

related to 4.5.1.b.3 in a previous TS change.

Environmental Impacts to the Proposed Action

The proposed changes will provide additional time for operator action in a boron dilution event to assure that there is at least 15 minutes between the time to boron dilution alarm assuming an alarm penalty of 1.3 and the time to criticality for Modes 1 through 5 and 30 minutes for Mode 6 for operator action. The Commission has completed its evaluation of the proposed TS changes and concludes that the combination of the shutdown margin increases and the lower credited boron dilution alarm setpoint assuming an alarm penalty factor of 1.3 will provide assurance that the criteria for operator action will be met. In addition, the neutron sources will be moved further away from the excore detectors for the Cycle 19 startup (approximately March 1995). This will provide additional margin in the alarm setpoint as the need for any penalty factor will be significantly reduced or completely eliminated. In addition, the staff agrees that the change in references in TS 3.1.2.2, 3.1.2.4, and 3.1.2.6, and Surveillance Specifications 4.1.2.3.1 and 4.1.2.4.1 are editorial in nature.

The proposed TS change will not increase the probability or consequences of accidents, no changes are being made in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite, and there is no significant increase in the allowable individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant radiological environmental impacts associated with this proposed TS amendment.

With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed amendment does involve features located entirely within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. It does not affect nonradiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impact. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant nonradiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed amendment.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

Since the Commission has concluded there is no measurable environmental impact associated with the proposed amendment, any alternatives with equal or greater environmental impact need not be evaluated. As an alternative to the proposed action, the staff considered denial of the proposed action. Denial of application would result in no change in current environmental impacts. The

environmental impacts of the proposed action and the alternative action are similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

This action does not involve the use of resources not considered previously in the Final Environmental Statement for the Haddam Neck Plant.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

In accordance with its stated policy, the staff consulted with the Connecticut State official regarding the environmental impact of the proposed action. The State official has no comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

Based upon the environmental assessment, the Commission concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the Commission has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed amendment.

For further details with respect to this proposed action, see the licensee's letter dated September 7, 1994, which is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at the Russell Library, 123 Broad Street, Middletown, CT 06547.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 3rd day of February 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Phillip F. McKee,

Director, Project Directorate I-4, Division of Reactor Projects—I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

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Northeast Nuclear Energy Company; Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3; Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-49, issued to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (the licensee), for operation of the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3, located in New London County, Connecticut.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

The proposed action would revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.2.a by granting a one-time extension of the allowable Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

pump outage time for mechanical seal replacement and related modifications from 72 hours to 120 hours. This exception would only be used one time per pump and expire on April 30, 1995. The amendment would clearly define the times in which each RHR pump and associated RHR heat exchanger must be restored to an operable state.

The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's application for amendment dated August 16, 1994, as supplemented by letter dated January 10, 1995.

The Need for the Proposed Action

The proposed action would reduce the potential for an unnecessary plant shutdown, thus, eliminating a source of unnecessary challenges to the plant's safety systems.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

The Commission has completed its evaluation of the proposed action and concludes that one-time extension of the RHR pump outage time from 72 hours to 120 hours to acceptable.

The change will not increase the probability or consequences of accidents, no changes are being made in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite, and there is no significant increase in the allowable individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant radiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed action does involve features located entirely within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR part 20. It does not affect nonradiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impact. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant nonradiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

Since the Commission has concluded there is no measurable environmental impact associated with the proposed action, any alternatives with equal or greater environmental impact need not be evaluated. As an alternative to the proposed action, the staff considered denial of the proposed action. Denial of the application would result in no change in current environmental impacts. The environmental impacts of the proposed action and the alternative action are similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

This action does not involve the use of any resources not previously considered in the Final Environmental Statement for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

In accordance with its stated policy, the staff consulted with the Connecticut State official regarding the environmental impact of the proposed action. The State official had no comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

Based upon the environmental assessment, the Commission concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the Commission has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed action.

For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the licensee's letter dated August 16, 1994, as supplemented by letter dated January 10, 1995, which are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, The Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at the Learning Resource Center, Three Rivers Community-Technical College, Thames Valley Campus, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, CT 06360.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 3rd day of February 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Phillip F. McKee,

Director, Project Directorate I-4, Division of Reactor Projects—I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

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[Docket No. 50-413]

Duke Power Company, et al.; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-35 issued to Duke Power Company (the licensee) for operation of the Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1, located in York County, South Carolina.

The proposed amendment request would propose the renewal for Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 9 operation of the steam generator tube inspection bobbin probe

voltage-based interim plugging criteria that had been previously approved for Cycle 8. Approval of this amendment will preclude unnecessary plugging or repairing tubes by sleeving due to the occurrence of outer diameter initiated stress corrosion cracking (ODSCC) at the tube support plate elevations in the Catawba Unit 1 steam generators. The interim plugging criteria approved for Cycle 8 and contained in the draft Generic Letter 94-XX, "Voltage-Based Repair Criteria for the Repair of Westinghouse Steam Generator Tubes Affected by Outside Diameter Stress Corrosion Cracking," can be summarized as follows:

Flaw indications with a bobbin coil voltage less than or equal to 1.0 volt can remain in service without further action. For flaw indications in excess of 1.0 volt but less than 2.7 volts, the tube can remain in service provided an RPC inspection of the indication does not detect ODSCC or any other degradation mode. Crack indications above 2.7 volts will be plugged or repaired by sleeving, and do not require RPC confirmation.

This amendment request reflects the "Requested Actions: for a licensee that chooses to implement a steam generator tube interim plugging criteria, as stated in the draft NRC Generic Letter, 94-XX "Voltage-Based Repair Criteria for the Repair of Westinghouse Steam Generator Tubes Affected by Outside Diameter Stress Corrosion Cracking." The changes being proposed to the Technical Specification (TS) do not alter the interim plugging criteria currently stated in the TS which was approved and utilized during Cycle 8. The primary change to the TS is to incorporate the guidance of draft Generic Letter 94-XX, "Voltage-Based Repair Criteria for the Repair of Westinghouse Steam Generator Tubes Affected by Outside Diameter Stress Corrosion Cracking," which will allow removal of the cycle-specific limitation currently in the TS.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from

any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

(1) Operation of Catawba Unit 1 in accordance with the proposed license amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

A single tube rupture is not anticipated during operation of Catawba Unit 1. Based on the existing data base, the limiting RG [Regulatory Guide] 1.121 criterion for tube burst capability of 3 times normal operating differential is satisfied with 3/4" diameter tubing with bobbin coil indications with signal amplitudes less than 4.54 volts, regardless of the indicated depth measurement. This structural limit is based on a lower 95% prediction bound of the data and using LTL material properties. A 1.0 volt plugging criteria compares favorably with the structural limit considering the previously calculated growth rates for ODSCC within the Catawba Unit 1 steam generators. Assuming a voltage increase of 0.4 volts, and adding a 14% NDE uncertainty of 0.14 volts (90% cumulative probability) to the interim plugging criteria [IPC] of 1.0 volt results in an EOC [end-of-cycle] voltage of approximately 1.6 volts. This end of cycle voltage compares favorably with the Structural Limit of 4.54 volts. The applicability of assumed growth rates for each cycle of operation will be confirmed prior to return to power of Catawba Unit 1. A similar structural margin is anticipated for subsequent cycles.

In addition, for an EOC voltage structural limit of 4.54 volts, applying the 40% growth allowance and the 14% NDE uncertainty results in a margin between the structural limit and the alternate repair limit (2.7 volts), which is well within the structural limit. This repair limit will be applied for IPC implementation to repair bobbin indications greater than 2.7 volts independent of RPC confirmation of the indication.

Concerning SLB [steamline break] leakage in support of implementation to the interim plugging criteria, it will be determined whether the distribution of cracking indications at the tube support plate intersections at the end of a cycle are projected to be such that primary to secondary leakage would result in site boundary doses within the pertinent 10 CFR 100 limits. The SLB leakage rate calculation methodology * * * will be used to calculate End of Cycle SLB leakage. Based on EOC 8 projections, it is calculated that leakage during a postulated SLB event at the EOC 8 will be limited to approximately 1.61 gpm which is shown to result in acceptable dose consequences. [An] SLB leakage of 17.5 gpm in the faulted loop results in dose consequences which are less than the pertinent 10 CFR 100 limits. Similar results are expected for subsequent cycles and confirmation of leak rates will be performed prior to placing the [s]team generators in service.