[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 47 (Friday, March 10, 1995)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 13306-13309]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-5414]




  Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 47 / Friday, March 10, 1995 / 
Proposed Rules   
[[Page 13306]] 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Highway Administration

49 CFR PART 393

[FHWA Docket No. MC-94-31]
RIN 2125-AD46


Parts and Accessories Necessary for Safe Operation; Antilock 
Brake Systems

AGENCY: Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of intent; request for comments.

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SUMMARY: This document requests comments on the intent of the FHWA to 
initiate a rulemaking concerning requirements for antilock brake 
systems (ABS) on commercial motor vehicles engaged in interstate 
commerce. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
has issued a final rule, published elsewhere in today's Federal 
Register, requiring certain newly manufactured vehicles to be equipped 
with ABS. The FHWA intends to initiate a rulemaking addressing 
requirements for motor carriers to maintain the ABS on those vehicles 
which are subject to the NHTSA's final rule and address certain other 
ABS issues related to vehicles subject to the Federal Motor Carrier 
Safety Regulations (FMCSRs). The FHWA requests comments on this action.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before May 9, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Submit written, signed comments to FHWA Docket No. MC-94-31, 
Room 4232, HCC-10, Office of the Chief Counsel, Federal Highway 
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, D.C. 20590. All 
comments received will be available for examination at the above 
address from 8:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., e.t., Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays. Those desiring notification of receipt of 
comments must include a self-addressed, stamped postcard.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Larry W. Minor, Office of Motor 
Carrier Standards, HCS-10, (202) 366-2981; or Mr. Charles E. Medalen, 
Office of the Chief Counsel, HCC-20, (202) 366-1354, Federal Highway 
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, D. C. 20590. 
Office hours are from 7:45 a.m. to 4:15 p.m., e.t., Monday through 
Friday, except Federal holidays.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    Section 4012 of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency 
Act of 1991 (ISTEA) (Pub. L. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914, 2157) directs the 
Secretary of Transportation to initiate a rulemaking concerning methods 
for improving braking performance of new commercial motor 
vehicles,1 including truck tractors, trailers, and their dollies. 
Congress specifically directed that such a rulemaking examine antilock 
systems, means of improving brake compatibility, and methods of 
ensuring effectiveness of brake timing. The ISTEA requires that the 
rulemaking be consistent with the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 (49 
U.S.C. 31147(b)) and be carried out pursuant to, and in accordance 
with, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (49 
U.S.C. 30111 et seq.).

    \1\For the purposes of section 4012, the term ``commercial motor 
vehicle'' means any self-propelled or towed vehicle used on highways 
to transport passengers or property if such vehicle has a gross 
vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 11,794 kilograms (kg) (26,001 
pounds) or more. The NHTSA's final rule on ABS applies to medium and 
heavy vehicles with a GVWR of 4,536 kg (10,001 pounds) or more.
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The NHTSA Rulemaking

    In response to the ISTEA, the NHTSA has issued a final rule (which 
is published elsewhere in today's Federal Register) amending Federal 
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 105, Hydraulic Brake Systems, 
and FMVSS No. 121, Air Brake Systems, to require medium and heavy 
vehicles to be equipped with an antilock brake system (ABS) to improve 
the lateral stability (i.e., traction) and steering control of these 
vehicles during braking. For truck tractors, the ABS requirement is 
supplemented by a 30-mph braking-in-a-curve test on a low coefficient 
of friction surface using a full brake application. By improving 
lateral stability and control, these requirements will significantly 
reduce jackknifing and other losses of control during braking as well 
as the deaths and injuries caused by those control problems.
    In addition, the NHTSA final rule requires all powered heavy 
vehicles to be equipped with an in-cab lamp to indicate ABS 
malfunctions. Truck tractors and other trucks equipped to tow air-
braked trailers are required to be equipped with two separate in-cab 
lamps: one indicating malfunctions in the towing vehicle ABS and the 
other in the trailer ABS. Trailers produced during an initial eight-
year period must also be equipped with an external malfunction 
indicator that will be visible to the driver of the towing tractor. 
These indicators will provide valuable information about ABS 
malfunctioning to the driver in the event that the trailer is towed by 
a vehicle that is not equipped with an in-cab ABS malfunction indicator 
for trailers.
    The amendments to FMVSS No. 105 become effective on March 1, 1999. 
The amendments to FMVSS No. 121 become effective on March 1, 1997, with 
respect to truck tractors, and on March 1, 1998, with respect to air-
braked trailers, converter dollies, single unit trucks and buses.
    In the 1970's, FMVSS No. 121 included stopping distance 
requirements which essentially required heavy vehicles to be equipped 
with antilock brake systems. In response to a legal challenge, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit invalidated the 
stopping distance and ``no lockup'' requirements in Standard No. 121, 
along with certain other provisions, holding that the standard was 
``neither reasonable nor practicable at the time it was put into 
effect.'' PACCAR v. NHTSA, 573 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 862 (1978).
    As explained in NHTSA's final rule, the preconditions for an ABS 
requirement for heavy vehicles differ markedly from 20 years ago when 
the petitioners challenged the agency in PACCAR. First, NHTSA's 
extensive fleet study of heavy vehicle antilock systems demonstrates 
that these systems are reliable. Second, the agency's testing of truck 
tractors equipped with antilock systems indicates that they provide 
significantly improved lateral control and stability compared to 
vehicles without antilock systems. Third, unlike air brake systems in 
existence in the mid-1970's that relied on significantly larger, more 
aggressive foundation brakes, which could possibly create safety 
problems if the antilock system malfunctioned, the requirements being 
adopted today do not necessitate such aggressive brakes. Fourth, 
antilock brake systems are now in widespread, everyday use in this 
country and throughout the world. Fifth, the performance requirements 
adopted in today's final rule are objective and practicable. Based on 
these and other considerations discussed throughout its final rule, 
NHTSA believes the final rule satisfies the concerns raised in the 
PACCAR case.
    To evaluate the reliability of current-generation ABS designs, the 
NHTSA conducted extensive field studies of ABS-equipped heavy truck 
tractors and [[Page 13307]] semitrailers2 in developing its final 
rule. In response to the PACCAR case, these studies were structured to 
assess whether current-generation heavy vehicle antilock brake systems 
were reliable and fail-safe, whether they inordinately increased 
vehicle maintenance costs, and whether they could be successfully 
maintained and would remain functioning in typical U.S. heavy truck 
operating environments.

    \2\ ``An In-Service Evaluation of the Reliability, 
Maintainability, and Durability of Antilock Braking Systems (ABS) 
for Heavy Truck Tractors,'' DOT Report No. 807 846, March 1992, and 
``An In-Service Evaluation of the Reliability, Maintainability, and 
Durability of Antilock Braking Systems (ABS) for Semitrailers,'' DOT 
Report No. 808 059, October 1993.
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The NHTSA Research

    Between 1988 and 1993, the agency tracked the maintenance 
performance histories of 200 truck tractors and 50 semitrailers 
equipped with ABS, as well as the histories of a comparison group of 88 
truck tractors and 35 semitrailers not equipped with ABS, to determine 
the incremental maintenance costs and patterns associated with 
installing ABS on these heavy vehicles. Additionally, special on-board 
vehicle recorders were used to monitor the functioning and performance 
of the ABSs. Finally, drivers and mechanics at the participating test 
fleets were periodically interviewed to ascertain their views about the 
ABS test vehicles' performance and ease of maintenance. The study 
authors concluded that, based on the data collected during the fleet 
study, currently available antilock brake systems are reliable, durable 
and maintainable. While ABS is not a zero-cost maintenance item, its 
presence on a vehicle did not substantially increase maintenance costs 
(less than one percent for tractors, less than two percent for 
trailers) or decrease vehicle operational availability. Moreover, the 
NHTSA study found that system malfunctions would not render the 
vehicle's braking system unsafe, since the brake system would merely 
revert to one without an ABS; foundation brakes are unchanged when ABS 
is added. The incidents noted during the test program in which an ABS 
malfunction did compromise the vehicle's underlying brake system 
performance involved defective components.
    The NHTSA's research report indicates that in both the tractor and 
the trailer studies, many of the test vehicles either arrived in the 
test fleets with faulty ABS or had ABS malfunction indications shortly 
thereafter. These problems were the result of what was referred to as 
installation or pre-production design-related problems. In general, 
these problems were easily remedied, with most of the ABSs requiring 
only adjustments or minor repairs. Problems of this nature were at 
least partially attributable to the prototype nature of many of the 
installations accomplished for this test program.
    The NHTSA emphasizes that the problems encountered in the test 
program do not reflect inherent design flaws with the principal 
components (i.e., the electronic control units (ECU), modulators, and 
wheel-speed sensing hardware) of ABS. Instead, they highlight the 
importance of using high quality wiring components and paying close 
attention to installation details. The NHTSA anticipates that the 
frequency of these problems will be lower than that experienced during 
the agency's test program once ABS production/installation increases to 
a level high enough to enable the quality control programs typically 
utilized by suppliers and truck manufacturers to take effect.
    An average of 1.35 labor hours and $106.46 for replacement 
components per test truck tractor were necessary to rectify these 
installation/pre-production design-related problems. Comparable figures 
for semitrailers were 1.9 labor hours and $65.36 for parts. All these 
costs are usually recovered by fleets under the terms of typical 
warranties offered by ABS suppliers and/or truck manufacturers. The 
NHTSA notes that the start-up or installation/pre-production design-
related problems that the test fleets experienced are similar to the 
experiences that fleets were reported to have had with electronically 
controlled engines when they were first introduced on heavy trucks in 
the mid-1980's.
    During the two-year period in which the reliability of these 
systems was evaluated, 200 ABS-equipped test tractors accumulated 
39,818,659 miles of travel. During that period, 126 trucks (63 percent) 
needed ABS related maintenance that could best be attributed to normal 
service wear factors rather than installation or pre-production design-
related problems. A total of 421 incidents of this type occurred with 
the 126 trucks, the majority (321 or 76 percent) of which involved 
inspections/adjustments. The remainder (100 or 24 percent) involved 
repairs/replacements. All brands of the ABSs involved in the test 
program experienced incidents of this type at one time or another 
during their in-service operation.
    Forty vehicles experienced more than one failure warning, the 
reason for which could not be discovered. Two vehicles experienced 35 
and 31 such indications (23 percent of the total ECU resets (clearing 
the failure message from the ECU memory)) respectively. Two other 
trucks experienced 12 and 10 separate indications, respectively. These 
four vehicles (4.5 percent of the trucks with failure warning problems) 
accounted for 30 percent of the total intermittent failure warning 
indications and ECU resets.
    All five ABS systems (Bendix, Bosch, Midland, Rockwell, and WABCO) 
experienced intermittent failure indications with at least one of the 
forty test trucks each had involved in the test program. In each case, 
the ABS was either manually reset or the warning light did not 
reactivate when the truck's ignition was turned off and subsequently 
turned on again at some later time. However, 61 percent of the total 
failure warning indications of this type, and 34 percent of the 
vehicles experiencing intermittent failure indications, were 
attributable to one supplier's ABS. Another supplier's system accounted 
for 18 percent of total failure warning indications and 28 percent of 
the total vehicles involved. Since the time of the agency's test, both 
suppliers' systems have been modified to reduce the number of these 
false-positive malfunction indications.
    The NHTSA's final rule summarizes the maintenance related to in-
service wear that was required during the tractor portion of the 
program on each of the ABS components. Inspections and ECU resets 
associated with intermittent failure warning indications were the 
principal occurrences. In general, most of the work did not involve 
parts replacements. Parts-replacement incidents totaled 40, with 55 
percent of these (22) involving failure warning lamp bulbs or fuses. 
The average number of in-service wear-related maintenance incidents, 
including all inspections, adjustments, repairs, and replacements, was 
2.11 incidents per truck over the two-year period of the test.
    Replacing faulty major ABS components, plus performing all other 
inspections, adjustments and repairs that were in-service wear-related, 
required approximately 403 hours of labor and $4,068 for parts 
replacements for all tractors in the test. At a standard hourly rate of 
$35, this amounts to $18,173, or 0.046 cents per mile (based on 
39,818,659 total miles of travel) for the cost of maintaining the ABSs 
over the two-year period. The inspections/ECU resets, which only 
involved labor [[Page 13308]] expenditure, accounted for 45 percent of 
these total costs. Although they occurred infrequently, ECU 
replacements were costly, accounting for 21 percent of the in-service 
wear-related maintenance costs.
    Similar findings were noted for the 50 ABS-equipped semitrailers 
that were evaluated. The test vehicles accumulated 4,001,369 miles of 
in-service use during almost two years of operation. In that period, 23 
semitrailers (46 percent) needed ABS-related maintenance that could 
best be attributed to normal service factors, rather than installation 
or pre-production design-related problems. This compares favorably to 
the 63 percent of tractors requiring ABS service during the tractor 
program. A total of 44 incidents of this type occurred with the 
semitrailers, with the majority (29, or 66 percent) involving 
inspections or adjustments. The remainder (15, or 34 percent) involved 
repairs or replacements. These percentages are similar to the 76 
percent for adjustments and inspections and 24 percent for repairs and 
replacements seen during the tractor program.
    In summarizing the in-service maintenance that was required for ABS 
components during the trailer portion of the test program, the NHTSA 
notes that inspections and ECU resets associated with intermittent 
failure warning indications were the principal occurrences. Parts-
replacement incidents totaled six, with three of these being status 
light bulbs and three speed sensors. In general, most of the work did 
not involve parts replacement.
    The average number of in-service maintenance incidents, including 
all inspections, adjustments, repairs, and replacements, was 0.88 
incidents per semitrailer over the two-year test period. This compares 
well with the 2.11 incidents per tractor seen during the tractor 
portion of this program.
    Replacing faulty ABS components, plus performing all other 
inspections, adjustments, and repairs that were in-service related, 
required approximately 44 hours of labor and $234 for parts 
replacements. At a standardized hourly rate of $35, the total cost of 
maintaining the ABSs over the two-year period ($1,774) amounts to 0.044 
cents per mile (based on 4,001,369 total miles of travel). The 
inspections and ECU resets (which only involved labor expenditure) 
accounted for 35 percent of the total costs. The comparable tractor 
figures are 0.046 cents per mile for total costs and 45 percent of the 
total costs for inspection and ECU reset, indicating that the 
semitrailers performed very much like the tractors.

Maintenance of ABS

    At the completion of the overall 5-year test program, the NHTSA 
conducted a final follow-up survey among the participating fleets. 
Among the 13 fleets that were continuing to maintain the ABS on the 
original test tractors, 97 percent of those tractors had functioning 
ABS. On the other hand, the ABSs were not functioning on two-thirds of 
the original test tractors in the other three fleets surveyed that 
chose not to continue maintaining the systems. This demonstrates that 
fleets must be committed to maintaining the ABS if it is to be kept 
operational.
    Antilock brake systems require some periodic, and occasionally non-
periodic, non-scheduled maintenance in order to remain functional. 
Nonetheless, the NHTSA believes that the data contained in the two 
fleet study reports indicate that equipping vehicles with ABS is 
appropriate. Taken in total, those data indicate that, while ABS is not 
a zero-maintenance component, it is neither difficult nor unduly 
expensive to maintain. The fleet test results do not indicate that the 
level of maintenance attention needed to keep ABS functional is 
unreasonable relative to the safety benefits that will result from use 
of these systems.

FHWA Intention

    The FHWA has concluded that a rulemaking should be initiated 
proposing to amend the FMCSRs to include ABS requirements for certain 
commercial motor vehicles subject to those regulations. At a minimum, 
the rulemaking would propose that motor carriers be required to 
maintain the ABS units on all vehicles subject to the NHTSA rule.
    The agency is not offering for comment at this time any proposed 
language for amendments to the FMCSRs. The FHWA does, however, solicit 
comments on its decision to initiate a rulemaking on ABS. Following a 
careful review of the docket comments sent in response to this notice, 
the FHWA will publish a notice of proposed rulemaking containing 
specific regulatory language. The FHWA anticipates that this rulemaking 
will be concluded prior to the effective date of the NHTSA's ABS 
requirement.

Rulemaking Analyses and Notices

    All comments received before the close of business on the comment 
closing date indicated above will be considered and will be available 
for examination in the docket room at the above address. Comments 
received after the comment closing date will be filed in the docket and 
will be considered to the extent practicable. In addition to late 
comments, the FHWA will also continue to file in the docket relevant 
information that becomes available after the comment closing date, and 
interested persons should continue to examine the docket for new 
material.

Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory Planning and Review) and DOT 
Regulatory Policies and Procedures

    The FHWA has determined that this action is not a significant 
regulatory action within the meaning of Executive Order 12866 or 
significant within the meaning of Department of Transportation 
regulatory policies and procedures. Due to the preliminary nature of 
this document and lack of necessary information on costs, however, the 
FHWA is unable to evaluate fully the economic impact of the potential 
regulatory changes being considered in this rulemaking. Based on the 
information received in response to this notice, the FHWA intends to 
carefully consider the costs and benefits associated with various 
alternative requirements. Comments, information, and data are solicited 
on the economic impact of the potential changes.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    Due to the preliminary nature of this document and lack of 
necessary information on costs, the FHWA is unable to evaluate fully 
the effects of the potential regulatory changes on small entities. 
Based on the information received in response to this notice, the FHWA 
intends, in compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act (Pub. L. 96-
354; 5 U.S.C. 601-612), to carefully consider the economic impacts of 
these potential changes on small entities. The FHWA solicits comments, 
information, and data on these impacts.

Executive Order 12612 (Federalism Assessment)

    This action has been analyzed in accordance with the principles and 
criteria contained in Executive Order 12612, and it has been determined 
that this rulemaking does not have sufficient Federalism implications 
to warrant the preparation of a Federalism assessment. Nothing in this 
document directly preempts any State law or regulation.

Executive Order 12372 (Intergovernmental Review)

    Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Number 20.217, Motor 
Carrier Safety. The regulations implementing Executive Order 12372 
regarding intergovernmental [[Page 13309]] consultation on Federal 
programs and activities apply to this program.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    This action does not contain a collection of information 
requirement for the purposes of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 44 
U.S.C. 3501 et seq.

National Environmental Policy Act

    The agency has analyzed this rulemaking for the purpose of the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) and 
has determined that this action would not have any effect on the 
quality of the environment.

Regulation Identification Number

    A regulation identification number (RIN) is assigned to each 
regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. 
The Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda 
in April and October of each year. The RIN contained in the heading of 
this document can be used to cross reference this action with the 
Unified Agenda.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 393

    Highway safety, Motor carriers, Motor vehicle safety.

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 31136, 31502; 49 CFR 1.48

    Issued on: March 1, 1995.
Rodney E. Slater,
Federal Highway Administrator.
[FR Doc. 95-5414 Filed 3-7-95; 8:45 am]
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