[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 70 (Wednesday, April 12, 1995)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 18566-18574]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-9025]



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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

49 CFR Part 571

[Docket No. 92-66; Notice 3]
RIN 2127-AF36


Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Fuel System Integrity

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 
Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM).

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SUMMARY: This notice announces the agency's plans to consider upgrading 
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 301, Fuel System 
Integrity, by making the current crash requirements more stringent and 
by broadening the standard's focus to include mitigation concepts 
related to fuel system components and environmental and aging tests 
related to components. This notice requests comments on the agency's 
plans to explore a three-phase approach to upgrading the standard. The 
notice also requests data, methods, and strategies, which may assist in 
the agency's regulatory decisions in defining specific requirements and 
test procedures for upgrading the standard.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before June 12, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Comments should refer to the docket and notice numbers above 
and be submitted to: Docket Section, National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, 400 Seventh Street SW., Washington, D.C. 20590. Docket 
hours are 9:30 a.m. to 4 p.m., Monday through Friday.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. William J.J. Liu, Office of 
Vehicle Safety Standards, National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, 400 Seventh Street SW., Washington, D.C. 20590. 
Telephone: (202) 366-2264. [[Page 18567]] 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Introduction

    The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is 
announcing its plans to consider upgrading Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 
Standard (FMVSS) No. 301, Fuel System Integrity. The purpose of this 
rulemaking is to further reduce fatalities and injuries from fires 
resulting from motor vehicle crashes. Specifically, the agency is 
considering whether to make more stringent the current crash 
requirements applicable to vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating 
(GVWR) of 10,000 pounds (4,536 kg) or less. It is considering also 
whether to broaden the standard's focus to include ways to prevent or 
decrease the severity of vehicle fires by exploring regulations related 
to fuel system components and tests of the resistance of components to 
environmental and aging factors.
    Today's notice outlines NHTSA's plans to explore a three-phase 
approach to upgrading the standard. In Phase One, the agency would 
evaluate performance criteria for components to ensure that the flow of 
fuel from the tank is stopped in a crash. Phase Two would involve 
defining upgraded crash test performance for frontal, side, and rear 
impacts (e.g., higher test speeds, additional impact barriers, etc.). 
During Phase Three, NHTSA would address the effect of environmental and 
aging factors such as corrosion and vibration on components in the fuel 
system.
    Today's notice also summarizes issues related to vehicle fires and 
discusses the agency's recent work in this area. The agency is seeking 
public comment on the merits of the agency's rulemaking efforts to 
explore alternative ways to upgrade the present standard. Today's 
notice also supplements a previous notice published on December 14, 
1992, in which the agency requested comments about making FMVSS No. 301 
more stringent (57 FR 59041, Docket 92-66, Notice 1).
    On December 2, 1994, Secretary of Transportation Federico Pena 
announced a settlement of an investigation by NHTSA of an alleged 
safety defect in certain General Motors (GM) pickup trucks with fuel 
tanks mounted outside the frame rails. Under that settlement, GM will 
contribute over $51.3 million for a variety of safety initiatives. 
Among other things, the settlement will fund research on ways to reduce 
the occurrence and effects of post-crash fires. All relevant results of 
this research will be placed in the public docket for this rulemaking.

The Fire Problem

    While vehicle fires are relatively rare events (occurring in only 
one percent of towed vehicles in crashes), they tend to be severe in 
terms of casualties. The agency's General Estimates System (GES) 
reports that, in 1992, approximately 21,000 passenger cars, light 
trucks, and multipurpose vehicles had a fire related to a crash. Based 
on an analysis of the agency's Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS), 
four to five percent of occupant fatalities occur in crashes involving 
fire (the fatality being due to burns and/or impact injuries). Overall, 
the fire itself is deemed to be the most harmful event in the vehicle 
for about one-third of these fatalities.
    An analysis of 1979-1986 National Accident Sampling System (NASS) 
data (Reference: ``Fires and Burns in Towed Light Passenger Vehicles,'' 
Docket No. 92-66-N01-001) shows that about 29,000 occupants per year 
were exposed to fire in towed light passenger vehicles (cars, light 
trucks, and multipurpose vehicles), of whom three percent received 
second or third degree burns over at least six percent of the body. The 
Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) defines these burns as moderate and more 
severe (AIS 2 and greater). Half of those with moderate and more severe 
burns had second or third degree burns over more than ninety percent of 
the body; these maximum-severity (AIS 6) burns are always fatal. These 
estimates are based on all 47 occupants with moderate and more severe 
burns received in vehicle fires that were investigated as part of the 
NASS during the eight years from 1979 to 1986.
    NASS investigated vehicle fires that involved another 44 occupants 
with moderate and more severe burns between 1988 and 1990. The eleven 
years of NASS data suggest that each year 280 surviving occupants and 
725 fatally-injured occupants received moderate or more severe burns 
(AIS 2 or greater). These injuries and fatalities may have been caused 
by burns or impacts.
    NASS 1988 to 1990 data also indicate that potential escape from the 
fire was made more difficult for most occupants (87 percent) with 
moderate or more serious burns because they (1) were sitting next to a 
door that was jammed shut by crash forces, (2) did not have a door at 
their position, or (3) had a part of their body physically restrained 
by deformed vehicle structure.

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301

    FMVSS No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, first became effective for 
passenger cars in 1968. The requirements in the current standard apply 
to all vehicles with a Gross Vehicle Weight Rating (GVWR) of 10,000 
pounds (4,536 kg) or less since September 1, 1977, and to school buses 
that have a GVWR greater than 10,000 pounds (4,536 kg) GVWR since April 
1, 1977. FMVSS No. 301 only applies to vehicles that use fuel with a 
boiling point above 32 degrees Fahrenheit (0 degree Celsius).
    FMVSS No. 301 limits the amount of fuel spillage from fuel systems 
of vehicles tested under the procedures specified in the standard 
during and after specified front, rear, and lateral barrier impact 
tests. The standard limits fuel spillage due to these required impact 
tests to 1 ounce (28.4 grams) by weight during the time from the start 
of the impact until motion of the vehicle has stopped and to a total of 
5 ounces (142 grams) by weight in the 5-minute period after the stop. 
For the subsequent 25-minute period, fuel spillage during any 1-minute 
interval is limited to 1 ounce (28.4 grams) by weight. Similar fuel 
spillage limits are required for the standard's static rollover test 
procedure, which is conducted after the front, rear and lateral impact 
tests.
    The required impact tests for all vehicles that have a GVWR of 
10,000 pounds (4,536 kg) or less are: a 30 mph (48.3 kmph) frontal 
fixed rigid barrier impact with the barrier face perpendicular to the 
line of travel of the vehicle or at any angle up to 30 degrees from the 
perpendicular; a 30 mph (48.3 kmph) rear moving flat rigid barrier 
impact with the barrier face perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of 
the vehicle; and a 20 mph (32.2 kmph) lateral moving flat rigid barrier 
impact in a direction perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the 
vehicle (i.e., with the barrier face parallel to the longitudinal axis 
of the vehicle). The weight of the moving barrier is 4,000 pounds 
(1,814 kg). A rollover test is conducted following the barrier impacts.
    The required impact test for large school buses that have a GVWR 
greater than 10,000 pounds (4,536 kg) is a 30 mph (48.3 kmph) moving 
contoured rigid barrier impact at any point and angle. The weight of 
the barrier is 4,000 pounds (1,814 kg). The static rollover test is not 
required for large school buses.
    The standard does not apply to large non-school buses or other 
vehicles that [[Page 18568]] have a GVWR greater than 10,000 pounds 
(4,536 kg).

December 14, 1992 Notice

    On December 14, 1992, NHTSA published a Request for Comments notice 
in the Federal Register (57 FR 59041, Docket No. 92-66, Notice 1) 
stating that the agency ``is considering initiating rulemaking to 
upgrade the protection currently provided by'' FMVSS No. 301. The 
notice also requested answers to specific questions related to test 
impact speeds, impact barriers, effect of vehicle aging on the 
likelihood of fire, contribution of occupant entrapment to the 
likelihood of fire-related injuries, etc.
    NHTSA received 35 public comments by October 1994 including 
comments from most of the major vehicle manufacturers, the American 
Automobile Manufacturers Association (AAMA), Advocates for Highway and 
Auto Safety (Advocates), the Center for Auto Safety (CAS), and the 
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS). Commenters raised issues 
regarding the safety need, the adequacy of the current test procedures, 
the availability and necessity of developing new test procedures, and 
the existence and feasibility of countermeasures. Many commenters 
stressed the need for further detailed investigation of real-world 
crash data to determine the causes of vehicle fires and fire-related 
occupant fatalities and injuries. In addition to support for the test 
procedures currently used in FMVSS No. 301, commenters suggested 
several alternatives, including substituting the dynamic side-impact 
test procedures of FMVSS No. 214 for those currently specified in FMVSS 
No. 301, adding frontal offset crash conditions, and developing new 
barriers that might be more representative of real-world crash 
conditions.
    The agency has initiated work related to several fire safety issues 
that need to be considered to define mitigation concepts to reduce 
fatalities and injuries. Due to resource considerations, not all the 
safety issues discussed in the previous notice are included in this 
notice. The issues discussed in this ANPRM include crash conditions, 
origin of fires, and vehicle age.

Agency Efforts Related to Fuel System Integrity

    NHTSA has undertaken the following activities to more-fully 
understand motor vehicle fires. These include comparing fuel system 
safety requirements in this country with those in other countries, 
conducting extensive test crashes related to fuel system integrity, and 
analyzing data of real-world crashes.

Comparison of U.S. and Foreign Fuel System Safety Requirements

    FMVSS No. 301's requirements have been compared to the following 
foreign fuel system integrity standards: (1) The Canadian CMVSS No. 
301, Fuel System Integrity (Gasoline, Diesel); (2) the Economic 
Commission for Europe (ECE) Regulation No. 34, Uniform Provisions 
Concerning the Approval of Vehicles with Regard to the Prevention of 
Fire Risks (01 Series, Amendment 1, January 29, 1979) (Thirteen 
European countries have agreed to adopt ECE Reg. No. 34, including 
Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, 
United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Norway, Finland, Denmark, and Romania); and 
(3) the Japanese Standard, Technical Standard for Fuel Leakage in 
Collision etc. (Amended on August 1, 1989).
    The Canadian CMVSS No. 301 has requirements identical to those of 
the U.S. FMVSS No. 301.
    In terms of application to vehicles: FMVSS No. 301 applies to all 
vehicles 10,000 pounds (4,536 kg) or less GVWR and school buses over 
10,000 pounds (4,536 kg) GVWR. ECE Reg. No. 34 only applies to 
passenger cars, and the Japanese standard applies to passenger cars and 
multipurpose passenger vehicles 5,600 pounds (2,540 kg) or less.
    In terms of required impact tests: As described above, FMVSS No. 
301 requires frontal, rear and side impact tests at 30, 30, and 20 mph 
(48.3, 48.3 and 32.2 kmph), respectively, plus a static rollover test, 
for vehicles 10,000 pounds (4,536 kg) or less GVWR. FMVSS No. 301 also 
requires a 30 mph (48.3 kmph) impact test for school buses over 10,000 
pounds (4,536 kg) GVWR.
    The ECE Reg. No. 34 requires a 48.3 to 53.1 kmph frontal fixed 
barrier impact test and a 35 to 38 kmph rear moving flat barrier impact 
test. The flat rigid barrier weighs 1,100+20 kg. A pendulum can be used 
as the impactor. ECE Reg. No. 34 does not require a rollover test. The 
standard requires a hydraulic internal-pressure test for all fuel tanks 
and special tests (impact resistance, mechanical strength, and fire 
resistance) for plastic fuel tanks.
    The Japanese standard requires a 50+2 kmph frontal fixed barrier 
impact test and a 35 to 38 kmph rear moving flat barrier impact test. 
The flat rigid barrier weighs 1,100+20 kg. A pendulum can be used as 
the impactor.
    In terms of test performance requirements: all three standards 
limit fuel spillage. As in FMVSS No. 301, the ECE Reg. No. 34 and the 
Japanese standard, in general, also limit fuel spillage to about 1 
ounce/min (28.4 grams/min). The Japanese standard lists the ECE Reg. 
No. 34 and FMVSS No. 301 as examples of equivalent standards.
    In summary, FMVSS No. 301 applies to more vehicle classes and to 
higher vehicle weights than the ECE Reg. No. 34 or the Japanese 
standard. FMVSS No. 301 requires testing in all crash modes (frontal, 
side, rear, and rollover). ECE Reg. No. 34 and the Japanese standard 
require only frontal and rear impact tests. FMVSS No. 301 uses a much 
heavier moving barrier for impact tests than the ECE and Japanese 
standards (1,814 kg vs. 1,100 kg). However, FMVSS No. 301 does not 
require a hydraulic pressure test for fuel tanks, a battery retention 
requirement, or additional tests for plastic fuel tanks; ECE Reg. No. 
34 does. In addition, the ECE Reg. No. 34 requires that ``no fire 
maintained by the fuel shall occur'' and no failure of the battery 
securing device due to the impact. Since ECE Reg. No. 34 also requires 
filling the impacted vehicle's fuel tank ``either with fuel or with a 
non-inflammable liquid,'' the no-fire requirement is actually 
interpreted from the observed fuel leakage. It is the agency's 
understanding that in practice, when the ECE Reg. No. 34 tests are 
conducted, the fuel tank is filled with non-inflammable liquid.

Safety Issues Related to Vehicle Fires

A. Crash Conditions

    The crash conditions discussed in this section refer to real-world 
crash conditions that result in vehicle fires and their implications 
for compliance test conditions and performance requirements for the 
current FMVSS No. 301. To further refine the relationship between real-
world and laboratory crash conditions, this notice has examined certain 
engineering parameters such as impact speeds, impact locations, objects 
struck, and damage patterns.
Laboratory Crash Test Results
    Between 1968 and 1994, the agency has conducted 563 FMVSS No. 301 
compliance tests in the frontal impact mode: 14 failures resulted (3%), 
the last occurring in 1992. Effective September 1, 1976, the standard 
was amended by requiring rear impact tests for all vehicles and side-
impact tests for passenger cars only. Side-impact testing was extended 
to all vehicles and became effective on September 1, 1977. For model 
years 1977 through 1994, 331 rear impact and 25 side-impact compliance 
tests have been conducted; 26 rear impact failures (8%) and 1 side 
[[Page 18569]] impact failure (4%) resulted. In computing these failure 
rates, the rollover test is considered a part of the frontal, rear, or 
side impact test.
    The agency conducted a research test program on FMVSS No. 214, Side 
Impact Protection, for light trucks. Since December 1988, 24 crash 
tests have been conducted, 2 tests produced fuel leakage at a rate 
higher than FMVSS No. 301 requirements. Both tests used the FMVSS No. 
214 test protocol.
    Between 1979 and 1986, 12 out of 201 (6%) frontal New Car 
Assessment Program (NCAP) tests indicated leakage at a rate above the 
fuel spillage requirements of FMVSS No. 301 at 35 mph (56.3 kmph). In 
addition, during the same period, NCAP conducted 53 FMVSS No. 301 rear 
impact tests at 35 mph (56.3 kmph), and 6 (11%) leaked at a rate above 
the fuel spillage requirements of the standard. Rollover tests were not 
conducted following any of the frontal or rear impact NCAP tests. Some 
of these vehicles were retested at 30 mph (48.3 kmph), but none failed. 
In 1993, NCAP resumed examining FMVSS No. 301 fuel spillage 
requirements, and added a rollover test following the frontal impact 
tests. To date, only one of the approximately 80 vehicles tested leaked 
at a rate above the requirements of the standard at the higher speed.
    Between April and June 1993, the agency conducted six baseline 
vehicle crash tests (all 1993 models) as part of its initial research 
effort for exploring potential upgrades to FMVSS No. 301. In addition, 
the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) conducted a seventh crash 
test for the agency. Information on the seven tests has been entered 
into the docket.
    The test conditions for the seven crash tests represent a baseline 
of delta-v (change of velocities), impact barrier, and impact location. 
The tested cars were chosen based on their high sales volume as well as 
agency experience with the cars in other test programs.
    The six NHTSA tests include two in each of the crash modes: 
frontal, side, and rear. Three tests used a 4,000-pound (1,814-kg) 
moving contoured barrier--a frontal impact into a Chevrolet Corsica at 
65 kmph (40.5 mph), a side impact into a Toyota Corolla at 49.4 kmph 
(30.7 mph), and a rear impact into a Ford Escort at 56.6 kmph (35.2 
mph). None of these three tests resulted in a loss of fuel system 
integrity.
    The other three tests were: a frontal impact of a Chevrolet Corsica 
into a 305-mm (12-inch) diameter stationary pole at 56.3 kmph (35 mph), 
a side impact into a Toyota Corolla with a 1,361-kg (3,000-pound) 
deformable moving barrier (FMVSS No. 214 side impact barrier) at 87.1 
kmph (54.1 mph), and an offset rear impact into a Ford Mustang with the 
same type of FMVSS No. 214 moving barrier at 84 kmph (52.2 mph).
    The only fuel system failure was a ruptured fuel tank from the rear 
impact to the Ford Mustang by the FMVSS No. 214 deformable moving 
barrier, resulting in a delta-v of about 39 kmph (24 mph). The head and 
chest injury measurements on the instrumented driver and passenger 
dummies exceeded the criteria specified in FMVSS No. 208, Occupant 
Crash Protection. Thus, the survivability of this crash in the absence 
of a fire is questionable. However, the agency would like to point out 
that FMVSS No. 208 is for frontal tests and the test dummies used for 
the tests were not specifically designed to collect impact data for 
rear impact tests.
    The crash test conducted by FHWA was on a Toyota Corolla, which was 
crashed into a 203-mm (8-inch) diameter stationary pole directed at the 
fuel tank location, in a side impact orientation at 32.2 kmph (20 mph). 
There was no fuel system integrity failure. No dummy instrumentation 
was used in this test.
    The agency also conducted other frontal impact tests. These tests 
primarily consisted of high speed, vehicle-to-vehicle offset crashes. 
In addition, several side impact tests were conducted using the FMVSS 
No. 214 test procedure. Since December 1990, a total of 25 crash tests 
have been conducted. One test, involving a Chevrolet Corsica, resulted 
in a small fuel leak from the fuel return line (within FMVSS No. 301's 
limit). This test was conducted in an oblique configuration with a 
Honda Accord striking the left front corner of the Corsica.
    At the request of NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation (ODI), 
the Vehicle Research Test Center (VRTC) conducted 24 side-impact crash 
tests (including one test with no instrumentation to determine 
appropriate test speed) of the 1973-1987 General Motors full-size 
pickup trucks and peer pickup trucks of the same vintage. These tests 
were conducted as a part of a safety defect investigation, EA 92-041. 
Seven of these tests were FMVSS No. 301 type side impact tests, three 
were FMVSS No. 214 moving deformable barrier tests, three were vehicle-
to-pole side impact tests, and eleven were various vehicle-to-pickup 
side impact tests. Reports of these tests are included in the public 
file for EA92-041.
    The summary report for this test program notes that the FMVSS No. 
301 type tests produced no leaks in a test of a new replacement fuel 
tank; however, one of the four GM trucks tested with ``as received'' GM 
tanks leaked an amount in excess of the FMVSS No. 301 requirements in a 
rusty area. Non-tank components of one Ford and one GM truck did leak 
during the static rollover test.
    In the three GM truck tests using the FMVSS No. 214 barrier, one at 
53.1 kmph (33 mph) and two at 72.4 kmph (45 mph), one caused a leak in 
the seam of the tank which resulted in a damp area, while the other two 
did not leak.
    In the vehicle-to-vehicle tests, the ride height of the striking 
vehicle was adjusted to simulate heavy braking. At 72.4 kmph (45 mph) 
with a Taurus striking car, the GM fuel tank significantly leaked at 
the sending unit, filler nose, and a rusty area and small cut in the 
tank. Although no leakage was noted from the fuel tank during a similar 
test of a Ford F-150, significant fuel leakage was noted from the fuel 
reservoir mounted on the inside of the left rail.
    For the 80.5 kmph (50 mph) tests, significant leaks were noted from 
the GM vehicles (in ``as received'' and new condition), but no leaks 
were noted during a similar test on an F-150.
    In the 96.6 kmph (60 mph) tests, both the GM and Ford F-150 
vehicles leaked significant amounts, with the GM truck rupturing and 
the Ford F-150 trucks being punctured, forming small holes.
    One pole test was conducted at 48.3 kmph (30 mph) on a GM pickup 
truck with significant vehicle damage and significant fuel leakage. In 
the pole tests, at 32.2 kmph (20 mph) the GM tank leaked significantly, 
but in a similar test of a Ford F-150, no leakage was observed.
Data Analysis of Real-World Crashes
    Accurate data on vehicle fires are scarce, which makes it difficult 
to define cause/effect relationships under all circumstances. Unlike 
many other crashes, investigations of crashes involving fire are 
hampered by the destruction of evidence needed for crash reconstruction 
and analysis. The origin of fire in vehicle crashes needs to be 
understood better to help define possible countermeasures and 
performance requirements.
    NHTSA has reviewed real-world crashes involving fuel system 
integrity at great length. This analysis includes a review of the 
National Accident Sampling System (NASS) file, a recent analysis by the 
agency of the Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS) data, a detailed 
hard copy study of accident cases involving fire from NASS and 
[[Page 18570]] FARS, and an analysis of State accident files.
    The NASS review referenced in the December 14, 1992, Request for 
Comments notice, ``Fires and Burns in Towed Light Passenger Vehicles'' 
(Docket No. 92-66-N01-001), noted that most fires occurred in crashes 
with a delta-v of less than 32.2 kmph (20 mph). This figure is from all 
fires, regardless of injury level.
    When the same NASS files were analyzed for occupant burn injuries 
at AIS 2 or greater, the sample size was very small, even after the 
1991 data were added. The delta-v for frontal impacts resulting in fire 
was estimated to be from 33.8 to 106.2 kmph (21 to 66 mph), with a 66 
kmph (41 mph) median, based on 14 cases. The delta-v for side impacts 
was estimated to be from 16.1 to 66 kmph (10 to 41 mph), with a 43.4 
kmph (27 mph) median, based on seven cases. The delta-v for rear 
impacts was to be estimated from 12.9 to 96.5 kmph (8 to 60 mph), with 
a 41.8 kmph (26 mph) median, based on 11 cases.
    The following are estimates of the delta-v's. For vehicle- to-
vehicle crashes, a 32.2 to 64.4 kmph (20 to 40 mph) delta-v range could 
result from impact speeds in the 64.4 to 128.8 kmph (40 to 80 mph) 
range for equal mass vehicles. Similarly, the same delta-v range could 
be the result of other high impact speeds for crashes involving unequal 
mass vehicles.
    The FARS study analyzed real-world crash data related to vehicle 
fires to establish which barrier design most closely replicates the 
damage seen in real-world fatal crashes involving fire. Preliminary 
results of the agency's FARS study indicate that the combined 1979-1992 
data from FARS for light vehicles of model years 1978 and later include 
9,440 vehicles with a post- crash fire, of which 2,840 were crashes 
where fire was classified as the most harmful event. Of the latter 
vehicles, approximately half were involved in single-vehicle crashes, 
and half were in multi-vehicle crashes.
    For frontal and side fatal crashes involving a fire, approximately 
60 percent involved multiple vehicles, while for rear-impact crashes 
involving in a fire, approximately 90 percent of the crashes involved 
multiple vehicles. Narrow objects, including trees and poles, account 
for approximately 40 percent of the objects struck in single vehicle 
crashes resulting in a fire.
    The agency recently completed a detailed hard copy study of a 
sample of accident cases involving fire from NASS and FARS. The 
detailed case study report has been entered into the docket of this 
notice. The title of the report is: ``Fuel System Integrity Upgrade--
NASS & FARS Case Study,'' a NHTSA sponsored research study, by GESAC, 
Inc., DOT Contract No. DTNH-22-92-D- 07064, March 1994.
    The GESAC study selected 150 NASS cases for detailed analysis, 
which were selected from recent years and involved fire with any 
occupant injury of AIS 2 or greater. One of the objectives of the 
analysis was to suggest a laboratory simulation for accidents that led 
to vehicle fires. The suggested crash simulations include impact mode, 
speed, barrier, location, and orientation.
    The report presents information on a possible barrier test that 
most accurately ``simulates'' crashes that resulted in ``moderate'', 
``severe'', and ``very severe'' fires. A ``moderate'' fire is defined 
as fire damage to between 25% and 50% of the vehicle surface, a 
``severe'' fire has fire damage to between 50% and 75% of the vehicle 
surface, and a ``very severe'' fire has fire damage to more than 75% of 
the vehicle surface.
    For this analysis, only the cases for which a simulation was 
defined were included. Simulations were not defined, for example, for 
cases where the fire originated outside the vehicle or where the crash 
conditions were too complicated--these events included multiple 
impacts, undercarriage impacts, or rollover events, etc. Based on these 
criteria, there were 64 vehicles selected for simulations.
    For vehicles receiving frontal damage, the report indicates that a 
pole would be the most common simulation barrier type. For rear damage, 
a moving deformable barrier with a partial overlap (a partial width of 
the vehicle involved in the crash) was cited most often as a simulation 
procedure. For side impacts, a pole impact was the most common 
simulation procedure. The GESAC report also presents information on 
impact speed for these simulations.
    For frontal impacts, the delta-v ranged from 23 kmph to 105 kmph 
(14 to 65 mph) with a 55 kmph (34 mph) medium delta-v. For rear 
impacts, the delta-v ranged from 11 kmph to 73 kmph (7 to 45 mph) with 
a 42 kmph (26 mph) medium delta-v. Overlap, which is defined as the 
percentage of the frontal or rear width engaged in a crash, ranged from 
40% to 100% for frontal crashes, with an average level of 72% overlap. 
For rear crashes, the overlap ranged from 30% to 95% with an average 
level of 71%. This real-world crash is similar to the Ford Mustang 
test, discussed in the previous section, that resulted in a ruptured 
fuel tank.
    Based on these analyses, NHTSA tentatively concludes that in 
developing any new performance requirements, it should consider 
alternatives to the FMVSS No. 301 barriers in addition to possible 
changes in impact speeds. Possible alternatives to be considered are 
changes to simulate single vehicle crashes, pole tests, and offset 
tests.
    NHTSA also needs to consider the likelihood of an occupant 
surviving the crash forces in high severity crashes that are associated 
with many fire fatalities. To address this issue, the agency may have 
to develop new test dummies that are capable of collecting meaningful 
data at higher impact speeds and in rear impacts.
    To further define crash conditions that lead to fires, NHTSA 
anticipates conducting additional analysis of the FARS and NASS files, 
the GESAC study, and experimental crash testing. Additional full-scale 
crashes are being considered to help identify possible upgraded 
performance requirements.
Response to the Request for Comments Notice
Impact Speeds
    FMVSS No. 301 specifies that the frontal and rear crash tests be 
conducted at 30 mph (48.3 kmph) and the lateral crash test be conducted 
at 20 mph (32.2 kmph). The December 1992 notice asked about appropriate 
test speeds.
    In response to that notice, Advocates and CAS supported testing 
with increased impact speed. Specifically, Advocates stated that impact 
testing for all crash modes should be conducted at least at 56.3 kmph 
(35 mph). It also stated that the current side impact 32.2 kmph (20 
mph) test speed of existing FMVSS No. 301 is especially inappropriate 
in light of the agency's current consideration of dynamic lateral test 
regimens for light trucks. CAS stated that based on crash protection 
technology in new vehicles, the standard should be amended to provide 
for no fuel leakage in a 72.4 kmph (45 mph) frontal fixed barrier 
crash, a 72.4 kmph side moving barrier, and a 72.4 kmph fixed rear 
barrier.
    In contrast, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Volkswagen (VW), Toyota, GM, 
Chrysler, Mercedes-Benz, BMW, Ford Motor Company and the American 
Automobile Manufacturers Association (AAMA) questioned the need for 
testing at higher impact speeds or stated that more data are needed 
before considering such an increase. For instance, Toyota stated that 
the data and analyses on injuries and deaths from vehicle fires are 
insufficient to support a compliance test requirement for higher impact 
speeds. Similarly, Mercedes stated that increased impact speed as part 
of a compliance test does not appear to have [[Page 18571]] great 
potential for increasing real-world fire safety. AAMA stated that the 
difference in impact speeds for side versus front and rear tests is 
representative and reasonable.
Impact Barrier, Location, and Orientation
    FMVSS No. 301 requires either fixed or moving rigid impact barriers 
for the crash tests as described previously in this notice. In the 
December 1992 notice, NHTSA posed several questions about the 
appropriate barrier, including whether the current impact barriers 
should be replaced by the moving contoured rigid barrier for testing 
large school buses.
    National Truck Equipment Association (NTEA), Mazda, Advocates, VW, 
Toyota, AAMA, BMW, and Ford said no; and no commenter favored this 
approach. NTEA objected to extending the existing contoured barrier to 
other vehicles because of economic considerations. Mazda stated that 
the FMVSS No. 214 barrier represents real-world crashes better than the 
contoured barrier.
    In the December 1992 notice, NHTSA also asked whether the current 
barriers are representative of typical real-world crash situations.
    While GM and BMW stated ``yes,'' Advocates, Ford, and Volvo said 
``no.'' GM stated that the FMVSS No. 301 moving barrier side impact 
test is an appropriate surrogate for real-world side impact 
circumstances because it properly measures the fuel system performance 
regardless of component location. Advocates stated that the current 
perpendicular barrier crash test conditions for frontal and rear impact 
tests should be replaced by offset and angle impacts. Advocates also 
suggested that the current side impact test should be replaced by a 
pole impact test, claiming that such a test is more representative of 
real-world situations.
    The December 1992 notice also asked whether all vehicles with GVWR 
of 10,000 pounds (4,536 kg) or less should be subjected to the impact 
test requirements for large school buses. Advocates, VW, Toyota, AAMA, 
Mercedes, BMW, and Ford all opposed this approach, while no commenter 
favored it. These commenters stated that the contoured barrier does not 
simulate vehicles in use now.
    Another question was whether the FMVSS No. 214 dynamic side impact 
test should be incorporated into FMVSS No. 301, thereby replacing FMVSS 
No. 301's current lateral requirements. Of the twelve commenters 
responding to the question 11 answered ``yes'' (Mazda, Advocates, 
Mitsubishi, VW, GM, Chrysler, AAMA, Mercedes, BMW, Ford, and Volvo). 
Only Toyota said ``no.'' In general, the commenters stated that the 
FMVSS No. 214 side impact test conditions are more representative of 
real-world accidents than the current FMVSS No. 301 side impact test 
requirements. GM and AAMA also suggested allowing the FMVSS No. 214 
test as an optional test to the FMVSS No. 301 side impact test. In 
contrast, Toyota stated that available accident data do not demonstrate 
the need to replace the FMVSS No. 301 test with the FMVSS No. 214 test.

B. Origin of Fires

    The origin of fire in vehicle crashes needs to be understood better 
to help define possible countermeasures and performance requirements.
    The agency's NASS collects information on the origin of fires in 
towed light vehicles. NASS classifies fires as either minor or major. 
Fires were classified as major if they involved the whole passenger 
compartment or several different compartments such as the engine 
compartment, trunk compartment, undercarriage, etc. Approximately 65 
percent of crash-induced light vehicle ``major'' fires began in the 
engine compartment, 28 percent began in the fuel tank or another part 
of the fuel system, which includes the fuel supply lines, vent lines, 
and tank filler neck, and seven percent others.
    A recently published British article also concluded that the engine 
compartment was the most common source of fires. This was attributed to 
the varied electrical and mechanical systems. The article stated that: 
``Investigators found that a disproportionately high number of crash/
collision fires start in cars built after 1985--especially where the 
vehicles are fitted with a fuel-injection system. The investigations 
also showed that fuel line integrity was more at risk from heat and 
fire than from impact damage.'' (Ref: ``CACFOA Urges Action by Car 
Manufacturers on Fire Risks,'' Fire Prevention, October 1992.)

C. Vehicle Age and Fires

    Both the FMVSS No. 301 evaluation report referenced in the December 
14, 1992, Request for Comments notice and more recent analysis of real-
world crash results indicate that older vehicles involved in crashes 
represent a disproportionate number of cases in which there was a fire 
compared to newer crash vehicles. The agency's FARS analysis showed 
that vehicle age has a statistically significant relationship to fire 
in fatal crashes. The agency is conducting an extensive statistical 
analysis of fire occurrence in fatal and other crashes, as a function 
of the factors that may influence the likelihood of post-collision 
vehicle fires. Fire occurrence in FARS was examined in fatal crashes 
with any occurrence of a fire and in those crashes for which the fire 
was the ``Most Harmful Event.'' Preliminary results indicate that as 
vehicles (especially passenger cars) age, the likelihood of a fatal 
fire increases. The preliminary findings also indicate that while 
trucks involved in fatal crashes have a somewhat higher rate of fire 
occurrence than cars, there is not an increase in the likelihood of 
fire as light trucks age.
    Preliminary findings indicate that for cars, light trucks, and vans 
as a group and with all other factors held constant, a vehicle that is 
ten years older than another is on average, 29.3 percent more likely to 
be involved in a fatal fire. Most of this increase is found in cars. 
Although there is an indication that as light trucks and vans age the 
probability of a fire increases in fatal crashes, the estimated 
increase is less than the increase for cars only. However, the number 
of cases in the current data base is insufficient to produce 
statistically significant results using vehicle age as a variable.
    The combined data for cars, light trucks, and vans do not suggest 
any relationship between vehicle age and likelihood of involvement in a 
fatal crash where the most harmful event is fire. Nevertheless, post-
crash fires should be avoided to the extent practicable. The possible 
effect of vehicle aging, therefore may need to be addressed in an 
upgrade of FMVSS No. 301.
    To address the problems associated with older vehicles, 
requirements may need to address such factors as corrosion, stress 
cracking, fatigue, and mechanical damage. Various aging tests are 
available, such as the Salt Spray (Fog) Test (ASTM B117), Humidity 
Test, Laboratory Cyclic Testing and Electrochemical Testing to simulate 
corrosive environments. However, if the problem of aging in relation to 
fuel system leakage and fires were attributed to cracking of fuel 
hoses, etc. then there are other options. Standards with performance 
requirements for aging of fuel lines and tanks may be one approach to 
mitigating this problem.
    A question related to this subject was posed in the December 1992 
notice. Eight commenters did not support setting up an aging test 
standard within FMVSS No. 301 (Mazda, Mitsubishi, Toyota, GM, AAMA, 
Mercedes, BMW, and Ford). Advocates and Volvo [[Page 18572]] supported 
a component test procedure for aging. VW opposed aging tests on a total 
vehicle basis but not for components.
    Mitsubishi indicated that the design of various replacement parts, 
their materials and conditions of use and exposure will all vary, and 
it is not practical to set up a standard specifying time or mileage 
limits for each part. BMW stated that age-related degradation can occur 
not only in fuel system components, but also in other parts, 
components, and structures and could be a significant factor related to 
degradation, along with differences in vehicle use, operational and 
environmental conditions and maintenance.
    Mazda, VW, and Volvo recommended periodic inspection or replacement 
of certain fuel system components. Mazda recommended it be performed by 
the vehicle owner and VW suggested upgraded periodic inspections for 
vehicle condition be performed under local or state government 
programs. Mazda also stated that, in the long term, durability testing 
of critical fuel system components may be advisable.
    Advocates strongly supported simulation of fuel system component 
deterioration and overall system performance loss due to aging effects. 
Advocates suggested utilizing test standards to detect the deleterious 
effects of aging and/or exposure to operating or environmental 
conditions that degrade fuel system integrity.
    The agency requests specific comments on the wisdom and 
practicability of adopting existing test procedures or developing new 
component test procedures related to aging effects. Individual fuel 
system components could be evaluated using accelerated aging or 
corrosion treatment tests.

Phased Rulemaking Approach

    Based on the above discussions and preliminary analyses, the agency 
is considering research and rulemaking activities to amend FMVSS No. 
301 to address the following areas:
    1. The definition of performance criteria for fuel system 
components directed at mitigating the cause and spread of vehicle 
fires.
    2. The modification of the existing FMVSS No. 301 crash test 
procedures and performance criteria to better simulate the events that 
lead to serious injury and fatalities in fires.
    3. The definition of the role of environmental and aging factors 
such as corrosion and vibration as it affects fuel system integrity, 
and, if appropriate, the specification of performance criteria related 
to this area.
    The agency is considering whether to initiate rulemaking using a 
phased approach. The basis of this approach lies in the varying 
complexity of addressing the different issues listed above. The initial 
phase would focus on requirements for component performance, the second 
phase would address system performance, and the third phase would deal 
with issues related to environmental and aging effects.

Phase 1: Component Level Performance

A. Objectives of Component Approach
    The first phase would focus on the specification of performance 
criteria, at a component level, to attempt to ensure that the flow of 
fuel from the fuel tank or fuel lines will stop in a crash. It would 
also focus on minimizing the possibility of an electrical spark of 
sufficient intensity to act as an ignition source. These specifications 
would primarily affect fires that originate in the engine compartment. 
However, they would also help to shut off the fuel flow for all crash 
modes, including a rollover crash.
    Shutting off the fuel flow quickly during or immediately after a 
crash will eliminate a major fire and fuel source and therefore should 
both reduce fire incidents and limit the spread of fire, if one were to 
start. It also appears that many new vehicles incorporate different 
techniques for addressing this problem. An electric current shut-off 
device would minimize the possibility of a spark. The performance 
associated with the fuel shut-off and the electric current shut-off 
devices can be incorporated into the present crash tests in FMVSS No. 
301 or other compliance tests such as those conducted as part of FMVSS 
No. 214.
    As discussed below, the agency is also seeking comment about 
component test requirements for fuel tanks, fuel pumps, the vehicle's 
electrical system, and engine fire extinguishes.
    The agency requests information on the performance, cost, and 
practicability aspects of various systems in shutting off the fuel flow 
and the electric power. The agency also requests comments on ways to 
develop a practicable test procedure and to define specific criteria 
with sufficient objectivity that test variability is reduced to a 
minimum. In the event that other, more appropriate, component tests 
would satisfy the objectives of the Phase 1 effort, interested parties 
are requested to provide this information to the agency.
B. Components Now in Use
    The agency believes that technology already exists for detecting 
and identifying conditions when the fuel flow should be shut off. Most 
new vehicles sold in the United States are already equipped with 
devices that shut off the fuel pump in any collision that causes the 
engine to stop.
    In some vehicles, sensors detect the consequence of severe engine 
damage (rotation stops for camshaft, crankshaft or alternator) and 
immediately shut off the fuel pump. Often, signals from more than one 
sensor are used to determine if the engine has stopped running and the 
decision for fuel pump shut-off is left up to the vehicle's onboard 
computer (such as the Engine Control Unit or Electronic Control 
Module). Manufacturers also use a ``central'' for collecting and 
routing crash signals through a central collision detection bus.
    Other vehicles are equipped with an inertia switch. Inertia 
switches can be used to shut off the fuel flow as well as the electric 
current. Inertia switches operate on sudden impact to open the 
electrical circuit to the fuel pump or the battery during the crash. An 
inertia switch can be designed to operate at various levels of impact 
intensity and direction, and thus could be effective in all crash 
modes.
    The agency requests information on the different components used in 
vehicles for shutting off the fuel flow or electric current.
C. Component Test Procedures
    Fuel system components must operate in a real-world environment 
surrounded by extreme conditions imposed by modern engine technology. 
The materials and parts used to assemble fuel system components are 
already subject to manufacturers' specifications, often derived from or 
directly related to other engineering standards such as the 
publications of the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM). 
Some of the test requirements are generic to many of the ASTM 
standards, for example: vibration, shock, endurance testing, 
temperature cycling, temperature extremes, compatibility with other 
materials, etc.
    Comments are requested regarding the extent and scope of component 
test requirements that should be developed as part of the FMVSS No. 
301.
    The agency has identified the following fuel system and vehicle 
components as potential candidates for this approach:

a. Fuel tank, including filler pipe
b. Fuel pump(s) [[Page 18573]] 
c. Vehicle's electrical system
d. Engine fire retardant/extinguisher

    The agency has not included fuel lines in this proposed list 
because the potential to shut down the entire fuel delivery system when 
the fuel pump shuts down already exists. Comments are requested about 
this decision.
    a. Fuel tank, including filler pipe. During a vehicle crash, the 
fuel tank may receive crash forces great enough to move or dislodge the 
tank from its mountings and/or to rupture the tank. If the tank moves 
significantly, the filler pipe, which is attached to the vehicle body 
to provide access during refueling, may rupture or break away. If the 
filler pipe ruptures, fuel could spill. Fuel spillage can be expected 
under some crash conditions even if the fuel pump is shut off.
    One concept would include a check valve located in the filler pipe 
that is normally closed to prevent fuel flow but that would open 
automatically during refueling. For example, inserting of the pump 
filler nozzle could cause the closed check valve to open to permit fuel 
flow; withdrawing the nozzle would cause the valve to close.
    Another concept would use a check valve similar in function to the 
valves used on heavy truck crossover fuel lines. Applied to the filler 
neck, this concept would require a large valve, normally open, that 
would close automatically upon detachment of the filler neck due to a 
crash.
    Comments are requested on how filler check valves should be 
evaluated during safety compliance tests. For example:
    1. Should the filler valve pass a simple go no-go test or should 
the valve be subjected to many cycles of operation?
    2. What test condition would be appropriate for filler check 
valves: dynamic pendulum or other impact tests?
    3. What are the critical engineering parameters that would 
characterize the proper operation of a filler pipe check valve?
    4. Are there alternative ways to control spillage from broken 
filler pipes?
    b. Fuel pump(s). Today's passenger cars, light trucks, and vans use 
electrically operated fuel delivery pumps almost exclusively. Some 
electric fuel pumps shut down if certain engine operating parameters, 
such as crankshaft rotation, indicate that the engine has stopped. The 
agency is interested in how manufacturers use engine sensing to control 
fuel pump operation and under what conditions the fuel pump is shut 
off. Specifically:
    1. Is current sensing time response adequate to prevent fuel 
spillage? If not, what would improve response time?
    2. How does cessation of engine rotation typically relate to the 
frontal crash pulse; i.e., after engine disintegration begins, how long 
does it take for the rotating parts to stop?
    3. During this time interval, how much fuel spillage could occur, 
assuming that the crash has damaged the fuel lines, making fuel 
spillage imminent?
    4. How would sensing engine rotation provide benefit to vehicles 
involved in a rear impact? rollover? side impact? in any crash where 
engine damage may be slight?
    5. With regard to vehicle rollover, would a separate rollover 
switch prevent fuel spillage? Could this function be practicably 
combined in a single switch that would respond to all crash modes?
    6. Does fuel pump shut-off prevent gravity-induced fuel flow 
through the pump?
    7. Should a single fuel pump cutoff switch be used to replace the 
functions currently performed by sensing engine rotational parameters?
    8. What advantages/disadvantages would such an installation incur? 
Some manufacturers currently use inertia switches to interrupt the flow 
of electricity to the fuel pump when a crash is sensed, thereby causing 
the fuel pump to shut down.
    1. Could an inertial switch be substituted for the systems that 
sense engine shut down to disable fuel pumping?
    2. Under what conditions would such a substitution be impracticable 
or too costly?
    3. What sensitivity of operation should an effective inertia switch 
have?
    4. Can inertia switches be manufactured with sufficient durability 
and reliability to function for long periods of time unattended in a 
relatively harsh automotive environment?
    5. Are there any other features of an inertia switch that would be 
detrimental to occupant safety; e.g., what measures must an occupant 
take to restart the vehicle after an inertia switch has stopped fuel 
flow?
    The agency is also interested if manufacturers or others have any 
alternative techniques for accomplishing fuel shut-off during a crash.
    c. Vehicle's electrical system. Other means exist to cause the fuel 
pump to shut down in a crash. For example, a battery shut-off device 
could remove all electrical power from the vehicle at the onset of a 
crash. However, battery shut-off may have unintended consequences if 
electrically operated door locks or windows are rendered inoperative 
during a crash. Comments are requested regarding the relative costs and 
practicability of battery shut-off devices.
    d. Engine fire retardant/extinguisher. After ignition takes place, 
vehicle fires could be controlled or extinguished if the proper 
equipment were available and functioning. Examples of equipment that 
could help control or extinguish a fire include an onboard fire 
extinguisher mounted in the engine compartment and fire retardant 
blankets. A fire extinguisher using carbon dioxide or other gaseous 
mixtures could be operated by means of existing vehicle sensors (such 
as the inertia switch) or by other signals. Fire retardant blankets 
attached underneath the vehicle's hood could drop down onto the engine 
to smother a fire in the event of a crash. Comments are requested on 
the costs and practicability of these concepts.

Phase 2: System Level Performance

    The second phase would focus on the process of defining upgraded 
crash test performance for frontal, side, and rear impacts. The present 
crash tests specified in FMVSS No. 301 require a frontal fixed barrier 
impact at 30 mph (48.3 kmph), a moving barrier impact of 20 mph (32.2 
kmph) into the side of a stationary vehicle, and a moving barrier 
impact of 30 mph (48.3 kmph) into the rear of a stationary vehicle.
    From the information discussed in this notice, it appears that the 
present tests in FMVSS No. 301 may not be representative of the 
severity of the crash conditions associated with fatal and severe 
injury-causing fires. However, it is difficult at this time to define 
specific upgrades to these crash conditions without further tests. Some 
potential tests that appear promising for upgrading FMVSS No. 301 test 
procedures are the offset/oblique tests in the frontal mode, the FMVSS 
No. 214 offset barrier in the rear test mode and a pole impact or FMVSS 
No. 214 barrier for the side impact.
    As identified in the GESAC study, a key objective for such tests 
may be to limit the engagement to a narrower area than engaged with 
current barriers. The specific crash conditions that cause fuel system 
loss of integrity must be defined, along with an understanding of which 
crashes would be survivable if fire was avoided. Accident data analyses 
and crash testing are being considered to further explore these issues, 
which is expected to be the second phase of [[Page 18574]] rulemaking, 
which may be conducted concurrently with the first phase.
    The agency requests comments on the performance aspects and 
practicability of this approach.

Phase 3: Environmental and Aging Effects

    The third phase would explore the issue of environmental and aging 
effects on vehicle condition and the possible relationship to fire 
occurrence. The agency's preliminary analyses of FARS and State 
accident files indicate that the likelihood of fire increases with the 
age of the vehicle. The analysis also attempted to determine the 
possible differences, if any, in the occurrence of fire in fatal 
crashes in states that typically experience more inclement weather 
(i.e., snow and ice) and as a result, use more salt and other corrosive 
substances on public roadways, when compared to other states.
    Passenger cars registered in the ``salt belt'' states and involved 
in fatal crashes were found to have an approximately 25 percent greater 
rate of fire occurrence in fatal crashes, compared with passenger cars 
in fatal crashes in the ``sun belt'' states. (It should be noted that 
when the fire itself was deemed to be the most harmful event in the 
vehicle, the ``salt belt'' states had a lower rate compared to the 
``sun belt'' states.) It is not clear at this time whether this 
possible relationship between vehicle aging, weather and use of salt 
and similar substances and fire occurrence may be due to environmental 
characteristics, to changes in vehicle design, to differences in 
operator characteristics, or a combination of these factors. If this 
disparity can be attributed to environmental factors, it may be 
possible to add environmental tests, such as corrosion, to FMVSS No. 
301.
    Further work is needed to associate vehicle fires with 
environmental and aging factors and to define possible performance 
tests. Because of this, the agency is considering addressing this 
problem in a third phase of rulemaking.
    The agency requests comments on this phased approach. This approach 
may be implemented either sequentially or concurrently, depending on 
the timing of the research.

Rulemaking Analyses

    NHTSA has considered the impact of this rulemaking action under 
Executive Order 12866 and the Department of Transportation's regulatory 
policies and procedures. The agency has determined that this notice is 
significant under Department's policies and procedures. The agency 
notes that the increase in vehicle production costs and corresponding 
increases in consumer costs that would result from upgrading the 
requirements of FMVSS No. 301 would depend on the stringency and nature 
of the new requirements and the extent to which present and planned new 
production vehicles would already meet them, i.e., the type and extent 
of vehicle changes that would be necessary. Since the agency is still 
in the research and analysis phase of the rulemaking, including 
assessing new vehicle hardware and fuel system crash integrity, it 
cannot provide a cost estimate at this time. Nevertheless, a more 
comprehensive discussion of this notice's cost impacts is discussed in 
the Preliminary Regulatory Evaluation, which has been placed in the 
public docket.

Submission of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit comments on the proposal. 
It is requested but not required that 10 copies be submitted. All 
comments must not exceed 15 pages in length (49 CFR 553.21). Necessary 
attachments may be appended to these submissions without regard to the 
15-page limit. This limitation is intended to encourage commenters to 
detail their primary arguments in a concise fashion.
    If a commenter wishes to submit certain information under a claim 
of confidentiality, three copies of the complete submission, including 
purportedly confidential business information, should be submitted to 
the Chief Counsel, NHTSA, at the street address given above, and seven 
copies from which the purportedly confidential information has been 
deleted should be submitted to the Docket Section. A request for 
confidentiality should be accompanied by a cover letter setting forth 
the information specified in the agency's confidential business 
information regulation 49 CFR Part 512.
    All comments received before the close of business on the comment 
closing date indicated above will be considered, and will be available 
for examination in the docket at the above address both before and 
after that date. To the extent possible, comments filed after the 
closing date will also be considered. Comments received too late for 
consideration in regard to the ANPRM will be considered as suggestions 
for further rulemaking action. Since NHTSA will continue to file 
relevant information as it becomes available in the docket after the 
closing date, it is recommended that interested persons continue to 
examine the docket for new material.
    Those persons desiring to be notified upon receipt of their 
comments in the rules docket should enclose a self-addressed, stamped 
postcard in the envelope with their comments. Upon receiving the 
comments, the docket supervisor will return the postcard by mail.

    Issued on April 6, 1995.
Barry Felrice,
Associate Administrator for Safety Performance Standard.
[FR Doc. 95-9025 Filed 4-11-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P