

Texas 77252- 8341, with Texas Commerce Bank, National Association as the surviving corporation in the merger.

Dated: February 2, 1995.

By Order of the Maritime Administrator.

**Murray A. Bloom,**

*Acting Secretary.*

[FR Doc. 95-3127 Filed 2-7-95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-81-P

### Notice of Merger of Approved Trustee

Notice is hereby given that Ameritrust Texas, National Association, Houston, Texas, changed its name to Texas Commerce Trust Company, National Association effective September 28, 1993. Texas Commerce Trust Company, National Association merged with and into Texas Commerce Bank, National Association, P. O. Box 2558, Houston, Texas 77252-8341, effective December 17, 1993, with Texas Commerce Bank, National Association as the surviving corporation in the merger.

Dated: February 2, 1995.

By Order of the Maritime Administrator.

**Murray A. Bloom,**

*Acting Secretary.*

[FR Doc. 95-3128 Filed 2-7-95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-81-P

### Notice of Merger of Approved Trustee

Notice is hereby given that New First City Texas-Beaumont, National Association, Beaumont, Texas, merged with and into Texas Commerce Bank, National Association-Beaumont, P. O. Box 2751, Beaumont, Texas 77704, effective February 13, 1993, with Texas Commerce Bank, National Association-Beaumont as the surviving corporation in the merger.

Dated: February 2, 1995.

By Order of the Maritime Administrator.

**Murray A. Bloom,**

*Acting Secretary.*

[FR Doc. 95-3130 Filed 2-7-95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-81-P

### Research and Special Programs Administration

[Docket No. PS-132; Notice 2]

#### Office of Pipeline Safety; Risk Assessment Prioritization (RAP)

**AGENCY:** Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Request for information.

**SUMMARY:** RSPA, through the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), is implementing

a pipeline Risk Assessment Prioritization (RAP) process and invites representatives of industry, government agencies, environmental organizations, public safety organizations and other members of the public to contribute information on solutions to pipeline safety issues. The proposed solutions are a vital part in developing the RAP process. Through the RAP process, the solutions will be prioritized and will become a basis upon which OPS management will decide how to commit available resources.

**DATES:** Responses to this request for information should be submitted on or before April 10, 1995. Late-filed comments will be considered to the extent practicable.

**ADDRESSES:** Send comments in duplicate to the Dockets Unit, Room 8421, Research and Special Programs Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590. Identify the docket and notice number stated in the heading of this notice. All comments and docketed material will be available for inspection and copying in room 8421 between 8:30 a.m. and 5 p.m. each business day.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Patrick J. Ramirez, (202) 366-9864, regarding the subject matter of this notice. Contact the Dockets Unit, (202) 366-5046, for docket material.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

##### Background on RAP

OPS prescribes and enforces the safety standards for the transportation of gases and hazardous liquids by pipeline and for liquified natural gas facilities. OPS frequently must allocate its resources to address safety actions identified by authorities outside of the agency, including Congress, the National Transportation Safety Board, and the General Accounting Office. OPS believes that pipeline safety resources can be most effectively utilized through analyzing and prioritizing of potential pipeline safety actions based on risk assessment.

The RAP process was developed following a thorough assessment of OPS operations conducted in 1991 and the adoption in 1992 of a set of goals necessary to enable OPS to respond most effectively to increasing pipeline safety concerns. RAP is being developed as a management process with which OPS may: identify pipeline safety and environmental protection issues; identify potential solutions for these issues; assess the relative impact of each solution on the likelihood or consequences of pipeline accidents;

estimate the cost to OPS and industry of each proposed solution; and allocate available OPS resources to the most cost-effective set of solutions.

It is likely that OPS will not have the resources necessary to implement, in the near term, all of the solutions proposed by industry, OPS and other stakeholders. However, the RAP process will help ensure that OPS can assign available resources to solutions that will produce the greatest reduction in pipeline risks and environmental risks.

#### Highlights of the RAP process

The RAP process will utilize basic risk-based prioritization and resource allocation models to help structure and focus OPS management decisions. In addition, the process will facilitate effective communication and interactions with OPS stakeholders through a common understanding of pipelines safety concerns.

The details of the RAP process are described in 58 FR 51402 dated October 1, 1993. The sequence of steps in the RAP process is as follows:

- a. Chart Pipeline Safety Subjects.
- b. Poll for Issues—**Federal Register** Notice dated Oct. 1, 1993.
- c. Insert Mandated Issues.
- d. Compile Issues List.
- e. Poll for Solutions—Current stage in the process.
- f. Insert Mandated Solutions.
- g. Compile Solutions List.
- h. Set Rating Criteria.
- i. Rate Each Solution.
- j. Estimate Economic Impact.
- k. Assemble Rated Priorities.
- l. Identify Mandates.
- m. Estimate Resource Availability.
- n. Assign Resources.
- o. Issue Action Plan.
- p. Monitor Performance.
- q. Maintain Data Base.
- r. Repeat Cycle.

#### Request for Information

The purpose of this notice is to solicit stakeholder participation in the second data gathering step of the RAP process by collecting solution statements associated with pipeline issues described in Section B of this notice. After OPS has received and consolidated the solutions, including solutions identified by OPS in connection with its ongoing risk determination efforts (e.g., accident investigations, special studies), OPS will hold a public meeting to ensure that interested stakeholders have a thorough understanding of the issues and solutions as well as the remainder of the RAP process.

**Form for a Solution Statement**

To aid in processing solution statements, OPS suggests a standard format. Section A information may be provided one time for all solutions submitted from one responder. A solution statement should contain:

- A. The identification of the responder per Section A below.
- B. The B-code designation of the issue being addressed, per Section B below.
- C. The complete proposed solution description. See Section C below for discussion of a solution statement.
- D. The type of solution that is being proposed, per Section D below.
- E. The kind of facility affected, selected from Section E below.

As a guide for preparing solution statements, the following examples are provided.

**Example 1.**

- A. Responder identification
- B. B4.3 (Internal Corrosion)
- C. A regulation requiring the periodic use of smart pigs
- D. D3
- E. E2 (Liquid transportation lines)

**Example 2.**

- A. Responder identification
- B. B4.3 (Internal Corrosion)
- C. Financial support of research to improve smart pigs
- D. D9 (Support research and development)
- E. E2 (Liquid transportation lines)

**Section A. Responder Identification**

- A1 Responder name
- A2 Responder position or title
- A3 Responder organization
  - Responder organization type (Operators indicate all applicable)
- A4a Operator, hazardous liquid, gathering
- A4b Operator, hazardous liquid, transportation
- A4c Operator, gas, gathering
- A4d Operator, gas, transmission
- A4e Operator, gas, distribution
- A4f Operator, LNG facility
- A4g Pipeline industry association
- A4h Pipeline contractor
- A4i Pipeline supplier
- A4j Environmental organization
- A4k Consumer safety organization
- A4l Government, federal
- A4m Government, state
- A4n Government, municipal
- A4o Public
- A4p Other (Please specify)
- A5 Address
- A6 Contact name (If other than responder)
- A7 Contact phone number
- A8 Contact facsimile number

**Section B. Consolidated Issues List**

The following consolidated issues list represents the key elements of the issues

that the respondents provided to RSPA's request for information, 58 FR 51402; October 1, 1993. OPS analyzed over 400 responses, converted proposed solution statements into issues statements, and to an appropriate degree, consolidated variations of similar issue statements. In preparing proposals for solutions, respondents are encouraged to give their widest interpretation to any of the 189 issues listed below. A solution statement may apply to more than one issue provided each issue being addressed is listed using the designated issue code (i.e., B1, B2, etc).

The consolidated list is organized into five categories of issues contributing to the probability of pipeline accident occurrence; five categories of issues contributing to the consequence of pipeline accidents and one category that includes issues directed at identifying and managing risks. The five categories for probability and consequence are, Design, Construction, Operations and Maintenance, Corrosion and Outside Force.

**B1 DESIGN ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE PROBABILITY OF ACCIDENT OCCURRENCE DUE TO:**

or DUE TO LACK OF:

or DUE TO INADEQUATE:

- B1.1 • Allowable maximum operating pressure
- B1.2 • Breakout tanks
- B1.3 • Materials selection
- B1.3.A —Steel pipe toughness
- B1.3.B —Steel pipe weldability
- B1.4 • Obsolescent technology
- B1.5 • Obstacles to instrumented internal inspection
- B1.6 • Offshore pipelines
- B1.7 • Railroad rights-of-way
- B1.8 • Thin wall, high strength pipe
- B1.9 • Underwater hazards to navigation
- B1.10 • Valve definitions

**B2 CONSTRUCTION ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE PROBABILITY OF ACCIDENT OCCURRENCE DUE TO:**

or DUE TO LACK OF:

or DUE TO INADEQUATE:

- B2.1 • Hydrostatic testing
- B2.1.A —Errors
- B2.1.B —Procedures
- B2.2 • Inspection
- B2.2.A —for errors and flaws
- B2.2.B —of girth welds
- B2.2.C —for rock impingement
- B2.2.D —of welded split sleeves
- B2.3 • Maps and records
- B2.4 • Material and equipment noncompliance
- B2.4.A —pre-1970 (low frequency) ERW pipe
- B2.4.B —railroad transportation fatigue cracks

- B2.5 • Plastic pipe electrofusion joints
- B2.6 • Plastic pipe fusion joints
- B2.6.A —dissimilar materials
- B2.7 • Specifications
- B2.8 • Tracer wire wraps around plastic pipe

**B3 OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE PROBABILITY OF ACCIDENT OCCURRENCE DUE TO:**

or DUE TO LACK OF:

or DUE TO INADEQUATE:

- B3.1 • Accident investigations
- B3.2 • Allowable maximum operating pressure
- B3.2.A —Exceeding
- B3.2.A.1 >grandfathered pipelines
- B3.2.B —Low safety margin relative to test pressure
- B3.2.B.1 >in Class 1 locations
- B3.2.C —Reduction following an incident
- B3.3 • Branch service lines
- B3.4 • Breakout tanks
- B3.5 • Bypass lines/direct sales lines/farm taps
- B3.6 • Control systems
- B3.6.A —Excessive false alarms
- B3.7 • Customer owned gas lines
- B3.8 • Drug and alcohol abuse
- B3.9 • Equipment failure
- B3.10 • HVL facilities
- B3.10.A —Two phase flow
- B3.11 • Hydrostatic testing
- B3.11.A —Exemption from
- B3.11.B Periodic
- B3.12 • Inspections
- B3.12.A —Third party construction activity
- B3.12.B —Encroachment
- B3.12.C —Dents and gouges
- B3.12.D —Cased crossings
- B3.12.E —Minimum cover
- B3.12.F —Obstacles to instrumented internal inspection
- B3.12.G —Reporting requirements after voluntary use of instrumented internal inspection
- B3.12.H —Requirements for instrumented internal inspection
- B3.12.I —Technical variability among instrumented internal inspection.
- B3.13 • Liquefied natural gas/petroleum gas (LNG/LPG) systems
- B3.13.A —Dense gas dispersion model
- B3.13.B —Mobile LNG facilities
- B3.14 • Pipeline Marker destruction
- B3.15 • Obsolescent technology
- B3.16 • Offshore pipelines
- B3.17 • Operator qualification
- B3.17.A —Excavator
- B3.17.B —Pipeline
- B3.17.C —Master meter system
- B3.17.D —Liquid petroleum gas

distribution system

B3.18 • Pipeline age

B3.19 • Pipeline realignment

B3.20 • Plans and procedures

B3.21 • Protection of pipeline employees

B3.22 • Railroad rights-of-way

B3.23 • Records and reports

B3.23.A —Annual

B3.23.B —Incident

B3.24 • Reduced operating staff

B3.25 • Repairs/rehabilitation

B3.25.A —Casing shorts

B3.25.B —Cast iron pipe

B3.25.B.1 >Aging

B3.25.B.2 >Graphitization

B3.25.B.3 >Movement

B3.25.C —Pipe support during

B3.26 • Small gas distribution systems

B3.27 • Training

B3.28 • Underground utility location

B3.29 • Underwater hazards to navigation

**B4 CORROSION ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE PROBABILITY OF ACCIDENT OCCURRENCE DUE TO:**

or DUE TO LACK OF:  
or DUE TO INADEQUATE:

B4.1 • Atmospheric

B4.2 • External

B4.2.A —Bare steel pipe

B4.2.B —Cathodic protection

B4.2.B.1 >Inconsistent regulations

B4.2.B.2 >Test points

B4.2.B.3 >Surveys

B4.2.C —Coating

B4.2.C.1 >Condition

B4.3 • Internal

B4.4 • Tank bottom

**B5 OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE TO BURIED PIPELINES ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE PROBABILITY OF ACCIDENT OCCURRENCE DUE TO:**

or DUE TO LACK OF:  
or DUE TO INADEQUATE:

B5.1 • Digging with power mechanical equipment instead of hand digging in close proximity to facilities

B5.2 • Natural forces

B5.3 • Operator personnel

B5.3.A —Pumping stations

B5.4 • Public activity

B5.4.A —Gas distribution facilities

B5.5 • Third party operations

B5.5.A —Mandatory state one-call system

B5.5.B —Universal/uniform one-call system

B5.5.C —Statutory one-call enforcement authority

B5.5.D —Without using available one-call system

B5.5.E —One-call system public

education

B5.5.F —While exempt from available one-call systems

B5.5.G —Incorrect operator one-call marks

B5.5.H —Ignoring one-call marks

B5.5.I —One-call marks are altered/removed

B5.5.J —Violation of one-call laws (inadequate penalties/enforcement)

B5.5.K —Incorrect construction marks

B5.5.L —Pipeline markers are inadequate

B5.5.M —Public right-of-way

B5.6 • Unreported or unrecognized damage

B5.7 • Vandalism or sabotage

**B6 DESIGN ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS THAT OCCUR DUE TO:**

or DUE TO LACK OF:  
or DUE TO INADEQUATE:

B6.1 • Allowable maximum operating pressure

B6.1.A —High risk areas

B6.2 • HVL facilities

B6.3 • Proximity to inhabited buildings

B6.4 • Uncontrolled leaks

B6.4.A —Service lines

B6.5 • Valve remote control

B6.6 • Valve location

**B7 CONSTRUCTION ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS THAT OCCUR DUE TO:**

or DUE TO LACK OF:  
or DUE TO INADEQUATE:

B7.1 • Environmental damage

**B8 OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS THAT OCCUR DUE TO:**

or DUE TO LACK OF:  
or DUE TO INADEQUATE:

B8.1 • Allowable maximum operating pressure

B8.1.A —High risk areas

B8.2 • Check valve malfunction

B8.3 • Emergency response

B8.3.A —Environmentally sensitive areas

B8.3.A.1 >Definition

B8.3.B —Highly populated areas

B8.3.C —Water supplies

B8.4 • Hazardous concentrations of hydrogen sulfide

B8.5 • HVL facilities

B8.6 • Leaks

B8.6.A —Undetected, in Service lines

B8.6.B —Unrecognized

B8.6.B.1 —During unsteady operations

B8.7 • Protection of pipeline employees

**B9 CORROSION ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS THAT OCCUR DUE TO:**

or DUE TO LACK OF:  
or DUE TO INADEQUATE:

The issues received were not appropriate for this category. The responder may submit issues and solutions for this category.

**B10 OUTSIDE FORCE ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS THAT OCCUR DUE TO:**

or DUE TO LACK OF:  
or DUE TO INADEQUATE:

The issues received were not appropriate for this category. The responder may submit issues and solutions for this category.

**B11 ISSUES THAT AFFECT OPS'S AND INDUSTRY'S ABILITY TO IDENTIFY AND MANAGE RISKS DUE TO:**

or DUE TO LACK OF:  
or DUE TO INADEQUATE:

B11.1 • Accident investigations

B11.1.A —Confidentiality of information

B11.2 • Conflicting responsibilities among conformance authorities

B11.2.A —Interstate pipelines

B11.2.B —Marine transfer pipelines

B11.2.C —Setback requirements

B11.3 • Federal/State

B11.3.A —Accident investigation coordination

B11.3.B —Facility inspection

B11.3.B.1 >frequency

B11.3.B.2 >of master meter systems

B11.3.C —Inspector

B11.3.C.1 >competence

B11.3.C.2 >corrosion control training

B11.3.C.3 >staff size

B11.3.D —Non-uniform regulatory enforcement

B11.4 • Fines and penalties

B11.5 • Incident reporting thresholds

B11.6 • Maps, records and reports

B11.6.A —Analysis

B11.6.B —Annual

B11.6.C —Incident

B11.6.D —High risk areas

B11.7 • Public education

B11.8 • Regulation ambiguities

B11.9 • State highway non-uniformity in design requirements

B11.10 • Unregulated

B11.10.A —Gathering pipelines

B11.10.B —Low stress pipelines

B11.10.C —Underground storage

#### Section C. Solution Statement

A SOLUTION is one of a number of remedies to one or more issues from

Section B listed above. The respondent's proposed solution statement should be complete and specific, but reasonably concise. See examples above in Form for a Solution Statement.

#### Section D. Type of Solution

To aid in consolidating the actions being proposed by each solution statement, select an action or actions for each solution from the listing below:

- D1. A new or revised regulation that requires changes in industry design practices
- D2. A new or revised regulation that requires changes in industry construction practices
- D3. A new or revised regulation that requires changes in industry operational and maintenance practices
- D4. A new or revised regulation that requires changes in industry reporting policies
- D5. A new or revised OPS enforcement policy concerning and existing regulation
- D6. A new or revised OPS audit or inspection practice
- D7. A research activity to improve OPS/industry knowledge concerning the causes and effects of pipeline accidents
- D8. A research activity to improve OPS/industry knowledge concerning the effects of proposed risk-reduction technologies
- D9. Other (Please specify)

#### Section E. Type of Facility

- E1 Hazardous liquid gathering pipelines.
- E2 Hazardous liquid transportation pipelines.
- E3 Two-phase pipelines.
- E4 Gas gathering pipelines.
- E5 Gas transmission pipelines.
- E6 Gas distribution pipelines.
- E7 Gas master meter systems.
- E8 LPG distribution systems.
- E9 LNG facilities.
- E10 All liquid pipelines.
- E11 All gas pipelines.
- E12 All pipelines.
- E13 Other (Specify)

**Authority:** 49 U.S.C. § 60101 et seq.; 49 CFR 1.53.

Issued in Washington, DC on February 2, 1995.

**George W. Tenley, Jr.,**

*Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.*

[FR Doc. 95-3154 Filed 2-7-95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-60-P

## DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

### Fiscal Service

[Dept. Circ. 570, 1994—Rev., Supp. No. 8]

#### Surety Companies Acceptable on Federal Bonds; Millers' Mutual Insurance Association of Illinois

Millers' Mutual Insurance Association of Illinois, an Illinois corporation, has formally changed its name to Millers Mutual Insurance Association, effective September 19, 1994. The Company was last listed as an acceptable surety on Federal bonds at 59 FR 34166, July 1, 1994.

A Certificate of Authority as an acceptable surety on Federal bonds, dated today, is hereby issued under Sections 9304 to 9308 of Title 31 of the United States Code, to Millers Mutual Insurance Association, Alton, IL. This new Certificate replaces the Certificate of Authority issued to the Company under its former name. The underwriting limitation of \$3,637,000 established for the Company as of July 1, 1994, remains unchanged until June 30, 1995.

Certificates of Authority expire on June 30, each year, unless revoked prior to that date. The Certificates are subject to subsequent annual renewal as long as the Company remains qualified (31 CFR part 223). A list of qualified companies is published annually as of July 1, in the Department Circular 570, which outlines details as to underwriting limitations, areas in which licensed to transact surety business and other information. Federal bond-approving officers should annotate their reference copies of the Treasury Circular 570, 1994 Revision, at page 34166 to reflect this change.

Questions concerning this notice may be directed to the Department of the Treasury, Financial Management Service, Funds Management Division, Surety Bond Branch, 3700 East-West Highway, Room 6F04, Hyattsville, MD 20782, Telephone (202/FTS) 874-6507.

Dated: February 2, 1995.

**Charles F. Schwan III,**

*Director, Funds Management Division,  
Financial Management Service.*

[FR Doc. 95-3102 Filed 2-7-95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4810-35-M

## TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

### Environmental Impact Statement; Water Supply Development for the Catoosa Utility District and Upper Cumberland Plateau Region of East Tennessee

**AGENCY:** Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).

**ACTION:** Notice of intent.

**SUMMARY:** This notice is provided in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and Rural Utilities Service (RUS) and TVA's implementing procedures. TVA in conjunction with RUS has decided to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on alternatives for water supply development for the Catoosa Utility District and the upper Cumberland Plateau region of East Tennessee. The EIS will consider the potential environmental impacts of alternatives to meet the water supply needs of the district and region over a 30-year planning horizon. Alternatives to be considered will range from the construction of a water supply dam and impoundment on Clear Creek or other water course to the installation of a water pipeline from Watts Bar, Center Hill, or Dale Hollow Reservoirs. The objective of the action is to satisfy the water supply needs in the project area. With this notice, RUS and TVA are inviting comments on the scope of the EIS analysis.

**DATES:** Comments on the scope of the EIS must be received on or before March 10, 1995.

**ADDRESSES:** Comments should be sent to Dale V. Wilhelm, NEPA Liaison, Tennessee Valley Authority, 400 West Summit Hill Drive, WT 8B, Knoxville, Tennessee 37902.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Jack L. Davis, Manager, Water Resource Projects, Tennessee Valley Authority, 400 West Summit Hill Drive, Knoxville, Tennessee 37902, phone (615) 632-7183.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** During the dry time of the year, water supplies are stressed in the Catoosa Water Supply District and other areas of the upper Cumberland Plateau region in East Tennessee. Projected growth for the region indicates a worsening of the situation. Presently, the Catoosa Utility District purchases potable water from the City of Crossville in Crossville, Tennessee, which must first meet the needs of its own customers, especially during drought conditions. In 1992, the Catoosa Utility District requested aid from RUS to develop a reliable and