[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 63 (Monday, April 3, 1995)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 16813-16814]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-8078]
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Proposed Rules
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
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Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 63 / Monday, April 3, 1995 / Proposed
Rules
[[Page 16813]]
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. 95-NM-34-AD]
Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A300-B2 and -B4 Series
Airplanes Equipped With General Electric CF6-50 Series Engines or Pratt
& Whitney JT9D-59A Engines
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
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SUMMARY: This document proposes the adoption of a new airworthiness
directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Airbus Model A300-B2 and -
B4 series airplanes. This proposal would require an inspection to
detect discrepancies of a certain thrust reverser control lever spring,
an operational test to verify the integrity of the flight inhibition
circuit of the thrust reverser system, and either correction of
discrepancies or deactivation of the associated thrust reverser. This
proposal is prompted by a report indicating that, due to broken and
deformed thrust reverser control lever springs, an uncommanded movement
of the thrust reverser lever to the unlock position and a ``reverser
unlock'' amber warning occurred on one airplane. The actions specified
by the proposed AD are intended to detect such broken or deformed
control lever springs before they can lead to uncommanded deployment of
a thrust reverser subsequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
DATES: Comments must be received by April 28, 1995.
ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-103,
Attention: Rules Docket No. 95-NM-34-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington 98055-4056. Comments may be inspected at this location
between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays.
The service information referenced in the proposed rule may be
obtained from Airbus Industrie, 1 Rond Point Maurice Bellonte, 31707
Blagnac Cedex, France. This information may be examined at the FAA,
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Stephen Slotte, Aerospace Engineer,
Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate,
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone (206)
227-2797; fax (206) 227-1320.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the
proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as
they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number
and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All
communications received on or before the closing date for comments,
specified above, will be considered before taking action on the
proposed rule. The proposals contained in this notice may be changed in
light of the comments received.
Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory,
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All
comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing
date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested
persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with
the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.
Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments
submitted in response to this notice must submit a self-addressed,
stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: ``Comments
to Docket Number 95-NM-34-AD.'' The postcard will be date stamped and
returned to the commenter.
Availability of NPRMs
Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request
to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-103, Attention: Rules
Docket No. 95-NM-34-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington
98055-4056.
Discussion
The Direction Generale de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC), which is the
airworthiness authority for France, recently notified the FAA that an
unsafe condition may exist on certain Airbus Model A300-B2 and -B4
series airplanes equipped with General Electric CF6-50 series engines
or Pratt & Whitney JT9D-59A engines. The DGAC advises that it has
received a report indicating that, during a simulated engine failure,
an uncommanded movement of the thrust reverser lever to the unlock
position and a ``reverser unlock'' amber warning occurred.
Investigation revealed that these failures were caused by broken and
deformed (not in original shape) thrust reverser lever springs. This
condition, if not corrected, could result in uncommanded deployment of
a thrust reverser and subsequent reduced controllability of the
airplane.
Airbus has issued All Operators Telex (AOT) 78-03, Revision 1,
dated July 20, 1994, which describes procedures for:
1. Performing a mechanical integrity inspection to detect
discrepancies of the thrust reverser control lever spring having part
number (P/N) A2791294520000;
2. Performing an operational test to verify the integrity of the
flight inhibition circuit of the thrust reverser system;
3. Replacing the thrust reverser control lever spring with a new
spring or deactivating the associated thrust reverser, if the control
lever spring is found broken or out of tolerance; and
4. Determining the origin of the malfunction, if the flight
inhibition circuit of the thrust reverser system fails the operational
test; and correcting discrepancies or deactivating the associated
thrust reverser.
The DGAC classified this All Operators Telex as mandatory and
issued French airworthiness directive 94-205-166(B), dated September
14, 1994, in order to assure the continued airworthiness of these
airplanes in France.
This airplane model is manufactured in France and is type
certificated for operation in the United States under the provisions of
Sec. 21.29 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.29)
[[Page 16814]] and the applicable bilateral airworthiness agreement.
Pursuant to this bilateral airworthiness agreement, the DGAC has kept
the FAA informed of the situation described above. The FAA has examined
the findings of the DGAC, reviewed all available information, and
determined that AD action is necessary for products of this type design
that are certificated for operation in the United States.
Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to
exist or develop on other airplanes of the same type design registered
in the United States, the proposed AD would require a mechanical
integrity inspection to detect discrepancies of the thrust reverser
control lever spring having part number (P/N) A2791294520000, and an
operational test to verify the integrity of the flight inhibition
circuit of the thrust reverser system. It also requires the correction
of discrepancies or deactivation of the associated thrust reverser. The
actions are required to be accomplished in accordance with the All
Operators Telex described previously.
The FAA estimates that 21 airplanes of U.S. registry would be
affected by this proposed AD, that it would take approximately 6 work
hours per airplane to accomplish the proposed actions, and that the
average labor rate is $60 per work hour. Required parts would cost
approximately $55 per airplane. Based on these figures, the total cost
impact of the proposed AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $8,715,
or $415 per airplane.
The total cost impact figure discussed above is based on
assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the proposed
requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish
those actions in the future if this AD were not adopted.
The regulations proposed herein would not have substantial direct
effects on the States, on the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in
accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this
proposal would not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant
the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed
regulation (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under
Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT
Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979);
and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact,
positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under
the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft
regulatory evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the
Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules
Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.
The Proposed Amendment
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend
part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as
follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. App. 1354(a), 1421 and 1423; 49 U.S.C.
106(g); and 14 CFR 11.89.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new
airworthiness directive:
Airbus Industrie: Amendment 39- . Docket 95-NM-34-AD.
Applicability: Model A300-B2 and -B4 series airplanes, equipped
with General Electric CF6-50 series engines or Pratt & Whitney JT9D-
59A engines; certificated in any category.
Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the
preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been
modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the
requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified,
altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of
this AD is affected, the owner/operator must use the authority
provided in paragraph (b) to request approval from the FAA. This
approval may address either no action, if the current configuration
eliminates the unsafe condition; or different actions necessary to
address the unsafe condition described in this AD. Such a request
should include an assessment of the effect of the changed
configuration on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no
case does the presence of any modification, alteration, or repair
remove any airplane from the applicability of this AD.
Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished
previously.
To ensure the detection of broken or deformed thrust reverser
control lever springs that could lead to uncommanded deployment of a
thrust reverser and subsequent reduced controllability of the
airplane, accomplish the following:
(a) Within 500 flight hours after the effective date of this AD,
perform a mechanical integrity inspection to detect discrepancies of
the thrust reverser control lever spring having part number (P/N)
A2791294520000, and an operational test to verify the integrity of
the flight inhibition circuit of the thrust reverser system, in
accordance with Airbus All Operators Telex AOT 78-03, Revision 1,
dated July 20, 1994.
(1) If no discrepancies are detected, no further action is
required by this AD.
(2) If the control lever spring is found broken or out of
tolerance, prior to further flight, replace it with a new control
lever spring or deactivate the associated thrust reverser in
accordance with the AOT.
(3) If the flight inhibition circuit of the thrust reverser
system fails the operational test, prior to further flight,
determine the origin of the malfunction, in accordance with the AOT.
(i) If the origin of the malfunction is identified, prior to
further flight, repair the flight inhibition circuit in accordance
with the AOT.
(ii) If the origin of the malfunction is not identified, prior
to further flight, replace the relay having P/N 125GB or 124GB, and
repeat the operational test, in accordance with the AOT. If the
malfunction is still present, prior to further flight, inspect and
repair the wiring in accordance with the AOT. If the malfunction is
still present following the inspection and repair, prior to further
flight, deactivate the associated thrust reverser in accordance with
the AOT.
(b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the
compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be
used if approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, FAA,
Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-113. Operators shall submit
their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance
Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager,
Standardization Branch, ANM-113.
Note 2: Information concerning the existence of approved
alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be
obtained from the Standardization Branch, ANM-113.
(c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with
Secs. 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR
21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the
requirements of this AD can be accomplished.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on March 27, 1995.
Darrell M. Pederson,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 95-8078 Filed 3-31-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-U