[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 35 (Wednesday, February 22, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 9824-9829]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-4308]



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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Savannah River Operations Office; Record of Decision: 
Stabilization of Plutonium Solutions Stored in the F-Canyon Facility at 
the Savannah River Site, Aiken, SC

AGENCY: U.S. Department of Energy.

ACTION: Record of Decision, Stabilization of Plutonium Solutions Stored 
in the F-Canyon Facility at the Savannah River Site, Aiken, South 
Carolina.

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Summary: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has prepared and issued a 
Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) (DOE/EIS-0219, December 30, 
1994), to assess the potential environmental impacts of stabilizing 
approximately 80,000 gallons of plutonium solutions currently stored in 
tanks in the F-Canyon chemical separations facility at the Savannah 
River Site (SRS) near Aiken, South Carolina. As long as the plutonium 
remains in solution there is a risk of releases and subsequent 
radiation exposure to workers, the public, and the environment from 
accidental criticality incidents, leaks, and disruptions of engineered 
systems from earthquakes. The Department has evaluated the impacts of 
alternative methods that would achieve stabilization of the solutions. 
The analysis reveals that the potential environmental impacts of 
implementing alternatives that would eliminate the risk inherent in 
storing plutonium in liquid form are small. Further, the impacts differ 
little among the alternatives. DOE currently has available the 
capability to process the plutonium solutions to a metal form. Given 
this existing capability, the potential for environmental releases that 
exists as a result of storing the plutonium in liquid form, and the 
relative lack of environmental advantages to implementing other 
options, DOE has decided to process the plutonium solutions to metal 
form using the F-Canyon and FB-Line facilities at the SRS. DOE has 
committed that this [[Page 9825]] plutonium metal will not be used for 
nuclear explosive purposes and intends to offer it for inspection by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency.
    During the time the SRS was actively involved in nuclear material 
production, DOE transferred irradiated fuels and targets from SRS 
reactors to disassembly basins, which are water-filled pools, to allow 
short-lived radioactive isotopes to decay. From the pools, DOE 
transferred the fuel and targets to canyon facilities in F- and H-
Areas, where they were chemically dissolved into liquid solutions. The 
useful isotopes were recovered, converted to a solid form, and either 
shipped to other DOE facilities or stored at the SRS. This chemical 
reprocessing activity has been suspended since 1992, and plutonium 
solutions have been stored in tanks in the F-Canyon facility since that 
time. The Final F-Canyon Plutonium Solutions EIS examines alternative 
methods for stabilizing these solutions.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the 
stabilization of F-Canyon plutonium solutions or to receive a copy of 
the Final EIS contact: A. B. Gould, Jr., NEPA Compliance Officer, U.S. 
Department of Energy, Savannah River Operations Office, P.O. Box 5031, 
Aiken, South Carolina 29804-5031, (800) 242-8269.
    For further information on the DOE National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) process, contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of 
NEPA Policy and Assistance (EH-4.2), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 
Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, D.C. 20585, (202) 586-4600, or 
leave a message at (800) 472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    DOE prepared this Record of Decision in accordance with the 
regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality for implementing 
NEPA (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508) and DOE's NEPA Implementing Procedures 
(10 CFR Part 1021). This Record of Decision is based on DOE's Final F-
Canyon Plutonium Solutions Environmental Impact Statement, Savannah 
River Site, Aiken, South Carolina (DOE/EIS-0219).
    The SRS occupies approximately 800 square kilometers (300 square 
miles) adjacent to the Savannah River, mostly in Aiken and Barnwell 
Counties of South Carolina, about 40 kilometers (25 miles) southeast of 
Augusta, Georgia, and about 32 kilometers (20 miles) south of Aiken, 
South Carolina. When established in the early 1950s, SRS's primary 
mission was to produce nuclear materials to support the defense, 
research, and medical programs of the United States. The present 
mission emphasizes waste management, environmental restoration, 
transition activities, and decontamination and decommissioning of 
facilities that are no longer needed for nuclear materials production.
    In March 1992, DOE suspended chemical processing operations in the 
F-Canyon to address a potential safety concern. That concern was 
addressed; however, prior to the resumption of processing, the 
Secretary of Energy directed that SRS phase out chemical separations 
activities (i.e., reprocessing). Non-safety-related facility operations 
have remained shut down since that time (March 1992). Approximately 
303,000 liters (80,000 gallons) of solutions containing plutonium have 
remained in tanks in F-Canyon since the suspension of operation.
    In September 1992, the SRS completed a plan that described the 
actions that DOE would have to take to phase out reprocessing. The plan 
included actions for removing the material that remained in the canyons 
as a result of the suspension of chemical separation activities in 
March 1992. In February 1993, the Site requested approval from DOE to 
restart F-Canyon after the completion of operational readiness reviews 
conducted as part of the response to the above-mentioned March 1992 
safety concern. The SRS made this startup request in light of the 
Secretary's direction to accelerate the transition of F-Area 
reprocessing facilities to a standby condition and because all 
contemplated actions were typical of previous facility operations.
    During this same time period, DOE was drafting new requirements for 
operational readiness reviews necessary for the startup or restart of 
nuclear facilities. Under these requirements, facilities had to be able 
to demonstrate the capability to perform satisfactorily in relation to 
a broad range of topics associated with the safe operation of a nuclear 
facility. DOE promulgated these requirements in DOE Order 5480.31, 
``Startup and Restart of Nuclear Facilities,'' which it issued in 
September 1993. DOE decided that the SRS should apply these 
requirements to the restart of the F- and H-Canyons and, in November 
1993, determined that the Site should hold the proposed F-Canyon (and 
FB-Line) restart in abeyance until it had completed a restart review in 
accordance with the new Order. In January 1994, DOE determined that 
unless there was an emergency condition, there should be no processing 
in F-Canyon before the completion of an environmental impact statement.
    On March 17, 1994, DOE published a Notice of Intent (59 FR 12588) 
to prepare an environmental impact statement on the interim management 
of nuclear materials at the SRS. The proposed DOE interim management 
actions are to stabilize those nuclear materials at the SRS that 
represent a health or safety concern for the public, workers, and the 
environment and to convert certain materials to a usable form to 
support DOE program needs. These proposed interim actions would be 
carried out while DOE makes and implements long-term decisions on the 
disposition of nuclear materials. DOE is addressing its long-term 
decisions in a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Storage 
and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials, for which it 
issued an NOI on June 21, 1994 (59 FR 31985). DOE expects that it could 
require 10 years or more to make and implement these long-term 
decisions.
    In May 1994, the Manager of the Savannah River Operations Office 
recommended that the DOE Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs seek 
alternative arrangements for compliance with the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) under the emergency provisions of the Council on 
Environmental Quality NEPA Regulations, 40 CFR Part 1506.11, to allow 
immediate stabilization of the plutonium solutions in F-Canyon and the 
Mark-31 targets stored in the L-Reactor Disassembly Basin. The 
recommendation was based on the Manager's determination that the 
materials present risks to workers, the public, and the environment in 
the form of radiation exposure from normal operations and potential 
accidents, which DOE could reduce by converting the material to a solid 
stable form.
    The Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs endorsed the Savannah 
River Operations Office Manager's request and asked that the DOE Office 
of Environment, Safety and Health perform an independent evaluation to 
determine if stabilization actions should proceed in advance of the 
completion of the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials EIS. The DOE 
Office of Environment, Safety and Health performed this independent 
evaluation in June 1994. The report from the evaluation characterized 
the following potential facility accidents to be of serious 
significance: (1) the potential for inadvertent criticality of 
plutonium due to precipitation of plutonium from the F-Canyon plutonium 
solutions, and (2) potential radiological releases to the 
[[Page 9826]] environment due to leakage of plutonium solutions through 
tank cooling coils. The loss of experienced facility personnel through 
resignation and retirement was an issue of marginal concern, with the 
recognition that this could become a serious concern if the current 
trend continued. The report did not include the Mark-31 targets in the 
materials of serious concern. DOE evaluated the request to pursue 
alternative arrangements for compliance with NEPA under the emergency 
provisions of 40 CFR 1506.11 in light of the Office of Environment, 
Safety and Health's evaluation and determined that the appropriate 
action would be to accelerate the evaluation of stabilization 
alternatives for the F-Canyon plutonium solutions by preparing a 
separate environmental impact statement on an accelerated schedule.
    The vulnerabilities associated with the continued storage of the 
plutonium in solution have also been documented by the Defense Nuclear 
Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB). In April 1994, the DNFSB ``concluded 
from observations and discussions with others that imminent hazards 
could arise within two to three years unless certain problems are 
corrected. . . . The Board is especially concerned about . . . 
(s)everal large tanks in the F-Canyon at the Savannah River Site (that) 
contain tens of thousands of gallons of solutions of plutonium and 
trans-plutonium isotopes. . . . If an earthquake or other accident were 
to breach the tanks, F-Canyon would become so contaminated that cleanup 
would be practically impossible. Containment of the radioactive 
materials under such circumstances would be highly uncertain . . . 
therefore, the Board recommends . . . (t)hat preparations be expedited 
to process the dissolved plutonium and trans-plutonium isotopes in 
tanks in the F-Canyon at the Savannah River Site into forms safer for 
interim storage. The Board considers this problem to be especially 
urgent.''
    While the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board noted that no 
emergency presently exists, the Board also noted that the plutonium 
solutions in F-Canyon could present an imminent hazard within two or 
three years. Given that even the shortest time to complete 
stabilization is almost two years, the Department concluded that 
expediting the decision to stabilize plutonium solutions was prudent.
    As noted above, DOE determined that there are safety concerns 
associated with plutonium solutions stored in F-Canyon that warrant 
consideration of actions prior to the issuance of a Record of Decision 
for the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials EIS. Therefore, DOE 
decided to prepare the F-Canyon Plutonium Solutions EIS on an expedited 
basis. On August 23, 1994, DOE published in the Federal Register a 
notice amending the NOI for the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials 
at the SRS. The notice explained DOE's decision to prepare the F-Canyon 
Plutonium Solutions EIS.
    The NOI for the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials EIS 
requested public comments and suggestions for DOE to consider in its 
determination of the scope of that EIS, and announced a public scoping 
period that ended on May 31, 1994. DOE held scoping meetings in 
Savannah, Georgia, North Augusta and Columbia, South Carolina, on May 
12, 17, and 19, 1994, respectively. As a result of this public scoping 
process, DOE received comments applicable to the stabilization of F-
Canyon plutonium solutions from individuals, organizations, and 
government agencies, and has considered these comments in the 
preparation of the F-Canyon Plutonium Solutions EIS.
    On September 9, 1994, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
published a Notice of Availability (NOA) in the Federal Register (59 FR 
174, pages 46643-46644), which started the public comment period on the 
Draft F-Canyon Plutonium Solutions EIS; DOE published a corresponding 
NOA for the Draft EIS on September 9, 1994 (59 FR 174, pages 46627-
46628). The public comment period ended on October 24, 1994.
    DOE revised the Draft EIS in response to written and oral comments 
received during the public comment period from individuals, 
organizations, and Federal and state agencies. Public hearings were 
held in Columbia and North Augusta, South Carolina, and Savannah, 
Georgia (October 4, 6, and 11, 1994, respectively). On December 30, 
1994, EPA published a Notice of Availability of the Final F-Canyon 
Plutonium Solutions EIS in the Federal Register (59 FR 250, page 
67706), following distribution of approximately 400 copies to 
government officials and interested groups and individuals.
    The Department of Energy received letters from the following 
organizations following the distribution of the Final EIS: (1) the 
South Carolina Department of Transportation; (2) the Centers for 
Disease Control, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; (3) the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of 
Commerce; and, (4) the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
Region IV. The EPA Region IV letter indicates that a comment on the 
Draft EIS concerning impacts to ecological systems is only partially 
addressed in the Final EIS. The Final EIS briefly considered the 
potential for impacts to ecological systems and concluded that none of 
the alternatives discussed in the EIS would affect threatened or 
endangered species or any of the flora or fauna routinely found in the 
vicinity of F-Canyon areas. Therefore, DOE did not include a detailed 
analysis of the impacts on ecological systems in the Final EIS. DOE 
will be discussing with EPA how to better represent/analyze potential 
impacts of emissions on ecosystems. The EPA Region IV letter states 
that the preferred alternative will have the least overall impact and 
that EPA supports DOE's action. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration concluded that no federally-listed threatened or 
endangered species under its jurisdiction would be affected by the 
proposed action. The other organizations had no comments on the Final 
EIS, and indicated they supported DOE's action plans or provided 
neither an indication of support nor opposition of DOE's action plans.

II. Alternatives

    The proposed action addressed in the Final F-Canyon Plutonium 
Solutions EIS is to stabilize the plutonium solutions in order to 
eliminate the risks inherent in storing this plutonium in liquid form. 
DOE examined four alternatives for stabilizing the solutions, and a no-
action alternative, in the Final EIS.

A. No Action

    DOE would continue to manage the existing 303,000 liter (80,000 
gallon) inventory of solutions in stainless steel tanks in the F-
Canyon. The solutions would be monitored and corrective actions taken, 
as necessary, to minimize the potential for precipitation of the 
plutonium and the possibility of an inadvertent criticality. This 
action would continue for the 10-year time period evaluated in the 
Final EIS.

B. Process to Plutonium Metal (the Preferred Alternative)

    Under this alternative, DOE would use the existing F-Canyon and FB-
Line processes and equipment to convert the plutonium solutions to 
metal. The metal would be a chemically stable form of plutonium that 
DOE could produce without modifying the existing equipment. Because 
there is no need for additional plutonium for weapons, DOE would not 
attempt to meet previous isotopic or chemical purity 
[[Page 9827]] specifications that were applicable for weapons 
production. In addition, DOE has made a commitment that plutonium-239 
from stabilization actions would not be used for nuclear explosive 
purposes. The plutonium metal would be packaged and stored, similar to 
other plutonium metal already in vault storage. DOE expects this 
stabilization alternative could be accomplished in 20 months from the 
date of a Record of Decision, which would be significantly faster than 
stabilization could be accomplished under the other alternatives. In 
conjunction with stabilizing the solutions to metal, DOE would 
undertake a project to modify a portion of the FB-Line facility to 
provide the capability to repackage the plutonium metal into a 
configuration that meets the recently issued DOE standard for long-term 
storage of plutonium (U.S. Department of Energy Criteria for Storage of 
Plutonium Metals and Oxides, DOE-STD-3013-94, Washington, D.C.). The 
new storage standard requires plutonium to be packaged in a form that 
is stable over an extended period (e.g., 20 years) without human 
intervention. Plutonium metal would be packaged in sealed metal cans 
without the presence of plastics. Current SRS plutonium metal packaging 
requires the use of plastic around an inner can for contamination 
control purposes. DOE estimates that it could accomplish the 
modifications to the FB-Line packaging capability by late 1997 at a 
cost of approximately $3 million. Alternatively, while the solutions 
are stabilized to metal, DOE could modify a different vault facility to 
provide the necessary equipment to repackage the metal to meet long-
term storage requirements. DOE estimates this could cost between $70 
million and $150 million and that it could complete repackaging by the 
end of 2001.
    The stabilization to metal alternative would produce a solid form 
of plutonium that would be safer and easier to store in the shortest 
period of time. As a result, this is DOE's preferred alternative.

C. Processing to Plutonium Oxide

    DOE would modify the FB-Line to support conversion of the plutonium 
solutions to a plutonium oxide and to package the material for storage. 
The objective would be to produce a material form and packaging 
configuration that met the new DOE standard for long-term storage of 
plutonium. If the extent of the FB-Line modifications necessary to 
convert the plutonium solutions to a plutonium oxide and to package the 
material to meet the long-term storage standard were economically or 
physically impractical, DOE would perform the stabilization in two 
phases. DOE would modify FB-Line to be able to convert the material 
initially to an oxide form and package it in FB-Line. At the same time, 
DOE would design and construct a new facility to process, package, and 
store the oxide in accordance with the new standard. DOE estimates that 
the minimally required modifications to FB-Line to provide the 
solution-to-oxide conversion capability would cost $7 million and take 
three years to complete. Following completion and modification, DOE 
would operate the FB-line for approximately 9 months to convert and 
package the oxide for storage. Repackaging the oxide to meet the new 
plutonium storage standard would not occur for another three years when 
the new facility for packaging were available. This new facility is 
estimated to cost between $70 million and $150 million; repackaging of 
the oxide could also be completed by the end of 2001.

D. Vitrification in the Defense Waste Processing Facility

    DOE would transfer the plutonium solutions to the SRS waste tank 
farm. Before transfer, the solutions would be adjusted to ensure the 
safety of the material in the tanks. DOE has identified several 
concepts for adjusting the solutions: diluting the solutions with water 
and chemicals to achieve very low plutonium concentration, diluting the 
solutions with depleted uranium, or adding iron and manganese or other 
neutron poisons such as gadolinium. In the waste tanks, high-activity 
waste would settle to the bottom of the tank in the form of sludge. DOE 
would transfer highly radioactive sludge to the Defense Waste 
Processing Facility, where it would be vitrified (converted to a glass-
like substance) and stored on the Site until DOE made and implemented 
final disposition decisions.
    DOE estimates it would take approximately six years to perform the 
technical studies, training, and qualification efforts necessary to 
ensure safe operations for transferring the solutions for subsequent 
vitrification under this alternative. The solutions would not be 
transferred to the high-level waste tanks until all studies for 
vitrification were final. After these studies were completed, DOE 
estimates that it would take an additional three years to complete the 
process of transferring all the plutonium solutions to the high-level 
waste tanks because of the limited availability of tank space and 
criticality concerns. The plutonium solutions would remain in the high-
level waste tanks until DOE transferred the contents to the Defense 
Waste Processing Facility for vitrification.

E. Vitrification in F-Canyon

    Under this alternative, DOE would vitrify the plutonium into a 
borosilicate glass matrix using an F-Canyon vitrification facility. 
Modifications to the F-Canyon would be necessary, and include the 
installation of a geometrically favorable evaporator to concentrate 
plutonium solution, and equipment to convert the concentrated plutonium 
solution to a glass matrix using technology similar to that to be used 
on a larger scale in the Defense Waste Processing Facility. The capital 
costs of these modifications would be about $27 million; the facility 
could be available by January 1999.
    When the modifications to the F-Canyon to install the vitrification 
facility were completed, the plutonium solutions would be transferred 
to the facility and evaporated. This concentrated plutonium solution 
would be fed, along with finely ground glass (frit), to a melter to 
produce a borosilicate glass containing the plutonium. The molten glass 
would be poured into stainless steel packages and stored in an existing 
vault at the SRS until final disposition decisions were made and 
implemented.
    Although the vitrification of this plutonium could begin as early 
as January 1999, DOE analyzed the Vitrification in F-Canyon Alternative 
as though it began during the first six months of 2000. The Final EIS 
describes its environmental consequences, which are largely independent 
of the schedule for vitrification.

F. Other Activities for Reduction of Risk

    In addition to the alternatives analyzed in detail in the Final F-
Canyon Plutonium Solutions EIS to stabilize the plutonium solutions, 
DOE identified other activities that have the potential to reduce the 
risk associated with storing the plutonium solutions in liquid form. 
These activities are: (1) transporting the solutions to H-Canyon for 
stabilization, (2) purification of the solutions by processing those 
that have the greatest criticality risk through the second plutonium 
cycle in F-Canyon, (3) risk reduction activities identified in the DOE 
Office of Environment, Safety and Health Assessment of Interim Storage 
of Plutonium Solutions in F-Canyon and Mark-31 Targets in L-Basin at 
the Savannah River Site (DOE-EH-0397P/SRS-FCAN-94-01), and (4) shipment 
of the solutions off the Site for [[Page 9828]] stabilization. 
Activities that involve transportation of the plutonium solutions would 
involve all the risks associated with the alternatives for 
stabilization plus the risks and costs associated with transportation 
of radioactive liquids. Activities such as purification of the 
plutonium solutions by operating the second plutonium cycle in F-Canyon 
would reduce but not eliminate the risks associated with storing liquid 
plutonium solutions. In addition, operation of only the second 
plutonium cycle to purify plutonium solutions would require process 
development work and establishment of operating parameters, because the 
F-Canyon process has never been operated in this manner. One important 
issue associated with this approach would be unprecedented high levels 
of radiation in the second cycle portion of the facility due to the 
greatly increased presence of fission products.

III. Environmental Impacts of Alternatives

    The Final F-Canyon Plutonium Solutions EIS evaluated the 
environmental impacts of the alternatives, including the no action 
alternative. DOE analyzed the potential impacts that would result from 
implementation of the alternatives and believes there would be minimal 
impacts in the areas of geologic resources, ecological and cultural 
resources, socioeconomics, aesthetics and scenic resources, and noise. 
This is because implementation of each of the alternatives would occur 
within the F-Area and mostly within the F-Canyon building. In light of 
planned SRS workforce reductions, any jobs associated with 
implementation of any of the alternatives could be filled through 
reassignment of current workers, resulting in no discernible impact on 
the regional economy.
    Radiological health effects on workers from normal operations would 
be small for any alternative, much less than one additional cancer 
death (0.2 latent cancer fatalities for the no action alternative and 
less for the other alternatives) during the lifetimes of the affected 
individuals. The effect on the general public could be at most 0.0006 
additional cancer deaths (for the processing to oxide and vitrification 
in F-Canyon alternatives, and less for the other alternatives) in the 
general population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the SRS. This is 
to say that no latent cancer fatalities in either workers or the 
general population are expected to occur as a result of routine 
operations. DOE expects similarly small adverse nonradiological health 
effects to workers and the public from emissions of toxic pollutants. 
Because discharges and emissions would vary little among the 
alternatives, public health effects would vary little among the 
alternatives. The analysis in the EIS shows that these potential small 
impacts would not disproportionately affect minority or low income 
populations.
    Implementation of any of the alternatives, including the No Action 
alternative, would result in a risk of accidents. The Final EIS 
evaluates a spectrum of potential accidents for each alternative. To 
enable a relative comparison of potential impacts among the 
alternatives, the accident with the highest reasonably foreseeable 
consequence for each alternative was assumed to occur and the maximum 
potential effects (latent cancer fatalities) were calculated. The 
projected frequency for these high-consequence accidents ranged from 
once in 17,000 years for a plutonium solutions fire involving solvents 
to once in 5,000 years for a severe earthquake. The maximum potential 
effect accident, although with a low probability, during the storage of 
plutonium solutions (for the periods prior to stabilization and for the 
No Action alternative) and during F-Canyon operation for stabilization 
is about 6 latent cancer fatalities to the exposed offsite population. 
For the stabilization actions involving FB-Line operations (processing 
to metal or processing to oxide), the maximum potential effect from an 
accident is less than 2 latent cancer fatalities in the exposed offsite 
population. Following stabilization and during stabilized plutonium 
storage, the maximum potential effect from an accident is less than 1 
latent cancer fatality in the exposed offsite population.
    The SRS generates several different types of waste, including low-
level waste, high-level waste, transuranic waste and mixed waste. The 
Final EIS lists estimates of waste generation for each alternative. DOE 
estimates that the smallest increase for all waste types would occur if 
the processing to plutonium metal alternative were implemented. 
Implementation of this alternative would eventually result in high-
level waste equivalent to 40 Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) 
high-level waste canisters. The largest increase in high-level waste 
would occur if the vitrification in DWPF alternative were implemented. 
The largest increase in saltstone and low-level waste generation would 
result from implementing the processing to oxide alternative. None of 
the alternatives is expected to generate substantial quantities of 
mixed waste. With the exception of vitrification in DWPF, the impact on 
SRS waste management capacities from implementing any of the 
alternatives would be minimal because the Site can accommodate all the 
waste generated with existing and planned radioactive waste storage and 
disposal facilities.
    It would not be appropriate under any of the alternatives that 
would result in stabilized plutonium to characterize the stabilized 
plutonium as waste. The alternatives for the disposition of surplus 
weapons-usable plutonium are currently being examined in a programmatic 
environmental impact statement that is scheduled for completion early 
next year. The nitric acid that is associated with the plutonium 
solutions likewise should not be characterized as waste. The nitric 
acid historically was introduced into the separations process to 
dissolve irradiated materials and provide for criticality/radiological 
safety by maintaining the plutonium in solution pending stabilization. 
The nitric acid continues to serve this vital safety function. The 
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) 
agrees with DOE that the F-Canyon plutonium solutions should not be 
regulated as a mixed waste (Letter, R. Lewis Shaw, SCDHEC to Frank R. 
McCoy, III, DOE, January 26, 1995).

IV. Other Factors

    In addition to examining the environmental impacts of the 
alternatives, DOE also considered other factors related to the 
stabilization of the F-Canyon plutonium solutions. These factors are: 
(1) new facilities that would be required, (2) security and nuclear 
nonproliferation, (3) implementation schedule, (4) technology 
availability and technical feasibility, (5) labor availability and core 
competency, (6) degree of reliance on aging facilities, and (7) post-
stabilization custodial care required. The processing to plutonium 
metal alternative would be the most advantageous for all factors 
except: (2) security and nuclear nonproliferation and (6) reliance on 
aging facilities.
    The processing to oxide and vitrification alternatives would 
involve minimal reliance on aging facilities because they would use new 
facilities for the final step involved in stabilizing the plutonium and 
for storing the plutonium after completion of stabilization. The 
processing to metal alternative would use existing facilities to 
stabilize the plutonium solutions.
    The vitrification alternatives would be preferable from the 
security and nuclear nonproliferation standpoint because 
[[Page 9829]] vitrification would produce a form of material least 
likely to be used in manufacturing a nuclear weapon. However, a 
proliferator could recover the plutonium from the vitrified (glass) 
matrix if the necessary resources and proper technology were available. 
The processing to metal alternative would result in a form of plutonium 
that closely resembles materials used in weapons production. DOE does 
not believe that processing these solutions to metal and storing the 
metal in vaults in protected areas of the SRS, adding appreciably less 
than one percent to the U.S. inventory of many metric tons, would 
constitute a proliferation risk. DOE has committed to not using 
plutonium-239 and weapons-usable highly enriched uranium separated or 
stabilized during the phaseout, shutdown, and cleanout of weapons 
complex facilities for nuclear explosive purposes. This prohibition 
would apply to the plutonium metal produced as a result of the decision 
to process the F-Canyon plutonium solutions to metal. DOE believes that 
the processing to metal alternative is fully consistent with the 
Presidential Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy, under which 
the United States ``* * * will seek to eliminate where possible the 
accumulation of stockpiles of highly-enriched uranium or plutonium, and 
to ensure that where these materials already exist they are subject to 
the highest standards of safety, security, and international 
accountability.'' Furthermore, in accordance with the provision in this 
Policy to submit U.S. fissile material surplus to national security 
requirements to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), the Department intends to offer this material along with other 
material at the SRS for IAEA inspection when the material is in a form 
and consolidated in a storage facility suitable for safe and effective 
monitoring by the IAEA.

V. Environmentally Preferable Alternative

    As shown in the Final F-Canyon Plutonium Solutions EIS, the 
potential environmental impacts of implementing any of the alternatives 
are generally small and within the same range. DOE believes that any of 
the action alternatives would be preferable to the no action 
alternative because the inherent risk of storing plutonium in liquid 
form would be eliminated. DOE considers the processing to metal 
alternative the environmentally preferable alternative because it would 
eliminate the inherent risk of maintaining plutonium in solution in the 
shortest period of time. While the plutonium remains in solution, there 
is a risk of releases and subsequent radiation exposure to workers, the 
public, and the environment from accidental criticality incidents, 
leaks, and disruptions to engineered systems from earthquakes.

VI. Decision

    DOE has decided to implement the preferred alternative, processing 
the F-Canyon plutonium solutions to metal, as discussed in the Final F-
Canyon Plutonium Solutions EIS. Concurrent with the processing, 
packaging and storage of the metal, which is expected to take about 20 
months, DOE will undertake activities to modify part of the FB-Line 
facility to provide the capability to repackage the plutonium metal 
into a configuration that meets the DOE standard for long-term storage 
of plutonium. The plutonium metal resulting from this action will not 
be used for nuclear explosive purposes.

VII. Mitigation

    The F-Canyon and FB-Line facilities that will be used to process 
the plutonium solutions to metal incorporate engineered features to 
limit the potential impacts of facility operations to workers, the 
public and the environment. All of the engineered systems and 
administrative controls are subject to the startup requirements of DOE 
Order 5480.31, which will assure, prior to startup, the safe operation 
of the facilities. No other mitigation measures have been identified; 
therefore, DOE need not prepare a Mitigation Action Plan.

VIII. Conclusion

    DOE has determined that the F-Canyon and FB-Line facilities should 
be operated to process to metal approximately 303,000 liters (80,000) 
gallons of plutonium solutions currently stored in F-Canyon. In 
reaching this decision, DOE considered the analysis of the potential 
environmental impacts of alternatives for stabilizing this material in 
the Final F-Canyon Plutonium Solutions EIS. This action will produce a 
solid form of plutonium that will be safer and easier to store than a 
liquid solution. It will take less time than other alternatives and 
will therefore eliminate more quickly the risk inherent in storing 
plutonium in liquid form. The plutonium metal resulting from this 
action will be stored at the Savannah River Site pending decisions on 
its disposition and will not be used for nuclear explosive purposes.

    Issued at Washington, DC, February 1, 1995.
Thomas P. Grumbly,
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management.
[FR Doc. 95-4308 Filed 2-21-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P