[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 26 (Wednesday, February 8, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 7620-7623]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-3154]



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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Research and Special Programs Administration
[Docket No. PS-132; Notice 2]


Office of Pipeline Safety; Risk Assessment Prioritization (RAP)

AGENCY: Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), DOT.

ACTION: Request for information.

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SUMMARY: RSPA, through the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), is 
implementing a pipeline Risk Assessment Prioritization (RAP) process 
and invites representatives of industry, government agencies, 
environmental organizations, public safety organizations and other 
members of the public to contribute information on solutions to 
pipeline safety issues. The proposed solutions are a vital part in 
developing the RAP process. Through the RAP process, the solutions will 
be prioritized and will become a basis upon which OPS management will 
decide how to commit available resources.

DATES: Responses to this request for information should be submitted on 
or before April 10, 1995. Late-filed comments will be considered to the 
extent practicable.

ADDRESSES: Send comments in duplicate to the Dockets Unit, Room 8421, 
Research and Special Programs Administration, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590. Identify 
the docket and notice number stated in the heading of this notice. All 
comments and docketed material will be available for inspection and 
copying in room 8421 between 8:30 a.m. and 5 p.m. each business day.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Patrick J. Ramirez, (202) 366-9864, 
regarding the subject matter of this notice. Contact the Dockets Unit, 
(202) 366-5046, for docket material.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background on RAP

    OPS prescribes and enforces the safety standards for the 
transportation of gases and hazardous liquids by pipeline and for 
liquified natural gas facilities. OPS frequently must allocate its 
resources to address safety actions identified by authorities outside 
of the agency, including Congress, the National Transportation Safety 
Board, and the General Accounting Office, OPS believes that pipeline 
safety resources can be most effectively utilized through analyzing and 
prioritizing of potential pipeline safety actions based on risk 
assessment.
    The RAP process was developed following a thorough assessment of 
OPS operations conducted in 1991 and the adoption in 1992 of a set of 
goals necessary to enable OPS to respond most effectively to increasing 
pipeline safety concerns. RAP is being developed as a management 
process with which OPS may: identify pipeline safety and environmental 
protection issues; identify potential solutions for these issues; 
assess the relative impact of each solution on the likelihood or 
consequences of pipeline accidents; estimate the cost to OPS and 
industry of each proposed solution; and allocate available OPS 
resources to the most cost-effective set of solutions.
    It is likely that OPS will not have the resources necessary to 
implement, in the near term, all of the solutions proposed by industry, 
OPS and other stakeholders. However, the RAP process will help ensure 
that OPS can assign available resources to solutions that will produce 
the greatest reduction in pipeline risks and environmental risks.

Highlights of the RAP process

    The RAP process will utilize basic risk-based prioritization and 
resource allocation models to help structure and focus OPS management 
decisions. In addition, the process will facilitate effective 
communication and interactions with OPS stakeholders through a common 
understanding of pipelines safety concerns.
    The details of the RAP process are described in 58 FR 51402 dated 
October 1, 1993. The sequence of steps in the RAP process is as 
follows:
    a. Chart Pipeline Safety Subjects.
    b. Poll for Issues--Federal Register Notice dated Oct. 1, 1993.
    c. Insert Mandated Issues.
    d. Compile Issues List.
    e. Poll for Solutions--Current stage in the process.
    f. Insert Mandated Solutions.
    g. Compile Solutions List.
    h. Set Rating Criteria.
    i. Rate Each Solution.
    j. Estimate Economic Impact.
    k. Assemble Rated Priorities.
    l. Identify Mandates.
    m. Estimate Resource Availability.
    n. Assign Resources.
    o. Issue Action Plan.
    p. Monitor Performance.
    q. Maintain Data Base.
    r. Repeat Cycle.

Request for Information

    The purpose of this notice is to solicit stakeholder participation 
in the second data gathering step of the RAP process by collecting 
solution statements associated with pipeline issues described in 
Section B of this notice. After OPS has received and consolidated the 
solutions, including solutions identified by OPS in connection with its 
ongoing risk determination efforts (e.g., accident investigations, 
special studies), OPS will hold a public meeting to ensure that 
interested stakeholders have a thorough understanding of the issues and 
solutions as well as the remainder of the RAP process. [[Page 7621]] 

Form for a Solution Statement

    To aid in processing solution statements, OPS suggests a standard 
format. Section A information may be provided one time for all 
solutions submitted from one responder. A solution statement should 
contain:
    A. The identification of the responder per Section A below.
    B. The B-code designation of the issue being addressed, per Section 
B below.
    C. The complete proposed solution description. See Section C below 
for discussion of a solution statement.
    D. The type of solution that is being proposed, per Section D 
below.
    E. The kind of facility affected, selected from Section E below.
    As a guide for preparing solution statements, the following 
examples are provided.
    Example 1.
    A. Responder identification
    B. B4.3 (Internal Corrosion)
    C. A regulation requiring the periodic use of smart pigs
    D. D3
    E. E2 (Liquid transportation lines)
    Example 2.
    A. Responder identification
    B. B4.3 (Internal Corrosion)
    C. Financial support of research to improve smart pigs
    D. D9 (Support research and development)
    E. E2 (Liquid transportation lines)

Section A. Responder Identification

    A1  Responder name
    A2  Responder position or title
    A3  Responder organization
      Responder organization type (Operators indicate all applicable)
    A4a  Operator, hazardous liquid, gathering
    A4b  Operator, hazardous liquid, transportation
    A4c  Operator, gas, gathering
    A4d  Operator, gas, transmission
    A4e  Operator, gas, distribution
    A4f  Operator, LNG facility
    A4g  Pipeline industry association
    A4h  Pipeline contractor
    A4i  Pipeline supplier
    A4j  Environmental organization
    A4k  Consumer safety organization
    A4l  Government, federal
    A4m  Government, state
    A4n  Government, municipal
    A4o  Public
    A4p  Other (Please specify)
    A5  Address
    A6  Contact name (If other than responder)
    A7  Contact phone number
    A8  Contact facsimile number

Section B. Consolidated Issues List

    The following consolidated issues list represents the key elements 
of the issues that the respondents provided to RSPA's request for 
information, 58 FR 51402; October 1, 1993. OPS analyzed over 400 
responses, converted proposed solution statements into issues 
statements, and to an appropriate degree, consolidated variations of 
similar issue statements. In preparing proposals for solutions, 
respondents are encouraged to give their widest interpretation to any 
of the 189 issues listed below. A solution statement may apply to more 
than one issue provided each issue being addressed is listed using the 
designated issue code (i.e., B1, B2, etc).
    The consolidated list is organized into five categories of issues 
contributing to the probability of pipeline accident occurrence; five 
categories of issues contributing to the consequence of pipeline 
accidents and one category that includes issues directed at identifying 
and managing risks. The five categories for probability and consequence 
are, Design, Construction, Operations and Maintenance, Corrosion and 
Outside Force.
    B1 DESIGN ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE PROBABILITY OF ACCIDENT 
OCCURRENCE     DUE TO:

    or DUE TO LACK OF:
    or DUE TO INADEQUATE:
    B1.1   Allowable maximum operating pressure
    B1.2   Breakout tanks
    B1.3   Materials selection
    B1.3.A  --Steel pipe toughness
    B1.3.B  --Steel pipe weldability
    B1.4   Obsolescent technology
    B1.5   Obstacles to instrumented internal inspection
    B1.6   Offshore pipelines
    B1.7   Railroad rights-of-way
    B1.8   Thin wall, high strength pipe
    B1.9   Underwater hazards to navigation
    B1.10   Valve definitions

    B2 CONSTRUCTION ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE PROBABILITY OF ACCIDENT 
OCCURRENCE    DUE TO;

    or DUE TO LACK OF;
    or DUE TO INADEQUATE;
    B2.1   Hydrostatic testing
    B2.1.A  --Errors
    B2.1.B  --Procedures
    B2.2   Inspection
    B2.2.A  --for errors and flaws
    B2.2.B  --of girth welds
    B2.2.C  --for rock impingement
    B2.2.D  --of welded split sleeves
    B2.3   Maps and records
    B2.4   Material and equipment noncompliance
    B2.4.A  --pre-1970 (low frequency) ERW pipe
    B2.4.B  --railroad transportation fatigue cracks
    B2.5   Plastic pipe electrofusion joints
    B2.6   Plastic pipe fusion joints
    B2.6.A  --dissimilar materials
    B2.7   Specifications
    B2.8   Tracer wire wraps around plastic pipe

    B3 OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE 
PROBABILITY OF ACCIDENT OCCURRENCE    DUE TO:

    or DUE TO LACK OF:
    or DUE TO INADEQUATE:
    B3.1   Accident investigations
    B3.2   Allowable maximum operating pressure
    B3.2.A  --Exceeding
    B3.2.A.1  >grandfathered pipelines
    B3.2.B  --Low safety margin relative to test pressure
    B3.2.B.1  >in Class 1 locations
    B3.2.C--Reduction following an incident
    B3.3   Branch service lines
    B3.4   Breakout tanks
    B3.5   Baypass lines/direct sales lines/farm taps
    B3.6   Control systems
    B3.6.A  --Excessive false alarms
    B3.7   Customer owned gas lines
    B3.8   Drug and alcohol abuse
    B3.9   Equipment failure
    B3.10   HVL facilities
    B3.10.A  --Two phase flow
    B3.11   Hydrostatic testing
    B3.11.A  --Exemption from
    B3.11.B  Periodic
    B3.12   Inspections
    B3.12.A  --Third party construction activity
    B3.12.B  --Encroachment
    B3.12.C  --Dents and gouges
    B3.12.D  --Cased crossings
    B3.12.E  --Minimum cover
    B3.12.F  --Obstacles to instrumented internal inspection
    B3.12.G  --Reporting requirements after voluntary use of 
instrumented internal inspection
    B3.12.H  --Requirements for instrumented internal inspection
    B3.12.I  --Technical variability among instrumented internal 
inspection.
    B3.13   Liquefied natural gas/petroleum gas (LNG/LPG) 
systems
    B3.13.A  --Dense gas dispersion model
    B3.13.B  --Mobile LNG facilities
    B3.14   Pipeline Marker destruction
    B3.15   Obsolescent technology
    B3.16   Offshore pipelines
    B3.17   Operator qualification
    B3.17.A  --Excavator
    B3.17.B  --Pipeline
    B3.17.C  --Master meter system
    B3.17.D  --Liquid petroleum gas [[Page 7622]] distribution system
    B3.18   Pipeline age
    B3.19   Pipeline realignment
    B3.20   Plans and procedures
    B3.21   Protection of pipeline employees
    B3.22   Railroad rights-of-way
    B3.23   Records and reports
    B3.23.A  --Annual
    B3.23.B  --Incident
    B3.24   Reduced operating staff
    B3.25   Repairs/rehabilitation
    B3.25.A  --Casing shorts
    B3.25.B  --Cast iron pipe
    B3.25.B.1  >Aging
    B3.25.B.2  >Graphitization
    B3.25.B.3  >Movement
    B3.25.C  --Pipe support during
    B3.26   Small gas distribution systems
    B3.27   Training
    B3.28   Underground utility location
    B3.29   Underwater hazards to navigation

    B4 CORROSION ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE PROBABILITY OF ACCIDENT 
OCCURRENCE    DUE TO:

    or DUE TO LACK OF:
    or DUE TO INADEQUATE:
    B4.1   Atmospheric
    B4.2   External
    B4.2.A  --Bare steel pipe
    B4.2.B  --Cathodic protection
    B4.2.B.1  >Inconsistent regulations
    B4.2.B.2  >Test points
    B4.2.B.3  >Surveys
    B4.2.C  --Coating
    B4.2.C.1  >Condition
    B4.3   Internal
    B4.4   Tank bottom

    B5 OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE TO BURIED PIPELINES ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO 
THE PROBABILITY OF ACCIDENT OCCURRENCE    DUE TO:

    or DUE TO LACK OF:
    or DUE TO INADEQUATE:
    B5.1   Digging with power mechanical equipment instead of 
hand digging in close proximity to facilities
    B5.2   Natural forces
    B5.3   Operator personnel
    B5.3.A  --Pumping stations
    B5.4   Public activity
    B5.4.A  --Gas distribution facilities
    B5.5   Third party operations
    B5.5.A  --Mandatory state one-call system
    B5.5.B  --Universal/uniform one-call system
    B5.5.C  --Statutory one-call enforcement authority
    B5.5.D  --Without using available one-call system
    B5.5.E  --One-call system public education
    B5.5.F  --While exempt from available one-call systems
    B5.5.G  --Incorrect operator one-call marks
    B5.5.H  --Ignoring one-call marks
    B5.5.I  --One-call marks are altered/removed
    B5.5.J  --Violation of one-call laws (inadequate penalties/
enforcement)
    B5.5.K  --Incorrect construction marks
    B5.5.L  --Pipeline markers are inadequate
    B5.5.M  --Public right-of-way
    B5.6   Unreported or unrecognized damage
    B5.7   Vandalism or sabotage

    B6 DESIGN ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS THAT 
OCCUR    DUE TO:

    or DUE TO LACK OF:
    or DUE TO INADEQUATE:
    B6.1   Allowable maximum operating pressure
    B6.1.A  --High risk areas
    B6.2   HVL facilities
    B6.3   Proximity to inhabited buildings
    B6.4   Uncontrolled leaks
    B6.4.A  --Service lines
    B6.5   Valve remote control
    B6.6   Valve location

    B7 CONSTRUCTION ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
ACCIDENTS THAT OCCUR    DUE TO:

    or DUE TO LACK OF:
    or DUE TO INADEQUATE:
    B7.1   Environmental damage

    B8 OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS THAT OCCUR    DUE TO:

    or DUE TO LACK OF:
    or DUE TO INADEQUATE:
    B8.1   Allowable maximum operating pressure
    B8.1.A  --High risk areas
    B8.2   Check valve malfunction
    B8.3   Emergency response
    B8.3.A  --Environmentally sensitive areas
    B8.3.A.1  >Definition
    B8.3.B  --Highly populated areas
    B8.3.C  --Water supplies
    B8.4   Hazardous concentrations of hydrogen sulfide
    B8.5   HVL facilities
    B8.6   Leaks
    B8.6.A  --Undetected, in Service lines
    B8.6.B  --Unrecognized
    B8.6.B.1  --During unsteady operations
    B8.7   Protection of pipeline employees

    B9 CORROSION ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS 
THAT OCCUR    DUE TO:

    or DUE TO LACK OF:
    or DUE TO INADEQUATE:

The issues received were not appropriate for this category. The 
responder may submit issues and solutions for this category.
    B10 OUTSIDE FORCE ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
ACCIDENTS THAT OCCUR    DUE TO:

    or DUE TO LACK OF:
    or DUE TO INADEQUATE:

The issues received were not appropriate for this category. The 
responder may submit issues and solutions for this category.
    B11 ISSUES THAT AFFECT OPS'S AND INDUSTRY'S ABILITY TO IDENTIFY AND 
MANAGE RISKS    DUE TO:

    or DUE TO LACK OF:
    or DUE TO INADEQUATE:
    B11.1   Accident investigations
    B11.1.A  --Confidentiality of information
    B11.2   Conflicting responsibilities among conformance 
authorities
    B11.2.A  --Interstate pipelines
    B11.2.B  --Marine transfer pipelines
    B11.2.C  --Setback requirements
    B11.3   Federal/State
    B11.3.A  --Accident investigation coordination
    B11.3.B  --Facility inspection
    B11.3.B.1  >frequency
    B11.3.B.2  >of master meter systems
    B11.3.C  --Inspector
    B11.3.C.1  >competence
    B11.3.C.2  >corrosion control training
    B11.3.C.3  >staff size
    B11.3.D  --Non-uniform regulatory enforcement
    B11.4   Fines and penalties
    B11.5   Incident reporting thresholds
    B11.6   Maps, records and reports
    B11.6.A  --Analysis
    B11.6.B  --Annual
    B11.6.C  --Incident
    B11.6.D  --High risk areas
    B11.7   Public education
    B11.8   Regulation ambiguities
    B11.9   State highway non-uniformity in design requirements
    B11.10   Unregulated
    B11.10.A  --Gathering pipelines
    B11.10.B  --Low stress pipelines
    B11.10.C  --Underground storage

Section C. Solution Statement

A SOLUTION is one of a number of remedies to one or more issues from 
[[Page 7623]] Section B listed above. The respondent's proposed 
solution statement should be complete and specific, but reasonably 
concise. See examples above in Form for a Solution Statement.

Section D. Type of Solution

    To aid in consolidating the actions being proposed by each solution 
statement, select an action or actions for each solution from the 
listing below:

    D1. A new or revised regulation that requires changes in industry 
design practices
    D2. A new or revised regulation that requires changes in industry 
construction practices
    D3. A new or revised regulation that requires changes in industry 
operational and maintenance practices
    D4. A new or revised regulation that requires changes in industry 
reporting policies
    D5. A new or revised OPS enforcement policy concerning and existing 
regulation
    D6. A new or revised OPS audit or inspection practice
    D7. A research activity to improve OPS/industry knowledge 
concerning the causes and effects of pipeline accidents
    D8. A research activity to improve OPS/industry knowledge 
concerning the effects of proposed risk-reduction technologies
    D9. Other (Please specify)

Section E. Type of Facility

    E1  Hazardous liquid gathering pipelines.
    E2  Hazardous liquid transportation pipelines.
    E3  Two-phase pipelines.
    E4  Gas gathering pipelines.
    E5  Gas transmission pipelines.
    E6  Gas distribution pipelines.
    E7  Gas master meter systems.
    E8  LPG distribution systems.
    E9  LNG facilities.
    E10  All liquid pipelines.
    E11  All gas pipelines.
    E12  All pipelines.
    E13  Other (Specify)

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. Sec. 60101 et seq.; 49 CFR 1.53.

    Issued in Washington, DC on February 2, 1995.
George W. Tenley, Jr.,
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 95-3154 Filed 2-7-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P