[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 62 (Friday, March 31, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 16627-16629]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-7892]



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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary


Record of Decision for the Theater Missile Defense Extended Test 
Range Final Environmental Impact Statement

AGENCY: Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO).

ACTION: Record of Decision text is as follows:

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INTRODUCTION: This document records [BMDO Director's] decision for the 
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to conduct tests at two of four 
alternative test ranges. The potential for environmental impacts at 
these ranges was analyzed and documented in the Theater Missile Defense 
Extended Test Range Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS), and 
the public was notified of its availability on January 13, 1995. The 
following ranges were considered for extended range testing: White 
Sands Missile Range (WSMR), New Mexico, Eglin Air Force Base (AFB) 
Florida, Western Range, California, and Kwajalein Missile Range (KMR), 
U.S. Army Kwajalein Atoll (USAKA), Republic of the Marshall Islands.
    In September 1993, [BMDO] issued [BMDO's] Record of Decision (ROD) 
for the TMD Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement which 
analyzed potential environmental impacts over the life-cycle of the TMD 
Program. That document addressed potential environmental consequences 
of the proposed research, development, testing and production, basing, 
and eventual decommissioning activities. It serves as the foundation 
for the TMD Extended Test Range FEIS. [BMDO Director] have also 
carefully considered the requirements of Executive Order 12898, Federal 
Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and 
Low Income Populations (Feb. 11, 1994), that this action not have a 
disproportionate impact on minority or low-income populations.

Need

    The proposed extended range testing arises from compelling national 
security needs recognized by both the Congress and the Administration. 
Effective Theater Missile Defense (TMD) is necessary to protect forward 
deployed and expeditionary elements of the Armed Forces of the United 
States and U.S. friends and allies overseas. Extended range testing is 
critical to the development of an effective theater missile defense.

Purpose

    Extended range tests for TMD must realistically test missile 
defense systems under circumstances similar to a theater of operations. 
This includes construction of target launch facilities; development and 
testing of sensors, Battle Management Command, Control, and 
Communications components, and defensive missiles; and intercepts of 
missiles over land and water areas. System operational needs require 
conducting target and other missile system flight tests and intercepts 
at altitudes and over distances, greater than can be accommodated by 
current ranges. These tests validate system design and operational 
effectiveness of ground-based interceptors to protect our forces and 
allies overseas from theater ballistic missiles.

Decision

    [BMDO Director's] decision is to proceed with the extended range 
testing at the WSMR and the KRM. At WSMR, [BMDO Director] select the 
option to launch target missiles from Fort Wingate Depot Activity 
(FWDA) using Booster Drop Zone C, with intercepts over WSMR. It is part 
of [BMDO Director's] decision to take action to reserve a portion of 
FWDA for the proposed TMD activities. On February 28, 1994, the BMDO 
notified the Secretary of the Army of its potential need for sufficient 
property at FWDA to conduct missile launch activities, including 
provision [[Page 16628]] for security, safety, and access. The BMDO 
will confirm its need for property at FWDA and take other necessary 
actions to ensure such property is not disposed of under the provisions 
of the Base Realignment and Closure Act. [BMDO Director] have decided 
not to select sea-based target missile launches at this time. [BMDO 
Director] select only the land-based target launch option from Wake 
Island for the KMR alternative. Missile intercepts will take place over 
existing impact areas or open sea areas at KMR.

Proposed Action and Alternatives

    Background: The proposed action analyzed in the TMD Extended Test 
Range FEIS was to conduct extended range tests of target missiles, 
defensive missiles, and sensor systems at one or more of four 
alternative test range areas. The tests would involve target and 
defense missile launches from existing test ranges and from off-range 
locations with intercepts over existing ranges or open ocean areas. 
Preparations and testing would begin in 1995 and continue into the next 
century. The FEIS compared the impacts of alternative test range areas 
and a no-action alternative.
    As individual TMD system programs mature to the point of defining 
specific flight/intercept test requirements, the most appropriate test 
range area(s) capable of meeting test requirements will be identified. 
The proposed action includes safety measures and standard range 
operating procedures to ensure the safety of the public and the 
environment. Some of these safety measures include (1) activating new 
or existing restricted airspace, (2) the establishment and evacuation 
of launch hazard areas and booster drop zones, including temporary 
closure of associated roads, and (3) public notification of launch 
activities, including Notices to Airmen and Notices to Mariners.
    No-Action Alternative: Ongoing activities and operations would 
continue to be performed at all locations. The development of ground 
based TMD missile and sensor systems would continue, with missile 
flight tests and target intercepts being conducted utilizing existing 
test ranges. Testing for TMD would likely increase at WSMR and possibly 
at the KMR. Ground-based TMD testing of missile and sensor systems at 
Eglin AFB and the Western Range would not occur. The missile testing 
restrictions associated with existing ranges, particularly with shorter 
range missile flights conducted at WSMR, place artificial limits on 
system test capabilities. This would make it impossible to fully 
validate system design and operational effectiveness in a variety of 
realistic theater environments. Although this alternative is the 
environmentally preferable alternative, it was not selected because it 
fails to meet BMDO's mission requirements. A comparison of the impacts 
at the four ranges revealed the least impacts to resources at the KMR. 
Impacts to resources at Western Range, Eglin AFB, are roughly 
equivalent. The greatest potential impacts were identified for the WSMR 
alternative and are primarily related to land use, cultural, and 
transportation issues associated with the initial booster drop zones 
analyzed in the Draft EIS.
    White Sands Missile Range Candidate Test Area Alternative: This 
alternative included defensive missile launches from WSMR, New Mexico, 
and Fort Bliss, Texas, and off-range target missile launches from FWDA, 
New Mexico, and the Green River Launch Complex (GRLC), Utah, with 
intercepts over WSMR. Testing of TMD radars, positioned on WSMR, would 
occur during these flight tests. This option also included Army 
tactical missile launches from FWDA with impacts on WSMR. [BMDO 
Director] anticipate approximately 6 to 8 launches per year from FWDA.
    Two potential booster Drop Zones (A and B) were analyzed in the 
Draft EIS for both the FWDA and GRLC target launch options. Substantial 
concerns were raised over the use of these drop zones. Although a 
number of mitigations could have been implemented to minimize the land 
use and other impacts, they could have become significant. In addition, 
[BMDO Director] am sensitive to general concerns about missile 
overflight of substantial areas of Native American lands in Utah and 
New Mexico. Accordingly, other booster drop zones were identified and 
analyzed for both the FWDA and GRLC options in a supplement to the 
Draft EIS. In both cases, these drop zones were further away from the 
launch position and further along the flight path and required smaller 
launch hazard areas at the launch site due to a less vertical 
trajectory at launch. This enabled the respective launch hazard areas 
to be reduced in size, responsive to the concerns about proximity to 
schools, residences, and other potential users of surrounding areas at 
FWDA. It also avoided the requirement to close Interstate 70 and 
portions of the Green River during launches for the GRLC option.
    In the case of the GRLC target launch options, both Booster Drop 
Zones A and B would have created significant land use problems 
associated with restricting access to Canyonlands National Park and 
Dead Horse State Park. Use of either of these drop zones would also 
have necessitated temporary closure of Interstate 70 and portions of 
the Green River adjacent to the launch area, due to the requirement for 
a large launch hazard area. The new Booster Drop Zones C1 and C2 for 
GRLC included Bureau of Land Management (BLM) state of Utah, and 
private land, as well as the Bridger Jack Mesa and Fish Creek Canyon 
Wilderness Study Areas. Concerns included restrictions on public access 
for recreation, and hunting. Booster impacts within the wilderness 
study area could be avoided, and missile launches could be timed so as 
to minimize impacts to recreation and avoid nesting and breeding 
seasons of sensitive species. However, the authority to use BLM lands 
for military purposes, including the proposed missile tests involving 
booster drops, would require a lengthy process that would not be 
responsive to current testing needs. Consequently GRLC options are not 
under current consideration.
    In the case of the FWDA option, use of either Booster Drop Zone A 
or B would require a launch hazard area extending up to 4\1/2\ miles 
from the launch site. This caused substantial safety concerns for the 
local community about a nearby school and residences and other areas at 
FWDA. In addition, Booster Drop Zone B included portions of the El 
Malpais National Monument and the El Malpais National Conservation 
Area, which encompassed wilderness and wilderness study areas. Use of 
this drop zone would be considered significant because it restricts 
access to recreational areas and conflicts with the statutory purposes 
for these special use areas. Booster drop zones A and B will not be 
used.
    The new Booster Drop Zone C for FWDA includes U.S. Forest Service 
and private land. Both the public land manager and private owner have 
expressed their willingness to allow use of these lands for booster 
drops. Use of this booster drop zone greatly reduces the launch hazard 
area at FWDA and significantly improves safety for nearby schools and 
residences, in keeping with the purpose of E.O. 12898 to avoid 
disproportionate impacts on minorities, such as the Indian communities 
in the Fort Wingate area. No significant environmental impacts have 
been identified associated with this drop zone.
    Kwajalein Missile Range, USAKA, Republic of the Marshall Islands 
[[Page 16629]] Alternative: This alternative included missile launches 
and sensor testing at KMR and Wake Island. USAKA would be primarily 
used for launching defensive missiles, however, there is a possibility 
that target missiles may be launched from USAKA. Wake Island would 
primarily be used for target missile launches, however, it also could 
be used for defensive missile launches. Technical difficulties with 
launches and costs removed sea-based target missile launches from 
consideration. Existing facilities at KMR and at Wake Island and 
planned construction of Wake Island (analyzed in the Wake Island 
Environmental Assessment, 1994) would be adequate for TMD interceptor 
and target launching activities; therefore minimal environmental 
impacts are anticipated. Issues of concern included potential impacts 
on sensitive plant and animal species at the KMR and Wake Island, 
particularly in undisturbed areas, the potential for damage, 
destruction, or vandalism of cultural resources, and safety issues. 
Mitigations included avoidance of areas of native vegetation and sea 
turtle nesting areas. consultation with appropriate U.S. and 
Marshallese officials to establish procedures to protect cultural 
resources such as data recovery, and avoidance. Mitigations also 
establish hazard areas and place operating restrictions on radars to 
avoid significant impacts. No significant environmental impacts are 
predicted with the use of KMR or Wake Island.
    Eglin Air Force Base Candidate Test Area Alternative: This 
alternative would include missile launches and sensor testing at Eglin 
AFB on Santa Rosa Island and at Cape San Blas, Florida, with missile 
launches from a sea-based platform in the Gulf of Mexico. No 
significant impacts are predicted with the use of Eglin AFB. Health and 
safety and airspace impacts would be avoided by the issuance of Notices 
to Airmen and Notices to Mariners, and ensuring that the launch, 
booster drop, and intercept debris impact areas are clear of air and 
water traffic before proceeding with the test flights. This alternative 
is not selected at this time because test objectives could be met at 
other ranges, sea-launch capabilities will not be available, and 
additional test instrumentation is needed.
    Western Range Test Area Alternative: This alternative would include 
missile launches and sensor testing at Vandenberg AFB, San Nicolas 
Island of the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, and San 
Clemente Island of the Naval Air Station North Island, California, with 
off-range missile launches from a sea-based platform in the Pacific 
Ocean. No significant impacts are predicted with the use of Western 
Range. Health and safety and airspace impacts would be avoided by the 
issuance of Notices to Airmen and Notices to Mariners, and ensuring 
that the launch, booster drop, and intercept debris impact areas are 
clear of all air traffic before proceeding with the test flights. This 
alternative is not selected at this time because test objectives could 
be met at other ranges, sea-launch capabilities will not be available, 
and additional test instrumentation is needed.
    Alternatives Considered But Not Carried Forward: Initially eleven 
candidate test range areas were considered for TMD testing. Criteria 
used to evaluate candidate test ranges included weather, scheduling, 
range instrumentation, range safety, and debris recovery. All but the 
four ranges analyzed in the FEIS were eliminated by the criteria 
established at the beginning of the selection process.

Mitigation, Monitoring, and Enforcement

    All practicable means to avoid and minimize environmental harm will 
be taken. [BMDO Director] direct BMDO Deputies and Program Executive 
Officers to monitor extended range testing activities and ensure the 
following mitigation measures described in the TMD Extended Test Range 
FEIS are implemented. Specifically, at the WSMR, and the associated 
FWDA, mitigations will include implementing the Evacuation Plan, 
Booster Recovery Plan, and Emergency Response Plan. Launches will be 
avoided during weather conditions that would have adverse effects on 
air quality or on test safety. To the extent possible, launches will be 
scheduled to avoid major events such as major military maneuvers (i.e., 
Roving Sand Operations), holidays, hunting seasons, cattle roundups, or 
local festivities that could be effected by the testing activities. 
Maximum advance notice of launch activities will be provided to local 
communities, travelers, etc., as described in the FEIS. Prior to 
conducting launches and starting construction, consultation with 
appropriate Federal and state agencies, as discussed in the EIS will 
occur concerning specific debris impact areas, debris recovery 
activities, and prelaunch and preconstruction surveys in order to 
protect cultural resources and threatened and endangered species. 
American Indian concerns regarding access to and disturbance of sacred 
lands will be addressed during consultation with each affected American 
Indian group on a regular basis and prior to each missile launch. 
Consultation with local community groups will establish the procedures, 
and coordinate times for use of FWDA lands under BMDO control during 
periods of launch inactivity.
    At the USAKA, the existing USAKA mitigation plan will be followed. 
Other mitigations include: International Notices to Airmen and Notices 
to Mariners, timely coordination with the International Civil Aviation 
Organization through the Federal Aviation Administration, adherence to 
established procedures for keep-out zones, hazard areas, and 
limitations on use of radars, and a scheduling plan will be implemented 
to minimize airspace and health and safety impacts. Preconstruction 
surveys and/or other mitigation measures will be accomplished in 
coordination with the appropriate Federal agencies and the Republic of 
the Marshall Islands Environmental Protection Authority to protect 
cultural resources and threatened and endangered species. [BMDO 
Director] will implement appropriate safeguards as subsequent decisions 
are made regarding system components and basing locations, and as their 
accompanying environmental documents elaborate specific requirements 
for monitoring and enforcement.

Date and Signature

    Record of Decision was signed March 21, 1995 by Malcolm R. O'Neill, 
Lieutenant General, United States Army, Director, Ballistic Missile 
Defense Organization.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:Mr. Rick Lehner, BMDO/SRE, Washington, 
DC 20301-7100, (703) 695-8743.

    Dated: March 27, 1995.
Patricia L. Toppings,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
[FR Doc. 95-7892 Filed 3-30-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5000-04-M