer who has properly analyzed the 
stresses resulting from the proposed loads.
    (c) Operating conditions. Operating conditions for exceptional 
loads may include speed restrictions, restriction of traffic from 
adjacent multiple tracks, and weight limitations on adjacent cars in 
the same train.
    4. Bridge records.
    (a) The organization responsible for the safety of a bridge should 
keep design, construction, maintenance and repair records readily 
accessible to permit the determination of safe loads. Having design or 
rating drawings and calculations that conform to the actual structure 
greatly simplifies the process of making accurate determinations of 
safe bridge loads.
    (b) Organizations acquiring railroad property should obtain 
original or usable copies of all bridge records and drawings, and 
protect or maintain knowledge of the location of the original records.
    5. Specifications for design and rating.
    (a) The recommended specifications for the design and rating of 
bridges are those found in the ``Manual for Railway Engineering'' 
published by the American Railway Engineering Association (AREA). These 
specifications incorporate recognized principles of structural design 
and analysis. They are continually reviewed and revised by committees 
of competent engineers. Other specifications for design and rating, 
however, have been successfully used by some railroads and may also be 
suitable now.
    (b) A bridge can be rated for capacity according to current 
specifications regardless of the specification to which it was 
originally designed.
    6. Periodic inspections.
    (a) Periodic bridge inspections by competent inspectors are 
necessary to determine whether a structure conforms to its design or 
rating condition and, if not, or the degree of nonconformity.
    (b) The prevailing practice throughout the railroad industry is to 
inspect railroad bridges at least annually. Inspections at more 
frequent intervals may be indicated by the nature or condition of a 
structure or intensive traffic levels.
    7. Underwater inspections.
    (a) Inspections of bridges should include measuring and recording 
the condition of substructure support at locations subject to erosion 
from moving water.
    (b) Stream beds are often not visible to the inspector. Indirect 
measurements by sounding, probing, or any other appropriate means are 
necessary in those cases. A series of records of those readings will 
provide the best information should unexpected changes suddenly occur. 
Where such indirect measurements do not provide the necessary assurance 
of foundation integrity, diving inspections should be performed as 
prescribed by a competent engineer.
    8. Special inspections.
    (a) A special bridge inspection should be performed after an 
occurrence that might have reduced the capacity of the bridge, such as 
a flood, a derailment, or an unusual impact.
    (b) When a railroad learns that a bridge might have suffered damage 
through an unusual occurrence, it should restrict train operation over 
the bridge until the bridge can be inspected and evaluated.
    9. Inspection records.
    (a) Bridge inspections should be recorded. Records should identify 
the structure inspected, the date of the inspection, the name of the 
inspector, the components inspected, and their condition.
    (b) Information from bridge inspection reports should be 
incorporated into a bridge management program to ensure that exceptions 
on the reports are corrected or accounted for. A series of inspection 
reports over time should be maintained so as to provide a valuable 
record of trends and rates of degradation of bridge components. The 
reports should be structured to promote comprehensive inspections and 
effective communication between an inspector and an engineer who 
performs an analysis of a bridge.
    (c) An inspection report should be comprehensible to a competent 
person without interpretation by the reporting inspector.
    10. Bridge inspectors and engineers.
    (a) Bridge inspections should be performed by technicians whose 
training and experience enable them to detect and record indications of 
distress on a bridge. Inspectors must provide accurate measurements and 
other information about the condition of the bridge in enough detail 
for an engineer to make a proper evaluation of the safety of the 
bridge.
    (b) Accurate information about the condition of a bridge should be 
evaluated by an engineer who is competent to determine the capacity of 
the bridge. The inspector and the evaluator are often not the same 
individual. The quality of the bridge evaluation depends on the quality 
of the communication between them.
    11. Scheduling inspections.
    (a) A bridge management program should include a means to ensure 
that each bridge under the program is inspected at the frequency 
prescribed for that bridge by a competent engineer.
    (b) Bridge inspections should be scheduled from an accurate bridge 
inventory list that includes the due date of the next inspection.
    12. Special considerations for railroad bridges.
    Railroad bridges differ from other types of bridges in the types of 
loads they carry, in their modes of failure and indications of 
distress, and in their construction details and components. Proper 
inspection and analysis of railroad bridges requires familiarity with 
the loads, details and indications of distress that are unique to this 
class of structure.

    Issued at Washington, DC., on April 21, 1995.
Jolene M. Molitoris,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 95-10323 Filed 4-26-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P