

will continue to effectively detect containment leakage resulting from the degradation of active containment isolation components, as well as containment penetrations. Administrative limits have been established for each Type B or C component at a fraction of the allowable leak rate, such that any leakage detected in excess of the administrative limit will indicate a potential valve or penetration degradation. In instances in which a component's leakage exceeds its administrative limit, proceduralized controls in the test program require that a work order be written to repair the component.

#### IV

Section III.D.1.(a) of Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50 states that a set of three Type A leakage rate tests shall be performed at approximately equal intervals during each 10-year service period.

The licensee proposes an exemption to this section which would provide a one-time interval extension for the Type A test by approximately 16 months. The Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(1), this exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common defense and security. The Commission further determined, for the reasons discussed below, that special circumstances, as provided in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are present justifying the exemption; namely, that application of the regulation in the particular circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. The underlying purpose of the requirement to perform Type A containment leak rate tests at intervals during the 10-year service period, is to ensure that any potential leakage pathways through the containment boundary are identified within a time span that prevents significant degradation from continuing or becoming unknown. The NRC staff has reviewed the basis and supporting information provided by the licensee in the exemption request. The NRC staff has noted that the licensee has a good record of ensuring a leak tight containment. All Type A tests have passed with significant margin and the licensee has noted that the results of the Type A testing have been confirmatory of the Type B and C tests which will continue to be performed. The licensee has stated that it will continue to perform the general containment civil inspection although it is only required by Appendix J (Section V.A.) to be performed in conjunction with Type A tests. The NRC staff considers that these inspections, though limited in scope, provide an important added level of

confidence in the continued integrity of the containment boundary.

The NRC staff has also made use of a draft staff report, NUREG-1493, which provides the technical justification for the present Appendix J rulemaking effort which also includes a 10-year test interval for Type A tests. The integrated leakage rate test, or Type A test, measures overall containment leakage. However, operating experience with all types of containments used in this country demonstrates that essentially all containment leakage can be detected by local leakage rate tests (Type B and C). According to results given in NUREG-1493, out of 180 ILRT reports covering 110 individual reactors and approximately 770 years of operating history, only 5 ILRT failures were found which local leakage rate testing could not detect. This is 3% of all failures. This study agrees with previous NRC staff studies which show that Type B and C testing can detect a very large percentage of containment leaks. The Catawba Unit 1 experience has also been consistent with this.

The Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC), now the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), collected and provided the NRC staff with summaries of data to assist in the Appendix J rulemaking effort. NUMARC collected results of 144 ILRTs from 33 units; 23 ILRTs exceeded  $1.0L_a$ . Of these, only nine were not due to Type B or C leakage penalties. The NEI data also added another perspective. The NEI data show that in about one-third of the cases exceeding allowable leakage, the as-found leakage was less than  $2L_a$ ; in one case the leakage was found to be approximately  $2L_a$ ; in one case the as-found leakage was less than  $3L_a$ ; one case approached  $10L_a$ ; and in one case the leakage was found to be approximately  $21L_a$ . For about half of the failed ILRTs, the as-found leakage was not quantified. These data show that, for those ILRTs for which the leakage was quantified, the leakage values are small in comparison to the leakage value at which the risk to the public starts to increase over the value of risk corresponding to  $L_a$  (approximately  $200L_a$ , as discussed in NUREG-1493).

Based on generic and plant-specific data, the NRC staff finds the licensee's proposed one-time exemption to permit a schedular extension of one cycle for the performance of the Appendix Type A test to be acceptable.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that granting this exemption will not have a significant impact on the human environment (60 CFR 11125).

This exemption is effective upon issuance and shall expire at the completion of the 1996 refueling outage.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of March 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

**John A. Zwolinski,**

*Acting Director, Division of Reactor Projects — I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.*

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### **Forrest L. Roudebush, Kansas City, Missouri; Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed Activities and Requiring Certain Notification to NRC**

#### I

Mr. Forrest L. Roudebush has been, from its inception, the owner and president of Piping Specialists Incorporated (PSI or Licensee), also known as PSI Inspection, which was the holder of Byproduct Material License No. 24-24826-01 issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) pursuant to 10 CFR Parts 30 and 34 on March 6, 1987. The license authorized the use of byproduct material (iridium-192 and cobalt-60) for industrial radiography in devices approved by the NRC or an Agreement State. The facility where licensed materials were authorized for storage was located at 1010 East 10th Street, Kansas City, Missouri. The use of licensed materials was authorized at temporary job sites anywhere in the United States that the NRC maintains jurisdiction for regulating the use of licensed materials. On October 17, 1991, the NRC staff issued an Order Suspending License (Effective Immediately) to PSI. On April 22, 1992, the NRC staff issued to PSI an Order Modifying Order Suspending License (Effective Immediately) and Order Revoking License. The revocation of the license was upheld by a decision of the NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB), Piping Specialists, Inc. and Forrest L. Roudebush, LBP 92-25, 36 NRC 156 (1992), which the Commission declined to review, CLI-92-16, 36 NRC 351 (1992).

#### II

NRC Region III initiated an inspection of the Licensee on September 4, 1991, and on September 24, 1991, the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) commenced an investigation based on information received on August 29, 1991, that the PSI radiation safety program was not being conducted in compliance with NRC rules, regulations, and license

conditions. The inspection and investigation focused on the Licensee's compliance with NRC regulations, including possible willful violations involving: (1) False statements to NRC inspectors and investigators; (2) use of unauthorized and/or unqualified radiographer's assistants while conducting radiography; (3) preparation of false, inaccurate, and incomplete records; (4) failure to provide or use personnel dosimetry devices while conducting radiography; and (5) failure to survey and post radiation area boundaries to provide notice of radiation hazards to the public while performing radiography.

The OI investigation was completed on February 21, 1992, and identified the following deliberate violations of NRC requirements attributable to Mr. Roudebush:

A. In violation of 10 CFR 30.9, the PSI Radiation Safety Officer (RSO), with the prior knowledge of Mr. Roudebush, deliberately provided incomplete and inaccurate information to NRC inspectors during inspections conducted on March 21 and September 17-18, 1991. Specifically, the RSO presented to the inspectors the Licensee's utilization log, records of pocket dosimeter readings, and records of surveys of radiographic exposure devices performed at the time of the storage of the device at the end of the work day. Those records were neither complete nor accurate because: (1) The records did not document the Licensee's uses of the radiographic exposure devices which occurred during periods when the Licensee's personnel dosimetry service was interrupted due to the nonpayment of service fees; and (2) the information in the records had not been recorded daily as required, but instead, had been fabricated en masse shortly before the inspections. Further, the RSO and Mr. Roudebush knew that the records were inaccurate and that the records had been fabricated by the RSO immediately before the inspections.

B. In violation of 10 CFR 30.9, during an interview with OI on October 16, 1991, Mr. Roudebush, under oath, after defining a radiographer's assistant as one who " \* \* \* handles and operates the enclosure, handle [sic] and operates the device, handles and operates the survey meter, takes charge of that dosimeter", denied to an OI investigator that he had performed work as a radiographer's assistant. This statement was deliberately false because during the NRC inspection conducted on September 17-18, 1991, Mr. Roudebush acknowledged that he had attached the control cable and guide tube to a radiographic exposure device and had

exposed and retracted the source during radiographic operations. Mr. Roudebush was not qualified as a radiographer or assistant radiographer.

The investigation found other deliberate violations of NRC requirements, as well as a number of violations that in the aggregate represented a breakdown in the management of the PSI radiation safety program. Those violations are discussed in the October 17, 1991 Order Suspending License (Effective Immediately), EA 91-136; and the April 22, 1992 Order Modifying Order Suspending License (Effective Immediately) and Order Revoking License, EA 92-054. Those orders discuss why the staff does not have reasonable assurance that the licensee or Mr. Roudebush would comply with NRC requirements in the future.

The ASLB conducted a hearing from April 28 to May 1, 1992 on the October 17, 1991 Order Suspending License (Effective Immediately) and the April 22, 1992 Order Modifying Order Suspending License (Effective Immediately) and Order Revoking License.

The ASLB, in its Final Initial Decision (Revoking License), LBP-92-25, 36 NRC 156 (1992), stated:

We conclude that there have been extensive failures on the part of PSI and Mr. Roudebush to comply with NRC regulations. The Board finds that the Licensee has failed to act as a reasonable manager of licensed activities; failed to detect and correct violations caused by an employee; willfully attempted to conceal violations from NRC Staff, and given untruthful information to the Staff during its inspections and investigations. Moreover, we find that Mr. Roudebush was untruthful in some aspects of his testimony both during a formal investigation and this Licensing Board. *Id.*, at 186.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, on August 18, 1994, Mr. Roudebush pled guilty in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri to one criminal count of violating Title 42, United States Code, Sections 2273 and 2201 (b) and (i) (§§ 161b, 161i, and 223 of the Atomic Energy Act). Specifically, the agreement describes the nature of the offense as the failure to provide dosimetry devices to employees. As a result, on December 12, 1994, an amended judgment was filed whereby Mr. Roudebush was sentenced to two years probation. The terms of the probation, in part, provide that Mr. Roudebush shall not apply for or obtain a license for radiography during the probation period.

### III

Based on the above, the NRC concludes that Forrest L. Roudebush, the owner and president of PSI, engaged in deliberate misconduct that caused the Licensee to be in violation of 10 CFR 30.9, 30.10, and 34.33. Mr. Roudebush deliberately provided information to NRC inspectors and investigators that he knew to be incomplete or inaccurate in some material respect to the NRC, and Mr. Roudebush was deliberately untruthful during portions of his testimony to the ASLB, in violation of 10 CFR 30.9 and 30.10. Further, Mr. Roudebush deliberately failed to provide dosimetry devices to his employees, in violation of 10 CFR 34.33 and 30.10. The NRC must be able to rely on its licensees, including their officers and employees, to comply with NRC requirements, including the requirement to provide information and to maintain records that are complete and accurate in all respects material to the NRC. The deliberate actions of Forrest L. Roudebush in causing the Licensee to violate 10 CFR 30.9, 30.10, and 34.33, and his misrepresentations to the NRC have raised serious doubt as to whether he can be relied on to comply with NRC requirements and to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC.

Consequently, I lack the requisite reasonable assurance that Forrest L. Roudebush will conduct licensed activities in compliance with the Commission's requirements or that the health and safety of the public will be protected if Forrest L. Roudebush were permitted at this time to be involved in NRC-licensed activities. Therefore, the public health, safety and interest require that, for a period of five years from October 17, 1991, the date that the PSI license was suspended by Immediately Effective Order, Forrest L. Roudebush be prohibited from any involvement in NRC-licensed activities for either: (1) An NRC licensee, or (2) an Agreement State licensee performing licensed activities in areas of NRC jurisdiction in accordance with 10 CFR 150.20. In addition, for a period of five years commencing after completion of the five year period of prohibition, Mr. Roudebush must notify the NRC of his employment or involvement in NRC-licensed activities to ensure that the NRC can monitor the status of Mr. Roudebush's compliance with the Commission's requirements and his understanding of his commitment to compliance. If Mr. Roudebush is currently involved with another licensee in NRC-licensed activities, Mr. Roudebush must immediately cease such activities, and inform the NRC of

the name, address and telephone number of the employer, and provide a copy of this order to the employer.

#### IV

Accordingly, pursuant to sections 81, 161b, 161i, 182 and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, 10 CFR 30.10, and 10 CFR 150.20, *it is hereby ordered* that:

1. Forrest L. Roudebush is prohibited until October 17, 1996 from engaging in any NRC-licensed activities. NRC-licensed activities are those activities that are conducted pursuant to a specific or general license issued by the NRC, including, but not limited to, those activities of Agreement State licensees conducted pursuant to the authority granted by 10 CFR 150.20.

2. For a period of five years, beginning October 17, 1996, after the five-year period of prohibition has expired, Forrest L. Roudebush shall, within 20 days of his acceptance of each employment offer involving NRC-licensed activities or his becoming involved in NRC-licensed activities, as defined in Paragraph IV.1 above, provide notice to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, of the name, address, and telephone number of the employer or the entity where he is, or will be, involved in the NRC-licensed activities. In the first such notification, Forrest L. Roudebush shall include a statement of his commitment to compliance with regulatory requirements and the basis why the Commission should have confidence that he will now comply with applicable NRC requirements.

3. If Forrest L. Roudebush is currently involved with any NRC licensee or Agreement State licensee engaging in NRC-licensed activities, then Forrest L. Roudebush must, as of the effective date of this Order, cease such activities and inform the NRC of the name, address and telephone number of the licensee, and provide a copy of this Order to the licensee.

The Director, Office of Enforcement, may, in writing, relax or rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration by Mr. Roudebush of good cause.

#### V

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, Forrest L. Roudebush must, and any other person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this Order, and may request a hearing on this Order, within 20 days of the date of this Order. The answer may consent to this Order. Unless the answer consents

to this Order, the answer shall, in writing and under oath or affirmation, specifically admit or deny each allegation or charge made in this Order and shall set forth the matters of fact and law on which Mr. Roudebush or other person adversely affected relies and the reasons as to why the Order should not have been issued. Any answer or request for a hearing shall be submitted to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attn: Chief, Docketing and Service Section, Washington, DC 20555. Copies also shall be sent to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to the Assistant General Counsel for Hearings and Enforcement at the same address, and to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region III, 801 Warrenville Road, Lisle, Illinois 60532-4531 if the answer or hearing request is by a person other than Mr. Roudebush. If a person other than Mr. Roudebush requests a hearing, that person shall set forth with particularity the manner in which his or her interest is adversely affected by this Order and shall address the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.714(d).

If a hearing is requested by Mr. Roudebush or a person whose interest is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to be considered at such hearing shall be whether, on the basis of the matters described in: (1) this Order; (2) EA 91-136; (3) EA 92-054; and (4) LBP-92-25, 36 NRC 156 (1992), this Order should be sustained.

In the absence of any request for hearing, the provisions specified in Section IV above shall be final 20 days from the date of this Order without further order or proceedings.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 3rd day of March 1995.

From the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

**Hugh L. Thompson, Jr.,**

*Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Materials Safety, Safeguards and Operations Support.*

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### NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL REVIEW BOARD

#### Board Meeting: Waste Isolation Strategy, Thermal Management Strategy, The Engineered Barrier System

Pursuant to its authority under section 5051 of Public Law 100-203, the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987, the Nuclear Waste Technical

Review Board will hold its spring meeting on April 19-20, 1995, in Las Vegas, Nevada. The meeting will be held at the Holiday Inn Crowne Plaza, 4255 S. Paradise Road, Las Vegas, Nevada 89109; Tel. (702) 369-4400; Fax (702) 369-3770. The meeting is open to the public and will begin at 8:30 a.m. both days. Presentations during the meeting will address three main topics: The Department of Energy's (DOE) emerging waste isolation strategy; the DOE's thermal management strategy, including thermal testing planned or being conducted for the Yucca Mountain project; and engineered barrier system research, development, design, and analysis. Additional presentations also will provide updates on the DOE's perspectives concerning current legislative issues (fiscal year 1996 budget and initiatives to amend or replace the Nuclear Waste Policy Act).

Topics that will be covered on Wednesday, April 19, include the current status of the DOE's waste management program and its evolving waste isolation strategy, the linkage between the waste isolation strategy and site suitability, the fiscal year 1996 DOE budget, and thermal management strategy. An afternoon panel discussion will explore the integration of these topics. Prior to recessing for the day, those attending the meeting will be invited to direct questions or comments to the Board and the discussion panel members.

On Thursday, April 20, the meeting will focus on the engineered barrier system and include repository subsurface operations concepts, multipurpose container (MPC) interface with a potential repository, waste package design, engineered barrier system performance assessment, corrosion research, in-repository criticality, potential use of backfill, and in-repository shielding. Following a time for public questions and comments, a panel discussion will address the compatibility of waste package and engineered barrier designs with the DOE's concept of repository operations and thermal management strategies. A final period for public comment will end the meeting's activities.

The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board was created by Congress in the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987 to evaluate the technical and scientific validity of activities undertaken by the DOE in its program to manage the disposal of the nation's spent nuclear fuel and defense high-level waste. In that same legislation, Congress directed the DOE to characterize a site at Yucca Mountain,