

based on assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the proposed requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the future if this AD were not adopted.

The regulations proposed herein would not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this proposal would not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed regulation (1) is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a "significant rule" under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft regulatory evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. App. 1354(a), 1421 and 1423; 49 U.S.C. 106(g); and 14 CFR 11.89.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

Fokker: Docket 94-NM-116-AD.

Applicability: Model F28 Mk 0100 series airplanes having serial numbers 11244 through 11437, inclusive; and equipped with Grimes Aerospace Passenger Service Units having part number (P/N) 10-1178-() through P/N 10-1571-(), inclusive; certificated in any category.

Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must use the authority provided in paragraph (d) to request approval from the FAA. This approval may address either no action, if the current configuration eliminates the unsafe condition; or different actions necessary to address the unsafe condition described in this AD. Such a request should include an assessment of the effect of the changed configuration on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no case does the presence of any modification, alteration, or repair remove any airplane from the applicability of this AD.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.

To ensure that warning signs are readable to passengers and flight attendants, and to eliminate a potential fire hazard, accomplish the following:

(a) Within 9 months after the effective date of this AD, install modified Passenger Service Unit (PSU) panel lenses in accordance with Fokker Service Bulletin SBF100-25-061, dated March 8, 1994 (as corrected by Fokker Service Bulletin Change Notification SBF100-25-061/02, dated June 20, 1994).

(b) Prior to further flight after accomplishing the installation required by paragraph (a) of this AD, perform a one-time post-installation inspection to detect corrosion and/or deterioration of the PSU connector, in accordance with Fokker Service Bulletin SBF100-25-068, dated March 31, 1994. Prior to further flight, correct any discrepancies detected and apply sealant in accordance with the service bulletin.

(c) As of the effective date of this AD, no person shall install on any airplane a Grimes Aerospace Passenger Service Unit having part number (P/N) 10-1178-() through P/N 10-1571-(), inclusive.

(d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Aircraft Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113.

Note 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Standardization Branch, ANM-113.

(e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on March 24, 1995.

Darrell M. Pederson,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 95-7780 Filed 3-29-95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-U

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 95-NM-06-AD]

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 747 SP, SR, -100, -200, and -300 Series Airplanes Equipped With Pratt & Whitney Model JT9D Series Engines (Excluding Model JT9D-70 Engines)

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes the adoption of a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 747 SP, SR, -100, -200, and -300 series airplanes. This proposal would require repetitive operational tests of the reversible gearbox pneumatic drive unit (PDU) or the reversing air motor PDU to ensure that the unit can restrain the thrust reverser sleeve, and correction of any discrepancy found. This proposal is prompted by the results of an investigation, which revealed that, in the event of thrust reverser deployment during high-speed climb or during cruise, these airplanes could experience control problems. The actions specified by the proposed AD are intended to ensure the integrity of the fail safe features of the thrust reverser system by preventing possible failure modes in the thrust reverser control system that can result in inadvertent deployment of a thrust reverser during flight.

DATES: Comments must be received by May 24, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-103, Attention: Rules Docket No. 95-NM-06-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056. Comments may be inspected at this location between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

The service information referenced in the proposed rule may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. This information may be examined at the FAA, Transport

Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: G. Michael Collins, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone (206) 227-2689; fax (206) 227-1181.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this notice may be changed in light of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this notice must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: "Comments to Docket Number 95-NM-06-AD." The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-103, Attention: Rules Docket No. 95-NM-06-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

Discussion

In May 1991, a Boeing Model 767 series airplane was involved in an accident in which a thrust reverser deployed inadvertently during flight. While the investigation of the accident has not revealed the cause of that deployment, it has identified a number of possible failure modes in the thrust reverser control system. Inadvertent deployment of a thrust reverser during

flight could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.

The FAA and the aviation industry are conducting an in-depth investigation of the thrust reverser systems installed on various types of large transport airplanes. In particular, this investigation has focused on airplane controllability in the event of an in-flight deployment of a thrust reverser, and thrust reverser reliability in general. Based on the data gathered from this ongoing investigation, the FAA issued several airworthiness directives (AD) to require periodic inspections and tests of the thrust reverser systems on certain Boeing Model 757 and 767 series airplanes [for example, reference AD 91-20-09, amendment 39-8043 (56 FR 46725, September 16, 1991) for certain Model 757 series airplanes; and AD 92-24-03, amendment 39-8408 (57 FR 53258, November 9, 1992) for certain Model 767 series airplanes]. In addition, the FAA has issued or proposed several AD's to require an additional locking device on thrust reversers that are installed on Model 737-300/-400/-500, 757, and 767 series airplanes [for example, reference AD 94-14-02, amendment 39-8954 (59 FR 33646, June 30, 1994) for certain Model 757 series airplanes; and AD 94-16-03, amendment 39-8993 (59 FR 41229, August 11, 1994) for certain Model 767 series airplanes]. These actions were taken to enhance the level of reliability on airplane models that were determined to have unacceptable flight characteristics following an in-flight deployment of a thrust reverser.

Until now, the investigation of thrust reverser system reliability on Boeing Model 747 series airplanes has not been given as high a priority as the other Boeing models because Model 747 series airplanes have never experienced control problems as a result of an in-flight thrust reverser deployment. Based on this long safety record and the available evidence up to this time, it has been accepted generally that all Model 747 series airplanes would be shown to be controllable throughout the flight envelope following an in-flight thrust reverser deployment.

Boeing has responded to an FAA request for further investigation to determine the controllability of Model 747 series airplanes following an in-flight thrust reverser deployment. The investigation results indicate that Model 747 SP, SR, -100, -200, -300, and -400 series airplanes could experience certain control problems in the event of a thrust reverser deployment occurring during high-speed climb or during cruise.

In light of that information, the FAA determined that certain inspections and functional tests of the thrust reverser control and indication system on all Model 747 series airplanes, similar to those required previously for Model 757 and 767 series airplanes, are necessary as precautionary actions to provide an acceptable level of safety for Model 747 series airplanes. Subsequently, on July 13, 1994, the FAA issued AD 94-15-05, amendment 39-8976 (59 FR 37655, July 25, 1994), to require inspections and functional tests of the thrust reverser control and indication system on all Model 747-400 series airplanes.

In the preamble to the notice of AD 94-15-05, the FAA indicated that it was considering similar rulemaking action for other Model 747 series airplanes. The FAA now has determined that such rulemaking action is indeed necessary, and this proposed AD follows from that determination. The FAA has determined that inspections and functional tests of the thrust reverser control and indication system, similar to those currently required by AD 94-15-05 for Model 747-400 series airplanes, are necessary for Model 747 SP, SR, -100, -200, and -300 series airplanes in order to reduce the exposure of these airplanes to potential undetected single failures in the thrust reverser control system. The presence of an undetected failure in the thrust reverser control system, in some cases, can increase the likelihood of an uncommanded thrust reverser deployment in the event of an additional thrust reverser control system failure.

The FAA has reviewed and approved Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-78A2131, dated September 15, 1994, which describes procedures for repetitive operational tests of the reversible gearbox pneumatic drive unit (PDU) or the reversing air motor PDU to ensure that the unit can restrain the thrust reverser sleeve, and correction of any discrepancy found. The alert service bulletin recommends that these initial tests be accomplished no later than 1,300 flight hours after release of the alert service bulletin. The alert service bulletin also recommends a repetitive test interval of 2,000 flight hours.

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other products of this same type design, the proposed AD would require repetitive operational tests of the reversible gearbox pneumatic drive unit (PDU) or the reversing air motor PDU to ensure that the unit can restrain the thrust reverser sleeve, and correction of any discrepancy found during the test. The actions would be required to be accomplished in accordance with the

alert service bulletin described previously.

In developing appropriate compliance times for the initial test contained in this proposed AD, the FAA considered the safety implications and normal maintenance schedules for timely accomplishment of the proposed actions. In consideration of these items, the FAA determined that 90 days (for the initial test of the PDU) represents the maximum interval of time allowable wherein that test can reasonably be accomplished and an acceptable level of safety can be maintained. Further, the FAA has determined that the proposed repetitive interval of 2,000 flight hours is appropriate, based on the service history of similar components and on an analysis of the system design to predict the reliability of the system during the service life of the aircraft.

The thrust reverser control and indication system on Model 747-400 series airplanes is similar to the system installed on the airplanes addressed in this proposed AD. The compliance time for the initial test proposed in this AD corresponds to that specified in AD 94-15-05 for Model 747-400 series airplanes. The repetitive test interval specified in this proposed AD should allow operators to perform the test during regularly scheduled maintenance.

This proposed AD also would require that operators submit a report of initial test results to the FAA.

This AD is considered to be interim action until final action is identified, at which time the FAA may consider additional rulemaking.

As a result of recent communications with the Air Transport Association (ATA) of America, the FAA has learned that, in general, some operators may misunderstand the legal effect of AD's on airplanes that are identified in the applicability provision of the AD, but that have been altered or repaired in the area addressed by the AD. The FAA points out that all airplanes identified in the applicability provision of an AD are legally subject to the AD. If an airplane has been altered or repaired in the affected area in such a way as to affect compliance with the AD, the owner or operator is required to obtain FAA approval for an alternative method of compliance with the AD, in accordance with the paragraph of each AD that provides for such approvals. A note has been included in this notice to clarify this long-standing requirement.

There are approximately 456 Model 747 SP, SR, -100, -200, and -300 series airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 173 airplanes of U.S. registry would be

affected by this proposed AD, that it would take approximately 16 work hours per airplane to accomplish the proposed actions, and that the average labor rate is \$60 per work hour. Based on these figures, the total cost impact of the proposed AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be \$166,080, or \$960 per airplane.

The total cost impact figure discussed above is based on assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the proposed requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the future if this AD were not adopted.

The regulations proposed herein would not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this proposal would not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed regulation (1) is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a "significant rule" under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft regulatory evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. App. 1354(a), 1421 and 1423; 49 U.S.C. 106(g); and 14 CFR 11.89.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

Boeing: Docket 95-NM-06-AD.

Applicability: Model 747 SP, SR, -100, -200, and -300 series airplanes equipped with Pratt & Whitney Model JT9D series engines (excluding Model JT9D-70 engines), certificated in any category.

Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must use the authority provided in paragraph (d) to request approval from the FAA. This approval may address either no action, if the current configuration eliminates the unsafe condition; or different actions necessary to address the unsafe condition described in this AD. Such a request should include an assessment of the effect of the changed configuration on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no case does the presence of any modification, alteration, or repair remove any airplane from the applicability of this AD.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.

To ensure the integrity of the fail safe features of the thrust reverser system, accomplish the following:

(a) Within 90 days after the effective date of this AD, perform an operational test of the reversible gearbox pneumatic drive unit (PDU) or the reversing air motor PDU to ensure that the unit can restrain the thrust reverser sleeve, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-78A2131, dated September 15, 1994. Repeat the test thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2,000 flight hours.

(b) If any of the tests required by this AD cannot be successfully performed, or if any discrepancy is found during those tests, accomplish either paragraph (b)(1) or (b)(2) of this AD.

(1) Prior to further flight, correct the discrepancy found, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-78A2131, dated September 15, 1994. Or

(2) The airplane may be operated in accordance with the provisions and limitations specified in an operator's FAA-approved Minimum Equipment List (MEL), provided that no more than one thrust reverser on the airplane is inoperative.

(c) Within 30 days after performing each initial test required by this AD, submit a report of the test results, both positive and negative, to the FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), ANM-100S, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; fax (206) 227-1181. Information collection requirements contained in this regulation have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) and have been assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056.

(d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that

provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.

Note 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO.

(e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 24, 1995.

Darrell M. Pederson,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 95-7781 Filed 3-29-95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-U

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 94-CE-32-AD]

Airworthiness Directives; Stemme S10 Gliders

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) that would apply to certain Stemme S10 gliders. The proposed action would require modifying the rudder control cable system. Rupture of a turnbuckle eye bolt in the rudder control cable system on one of the affected gliders prompted the proposed action. The actions specified by the proposed AD are intended to prevent rudder control cable system failure caused by rupture of the turnbuckle eye bolt, which, if not detected and corrected, could result in loss of rudder control.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before June 16, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket No. 94-CE-32-AD, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. Comments may be inspected at this location between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday through Friday, holidays excepted.

Service information that applies to the proposed AD may be obtained from Stemme GmbH & Co. KG, Flugplatz Gebaude 47, D-15344 Staussberg,

Germany. This information also may be examined at the Rules Docket at the address above.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Herman C. Belderok, Project Officer, Gliders, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, FAA, 1201 Walnut, suite 900, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone (816) 426-6932; facsimile (816) 426-2169.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications should identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this notice may be changed in light of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report that summarizes each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this notice must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: "Comments to Docket No. 94-CE-32-AD." The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket No. 94-CE-32-AD, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106.

Discussion

The Luftfahrt-Bundesamt (LBA), which is the airworthiness authority for Germany, recently notified the FAA that an unsafe condition may exist on Stemme S10 gliders. The LBA reports that the rudder control cable turnbuckle eye bolt ruptured on one of the affected gliders, which resulted in loss of rudder

control. Under the current configuration, the rudder control cables from the right and left pedals meet at the turnbuckle in the tailboom in a way that subjects the turnbuckle eye bolt to resistant forces (tensile and bending) that could pull the bolt from the rudder assembly. If not detected and corrected, rudder control cable turnbuckle eye bolt rupture could result in rudder control cable system failure and subsequent loss of rudder control.

Stemme has issued Service Bulletin (SB) A31-10-018, dated June 3, 1994, which specifies procedures for modifying the rudder control cable system on these S10 gliders. Pages 1-3 of this service bulletin are written in German and pages 4-6 are English translations. The LBA classified this service bulletin as mandatory and issued LBA AD 94-260, dated August 25, 1994, in order to assure the continued airworthiness of these gliders in Germany.

This glider model is manufactured in Germany and is type certificated for operation in the United States under the provisions of section 21.29 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.29) and the applicable bilateral airworthiness agreement. Pursuant to this bilateral airworthiness agreement, the LBA has kept the FAA informed of the situation described above. The FAA has examined the findings of the LBA, reviewed all available information, and determined that AD action is necessary for products of this type design that are certificated for operation in the United States.

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop in other Stemme S10 gliders of the same type design, the proposed AD would require modifying the rudder control cable system. The proposed action would be accomplished in accordance with the instructions to Stemme SB A31-10-018 (pages 4-6), dated June 3, 1994.

The FAA estimates that 3 gliders in the U.S. registry would be affected by the proposed AD, that it would take approximately 4 workhours per glider to accomplish the proposed action, and that the average labor rate is approximately \$60 an hour. Parts cost approximately \$56 per glider. Based on these figures, the total cost impact of the proposed AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be \$888 (\$296 per airplane). This figure is based on the assumption that no affected owner/operator of the affected gliders has incorporated the proposed modification.

The regulations proposed herein would not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship