Texas 77252- 8341, with Texas Commerce Bank, National Association as the surviving corporation in the merger.

Dated: February 2, 1995.

By Order of the Maritime Administrator.

Murray A. Bloom,

Acting Secretary.

[FR Doc. 95–3127 Filed 2–7–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–81–P

Notice of Merger of Approved Trustee

Notice is hereby given that Ameritrust Texas, National Association, Houston, Texas, changed its name to Texas Commerce Trust Company, National Association effective September 28, 1993. Texas Commerce Trust Company, National Association merged with and into Texas Commerce Bank, National Association, P. O. Box 2558, Houston, Texas 77252–8341, effective December 17, 1993, with Texas Commerce Bank, National Association as the surviving corporation in the merger.

Dated: February 2, 1995.

By Order of the Maritime Administrator.

Murray A. Bloom,

Acting Secretary.

[FR Doc. 95–3128 Filed 2–7–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–81–P

Notice of Merger of Approved Trustee

Notice is hereby given that New First City Texas-Beaumont, National Association, Beaumont, Texas, merged with and into Texas Commerce Bank, National Association-Beaumont, P. O. Box 2751, Beaumont, Texas 77704, effective February 13, 1993, with Texas Commerce Bank, National Association-Beaumont as the surviving corporation in the merger.

Dated: February 2, 1995.

By Order of the Maritime Administrator.

Murray A. Bloom,

Acting Secretary.

[FR Doc. 95–3130 Filed 2–7–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–81–P

Research and Special Programs Administration

[Docket No. PS–132; Notice 2]

Office of Pipeline Safety; Risk Assessment Prioritization (RAP)

AGENCY: Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), DOT.

ACTION: Request for information.

SUMMARY: RSPA, through the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), is implementing a pipeline Risk Assessment Prioritization (RAP) process and invites representatives of industry, government agencies, environmental organizations, public safety organizations and other members of the public to contribute information on solutions to pipeline safety issues. The proposed solutions are a vital part in developing the RAP process. Through the RAP process, the solutions will be prioritized and will become a basis upon which OPS management will decide how to commit available resources.

DATES: Responses to this request for information should be submitted on or before April 10, 1995. Late-filed comments will be considered to the extent practicable.

ADDRESSES: Send comments in duplicate to the Dockets Unit, Room 8421, Research and Special Programs Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590. Identify the docket and notice number stated in the heading of this notice. All comments and docketed material will be available for inspection and copying in room 8421 between 8:30 a.m. and 5 p.m. each business day.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Patrick J. Ramirez, (202) 366–9864, regarding the subject matter of this notice. Contact the Dockets Unit, (202) 366–5046, for docket material.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background on RAP

OPS prescribes and enforces the safety standards for the transportation of gases and hazardous liquids by pipeline and for liquified natural gas facilities. OPS frequently must allocate its resources to address safety actions identified by authorities outside of the agency, including Congress, the National Transportation Safety Board, and the General Accounting Office, OPS believes that pipeline safety resources can be most effectively utilized through analyzing and prioritizing of potential pipeline safety actions based on risk assessment.

The RAP process was developed following a thorough assessment of OPS operations conducted in 1991 and the adoption in 1992 of a set of goals necessary to enable OPS to respond most effectively to increasing pipeline safety concerns. RAP is being developed as a management process with which OPS may: identify pipeline safety and environmental protection issues; identify potential solutions for these issues; assess the relative impact of each solution on the likelihood or consequences of pipeline accidents; estimate the cost to OPS and industry of each proposed solution; and allocate available OPS resources to the most cost-effective set of solutions.

It is likely that OPS will not have the resources necessary to implement, in the near term, all of the solutions proposed by industry, OPS and other stakeholders. However, the RAP process will help ensure that OPS can assign available resources to solutions that will produce the greatest reduction in pipeline risks and environmental risks.

Highlights of the RAP process

The RAP process will utilize basic risk-based prioritization and resource allocation models to help structure and focus OPS management decisions. In addition, the process will facilitate effective communication and interactions with OPS stakeholders through a common understanding of pipelines safety concerns.

The details of the RAP process are described in 58 FR 51402 dated October 1, 1993. The sequence of steps in the RAP process is as follows:

a. Chart Pipeline Safety Subjects.

b. Poll for Issues—**Federal Register** Notice dated Oct. 1, 1993.

c. Insert Mandated Issues.

d. Compile Issues List.

e. Poll for Solutions—Current stage in the process.

f. Insert Mandated Solutions.

g. Compile Solutions List.

h. Set Rating Criteria.

i. Rate Each Solution.

j. Estimate Economic Impact.

k. Assemble Rated Priorities.

l. Identify Mandates.

m. Estimate Resource Availability.

n. Assign Resources.

o. Issue Action Plan.

p. Monitor Performance.

q. Maintain Data Base.

r. Repeat Cycle.

Request for Information

The purpose of this notice is to solicit stakeholder participation in the second data gathering step of the RAP process by collecting solution statements associated with pipeline issues described in Section B of this notice. After OPS has received and consolidated the solutions, including solutions identified by OPS in connection with its ongoing risk determination efforts (e.g., accident investigations, special studies), OPS will hold a public meeting to ensure that interested stakeholders have a thorough understanding of the issues and solutions as well as the remainder of the RAP process.

Form for a Solution Statement

To aid in processing solution statements, OPS suggests a standard format. Section A information may be provided one time for all solutions submitted from one responder. A solution statement should contain:

A. The identification of the responder per Section A below.

B. The B-code designation of the issue being addressed, per Section B below.

C. The complete proposed solution description. See Section C below for discussion of a solution statement.

D. The type of solution that is being proposed, per Section D below.

E. The kind of facility affected, selected from Section E below.

As a guide for preparing solution statements, the following examples are provided.

Example 1.
A. Responder identification
B. B4.3 (Internal Corrosion)
C. A regulation requiring the periodic use of smart pigs
D. D3
E. E2 (Liquid transportation lines)

Example 2.
A. Responder identification
B. B4.3 (Internal Corrosion)
C. Financial support of research to improve smart pigs
D. D9 (Support research and development)
E. E2 (Liquid transportation lines)

Section A. Responder Identification

A1 Responder name
A2 Responder position or title
A3 Responder organization
Responder organization type (Operators indicate all applicable)
A4a Operator, hazardous liquid, gathering
A4b Operator, hazardous liquid, transportation
A4c Operator, gas, gathering
A4d Operator, gas, transmission
A4e Operator, gas, distribution
A4f Operator, LNG facility
A4g Pipeline industry association
A4h Pipeline contractor
A4i Pipeline supplier
A4j Environmental organization
A4k Consumer safety organization
A4l Government, federal
A4m Government, state
A4n Government, municipal
A4o Public
A4p Other (Please specify)
A5 Address
A6 Contact name (If other than responder)
A7 Contact phone number
A8 Contact facsimile number

Section B. Consolidated Issues List

The following consolidated issues list represents the key elements of the issues that the respondents provided to RSPA's request for information, 58 FR 51402; October 1, 1993. OPS analyzed over 400 responses, converted proposed solution statements into issues statements, and to an appropriate degree, consolidated variations of similar issue statements. In preparing proposals for solutions, respondents are encouraged to give their widest interpretation to any of the 189 issues listed below. A solution statement may apply to more than one issue provided each issue being addressed is listed using the designated issue code (i.e., B1, B2, etc).

The consolidated list is organized into five categories of issues contributing to the probability of pipeline accident occurrence; five categories of issues contributing to the consequence of pipeline accidents and one category that includes issues directed at identifying and managing risks. The five categories for probability and consequence are, Design, Construction, Operations and Maintenance, Corrosion and Outside Force.

B1 DESIGN ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE PROBABILITY OF ACCIDENT OCCURRENCE DUE TO:
or DUE TO LACK OF:
or DUE TO INADEQUATE:
B1.1 • Allowable maximum operating pressure
B1.2 • Breakout tanks
B1.3 • Materials selection
B1.3.A —Steel pipe toughness
B1.3.B —Steel pipe weldability
B1.4 • Obsolescent technology
B1.5 • Obstacles to instrumented internal inspection
B1.6 • Offshore pipelines
B1.7 • Railroad rights-of-way
B1.8 • Thin wall, high strength pipe
B1.9 • Underwater hazards to navigation
B1.10 • Valve definitions

B2 CONSTRUCTION ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE PROBABILITY OF ACCIDENT OCCURRENCE DUE TO;
or DUE TO LACK OF;
or DUE TO INADEQUATE;
B2.1 • Hydrostatic testing
B2.1.A —Errors
B2.1.B —Procedures
B2.2 • Inspection
B2.2.A —for errors and flaws
B2.2.B —of girth welds
B2.2.C —for rock impingement
B2.2.D —of welded split sleeves
B2.3 • Maps and records
B2.4 • Material and equipment noncompliance
B2.4.A —pre-1970 (low frequency) ERW pipe
B2.4.B —railroad transportation fatigue cracks
B2.5 • Plastic pipe electrofusion joints
B2.6 • Plastic pipe fusion joints
B2.6.A —dissimilar materials
B2.7 • Specifications
B2.8 • Tracer wire wraps around plastic pipe

B3 OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE PROBABILITY OF ACCIDENT OCCURRENCE DUE TO:
or DUE TO LACK OF:
or DUE TO INADEQUATE:
B3.1 • Accident investigations
B3.2 • Allowable maximum operating pressure
B3.2.A —Exceeding
B3.2.A.1 >grandfathered pipelines
B3.2.B —Low safety margin relative to test pressure
B3.2.B.1 >in Class 1 locations
B3.2.C—Reduction following an incident
B3.3 • Branch service lines
B3.4 • Breakout tanks
B3.5 • Baypass lines/direct sales lines/farm taps
B3.6 • Control systems
B3.6.A —Excessive false alarms
B3.7 • Customer owned gas lines
B3.8 • Drug and alcohol abuse
B3.9 • Equipment failure
B3.10 • HVL facilities
B3.10.A —Two phase flow
B3.11 • Hydrostatic testing
B3.11.A —Exemption from
B3.11.B Periodic
B3.12 • Inspections
B3.12.A —Third party construction activity
B3.12.B —Encroachment
B3.12.C —Dents and gouges
B3.12.D —Cased crossings
B3.12.E —Minimum cover
B3.12.F —Obstacles to instrumented internal inspection
B3.12.G —Reporting requirements after voluntary use of instrumented internal inspection
B3.12.H —Requirements for instrumented internal inspection
B3.12.I —Technical variability among instrumented internal inspection.
B3.13 • Liquefied natural gas/ petroleum gas (LNG/LPG) systems
B3.13.A —Dense gas dispersion model
B3.13.B —Mobile LNG facilities
B3.14 • Pipeline Marker destruction
B3.15 • Obsolescent technology
B3.16 • Offshore pipelines
B3.17 • Operator qualification
B3.17.A —Excavator
B3.17.B —Pipeline
B3.17.C —Master meter system
B3.17.D —Liquid petroleum gas

distribution system
B3.18 • Pipeline age
B3.19 • Pipeline realignment
B3.20 • Plans and procedures
B3.21 • Protection of pipeline employees
B3.22 • Railroad rights-of-way
B3.23 • Records and reports
B3.23.A —Annual
B3.23.B —Incident
B3.24 • Reduced operating staff
B3.25 • Repairs/rehabilitation
B3.25.A —Casing shorts
B3.25.B —Cast iron pipe
B3.25.B.1 >Aging
B3.25.B.2 >Graphitization
B3.25.B.3 >Movement
B3.25.C —Pipe support during
B3.26 • Small gas distribution systems
B3.27 • Training
B3.28 • Underground utility location
B3.29 • Underwater hazards to navigation

B4 CORROSION ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE PROBABILITY OF ACCIDENT OCCURRENCE DUE TO:
or DUE TO LACK OF:
or DUE TO INADEQUATE:
B4.1 • Atmospheric
B4.2 • External
B4.2.A —Bare steel pipe
B4.2.B —Cathodic protection
B4.2.B.1 >Inconsistent regulations
B4.2.B.2 >Test points
B4.2.B.3 >Surveys
B4.2.C —Coating
B4.2.C.1 >Condition
B4.3 • Internal
B4.4 • Tank bottom

B5 OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE TO BURIED PIPELINES ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE PROBABILITY OF ACCIDENT OCCURRENCE DUE TO:
or DUE TO LACK OF:
or DUE TO INADEQUATE:
B5.1 • Digging with power mechanical equipment instead of hand digging in close proximity to facilities
B5.2 • Natural forces
B5.3 • Operator personnel
B5.3.A —Pumping stations
B5.4 • Public activity
B5.4.A —Gas distribution facilities
B5.5 • Third party operations
B5.5.A —Mandatory state one-call system
B5.5.B —Universal/uniform one-call system
B5.5.C —Statutory one-call enforcement authority
B5.5.D —Without using available one-call system
B5.5.E —One-call system public education
B5.5.F —While exempt from available one-call systems
B5.5.G —Incorrect operator one-call marks
B5.5.H —Ignoring one-call marks
B5.5.I —One-call marks are altered/removed
B5.5.J —Violation of one-call laws (inadequate penalties/enforcement)
B5.5.K —Incorrect construction marks
B5.5.L —Pipeline markers are inadequate
B5.5.M —Public right-of-way
B5.6 • Unreported or unrecognized damage
B5.7 • Vandalism or sabotage

B6 DESIGN ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS THAT OCCUR DUE TO:
or DUE TO LACK OF:
or DUE TO INADEQUATE:
B6.1 • Allowable maximum operating pressure
B6.1.A —High risk areas
B6.2 • HVL facilities
B6.3 • Proximity to inhabited buildings
B6.4 • Uncontrolled leaks
B6.4.A —Service lines
B6.5 • Valve remote control
B6.6 • Valve location

B7 CONSTRUCTION ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS THAT OCCUR DUE TO:
or DUE TO LACK OF:
or DUE TO INADEQUATE:
B7.1 • Environmental damage

B8 OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS THAT OCCUR DUE TO:
or DUE TO LACK OF:
or DUE TO INADEQUATE:
B8.1 • Allowable maximum operating pressure
B8.1.A —High risk areas
B8.2 • Check valve malfunction
B8.3 • Emergency response
B8.3.A —Environmentally sensitive areas
B8.3.A.1 >Definition
B8.3.B —Highly populated areas
B8.3.C —Water supplies
B8.4 • Hazardous concentrations of hydrogen sulfide
B8.5 • HVL facilities
B8.6 • Leaks
B8.6.A —Undetected, in Service lines
B8.6.B —Unrecognized
B8.6.B.1 —During unsteady operations
B8.7 • Protection of pipeline employees

B9 CORROSION ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS THAT OCCUR DUE TO:
or DUE TO LACK OF:
or DUE TO INADEQUATE:
The issues received were not appropriate for this category. The responder may submit issues and solutions for this category.

B10 OUTSIDE FORCE ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS THAT OCCUR DUE TO:
or DUE TO LACK OF:
or DUE TO INADEQUATE:
The issues received were not appropriate for this category. The responder may submit issues and solutions for this category.

B11 ISSUES THAT AFFECT OPS'S AND INDUSTRY'S ABILITY TO IDENTIFY AND MANAGE RISKS DUE TO:
or DUE TO LACK OF:
or DUE TO INADEQUATE:
B11.1 • Accident investigations
B11.1.A —Confidentiality of information
B11.2 • Conflicting responsibilities among conformance authorities
B11.2.A —Interstate pipelines
B11.2.B —Marine transfer pipelines
B11.2.C —Setback requirements
B11.3 • Federal/State
B11.3.A —Accident investigation coordination
B11.3.B —Facility inspection
B11.3.B.1 >frequency
B11.3.B.2 >of master meter systems
B11.3.C —Inspector
B11.3.C.1 >competence
B11.3.C.2 >corrosion control training
B11.3.C.3 >staff size
B11.3.D —Non-uniform regulatory enforcement
B11.4 • Fines and penalties
B11.5 • Incident reporting thresholds
B11.6 • Maps, records and reports
B11.6.A —Analysis
B11.6.B —Annual
B11.6.C —Incident
B11.6.D —High risk areas
B11.7 • Public education
B11.8 • Regulation ambiguities
B11.9 • State highway non-uniformity in design requirements
B11.10 • Unregulated
B11.10.A —Gathering pipelines
B11.10.B —Low stress pipelines
B11.10.C —Underground storage

Section C. Solution Statement

A SOLUTION is one of a number of remedies to one or more issues from

Section B listed above. The respondent's proposed solution statement should be complete and specific, but reasonably concise. See examples above in Form for a Solution Statement.

Section D. Type of Solution

To aid in consolidating the actions being proposed by each solution statement, select an action or actions for each solution from the listing below:

D1. A new or revised regulation that requires changes in industry design practices

D2. A new or revised regulation that requires changes in industry construction practices

D3. A new or revised regulation that requires changes in industry operational and maintenance practices

D4. A new or revised regulation that requires changes in industry reporting policies

D5. A new or revised OPS enforcement policy concerning and existing regulation

D6. A new or revised OPS audit or inspection practice

D7. A research activity to improve OPS/industry knowledge concerning the causes and effects of pipeline accidents

D8. A research activity to improve OPS/industry knowledge concerning the effects of proposed risk-reduction technologies

D9. Other (Please specify)

Section E. Type of Facility

E1 Hazardous liquid gathering pipelines.

E2 Hazardous liquid transportation pipelines.

E3 Two-phase pipelines.

E4 Gas gathering pipelines.

E5 Gas transmission pipelines.

E6 Gas distribution pipelines.

E7 Gas master meter systems.

E8 LPG distribution systems.

E9 LNG facilities.

E10 All liquid pipelines.

E11 All gas pipelines.

E12 All pipelines.

E13 Other (Specify)

Authority: 49 U.S.C. § 60101 et seq.; 49 CFR 1.53.

Issued in Washington, DC on February 2, 1995.

George W. Tenley, Jr.,

Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.

[FR Doc. 95–3154 Filed 2–7–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–60–P

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Fiscal Service

[Dept. Circ. 570, 1994—Rev., Supp. No. 8]

Surety Companies Acceptable on Federal Bonds; Millers' Mutual Insurance Association of Illinois

Millers' Mutual Insurance Association of Illinois, an Illinois corporation, has formally changed its name to Millers Mutual Insurance Association, effective September 19, 1994. The Company was last listed as an acceptable surety on Federal bonds at 59 FR 34166, July 1, 1994.

A Certificate of Authority as an acceptable surety on Federal bonds, dated today, is hereby issued under Sections 9304 to 9308 of Title 31 of the United States Code, to Millers Mutual Insurance Association, Alton, IL. This new Certificate replaces the Certificate of Authority issued to the Company under its former name. The underwriting limitation of $3,637,000 established for the Company as of July 1, 1994, remains unchanged until June 30, 1995.

Certificates of Authority expire on June 30, each year, unless revoked prior to that date. The Certificates are subject to subsequent annual renewal as long as the Company remains qualified (31 CFR part 223). A list of qualified companies is published annually as of July 1, in the Department Circular 570, which outlines details as to underwriting limitations, areas in which licensed to transact surety business and other information. Federal bond-approving officers should annotate their reference copies of the Treasury Circular 570, 1994 Revision, at page 34166 to reflect this change.

Questions concerning this notice may be directed to the Department of the Treasury, Financial Management Service, Funds Management Division, Surety Bond Branch, 3700 East-West Highway, Room 6F04, Hyattsville, MD 20782, Telephone (202/FTS) 874–6507.

Dated: February 2, 1995.

Charles F. Schwan III,

Director, Funds Management Division, Financial Management Service.

[FR Doc. 95–3102 Filed 2–7–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4810–35–M

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Environmental Impact Statement; Water Supply Development for the Catoosa Utility District and Upper Cumberland Plateau Region of East Tennessee

AGENCY: Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).

ACTION: Notice of intent.

SUMMARY: This notice is provided in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and Rural Utilities Service (RUS) and TVA's implementing procedures. TVA in conjunction with RUS has decided to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on alternatives for water supply development for the Catoosa Utility District and the upper Cumberland Plateau region of East Tennessee. The EIS will consider the potential environmental impacts of alternatives to meet the water supply needs of the district and region over a 30-year planning horizon. Alternatives to be considered will range from the construction of a water supply dam and impoundment on Clear Creek or other water course to the installation of a water pipeline from Watts Bar, Center Hill, or Dale Hollow Reservoirs. The objective of the action is to satisfy the water supply needs in the project area. With this notice, RUS and TVA are inviting comments on the scope of the EIS analysis.

DATES: Comments on the scope of the EIS must be received on or before March 10, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Comments should be sent to Dale V. Wilhelm, NEPA Liaison, Tennessee Valley Authority, 400 West Summit Hill Drive, WT 8B, Knoxville, Tennessee 37902.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jack L. Davis, Manager, Water Resource Projects, Tennessee Valley Authority, 400 West Summit Hill Drive, Knoxville, Tennessee 37902, phone (615) 632–7183.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: During the dry time of the year, water supplies are stressed in the Catoosa Water Supply District and other areas of the upper Cumberland Plateau region in East Tennessee. Projected growth for the region indicates a worsening of the situation. Presently, the Catoosa Utility District purchases potable water from the City of Crossville in Crossville, Tennessee, which must first meet the needs of its own customers, especially during drought conditions. In 1992, the Catoosa Utility District requested aid from RUS to develop a reliable and