[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 46 (Thursday, March 9, 1995)]
[Presidential Documents]
[Pages 12859-12881]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-5850]



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  Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 46 / Thursday, March 9, 1995 / 
Presidential Documents  

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 Title 3--
 The President  
[[Page 12859]] 
                Presidential Determination No. 95-15 of February 28, 
                1995

                
Certifications for Major Narcotics Producing and 
                Transit Countries

                Memorandum for the Secretary of State

                By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 
                490(b)(1)(A) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 
                amended, (``the Act''), I hereby determine and certify 
                that the following major drug producing and/or major 
                drug transit countries/dependent territories have 
                cooperated fully with the United States, or taken 
                adequate steps on their own, to achieve full compliance 
                with the goals and objectives of the 1988 United 
                Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
                Drugs and Psychotropic Substances:

                The Bahamas, Brazil, China, Dominican Republic, 
                Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Hong Kong, India, Jamaica, 
                Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Taiwan, Thailand, 
                Venezuela, and Vietnam.

                By virtue of the authority vested in my by section 
                490(b)(1)(B) of the Act, I hereby determine that it is 
                in the vital national interests of the United States to 
                certify the following countries:

                Bolivia, Colombia, Lebanon, Pakistan, Paraguay, and 
                Peru.

                Information on these countries, as required under 
                section 490(b)(3) of the Act, is attached.

                I have determined that the following major producing 
                and/or major transit countries do not meet the 
                standards set forth in section 490(b):

                Afghanistan, Burma, Iran, Nigeria, and Syria.

                I have made these determinations, taking into account 
                the factors set forth in section 490 of the Act, and 
                based on the information contained in the International 
                Narcotics Control Strategy Report of 1995. Because the 
                performance of these countries varies, I have attached 
                an explanatory statement in each case.

                You are hereby authorized and directed to report this 
                determination to the Congress immediately and to 
                publish it in the Federal Register.

                    (Presidential Sig.)

                THE WHITE HOUSE,

                    Washington, February 28, 1995.
                STATEMENT OF EXPLANATION

                The Bahamas

                    U.S.-Bahamian drug enforcement cooperation under 
                Operation Bahamas and Turks & Caicos (OPBAT) has been 
                excellent and resulted in a dramatic reduction in the 
                flow of drugs through The Bahamas into the United 
                States, as indicated by vastly reduced drug-seizure 
                levels over the last several years. Nevertheless, The 
                Bahamas remains a major transit country for U.S.- 
                [[Page 12860]] bound Colombian cocaine and Jamaican 
                marijuana. As a major financial center, The Bahamas is 
                vulnerable to money laundering. The Bahamas is a party 
                to the 1988 UN Convention. The Ingraham government has 
                taken a firm stand against drug trafficking, drug abuse 
                and money laundering and worked diligently during 1994 
                to fulfill the goals and objectives of the UN 
                Convention and U.S.-Bahamian bilateral counternarcotics 
                accords.
                    During 1994, Bahamian maritime cooperation with the 
                United States was excellent under the terms of several 
                bilateral agreements and arrangements. The Government 
                of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas (GCOB) moved to 
                improve cooperation with the Cuban government when 
                traffickers intensified their exploitation of Cuban 
                territory to avoid OPBAT enforcement efforts. The GCOB 
                generally responds positively to specific U.S. requests 
                under our Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. In 1994, the 
                GCOB took judicial action against three public 
                officials for drug-related corruption: a prison 
                official, an immigration officer and a customs officer.
                    The GCOB took several strong steps to improve its 
                drug-trafficking-control tools. The new U.S.-Bahamas 
                extradition treaty entered into force in 1994. The GCOB 
                also adopted legislation, based on U.S. law, making it 
                a crime to engage in a continuing criminal enterprise 
                related to narcotics trafficking. Working closely with 
                the USG, the GCOB placed special emphasis on 
                strengthening its judicial system by increasing its 
                courts budget, implementing a court automation system, 
                and enacting stronger bail and sentencing legislation.
                    In 1994, the GCOB drafted stronger money laundering 
                legislation, which it expects Parliament to approve in 
                1995. When enacted, this legislation will criminalize 
                money laundering. The GCOB agreed to an evaluation of 
                its money laundering controls by the Caribbean 
                Financial Action Task Force, also expected to take 
                place during 1995. We urge continued vigilance by The 
                Bahamas on possible money laundering through shell 
                corporations and international business companies, 
                which are proliferating in The Bahamas and elsewhere in 
                the Caribbean. Although Bahamian law renders the assets 
                of a convicted drug offender subject to forfeiture, in 
                practice asset forfeiture has been difficult to 
                implement. No procedures exist for civil asset 
                forfeiture in narcotics cases.

                Brazil

                    Brazil is a major transit country for cocaine from 
                Colombia destined for the United States and Europe. 
                Increased cocaine and precursor chemical trafficking 
                and money laundering contribute to Brazil's escalating 
                narcotics problem; corruption allegations against 
                counternarcotics officials in Brazil persist.
                    Despite these problems, Brazil endeavors to meet 
                the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention, and 
                has succeeded in some significant interdiction efforts. 
                The government has made progress towards complying with 
                the UN Convention in law enforcement, asset forfeiture, 
                extradition, and anti-corruption. The Brazilian 
                government generally meets the goals of bilateral 
                counternarcotics agreements with the USG on enforcement 
                and demand reduction.
                    Brazil's increased seizure rate in 1994 of 11 
                metric tons of cocaine marks both heightened trafficker 
                use of Brazil and improved abilities of the Brazilian 
                Federal Police Counternarcotics Unit (DPF/DRE). 
                Brazilian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) hosted 
                seminars by U.S. police in schools to voice the message 
                against drug abuse. The DPF/DRE has targetted and 
                disrupted major Cali-connected drug trafficking 
                organizations.
                    However, the Brazilian government has not hired new 
                police or provided increased funding for the DPF/DRE. 
                The Brazilians have not yet enacted legislation first 
                proposed in 1991 to implement effectively the goals and 
                objectives of the 1988 UN Convention, nor has it 
                drafted a national drug control strategy. Brazil has 
                not yet proposed specialized anti-money 
                launder [[Page 12861]] ing legislation, but requires 
                reporting of cash transactions involving amounts over 
                $10,000.
                    The international consultative forum, the Dublin 
                Group, has focused worldwide donor attention on the 
                need for Brazil to pay greater attention to 
                counternarcotics issues and urged the GOB to take more 
                vigorous action against its growing drug problem. 
                Newly-elected President Cardoso is expected to take 
                such action to confront narcotics traffickers.
                    Brazil's former President Franco signed a decree 
                increasing the DPF's licensing and oversight 
                responsibility for chemicals. The DPF/DRE initiated a 
                sea/airport security program, and continued to seize 
                drugs by riverine and ground law enforcement methods. 
                Brazil continues to plan for a radar system (SIVAM), 
                financed by the Export-Import Bank, to detect narcotics 
                trafficking aircraft in the Amazon.

                China

                    The Government of the People's Republic of China 
                (PRC) is committed to combatting narcotics trafficking 
                and use. China is a major transit route for heroin from 
                neighboring Burma, Laos and Vietnam to the United 
                States and other overseas markets. Drug addiction, 
                which was effectively stamped out following the 
                founding of the PRC in 1949, is once again on the rise. 
                Thanks to China's expanding economy and increasing 
                openness to the outside world, narcotics consumption 
                within the PRC is growing. In addition, opportunities 
                for investment in China provide greater potential for 
                money laundering.
                    Chinese enforcement efforts continue to be vigorous 
                and were stepped up in 1994. Strong laws based on a 
                national directive issued in 1990 call for the death 
                penalty for many drug-related crimes. Hundreds of drug 
                criminals are executed in accordance with these laws 
                annually. Narcotics trafficking in Yunnan province, 
                which borders Burma, decreased in the latter part of 
                1994. The Chinese arrested major figures in two drug 
                trafficking groups based in Burma, the Kokang and the 
                Wa. Better surveillance of the Burmese border, improved 
                intelligence work, and better control of precursor 
                chemicals have also contributed to at least a temporary 
                decrease in trafficking in Yunnan. PRC counternarcotics 
                officials project no increase in national trafficking 
                figures over 1993 levels. The PRC has taken a strong 
                stand against official corruption, and has laws dealing 
                specifically with government officials who are found 
                guilty of the use, manufacture or delivery of 
                narcotics.
                    The United States and China do not have a bilateral 
                counternarcotics agreement in place. China has met, or 
                is actively seeking to meet, the goals and objectives 
                of the 1988 UN Convention, to which it is a party, by 
                continuing its efforts to enhance law enforcement 
                measures, public education, and international 
                cooperation.
                    Illicit opium cultivation exists in remote, often 
                roadless areas of Yunnan province and is suspected to 
                exist in scattered pockets in other parts of China. The 
                authorities are committed to eradicating opium 
                cultivation when it is detected. Yunnan province 
                cultivation is estimated at 1,965 hectares, capable of 
                yielding approximately 25 metric tons of opium gum.
                    Impediments to bilateral cooperation remain. The 
                Chinese frequently cite the 1993 U.S. court decision 
                blocking the forced return to China of a Chinese drug 
                trafficker (``goldfish case'') as an obstacle to U.S.-
                China counternarcotics cooperation, but these same 
                officials state that they would like to expand 
                bilateral cooperation in the future.

                Dominican Republic

                    The United States Government and the Government of 
                the Dominican Republic (GODR) maintained close, 
                effective counternarcotics cooperation in 1994, despite 
                tensions over the disputed Dominican presidential 
                election and over Haiti. The Dominican Republic 
                intensified its counternarcotics effort and improved 
                interagency/inter-service cooperation under the 
                leadership of the new director of the National 
                Directorate of Drug Control (DNCD). [[Page 12862]] GODR 
                personnel, working with U.S. law enforcement, made 
                several multi-hundred kilo cocaine seizures in 1994. 
                The GODR was especially helpful in arranging the return 
                of several major drug figures who were fugitives from 
                U.S. justice.
                    Threat assessments indicate an increased flow of 
                narcotics into the Dominican Republic from Haiti, 
                especially since the September 1991 coup in Haiti. 
                Maritime shipments from Panama are also increasing. The 
                DNCD and Dominican Navy, working in concert with DEA, 
                interdicted one such maritime shipment on November 22, 
                seizing nearly a metric ton of cocaine and uncovering a 
                major smuggling operation.
                    During 1994, a wide range of USG-financed 
                professional training (law enforcement, drug abuse 
                prevention, financial investigations, and canine 
                handling assessment) was provided to DNCD personnel and 
                other military and civilian officials. The GODR 
                complied fully with its commitments under the bilateral 
                counternarcotics assistance agreement.
                    The Dominican Republic became a party to the UN 
                Convention in late 1993 and has taken action consistent 
                with the goals and objectives of the UN Convention. 
                Additional legislation, however, is needed in areas 
                such as money laundering and asset seizure to enable 
                the GODR to comply more fully with the Convention. The 
                GODR has been active in the Inter-American Drug Abuse 
                Control Commission and the United Nations Drug Control 
                Program. It hosted the 1994 United Nations Heads of 
                Narcotics Law Enforcement Agencies Conference for Latin 
                America and will host the Latin American International 
                Drug Enforcement Conference in April 1995. It has 
                established cooperative relationships with a number of 
                other governments in the hemisphere, most recently 
                signing a bilateral drug cooperation agreement with 
                Venezuela.
                    The GODR still faces many challenges in 
                establishing an effective national anti-drug effort. 
                While it has taken steps to address narcotics-related 
                and other official corruption, corruption continues to 
                undermine GODR law enforcement efforts. Anti-drug 
                legislation, while strengthened, has serious flaws; in 
                the area of money laundering control, for example, the 
                Dominican legislature removed prison sentences, leaving 
                only moderate fines for bankers convicted of 
                involvement in laundering activities. The GODR will 
                resubmit the package in 1995 to correct this.

                Ecuador

                    Ecuador is a bridge between the world's largest 
                supplier of coca leaf, Peru, and the world's major 
                processor of cocaine hydrochloride, Colombia. 
                Traffickers use Ecuador as a transit point to ship 30-
                50 metric tons (mt) of cocaine per year to the United 
                States and Europe, as well as to smuggle chemicals into 
                Colombia for cocaine processing. Money launderers take 
                advantage of Ecuador's loose banking laws and extensive 
                offshore banking system to conceal the illicit nature 
                of their proceeds.
                    Ecuadorian judges are subject to trafficker 
                intimidation and subornation, which has obstructed 
                efforts to bring Cali-connected kingpin Jorge Reyes 
                Torres to justice. Corrupt judicial practices have 
                precluded indictments in Reyes Torres-related cases, 
                specifically the Banco De Los Andes case. Stronger 
                resolve by the Government of Ecuador (GOE) to confront 
                judicial corruption will be necessary to successfully 
                conclude the Jorge Reyes Torres case and other 
                counternarcotics initiatives.
                    Ecuador made significant strides this year toward 
                complying with the 1988 UN Convention, to which it is a 
                party. The government has taken steps to generally meet 
                the goals of bilateral counternarcotics agreements with 
                the USG on enforcement, demand reduction, and 
                prosecutions of major narcotics traffickers. The GOE 
                enacted a law based on OAS model legislation on asset 
                sharing and completed a study to determine the amount 
                of licit chemical use in Ecuador. [[Page 12863]] 
                    However, the Ecuadorians should strive to control 
                trafficking in precursor and essential chemicals by 
                creating an effective monitoring and control system 
                based on the results of the completed study. Ecuador is 
                making efforts to control money laundering by involving 
                the police, Superintendency of Banks, and the National 
                Drug Council (CONSEP) in collaborative investigations.
                    The USG has provided Thrush aircraft to identify 
                illicit crop cultivation in Ecuador. None was 
                discovered in 1994, but search flights will continue in 
                1995. Ecuador is progressing in implementing its 
                National Drug Strategy. Ecuador signed an asset-sharing 
                agreement with the USG in 1994. A limited amount of 
                asset-sharing has already taken place based on this 
                agreement. The Ecuadorians used the funds for law 
                enforcement purposes. Ecuador continues to work toward 
                sharing the remainder of $3 million in assets forfeited 
                in the Reyes Torres investigation.
                    The USG counternarcotics assistance program helps 
                Ecuador to reduce money laundering, control essential 
                chemicals, and buttress the judiciary's ability to 
                preserve democracy by enforcing the rule of law.

                Guatemala

                    The Government of Guatemala (GOG) has successful 
                programs to reduce demand, cultivation, and transit of 
                illicit narcotics.
                    With USG technical support, specially trained units 
                of the Guatemalan Treasury Police conduct ongoing 
                eradication that has reduced opium poppy cultivation to 
                minimal levels. Persistent attempts to revive poppy 
                cultivation are the focus of a continuing suppression 
                program which includes detection and eradication.
                    Guatemala's hundreds of small, unmonitored 
                airfields connected by good roads appear to have almost 
                been forsaken by traffickers moving cocaine in small 
                planes to the United States from South America. In 
                response to DEA's Operation Cadence and GOG vigilance 
                in-country, traffickers are increasingly transporting 
                drugs overland and by sea. During 1994, over 1.5 metric 
                tons of cocaine were seized outside Guatemala as a 
                result of Guatemalan-based intelligence. Almost two 
                metric tons were seized in-country.
                    The GOG's aggressive investigation, interdiction 
                and eradication operations are consistent with the 
                goals of the 1988 UN Convention, to which Guatemala is 
                a party. However, Guatemala lacks legislation needed to 
                implement the Convention in areas such as money 
                laundering and essential chemical control. Money 
                laundering has not been criminalized in Guatemala and 
                is not considered a significant problem.
                    Corruption, especially in the judicial branch, is a 
                major problem in Guatemala. The GOG has begun to focus 
                attention on corruption, particularly in the courts 
                where several judges were relieved of their positions 
                for releasing prisoners under allegedly questionable 
                circumstances. The GOG does not, as a matter of policy 
                or practice encourage or facilitate illicit narcotics 
                production or distribution, or laundering of drug 
                proceeds.
                    Guatemala continues to accomplish the goals of its 
                bilateral narcotics agreements with the USG for drug 
                eradication, interdiction, and demand reduction. The 
                USG is working with the GOG to implement cost 
                reductions while retaining the high level of 
                effectiveness demonstrated by Guatemala's 
                counternarcotics programs.

                Haiti

                    Because of its ideal geographic location for 
                smuggling, the island of Hispaniola has long been a 
                significant transit point for cocaine destined for U.S. 
                and European markets. The unstable political situation 
                and weak government institutions in Haiti facilitated 
                narcotics trafficking for many years. The opportunities 
                for traffickers to take advantage of these conditions 
                were even greater after the September 1991 coup which 
                ousted President Jean Bertrand Aristide. Multi-hundred 
                kilo and multi-ton shipments of cocaine 
                [[Page 12864]] transited the country frequently. The 
                USG has received credible, but unsubstantiated, reports 
                for many years that the Haitian military was involved 
                in assisting traffickers. However, the USG was unable 
                to determine the veracity of reports that the de facto 
                regime or the military hierarchy secretly condoned such 
                activity.
                    Until the legitimate government of Haiti was 
                restored in September 1994, the USG maintained only 
                limited counternarcotics cooperation with the de facto 
                regime in Haiti, largely through the Haitian Center for 
                Information Coordination (CICC), which the United 
                States helped establish in 1987. The de facto 
                government undertook some drug enforcement efforts and 
                made a number of cocaine seizures in the 2-60 kg range 
                in 1993-1994, some in cooperation with USG law 
                enforcement personnel from the U.S. Embassy. However, 
                suspected multi-ton shipments transited Haiti unimpeded 
                until the country was subjected to an international 
                maritime blockade in April 1994.
                    Drug trafficking was among the six issues President 
                Clinton listed in early 1994 as key areas of U.S. 
                concern relating to Haiti. Growing drug trafficker 
                influence in Haiti may well have impeded the return of 
                democracy, sound administration of justice and economic 
                recovery. The Aristide administration, working with the 
                international community, has initiated an extensive 
                administration of justice and police reform program. 
                Former military and police personnel suspected of 
                involvement in drug trafficking are being excluded from 
                the new civilian police corps and the reorganized 
                military.
                    This massive and critical reform is the most 
                important step that the Government of Haiti can take at 
                this stage to attack the narcotics problem at its core. 
                Since the restoration of the Aristide government, the 
                USG-led Multinational Force and the International 
                Police Monitors have played a large role in law 
                enforcement in Haiti. These efforts have included 
                control of the major ports and airfields, and 
                supervising and monitoring the interim Haitian police. 
                This, and all other relevant activity, is undertaken 
                with the full concurrence of the Haitian government. 
                The Aristide government cooperated completely with the 
                United States in all aspects of this effort.
                    In the future, the restored Aristide government 
                will need to take a number of other measures to address 
                drug trafficking more effectively: it should become a 
                party to the 1988 UN Convention, establish a national 
                council to coordinate Haitian counternarcotics 
                activities, implement money laundering controls, and 
                forcefully address the problem of narco-corruption 
                within the police and military forces.-

                Hong Kong

                    Hong Kong is not a party to the 1988 UN Convention, 
                but the territory's counternarcotics efforts 
                effectively comply with most of the goals and 
                objectives of the agreement. Hong Kong takes serious 
                and effective measures to combat narcotics trafficking. 
                Nevertheless, Hong Kong remains an important 
                transshipment center for heroin from Southeast Asia. 
                Due to enforcement efforts and changes in trafficking 
                patterns, the volume of drugs passing through Hong Kong 
                seems to be dropping. The amount of heroin detected 
                transiting Hong Kong for Taiwan, Japan, and the United 
                States fell during 1994 and heroin arriving in Hong 
                Kong is increasingly intended for domestic consumption.
                    The USG is not aware of any narcotics-related 
                corruption among senior government or law enforcement 
                officials in Hong Kong. Hong Kong has a comprehensive 
                anti-corruption ordinance that is effectively enforced 
                by an independent commission that reports directly to 
                the Governor.
                    Hong Kong continues to serve as a major center of 
                money laundering of drug proceeds by local and regional 
                groups trafficking in heroin. Passage of the new 
                Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance improves the 
                Hong Kong Government's (HKG) ability to prosecute money 
                launderers. The HKG is in the final stages of drafting 
                amendments to the Financial Recovery [[Page 12865]] of 
                Proceeds Act to conform more fully with the Financial 
                Action Task Force recommendations and the UN 
                Convention.
                    There is a bilateral narcotics agreement, which 
                facilitates asset freezing and asset forfeiture. The 
                Hong Kong Government and the USG have worked closely 
                together on U.S. extradition requests, although there 
                is some concern that overly strict application of Hong 
                Kong evidentiary requirements has made extradition 
                difficult in some cases. Overall bilateral cooperation 
                on drug enforcement efforts is very good.

                India

                    India is the world's largest producer of licit 
                opium and the largest supplier to the U.S. 
                pharmaceutical industry. Opium is diverted from legal 
                production, and there is substantial illicit opium 
                cultivation in certain districts. India is also a 
                transit route for heroin from nearby producing 
                countries, and an exporter of methaqualone and heroin 
                precursor chemicals en route to the Middle East, 
                Africa, Europe and North America.
                    As a licit producer of opium, India must meet an 
                additional certification requirement. In accordance 
                with Section 490(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act, it 
                must maintain licit production and stockpiles at levels 
                no higher than those consistent with licit market 
                demand and take adequate steps to prevent significant 
                diversion of its licit cultivation and production into 
                illicit markets and to prevent illicit cultivation and 
                production.
                    The United States and India conducted an intensive 
                dialogue on narcotics issues, with meetings of a Joint 
                Working Group and a 1994 visit by Dr. Lee Brown. With 
                U.S. encouragement, India maintained during 1994 a 
                promising narcotics dialogue with Pakistan on cross-
                border smuggling of heroin and precursor chemicals, 
                despite poor bilateral relations in other areas.
                    Over the past several years, the Government of 
                India (GOI) has taken steps to reduce licit opium 
                stockpiles and the potential for diversion of licit 
                opium to the illicit market. The total area licensed 
                for cultivation was kept at about 14,000 hectares (ha) 
                in the 1993/4 crop season and physical controls on 
                harvested opium were enhanced. In 1994, in the course 
                of taking the first physical inventory in many years, 
                it became clear that real stocks on hand were far lower 
                (by 800 metric tons) than official inventories and that 
                supplies were insufficient to fulfill 1994 contractual 
                requirements. An International Narcotics Control Board 
                audit described the failure to have maintained adequate 
                inventory records as a violation of the 1961 Single 
                Convention on Narcotics Drugs. No adequate accounting 
                of several hundred tons of the discrepancy between book 
                stocks and real stocks has been made. New storage and 
                accounting controls put into place in 1994 should 
                reduce potential for diversion from licit stocks.
                    To combat large-scale diversion by growers, the GOI 
                has slowly increased minimum qualifying yields (MQY) on 
                licensed growers. MQY was raised from 40 kg per ha to 
                43 kg/ha for the 1994/5 growing season. An unreleased 
                GOI crop survey reportedly suggests that MQY could be 
                raised by a substantially greater amount. The United 
                States raised with India the need for a scientific crop 
                yield survey in the near future so that MQY can be 
                raised to a level high enough to prevent substantial 
                diversion to the illicit market.
                    To cope with the 1994 opium shortfall and rebuild 
                an appropriate reserve stockpile, the GOI decided in 
                1994/5 to expand the cultivated area to about 24,000 
                hectares, but to improve security by concentrating 
                production in a more limited region, granting 
                additional hectarage to farmers with a history of high 
                yields, and delicensing some 40,000 farmers whose opium 
                deliveries to the GOI fell below the MQY. This 
                expansion in cultivated area raises concern about the 
                potential for increased diversion.
                    The Government of India cooperates well with the 
                United States on individual cases of trafficking. There 
                has been little success, however, in cracking major 
                smuggling rings, pointing up a continuing lack of 
                resources and personnel, including lack of 
                intelligence-gathering capability and high-level 
                political [[Page 12866]] support, allocated to 
                narcotics enforcement. There were no seizures of heroin 
                laboratories in 1994. The United States has no specific 
                knowledge of any senior GOI officials encouraging or 
                facilitating trafficking or money laundering. 
                Allegations of corruption among lower-level judicial 
                and law enforcement personnel are widespread, but 
                successful prosecutions rare.
                    Illicit cultivation of opium is concentrated in the 
                state of Jammu and Kashmir, in remote areas of Uttar 
                Pradesh, and in other areas where political 
                disturbances and inadequate enforcement resources kept 
                GOI eradication efforts to a minimum. The GOI cited 
                bureaucratic difficulties in turning down a U.S. offer 
                of partial U.S. funding for an aerial crop survey in 
                1994. Illicit opium production is estimated to be in 
                the range of 80 metric tons on 5,500 hectares, with 
                reported eradication of about 100 hectares.
                    India is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and has 
                made some progress toward precursor chemical control 
                and law enforcement cooperation. However, India has not 
                yet passed asset seizure legislation or implemented 
                recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force. 
                Although India did not sign a bilateral agreement with 
                the United States in 1994, the goals of a 1993 
                agreement aimed at improving security at the opium 
                factories are being achieved.
                    India fulfilled the requirement of FAA Section 
                490(c) to maintain licit production and stockpiles at 
                levels no higher than consistent with market demand. 
                The GOI addressed a number of the specific U.S. 
                concerns expressed in 1994 bilateral narcotics 
                consultations, which focussed on better controls on 
                licit opium production. For 1994, India's efforts to 
                impose necessary controls on licit opium and 
                cooperation with DEA and other endorsement agencies 
                justify continued certification. In 1995, significant 
                additional steps will need to be taken if full 
                certification is to continue. Areas of outstanding 
                concern include: quantifying real licit opium yields; 
                revising MQY to appropriate levels; eradicating illicit 
                cultivation; taking effective action against major 
                narcotics trafficking syndicates and kingpins; and 
                implementing effective measures on money laundering and 
                asset seizure.

                Jamaica

                    Jamaica is both a major producer of marijuana and a 
                flourishing transshipment site for South American 
                cocaine en route to the United States, The Bahamas, 
                Canada and Europe. There is scant evidence of money 
                laundering at this point. Jamaica is not yet a party to 
                the 1988 UN Convention. However, the Government of 
                Jamaica (GOJ) took adequate steps during 1994 to 
                fulfill the goals and objectives of both the Convention 
                and U.S.-Jamaican counternarcotics agreements.
                    The GOJ made progress during 1994 in strengthening 
                its narcotics control effort. Jamaica's Forfeiture of 
                Assets Act, which allows for criminal but not civil 
                forfeiture, went into effect in August. The GOJ also 
                amended its Dangerous Drugs Act to provide for tougher 
                fines and longer imprisonment for drug offenders. The 
                GOJ continued work on money laundering control 
                legislation and expects to present it to Parliament 
                before April 1995. With the adoption of money 
                laundering legislation, Jamaica will have the full 
                range of implementing legislation for the 1988 UN 
                Convention, which it then intends to ratify. In 1994, 
                the GOJ submitted to Parliament enabling legislation to 
                permit Jamaican ratification of the U.S.-Jamaica Mutual 
                Legal Assistance Treaty, and the GOJ expects passage 
                soon.
                    Throughout 1994, the GOJ continued its excellent 
                cooperation on extradition. GOJ drug enforcement 
                agencies also continued to cooperate well with the U.S. 
                Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). These agencies 
                have recognized the need to bring major traffickers to 
                justice and break up trafficker networks and are taking 
                appropriate steps. Recognizing the necessity of prompt 
                prosecution and conviction, the GOJ has begun to work 
                with the USG on judicial reform, the objectives being 
                to improve the flow of cases through Jamaica's court 
                system and obtain more convictions. Although we know of 
                no GOJ prosecutions of officials for corruption in 
                1994, the GOJ, [[Page 12867]] and especially the Police 
                Commissioner, has attempted to de-politicize the police 
                force and control corruption, largely by transferring 
                suspect personnel. The Commissioner fully supported the 
                USG's revocation of the visas of several police 
                officers suspected of drug trafficking, as permitted 
                under U.S. law. The GOJ's major demand reduction 
                program, a UNDCP-funded project, is not making 
                appreciable progress at this time due to internal 
                problems within the National Council on Drug Abuse.
                    During 1994, the GOJ revitalized its marijuana 
                eradication program. In November, the Jamaica Defense 
                Force (JDF), Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) and DEA 
                cooperated to estimate the total amount of illegally-
                grown marijuana. The JDF and JCF quickly organized a 
                task force to eradicate the marijuana detected during 
                the estimation exercise. During 1994, the GOJ 
                eradicated 692 hectares of marijuana, a 52 percent 
                increase over 1993 eradication.

                Laos

                    Laos is not a party to the 1988 UN Convention, but 
                has drafted a comprehensive drug control program that 
                commits it to the goals of the Convention. As part of 
                this program, the government has pledged to become a 
                party to the Convention no later than the year 2000. A 
                letter of agreement on counternarcotics signed in 1989 
                is the basis for ongoing drug control projects funded 
                by the USG. These projects consist of an alternative 
                crop development project and a law enforcement support 
                project. In 1994, police units supported by the law 
                enforcement project became operational and began to 
                make arrests. Road building, dam site preparation and 
                other basic development work was undertaken in the crop 
                development project.
                    Based on USG estimates, Laos remains one of the 
                world's major producers of opium, although production 
                has been on a declining trend since 1990. Due primarily 
                to weather, opium cultivation and yield fell sharply 
                during the 1993/4 growing season. USG estimates for the 
                1994 crop show a decrease in cultivation of 
                approximately 29 percent, from 26,040 hectares in 1993 
                to 18,520 in 1994. Production of opium gum dropped even 
                more significantly, from about 180 metric tons in 1993 
                to only 85 metric tons in 1994, a decline of 53 
                percent. Opium cultivation is not illegal under 
                existing statutes.
                    In the past year, the Lao government has moved 
                forward in its anti-narcotics efforts through 
                continuation of both bilateral and multilateral 
                programs. Bilateral agreements signed with the USG 
                continued the crop control project in Houaphan Province 
                and the law enforcement project. An additional crop 
                control project has been approved, which will be 
                implemented by Norwegian Church Aid/UNDCP. An active 
                UNDCP program also operates an alternative development 
                program aimed at opium crop control. The Lao special 
                counternarcotics unit, which was formed as a result of 
                the 1992 bilateral USG-Lao law enforcement project 
                agreement, is now functioning and had some successes in 
                1994 in heroin interdiction efforts. Lao customs has 
                worked closely and effectively with the special unit in 
                several significant seizures of illicit drugs and in 
                follow-on investigations.
                    There have been allegations of military and 
                official collusion in narcotics production and 
                trafficking, but there is no solid evidence of official 
                corruption. Lao government employees receive low pay, 
                making them susceptible to corruption and low-level 
                corruption is assumed to exist. There is no clear 
                evidence that the Lao government as a matter of policy 
                encourages or facilitates the illicit production or 
                distribution of drugs or the laundering of drug money.

                Malaysia

                    Malaysia ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1993 
                and has worked cooperatively with the USG, as well as 
                taking adequate steps on its own, to fulfill the 
                Convention's goals and objectives. The USG and the 
                Government of Malaysia (GOM) continue strong 
                antinarcotics cooperation. Several important steps 
                forward in bilateral cooperation were made this year. 
                The two govern [[Page 12868]] ments renewed efforts to 
                collect and analyze intelligence on international drug 
                trafficking, and the Drug Enforcement Administration 
                and the Royal Malaysian Police restored their 
                cooperative relations. A bilateral agreement to assist 
                in demand reduction programs is being implemented 
                effectively. Negotiations for a new U.S.-Malaysia 
                extradition treaty are proceeding.
                    The Government of Malaysia considers the narcotics 
                problem a priority issue. Malaysia pursues an 
                aggressive enforcement policy under one of the most 
                severe drug laws in the world. A well-funded 
                counternarcotics program emphasizes both enforcement 
                and demand reduction.
                    Illicit heroin processing, heroin trafficking, and 
                growing addiction continue to be serious problems in 
                Malaysia. Traffickers smuggle heroin base into Malaysia 
                from Thailand and Burma and refined heroin continues to 
                transit Malaysia en route to the United States and 
                other Western markets.
                    During 1994, there were no notable cases of 
                corruption involving narcotics. However, Penang, where 
                Chinese triad gangs control most narcotics trafficking, 
                is still considered to be vulnerable to corruption and 
                gang members are believed to be involved in attempts to 
                engage law enforcement officials in various forms of 
                corruption. Corruption continued to be addressed by law 
                enforcement agencies. The Royal Malaysian Police 
                continued to take precautions against potential 
                corruption by a careful selection of officers for its 
                anti-narcotics unit and frequent transfers within the 
                unit. Although some law enforcement officials have been 
                charged with corruption in the past, there has been no 
                evidence of corruption among senior officials.
                    Despite severe legal penalties for both drug use 
                and trafficking, drug trafficking remains a major 
                problem. Illicit narcotics generally continue to be 
                available at stable prices for the local addict 
                population.
                    There is no evidence that Malaysia is a significant 
                center for money laundering now, but the Malaysian 
                government is concerned that a new offshore financial 
                center may be vulnerable to money laundering activities 
                and is looking for ways to head off this threat.

                Mexico

                    The United States Government and the Government of 
                Mexico (GOM) maintained close counternarcotics 
                cooperation in 1994, the final year of the Salinas 
                administration, in keeping with the commitments of the 
                bilateral agreement on cooperation in combatting 
                narcotics trafficking and drug dependency (Chiles 
                Amendment Agreement). Mexico continued its multi-
                faceted national campaign against production, 
                trafficking and abuse of illegal drugs, meeting many of 
                the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention. 
                However, the results of this campaign were mixed, with 
                cocaine seizures falling to the lowest level of 
                Salinas' tenure (about 21 mt) and few major traffickers 
                arrested and prosecuted. Narco-corruption remains a 
                serious impediment to effective drug law enforcement. 
                Eradication of opium poppy and cannabis also declined 
                substantially. One factor causing the decline may have 
                been the diversion of military personnel and resources 
                to handle the political uprising in the state of 
                Chiapas. On the positive side, heroin seizures 
                increased to about 300 kilograms, more than the 
                previous five years combined. Seizures of precursor and 
                essential chemicals and destruction of clandestine 
                laboratories likewise increased. Money laundering, 
                particularly the large-scale conversion of cash from 
                the United States, remains a major problem in Mexico, 
                which the GOM has not yet effectively curbed.
                    The decline in cocaine seizures was due to a number 
                of factors. Much of the Mexican Attorney General's 
                Office was devoted to investigating the assassinations 
                of the leading Presidential candidate and the Secretary 
                General of the ruling PRI party. Also, to avoid 
                detection by U.S. and Mexican air interdiction systems, 
                traffickers increased the use of fast moving cargo 
                jets, each transporting huge quantities of cocaine into 
                Mexico. Only one of these aircraft was seized; the U.S. 
                and Mexican governments are sharing intelligence and 
                upgrading equipment to address this 
                situation. [[Page 12869]] 
                    Despite commendable efforts by the Salinas 
                administration to tackle endemic corruption with the 
                Mexican police and judicial systems, including hundreds 
                of dismissals and numerous prosecutions, the measures 
                taken did not turn the tide. Anti-corruption actions, 
                as well as efforts to build strong anti-drug 
                institutions, were undermined by narco-influence (and 
                money) and frequent personnel turnovers, especially in 
                1994.
                    The actions taken by newly-inaugurated President 
                Ernesto Zedillo are encouraging. Zedillo stated 
                publicly that narcotrafficking presented the single 
                greatest threat to the national security of Mexico. 
                Within a few weeks of taking office, he promulgated a 
                sweeping judicial reform package, which was 
                overwhelmingly approved by the Mexican Congress. The 
                Zedillo administration has also pledged to pursue 
                institutional reform of Mexican law enforcement 
                agencies to counter official corruption and to 
                strengthen legal controls over money laundering and 
                precursor chemicals.

                Panama

                    Panama is a major money laundering center, a 
                producer of coca leaf, and a transit point for cocaine 
                destined for the United States.
                    For most of 1994, Panama was preoccupied by 
                election year politics and the transition of 
                administration from President Endara to President Perez 
                Balladares. Nonetheless, there were significant policy 
                and legislative initiatives on the counternarcotics 
                front.
                    Two important counternarcotics achievements were 
                enacted by the Endara administration before it left 
                office: the establishment of cross-border currency 
                controls and the passage of Law 13 which expanded the 
                Government of Panama's (GOP) ability to investigate and 
                prosecute narcotics-related crime.
                    Since taking office in September 1994, the 
                administration of Perez Balladares acknowledged that 
                narcotrafficking and narcotics-related money laundering 
                threaten Panama's political and economic stability. In 
                an effort to prevent abuse of incorporation laws, the 
                new President issued a decree mandating attorneys to 
                follow ``know-your-customer'' practices. He then 
                established a special commission to develop money 
                laundering controls. The resulting policy statement 
                prescribed a number of far-reaching changes. For 
                example, it criminalized drug-related money laundering, 
                mandated suspicious transaction reporting, and extended 
                cash transaction reporting obligations to non-financial 
                institutions. Moreover, Panama's new controls include 
                strengthening the regulatory authority of the National 
                Banking Commission and developing a financial analysis 
                center, an investigations unit, and a prosecutor's 
                office to develop cases of financial crime.
                    Panama was generally successful in meeting the 
                goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention and 
                bilateral counternarcotics agreements with the United 
                States. The GOP's aggressive eradication efforts 
                continued, and interdiction operations showed a marked 
                improvement. To combat money laundering and corruption, 
                the administration of Perez Ballardares moved rapidly 
                on the policy front but was unable to begin 
                implementation of controls before the end of the year. 
                Several middle- and low-level officials were 
                investigated for corruption and, in a few cases, 
                dismissed. The GOP does not, as a matter of policy or 
                practice, encourage or facilitate illicit narcotics 
                distribution, corruption, or laundering of drug 
                proceeds.
                    In 1994, Panama developed a framework on which it 
                can wage a campaign against traffickers and money 
                launderers. In 1995, the measure of the GOP's 
                counternarcotics programs will be the degree to which 
                it builds upon that framework by implementing controls, 
                seizing assets, and prosecuting offenders.

                Taiwan

                    Changing drug trafficking patterns in East Asia 
                have created a growing heroin trafficking problem in 
                Taiwan. Domestic demand for heroin has risen sharply, 
                and Taiwan has also emerged as an important center for 
                the transshipment of heroin. Over the past three or 
                four years, Taiwan authorities [[Page 12870]] have made 
                drug enforcement a priority and heroin seizures have 
                risen sharply, climbing to over one metric ton in 1993.
                    Taiwan is not a party to the 1988 UN Convention, 
                but the vigorous drug enforcement campaign mounted by 
                the Taiwan authorities demonstrates substantial 
                progress toward meeting some of the goals of the 
                Convention, and shows Taiwan is taking adequate steps 
                on its own to address the problem of heroin 
                trafficking. However, legislation and agreements do not 
                yet exist to implement the provisions of the Convention 
                regarding asset forfeiture, controlled delivery, 
                extradition, mutual legal assistance and illicit 
                traffic by sea. Taiwan authorities have expressed an 
                interest in developing agreements in some of these 
                areas. There were no reported incidents of police 
                corruption involving drugs. There is no evidence of 
                senior Taiwan officials being involved with the illegal 
                drug trade.
                    Working cooperation between the Drug Enforcement 
                Administration and both the Taiwan National Police and 
                the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau has been 
                good. Efforts are being made to enhance enforcement 
                cooperation and Taiwan authorities have expressed 
                interest in entering into a bilateral counternarcotics 
                agreement under the auspices of the Taipei Economic and 
                Cultural Representative Office in the United States and 
                the American Institute in Taiwan.

                Thailand

                    Thailand is the main transit route for the illicit 
                drug production from the Golden Triangle. Successful 
                eradication and development efforts have reduced opium 
                cultivation far below the amounts grown in the 
                neighboring countries of Burma and Laos. Due to the 
                efforts of the Thai Government authorities, 1994 
                cultivation of illicit opium was only 2,110 hectares, 
                yielding 17 metric tons of opium.
                    Drug enforcement cooperation is very good and 
                improved even further in 1994. In a precedent-setting 
                cooperative law enforcement operation, the Royal Thai 
                government in November 1994 arrested ten major 
                traffickers under indictment in the United States who 
                form part of drug lord Khun Sa's Shan United Army (SUA) 
                infrastructure and proceedings to extradite the 
                fugitives to the United States are now pending in Thai 
                courts. During 1994, Thailand also took action to close 
                off its northern border, reducing the flow of supplies 
                and other logistical support to the SUA in Burma. 
                Efforts continue to enhance judicial cooperation and 
                the Thai Cabinet has just moved to permit the courts to 
                consider the extradition of a former Thai Member of 
                Parliament under indictment in the United States on 
                large-scale marijuana smuggling charges.
                    Thailand is a leader in regional drug control 
                programs and shares its expertise through agreements 
                with neighboring countries and the United Nations and 
                through training and cooperative enforcement 
                activities.
                    Thailand remains vulnerable to money laundering due 
                to the relatively low level of sophistication of the 
                Thai banking system and the presence of an active 
                quasi-legal non-bank financial system. Thailand is now 
                in the process of drafting money laundering 
                legislation. Drug-related corruption of some 
                politicians and police officials remains a problem.
                    A bilateral agreement with the United States 
                supports law enforcement cooperation and crop control, 
                including eradication of opium poppies and Thailand has 
                performed well under that agreement. Thailand is not a 
                party to the 1988 UN Convention, but is a party to the 
                1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, its 1972 
                Protocol, and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic 
                Substances.

                Venezuela

                    Venezuela is a major drug transit country. 
                Traffickers ship an estimated 100-200 metric tons (mt) 
                of cocaine annually through Venezuela. Precursor and 
                essential chemical trafficking and money laundering are 
                also serious problems in Venezuela. The Venezuelan 
                judiciary's marginal ability to resist 
                [[Page 12871]] the corruptive influence of traffickers 
                has hampered counternarcotics efforts in that country.
                    Venezuela has taken adequate steps to meet the 
                goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention, to 
                which it is a party, especially in its vigorous 
                response to illicit crop cultivation. Venezuela quickly 
                eradicated in 1994, with USG assistance, over 1,000 
                hectares of coca and opium poppy cultivation in Zulia 
                state near its western border with Colombia. The 
                government generally meets the goals of bilateral 
                counternarcotics agreements with the USG. In addition, 
                the Venezuela-Colombia border agreement to keep 
                Venezuela free of narcotics traffickers and the 
                successful eradication effort indicates serious 
                Government of Venezuela (GOV) interest in preventing 
                traffickers from making incursions into Venezuela.
                    Seizures of cocaine increased in 1994 to 5.0 mt, 
                indicating both more trafficker use of Venezuela and 
                better interdiction of cocaine by Venezuelan 
                counternarcotics forces. Venezuela's bilateral 
                agreement with the United States to conduct 
                counternarcotics air interdiction operations reflects 
                invigorated cooperation on strategic initiatives.
                    In 1994, the Guardia Nacional (GN) seized 5.0 mt of 
                cocaine and 15 kilograms (kg) of heroin. However, the 
                recent arrests of two GN members for trafficking 250 kg 
                of cocaine through Maiquetia Airport evinces corruption 
                problems at lower levels in the organization. The GN 
                quickly removed the two soldiers and began an 
                investigation of the unit.
                    Although President Caldera has spoken out strongly 
                against narco-corruption, most recently at the December 
                Summit of the Americas, corruption in Venezuela remains 
                a serious problem. A convicted trafficker, Larry Tovar 
                Acuna, fled to Colombia after fraudulently obtaining a 
                pardon, and the Venezuelan government made an 
                extradition request to Colombia for Tovar. In addition, 
                a corrupt judge released members of the Sinforoso 
                Caballero money laundering organization. The Venezuelan 
                Supreme Court reopened the case and investigated the 
                judge.
                    Venezuela has not yet approved its draft national 
                counternarcotics strategy and has not begun to control 
                precursor and essential chemicals. With more attention 
                from President Caldera, Venezuela's compliance with 
                bilateral agreements on chemical control and money 
                laundering measures should improve.

                Vietnam

                    The Socialist Republic of Vietnam has a significant 
                opiate abuse problem and is emerging as a location for 
                drug trafficking. Illicit opium production exceeded 
                1,000 hectares, but the precise extent of cultivation 
                remains unclear. Estimates have ranged as high as 
                14,000 hectares during the 1992/3 growing season. The 
                government is undertaking a serious eradication effort 
                and has pledged to eliminate opium cultivation, which 
                exists primarily in relatively inaccessible regions of 
                the north.
                    Opiate addiction in urban areas is a serious 
                problem. The government, with the aid of the United 
                Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP), is 
                formulating a drug control plan to combat both 
                production and consumption in Vietnam. Economic reforms 
                and the growing overall volume of the Southeast Asian 
                heroin trade have made Vietnam an emerging transit 
                point for heroin destined for Taiwan, the United States 
                and other locations.
                    Corruption is a complicating factor in domestic 
                enforcement efforts, but there is no evidence that the 
                government tolerates, condones or profits from drug 
                trafficking activity.
                    The government is not a party to the 1988 UN 
                Convention, but is developing a program to work toward 
                fulfillment of the goals and objectives of the 
                Convention. This program is embodied in the drug 
                control plan being drafted with the assistance of 
                UNDCP. In coordination with UNDCP, the government is 
                drafting legislation that meets the goals of the 
                Convention. [[Page 12872]] 
                    There is no bilateral counternarcotics agreement 
                between the United States and Vietnam. However, 
                informal discussions have begun between representatives 
                of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the USG about 
                counternarcotics cooperation and the Vietnamese 
                response has been positive.
                VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS JUSTIFICATION

                Bolivia

                    Bolivia is the world's second largest producer of 
                coca leaf after Peru and the second largest producer of 
                cocaine after Colombia. Most of the cocaine refined 
                from Bolivian coca leaf is consumed in the United 
                States.
                    Bolivia was highly successful in counternarcotics 
                law enforcement operations during 1994. The Government 
                of Bolivia (GOB) conducted four major operations 
                designed to block trafficker movements, seized two 
                large cocaine HCl laboratories, and arrested major 
                traffickers with links to the Medellin drug mafia. GOB 
                forces foiled Colombian traffickers and their Bolivian 
                accomplices attempting a prison break at a maximum 
                security facility and arrested the prison warden for 
                complicity in the plot. Throughout 1994, the GOB 
                continued its probe of alleged trafficker ties to 
                former President Jaime Paz Zamora and members of his 
                Movement of the Left (MIR) political party. In June, 
                the Bolivian Congress removed two Supreme Court 
                justices for corruption.
                    President Sanchez de Lozada is seeking to develop a 
                strategy to eliminate illegal coca from the country 
                without the use of measures he considers to be 
                divisive, such as forced eradication. In 1994, however, 
                the GOB made no measurable progress toward creating a 
                plan to carry out this strategy.
                    In February 1994, the GOB briefly undertook a 
                campaign of forced eradication which resulted in a 
                violent reaction by coca growers. Voluntary, 
                compensated eradication dropped off sharply and new 
                plantings increased, resulting in a net increase in the 
                area of coca under cultivation.
                    The Sanchez de Lozada administration has supported 
                USG efforts to extradite drug traffickers, but such 
                efforts stalled in the Bolivian Supreme Court in 1994. 
                In early 1995, however, prominent trafficker Jose 
                Faustino Rico Toro was declared extraditable. Thirty-
                five other extradition requests by the United States 
                are pending with Bolivia. The GOB has declined to sign 
                an extradition treaty negotiated in 1990, but in early 
                1995, the Sanchez de Lozada administration proposed a 
                new draft treaty, which USG officials are reviewing.
                    It is in the vital national interests of the United 
                States to maintain and increase the level of 
                cooperation with Bolivia, the world's second largest 
                coca and cocaine producer. Denial of certification 
                would likely terminate much of Bolivia's multilateral 
                development bank assistance, which would have an 
                extremely harmful effect on the Bolivian economy. It 
                would reduce significantly the resources available to 
                the GOB to combat narcotics trafficking and would 
                foster conditions in which more Bolivians would be 
                driven to engage in illicit coca cultivation and 
                trafficking.
                    Because the World Bank and Inter-American 
                Development Bank are Bolivian's largest aid donors, USG 
                opposition to loans to Bolivia by those institutions 
                would result in strident calls within Bolivia for the 
                GOB to cease its counternarcotics cooperation with the 
                USG. Economic instability could lead to a loss of 
                confidence throughout the country and thereby serve to 
                undermine Bolivia's still-fledging democratic 
                institutions. Should Bolivia's current democratically-
                elected government be followed by an authoritarian 
                regime, narcotraffickers might gain a strong foothold, 
                as they did in the corrupt dictatorships of the early 
                1980's. Preserving and promoting democracy in Bolivia 
                is in the U.S. national interest of enhancing democracy 
                throughout the Western Hemisphere.
                    In 1994, although the GOB's efforts and cooperation 
                with the USG on interdiction and on broader political 
                issues were substantial, its overall 
                [[Page 12873]] counternarcotics efforts were not 
                adequate to meet the goals and objectives of the 1988 
                UN Convention. Nevertheless, the risks posed to vital 
                U.S. national interests from the possible consequences 
                of terminating U.S. assistance, as noted above, greatly 
                outweigh the risks posed by the lack of complete GOB 
                cooperation on counternarcotics. With recent positive 
                signs of action from the GOB, the USG will enter into 
                further discussions to secure commitments for action in 
                key areas.

                Colombia

                    In 1994, Colombia remained the world's largest 
                supplier of cocaine and the source of virtually all the 
                cocaine imported into the United States. There are 
                currently more than 111,000 acres (45,000 hectares) of 
                coca being cultivated, a 13.3 percent increase over 
                1993 and, if such cultivation is not contained and 
                crops are not eradicated, Colombia could soon surpass 
                Bolivia as the second largest source of coca after 
                Peru. Colombia is also a significant supplier of heroin 
                and one of the largest cultivators of opium poppy in 
                the world, along with Burma, Afghanistan and Laos. 
                Recent data indicate that after having been suppressed 
                over the last few years, Colombia's marijuana 
                cultivation and export to the United States is again 
                increasing. The expected diminution in the movement and 
                flow of narcotics originating in Colombia as a result 
                of the destruction of the Medellin syndicate in 1993 
                did not materialize. It is apparent that the removal of 
                Pablo Escobar and his drug empire from the Colombia 
                narcotics scene only benefited the now-dominant 
                syndicate headquartered in the city of Cali.
                    During 1994, the USG and the Government of Colombia 
                (GOC) collaborated on a number of fronts against the 
                scourge of narcotics trafficking in both countries. The 
                GOC had some successes. GOC performance on a number of 
                critical issues, however, was inadequate. Among the 
                successes attained by the GOC were ratification of the 
                1988 UN Convention which entered into force for 
                Colombia in September 1994, the legalization of the 
                herbicide glyphosate for use against coca cultivation, 
                the defeat of a bill in Congress supported by narco-
                traffickers that would have diluted the existing 
                illicit enrichment law, the indictment of Miguel 
                Rodriguez Orejuela, and an aerial eradication campaign 
                against illicit cultivation, which the GOC has pressed 
                in the face of large-scale protests by the cultivators. 
                Colombia remains the only producer of coca currently 
                permitting aerial eradication of illegal crops.
                    Individual police and other officials operating at 
                the ground level show considerable determination to 
                bring narcotics traffickers to justice. Sporadic and 
                ambivalent support by some quarters of the Colombian 
                political establishment prevents significant damage to 
                the Colombian drug syndicates. In 1994, the GOC took no 
                legislative steps to reverse the 1993 revision of the 
                criminal procedures code which made it more difficult 
                to bring mid-level and senior syndicate heads to 
                justice. As a result, following the trend set in 1993, 
                there were no arrests, incarcerations, or fines imposed 
                on such traffickers. In addition, a number of 
                previously convicted traffickers were able to benefit 
                from significant reductions in their sentences pursuant 
                to Colombia's woefully lenient sentencing laws. The 
                GOC's inability to protect and use information provided 
                to them by the U.S. Justice Department has made 
                impossible a full resumption of our previous law 
                enforcement evidence-sharing relationship. The GOC has 
                been informed that evidence obtained in the United 
                States will not be provided for any new criminal cases 
                pending a successful resolution of old cases for which 
                we have provided evidence.
                    In 1994, total drug seizures through interdiction 
                efforts were above those of 1993 but did not reach the 
                levels accomplished in 1991 (86.35 mt) as the USG had 
                recommended to the GOC. Performance on eradication has 
                improved, but results to date have not met 
                expectations. Even with increased USG-provided air and 
                herbicide assets, the amount of opium poppy eradicated 
                was almost 50 percent less than in 1993. As for coca 
                the numbers are impressive (4,500+ hectares vs. 793 ha 
                in 1993). They might have been [[Page 12874]] greater 
                had not local grower protests temporarily brought the 
                program to a near halt in December.
                    In excess of 15,000 active criminal corruption 
                investigations have been filed by the Attorney General 
                against government officials, including 21 Colombian 
                members of Congress. In 1994, there were no senior 
                government officials indicted for corruption. Although 
                Colombia and the United States in 1980 signed a Mutual 
                Legal Assistance Treaty, Colombia has failed to ratify 
                the treaty, and it has not entered into force. The 
                Colombian Congress did not pass bills introduced by the 
                Samper administration to counter money laundering 
                activities and asset retention by illegal enterprises 
                and those who participate in them. There was 
                insufficient progress to detect and remove those 
                corrupt officials primarily involved in 
                counternarcotics efforts. There continues to be a 
                problem with drug syndicate control of sovereign 
                territory, such as San Andres Island.
                    The performance of two successive governments of 
                Colombia during 1994 on the counternarcotics front did 
                not meet the expectations agreed upon between our 
                governments in numerous official and non-official 
                meetings on the subject. Certain performance criteria 
                were set out with the GOC in order to advance our joint 
                commitments to this problem. Despite a national 
                election and promises by the new government, Colombia 
                did not meet these performance criteria nor did it take 
                adequate steps on its own to achieve full compliance 
                with the goals and objectives established by the 1988 
                UN Convention. As a result, the activities of the 
                Colombian drug syndicates continue to ensure that the 
                flow of cocaine, heroin and marijuana from Colombia to 
                the United States remains undiminished.
                    There was a demonstrable absence of support by some 
                quarters of the political establishment to buttress the 
                gains achieved by GOC institutions operating at the 
                ground level. There were no efforts made in the areas 
                of judicial reform, capture and incarceration of 
                syndicate heads, or the strengthening of executive 
                institutions to counter the successful efforts of the 
                trafficking syndicates. Lack of action by the Congress 
                on GOC-introduced legislation also remains a problem.
                    Vital U.S. national interests would be at risk if 
                we were to deny Columbia certification. As Colombia is 
                the primary source of cocaine to the United States, 
                continued cooperation with the GOC is very important to 
                this country. A vital national interest certification 
                will ensure that USG policy and assistance remain 
                focused on developing more effective Colombian anti-
                drug efforts, while acknowledging that GOC actions to 
                date have not had the desired impact on the flow of 
                illegal narcotics to the United States. Further, such a 
                certification allows the United States to continue 
                working closely with Colombia on the other important 
                issues on our bilateral agenda: promoting human rights, 
                advancing free trade, and cooperating in international 
                fora.
                    If Colombia were not certified, the USG would be 
                required to vote against multilateral development 
                lending. Termination of such assistance would have an 
                adverse effect on the Colombian economy, reducing the 
                resources available to the GOC to combat narcotics 
                trafficking and fostering conditions in which more 
                Colombians would be encouraged to engage in illicit 
                coca cultivation and trafficking. Moreover, Colombia 
                would find it more difficult to get international 
                donors to help fund its projected alternative 
                development scheme. Columbia's planned purchase of a 
                U.S. radar system using Export-Import Bank financing 
                would be cancelled, further reducing Colombia's 
                interdiction capabilities.
                    While the GOC needs to do more in its efforts 
                against drugs, the decrease in narcotics cooperation 
                that would likely attend denial of certification would 
                result in even more narcotics entering this country. 
                Decertification would result in strident nationalistic 
                calls on the GOC to cease its CN cooperation with the 
                USG. In short, the risks associated with denying 
                certification to Colombia are greater than the risks 
                associated with Colombia's failure in the last year to 
                cooperate fully with the United States, or to 
                [[Page 12875]] take adequate steps on its own, to 
                combat narcotics. Continued cooperation with the GOC 
                will serve our drug control interests. Contrary to our 
                national interests, the net result of decertification 
                would be an increase in the flow of narcotics from 
                Colombia to the United States and in the number of 
                deaths among American drug victims.

                Lebanon

                    Lebanon remained a major nexus for narcotics 
                production and trafficking in 1994. Lebanese success in 
                dramatically reducing the cultivation of both opium and 
                cannabis in 1994 was offset by the continued processing 
                of imported narcotics. Lebanese production facilities 
                maintained pre-eradication levels of output. The 
                Syrians have been cooperative in facilitating some 
                advances in the Lebanese counternarcotics effort. 
                However, no processing laboratories in Lebanon were 
                dismantled in 1994 and the number of heroin and cocaine 
                laboratories increased significantly. The volume of raw 
                opium and cocaine flowing into Lebanon for processing 
                and reexport offset the decreased volume of opium and 
                cannabis cultivated in the Biqa' Valley.
                    In addition to significant successful eradication 
                efforts, positive developments in Lebanon during 1994 
                include the lifting of immunity to permit prosecution 
                of a legislator alleged to be corrupt, and the 
                initiation of investigations of other public figures. 
                There was also a marked increase in the number of small 
                seizures and arrests reported in Lebanon, a major 
                seizure of cocaine base in the port of Beirut was 
                recorded, and a major importer of pharmaceuticals was 
                also arrested on suspicion of diverting chemicals to 
                illicit laboratories.
                    Although Lebanon has signalled its intent to 
                accede, it is not yet a party to the 1988 UN Convention 
                and has not met some of the goals and objectives of the 
                Convention. Lebanon does not have a bilateral narcotics 
                agreement with the United States.
                    The threat posed to the United States by drug 
                trafficking and processing in Lebanon remains real. 
                However, Lebanon's inability to confront in a wholly 
                successful manner the narcotics threat, or to cooperate 
                fully with the United States reflects, in part, the 
                weakness of its institutions and regional political 
                dynamics. Moreover, the stability, peace, and economic 
                development of Lebanon are important to the stability 
                of the Middle East region. The United States' vital 
                national interests in continuing assistance to Lebanon 
                and in furthering regional stability outweigh the 
                threat posed by drug trafficking through Lebanon to the 
                United States.

                Pakistan

                    Pakistan is both a producer and an important 
                transit country for opiates destined for international 
                drug markets. Laboratories in Pakistan's Northwest 
                Frontier Province process opium grown there and in 
                neighboring Afghanistan. The USG estimates that about 
                one-tenth of heroin consumed in the United States 
                originates in Southwest Asia, much of it produced in 
                the illegal labs in Pakistan. During the 1993-94 crop 
                year, Pakistan produced about 160 metric tons of opium 
                from about 7,300 hectares of poppy.
                    Despite limited progress in some areas, in 1994 the 
                Government of Pakistan laid the foundation for 
                significant progress in early 1995.
                    The GOP extended, by decree, the 1930 Narcotics Law 
                to the tribal areas, increased significantly seizures 
                of opium and heroin, increased financial resources 
                devoted to combatting illicit narcotics processing and 
                trade, and in several meetings with Government of India 
                officials agreed to expand counternarcotics 
                cooperation. It also initiated twelve new asset seizure 
                cases in 1994 and used the media to alert the public to 
                the GOP counternarcotics efforts and the dangers of 
                narcotics.
                    There was limited progress in other areas. Despite 
                the GOP extension of the 1930 Narcotics Law to the 
                frontier areas, few major drug traffickers were 
                arrested or prosecuted during calendar year 1994. None 
                of the new asset seizure cases has been prosecuted. 
                Pakistan marginally extended the [[Page 12876]] opium 
                cultivation ban while eradication equaled only 1993's 
                total eradication. Poppy cultivation was up 16 percent 
                in 1994, although the overall level of cultivation has 
                remained more or less constant over the last five 
                years.
                    By year end, Pakistan had drafted and vetted 
                legislation to bring Pakistani law into conformance 
                with the 1988 UN Convention, to which Pakistan is a 
                party, and to prevent drug money laundering. President 
                Leghari promulgated the legislative package as a 
                temporary decree January 9, effective for 120 days 
                after disagreements in the cabinet precluded submission 
                to the National Assembly. Legislative action will be 
                required to make it permanent. Politically difficult 
                efforts to curb corruption in GOP law enforcement 
                agencies and the courts have been modest.
                    Building on the foundation laid in 1994, Pakistan 
                intensified its anti-narcotics efforts in 1995. The 
                government began an eradication campaign in Bajaur 
                Agency in January 1995 and created a demand reduction 
                office. It also announced on January 25 that it had 
                frozen $68 million in assets of narcotics traffickers. 
                In a late January raid on a drug warehouse in the 
                Northwest Frontier Province, 132 metric tons of drugs, 
                primarily hashish, were seized. Recently, the GOP 
                indicated a willingness to proceed expeditiously on 
                outstanding extradition requests. Pakistan recently 
                expanded the poppy ban in the NWFP.
                    Vital U.S. national interests could be damaged if 
                Pakistan were to be denied certification. Pakistan is a 
                strategically-located, moderate Islamic state with a 
                nuclear weapons capability. Pakistan has provided 
                troops for UN peacekeeping operations, most recently in 
                Bosnia and Somalia, and has cooperated in the 
                international fight against terrorists. The Government 
                of Pakistan has also used its moderating influence with 
                other Islamic countries. Decertification would be 
                viewed in Pakistan as abandonment of a loyal ally and 
                would endanger U.S./Pakistani dialogue and cooperation 
                on these vital issues. It could also undermine 
                Pakistan's ongoing efforts to address the drug problem, 
                including cooperation by Pakistani anti-narcotics 
                forces with DEA and the embassy narcotics affairs 
                section.
                    The risk to these vital U.S. interests, and 
                particularly our narcotics cooperation efforts, 
                outweighs the potential gain from decertifying Pakistan 
                for its inadequate efforts to combat narcotics. 
                Pakistan is the conduit for opium and morphine base 
                from Afghanistan, the second largest opium producer in 
                the world. If the surge of Afghan drugs is to be 
                stemmed, we need more Pakistani cooperation. Morale in 
                Pakistan's anti-narcotics organizations could be 
                adversely affected by decertification.
                    Although Pakistan is currently prohibited from 
                receiving many forms of aid by the Pressler Amendment, 
                denial of certification would add a requirement to vote 
                against Pakistan in multilateral development banks. 
                Access to such loans is vital to Pakistan. During the 
                period of national interest certification, the USG will 
                redouble its efforts to assist the GOP in improving its 
                anti-narcotics performance to meet the criteria for 
                full certification.

                Paraguay

                    Paraguay is used as a transit route for cocaine 
                shipped primarily from Bolivia, and perhaps 
                increasingly from Colombia, to Argentina and Brazil for 
                onward shipment to the United States and Europe. High-
                quality marijuana is exported to Argentina and Brazil 
                and consumed within Paraguay. Paraguay is potentially a 
                major money laundering center, based on its extensive 
                re-export trade and its expanding and poorly regulated 
                financial sector.
                    President Juan Carlos Wasmosy, Paraguay's first 
                democratically-elected civilian President in over five 
                decades, has stressed his personal commitment to 
                combatting narcotics trafficking. He has continued 
                authorization to stage USG counternarcotics 
                surveillance aircraft in Paraquay and submitted to 
                Congress legislation to control money laundering. 
                Nevertheless, he failed in 1994 to act decisively when 
                brought information relating to corruption within the 
                GOP's counternarcotics leadership. As a result, 
                Paraquay's co [[Page 12877]] operation in drug law 
                enforcement was weak in the first half of the year, and 
                one criminal investigation was very probably 
                compromised due to corruption. A lack of political will 
                to uncover what is widely believed to be extensive 
                official corruption led to an overall weak drug control 
                program. Given this situation, Paraguay cannot be 
                considered to be in compliance with the goals of the 
                1987 bilateral counternarcotics agreement with the USG, 
                which seeks to eliminate the illicit production, 
                processing, trafficking, and consumption of narcotics 
                in Paraguay and the transit of narcotics through 
                contiguous territorial waters.
                    Cooperation briefly improved in mid-year, resulting 
                in a successful joint investigation with the Drug 
                Enforcement Administration that netted 756 kilos of 
                cocaine, the largest seizure ever in Paraguay. In 
                October, the head of the anti-narcotics secretariat 
                (SENAD) was assassinated, apparently in a personal 
                dispute, disrupting further drug enforcement 
                investigations for the remainder of the year. The new 
                head of SENAD has expressed commitment to a cooperative 
                drug control effort and has promised to carry out 
                widespread changes in the composition of SENAD and the 
                national anti-narcotics police. The USG remains 
                concerned, however, that the Paraguayan military's 
                control over SENAD will cloud any efforts to change the 
                organization fundamentally.
                    The Government of Paraguay (GOP) made some progress 
                toward meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN 
                Convention when the Paraguayan Congress ratified a 
                financial information exchange agreement with the USG. 
                However, until the GOP takes credible action to 
                investigate allegations of corruption and to promote an 
                aggressive investigative stance against those aiding 
                drug trafficking, it cannot be considered to be fully 
                cooperating with the United States, or to be taking 
                adequate steps on its own, to comply with the goals and 
                objectives of the 1988 UN Convention.
                    Despite its concerns about the GOP's lack of 
                political will to seriously address drug trafficking, 
                the USG is cognizant that Paraguay remains a young, 
                fragile democracy. The consequences of decertification 
                would likely have a significant adverse impact on 
                Paraguay's ability to consolidate and sustain its 
                fledgling democracy. The USG believes that its long-
                term counternarcotics goal for Paraguay, the promotion 
                of strong, independent, credible institutions of 
                government able to defeat drug trafficking, is best 
                served by fully supporting the continued growth of 
                democracy. Such support is in the vital national 
                interest of the United States. Therefore, the vital 
                U.S. national interest of promoting democracy outweighs 
                the risks posed by the lack of full GOP cooperation on 
                counternarcotics.

                Peru

                    Vital U.S. national interests would be harmed if we 
                deny certification to Peru. Peru remains the largest 
                source of coca leaf in the world, making continued 
                cooperation with the Government of Peru very important 
                to the United States. In 1994, there was no measurable 
                reduction in the flow of coca base from Peru to 
                Colombia and no systematic mature coca eradication. 
                While the amount of coca under cultivation remained the 
                same, coca leaf production increased by six percent due 
                to new, more productive coca plantings in expanded new 
                areas that are superseding older areas, such as the 
                Huallaga Valley. A vital national interests 
                certification will ensure that U.S. Government policy 
                and assistance remain focused on reducing the 
                cultivation of coca and implementing the Peruvian drug 
                strategy promulgated in 1994. Further, such a 
                certification will allow the United States to continue 
                working closely with Peru on other important issues 
                such as democracy, economic reform and human rights.
                    In September, the Government of Peru (GOP) approved 
                a national drug plan that defines measures to eliminate 
                illegal drug production, trafficking and abuse, 
                including eliminating all coca cultivation destined for 
                illicit uses. It also established timetables and 
                assigned responsibilities for implementing sectoral 
                plans and programs, including a national alternative 
                development program. In June, the GOP passed a 
                stringent law with strict penalties [[Page 12878]] for 
                any aspect of opium poppy cultivation trafficking or 
                use, which requires destruction of any poppy found in 
                Peru. The GOP cooperated on most counternarcotics 
                matters contained in its bilateral narcotics agreement 
                with the United States, and took some steps to comply 
                with the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN 
                Convention. However, it made no progress toward the 
                critical goal of reducing mature coca cultivations.
                    In 1994, there was concrete evidence of refined 
                cocaine HCl processing and shipment from Peru to Mexico 
                by Peruvian trafficking organizations, raising the 
                specter of Peru as a potentially large-scale cocaine 
                refining and shipping center, similar to Colombia. 
                Police and armed forces seized over 9 mt of cocaine 
                base through November 1994, exceeding the 1993 total. 
                Nearly 6 mt were seized by the armed forces, using 
                police intelligence. In January 1994, at GOP request, 
                Colombia arrested major Peruvian trafficker Demetrio 
                Limonier Chavez-Penaherrera (``Vaticano''). He was 
                tried in Peru and is serving a 30-year sentence. There 
                were similar successes against other major Peruvian 
                trafficking organizations. The Peruvian Air Force (FAP) 
                continued to implement an air intercept program with A-
                37s and Tucano aircraft, despite the USG shutdown of 
                intelligence sharing in May (which has now resumed 
                pursuant to a U.S. Presidential Determination).
                    The GOP has cooperated with UN Drug Control Program 
                alternative development projects in parts of the 
                Huallaga, Aguaytia, Pachitea and Urubamba valleys. 
                Resumption of international financial institution 
                lending was followed by World Bank and Inter-American 
                Development Bank projects to rehabilitate over 1500 
                kilometers of roads, and improved electrical power 
                facilities in areas affected by the coca economy. Such 
                improvements in infrastructure facilitate the 
                production and transport of alternative licit crops. 
                Coca seedbed eradication was resumed in July, and has 
                had a measurable impact on efforts to reduce the 
                cultivation of coca in specific areas.
                    Alternative development programs in or near coca-
                producing regions will set the stage for future coca 
                crop reduction. The GOP must integrate alternative 
                development efforts with actual net reduction of coca 
                cultivation and prevent the expansion of new coca 
                cultivation areas in order to comply with 1988 UN 
                Convention goals and U.S. and Peruvian drug plans.
                    A decrease in narcotics cooperation with the GOP 
                would result in more cocaine entering the United 
                States. The risks associated with denying certification 
                to Peru are greater than the risks associated with 
                Peru's failure in the past year to cooperate fully with 
                the United States, or take adequate steps on its own to 
                reduce coca cultivations.
                STATEMENT OF EXPLANATION

                Afghanistan

                    In 1994, opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan 
                increased dramatically amid ongoing civil war, 
                widespread lawlessness, and poor economic 
                opportunities. According to USG estimates, opium 
                production in Afghanistan rose 38 percent to 
                approximately 950 metric tons of opium in 1994. 
                Cultivated hectarage rose 39 percent to 29,180 
                hectares. USG analysis indicates Afghanistan remains 
                the second largest opium producer in the world.
                    The nominal Government of Afghanistan was unable to 
                eradicate systematically poppy plants, investigate or 
                prosecute traffickers, or impede the transportation of 
                opium, morphine base, or other narcotics. Few 
                provincial leaders apart from Haji Qadir, Governor of 
                poppy-rich Nangarhar, attempted to disrupt the 
                cultivation or trafficking through the areas under 
                their control. Haji Qadir in late 1994 began a campaign 
                of plowing under Nangarhar's newly-planted poppy 
                fields. Despite a demonstration of poppy-plowing for 
                the benefit of U.S. and other international officials, 
                we are unable to judge the extent or efficacy of 
                Qadir's campaign. [[Page 12879]] 
                    Afghan traffickers continued development of new 
                trafficking routes through the Newly Independent 
                States, supplementing existing routes through Pakistan 
                and Iran.
                    Reports continue to allege the direct involvement 
                of some factional leaders, particularly small-scale 
                independent ``commanders,'' in narcotics production and 
                trafficking and the indirect involvement of others who 
                provide security to the narcotics trade in return for 
                payment.
                    There is no functioning bilateral agreement between 
                Afghanistan and the United States. While Afghanistan 
                ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1992, it has made 
                virtually no progress in achieving its goals.
                    The tremendous increase in poppy cultivation during 
                1994, combined with the inadequate efforts to eliminate 
                cultivation and trafficking, precludes a determination 
                that Afghanistan has cooperated fully with the United 
                States or taken adequate steps on its own to meet the 
                goals and objectives established by the 1988 
                Convention. The core problem in Afghanistan is the 
                absence of a functional central government. Although 
                the USG has vital national interests in fostering the 
                re-establishment of a functioning central government 
                that could cooperate with us on regional security 
                issues and drug eradication, USG assistance for such 
                purposes falls largely outside the definition of U.S. 
                assistance that would be cut off by denial of 
                certification, at least this fiscal year. Accordingly, 
                denial of certification is appropriate.

                Burma

                    Burma remains the world's largest producer of 
                illicit opium and heroin and the Government of Burma 
                (GOB) continues to treat counternarcotics efforts as a 
                matter of secondary importance. Estimated opium 
                production in 1993/94 was 2,030 metric tons and illicit 
                poppy cultivation covered 146,600 hectares. Opium 
                production fell by 21 percent, due principally to poor 
                weather. There were some modest signs of greater 
                government efforts in counternarcotics. One of the 
                results of a Burmese Army campaign against the Shan 
                United Army (SUA) of Khun Sa was to restrict the opium 
                supply and drug trafficking routes of the SUA. The GOB 
                has also begun to show signs of willingness to 
                cooperate in counternarcotics efforts and has agreed to 
                facilitate an opium yield survey in 1995 and to allow 
                the UN Drug Control Program (UNDCP) to perform an 
                aerial survey of project areas. Domestic enforcement 
                efforts have also shown some marginal improvement with 
                regional task forces under the Burmese police becoming 
                more active in drug enforcement. These efforts, 
                however, fall short of what is required to address 
                seriously the drug problem in Burma.
                    The government's ability to suppress Burma's opium 
                and heroin trade is severely limited by lack of access 
                to and control over the areas in which most opium is 
                grown and heroin processed. Well-equipped ethnic armies 
                sheltered in these remote mountainous regions have been 
                permitted wide-ranging, local autonomy in exchange for 
                halting their active insurgencies against Rangoon. At 
                the same time, opium poppy cultivation has soared in 
                the base areas of the insurgent groups, especially in 
                the Wa hills, despite nominal commitments by insurgents 
                and the government alike that efforts would be made to 
                reduce opium growing. Direct government complicity in 
                the drug trade does not appear to be a problem among 
                senior officials, but narcotics corruption is a problem 
                among lower level officials.
                    Multilateral drug control projects in enforcement 
                and alternative development under the UNDCP involving 
                cooperative efforts between Burma, China and Thailand 
                are underway. These projects continue to receive 
                support from the international community. Project scale 
                is small, however, and the overall impact of these 
                efforts on the huge opium cultivation problem in Burma 
                has been extremely limited so far.
                    Burma is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and has 
                enacted some legislation in conformity with the 
                Convention, but has not made a strong effort to enforce 
                these laws. There has been no bilateral 
                counternarcotics [[Page 12880]] agreement with the USG 
                since the State Law and Order Restoration Council 
                assumed power in 1988.

                Iran

                    Iran is a major drug transit country. Reportedly, 
                almost half the morphine base that arrives in Turkey 
                monthly for processing as heroin passes through Iran. 
                It also continues to grow opium poppy in remote 
                provinces. Although the USG did not estimate production 
                in 1994, the USG does not believe cultivation 
                diminished significantly as we know of no eradication 
                campaigns. The 1993 estimate was about 3,500 hectares 
                of cultivation with a yield of between 35 and 70 metric 
                tons of opium.
                    Iran is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and has 
                undertaken at least some activities to fulfill the 
                goals and objectives the Convention established. Since 
                Iran and the United States do not have diplomatic 
                relations and have not cooperated in counternarcotic 
                efforts, the U.S. has been unable to ascertain the 
                extent or adequacy of Iran's undertakings. There is no 
                bilateral counternarcotics agreement in place between 
                Iran's government and the USG.
                    According to both Iranian radio reports and Iranian 
                government reports to the UN Drug Control Program 
                (UNDCP), the Government of Iran (GOI) is waging a 
                vigorous campaign to eradicate trafficking through 
                Iran. Almost daily radio reports announce substantial 
                morphine base and heroin seizures. Reportedly many 
                individuals are arrested and later executed for drug 
                trafficking. The USG cannot verify many of these 
                reports as it has no representatives in Iran. UNDCP 
                observers have viewed some seizures, including 30 tons 
                of opium in one exhibit bond room. Interpol statistics 
                for 1994, probably based on Iranian government reports, 
                state Iran seized 112 tons of opium, 800 kilograms of 
                heroin and 15 tons of morphine base. However, despite 
                claims about the high level of Iran's counternarcotics 
                effort, the level of drugs arriving in Syria and Turkey 
                has not noticeably decreased.
                    UNDCP representatives have verified that Iran has 
                fortified frontier guard posts with Pakistan and dug a 
                trench to prevent crossing between posts in an effort 
                to decrease trafficking. Intelligence reports suggest 
                that border guards continue to be bribed to permit drug 
                caravans through, however. The USG believes drug-
                related corruption continues to be a serious problem 
                among Iran's law enforcement and security services. The 
                USG does not know the extent to which Iran enforces its 
                prominently advertised campaign to prevent and punish 
                public corruption.
                    Human rights organizations and some Iranian exiles 
                accuse Iran of executing dissidents on false charges of 
                drug trafficking.

                Nigeria

                    A major transit country for Asian heroin and Latin 
                American cocaine destined for the United States and 
                numerous other points around the world, Nigeria remains 
                the focal point for most West African trafficking 
                organizations. Corruption in the Nigerian Drug Law 
                Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) and other law enforcement 
                agencies has not been addressed adequately, thereby 
                hindering counternarcotics efforts. The export of 
                Nigerian drug trafficking to Liberia and other West 
                African counties is of particular concern. The NDLEA's 
                focus in 1994 remained almost exclusively on drug 
                couriers rather than on leaders of drug trafficking 
                groups.
                    The Government of Nigeria (GON) did begin to show 
                concern about international and domestic drug abuse 
                during 1994. The GON prepared a draft national drug 
                policy plan aimed at rooting out trafficking and 
                substance abuse. The GON formed a ministerial level 
                task force on drug abuse which will develop a drug 
                control strategy by mid-1995. In late December, the GON 
                appointed a special advisor on drugs, money laundering, 
                and advance fee fraud whose task is to coordinate the 
                anti-drug efforts of the NDLEA, the police, and the 
                customs agency. In 1994, the GON returned to the United 
                States three drug barons responsible for heroin 
                rings. [[Page 12881]] 
                    These steps may have potential for significant 
                improvement in Nigeria's anti-drug efforts. We will 
                evaluate at an early stage if they and other steps are 
                being implemented effectively and if these steps are 
                followed by additional anti-drug measures.
                    While the United States welcomes the positive steps 
                taken during the past year, Nigeria did not meet the 
                goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention. Nigeria 
                did not effectively implement its bilateral agreement 
                with the United States.
                    Based on a complete and thorough review of the 
                GON's counternarcotics actions throughout 1994, 
                Nigeria's prominent role in international narcotics 
                trafficking, and its failure in 1994 to make 
                significant progress in meeting the goals and 
                objectives of the 1988 UN Convention, the threat posed 
                to the United States by drug trafficking by Nigerians 
                through Nigeria and elsewhere justifies continued 
                denial of certification.

                Syria

                    Syria is a transit point for narcotics flowing 
                through the Middle East to Europe and, to a lesser 
                extent, the United States. In addition, Syria continues 
                to have a responsibility for assisting Lebanese 
                authorities in ending drug production and trafficking 
                through Lebanon because of the presence of some 30,000 
                Syrian troops in the Bekaa Valley. In 1994, Syria 
                continued and expanded its cooperation with Lebanese 
                authorities to eradicate opium poppy and cannabis 
                cultivation in the Bekaa Valley, significantly reducing 
                opium and cannabis cultivation. Syrian forces increased 
                seizures of cocaine, heroin, and hashish and raised the 
                number of arrests of drug traffickers in Syria and 
                Lebanon. Syrian military authorities in Lebanon 
                assisted in a significant seizure of cocaine base 
                delivered to Beirut's port during 1994. Despite these 
                efforts, however, the flow of narcotics did not 
                diminish in 1994.
                    The Syrian government has reiterated its 
                willingness to pursue all information regarding the 
                possible production of narcotics in Lebanon and Syria. 
                However, neither the Syrian nor the Lebanese 
                authorities moved successfully against cocaine or 
                heroin laboratories operating in either country. There 
                were a significant number of arrests in Syria for drug-
                related offenses, but despite reports of individual 
                Syrian military officials profiting from the drug trade 
                in Lebanon, no corruption investigations or charges 
                were brought against any Syrian government or military 
                officials in 1994.
                    The USG does not provide Syria with bilateral 
                assistance and does not support loans for Syria in 
                multilateral institutions.
                    Syria is a party to the 1988 UN Convention. While 
                Syria greatly improved its performance in reducing 
                illicit cultivation and increased seizures in Lebanon, 
                it did not meet some of the other goals and objectives 
                of the 1988 UN Convention. Syria does not have a 
                bilateral narcotics agreement with the United States.

[FR Doc. 95-5850
Filed 3-6-95; 4:03 pm]
Billing code 4710-10-M