Persons desiring to make oral statements should notify the ACRS Executive Director, Dr. John T. Larkins, at least five days before the meeting if possible, so that appropriate arrangements can be made to allow the necessary time during the meeting for such statements. Use of still, motion picture, and television cameras during this meeting may be limited to selected portions of the meeting as determined by the Chairman. Information regarding the time to be set aside for this purpose may be obtained by contacting the ACRS Executive Director prior to the meeting. In view of the possibility that the schedule for ACRS meetings may be adjusted by the Chairman as necessary to facilitate the conduct of the meeting, persons planning to attend should check with the ACRS Executive Director if such rescheduling would result in major inconvenience.

I have determined in accordance with Subsection 10(d) P.L. 92–463 that it is necessary to close portions of this meeting noted above to discuss proprietary information per 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(4); information that involves the internal personnel rules and practices of this Advisory Committee per 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(2); and to discuss information the release of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of pesonal privacy per 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(6).

Further information regarding topics to be discussed, whether the meeting has been cancelled or rescheduled, the Chairman's ruling on requests for the opportunity to present oral statements and the time allotted therefor can be obtained by contacting the ACRS Executive Director, Dr. John T. Larkins (telephone 301–415–7361), between 7:30 A.M. and 4:15 P.M. EST.

Dated: January 20, 1995.

Andrew L. Bates,

Advisory Committee Management Officer.

[FR Doc. 95–1894 Filed 1–24–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

[Docket No. 50–482]

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation, Wolf Creek Generating Station; Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an exemption from certain requirements of its regulations for Facility Operating License No. NPF–42, issued to Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (the licensee), for operation of the Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) located in Coffee County, Kansas.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of Proposed Action

The proposed action would allow implementation of a hand geometry biometric system of site access control such that photograph identification badges can be taken off site.

The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's application dated November 23, 1994, for exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 73.55, ''Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power plant reactors against radiological sabotage.''

The Need for the Proposed Action

Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, paragraph (a), the licensee shall establish and maintain an onsite physical protection system and security organization.

Paragraph (1) of 10 CFR 73.55(d), ''Access Requirements,'' specifies that ''licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area * * *.'' It is specified in 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) that ''A numbered picture badge identification system shall be used for all individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without escort.'' It also states that an individual not employed by the licensee (i.e., contractors) may be authorized access to protected areas without escort provided the individual ''receives a picture badge upon entrance into the protected area which must be returned upon exit from the protected area * * *.''

Currently, unescorted access into protected areas of the WCGS is controlled through the use of a photograph on a combination badge and keycard. (Hereafter, these are referred to as badges). The security officers at the entrance station use the photograph on the badge to visually identify the individual requesting access. The badges for both licensee employees and contractor personnel who have been granted unescorted access are issued upon entrance at the entrance/exit location and are allowed to take badges off site.

The licensee proposes to implement an alternative unescorted access control system which would allow all individuals with unescorted access to keep their badges with them when departing the site.

An exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to permit contractors to take their badges off site instead of returning them when exiting the site.

The Commission has completed its evaluation of the proposed action. Under the proposed system, each individual who is authorized to unescorted entry into protected areas would have the physical characteristics of their hand (hand geometry) registered with their badge number in the access control system. When an individual enters the badge into the card reader and places the hand on the measuring surface, the system would record the individual's hand image. The unique characteristics of the extracted hand image would be compared with the previously stored template to verify authorization for entry. Individuals, including licensee employees and contractors, would be allowed to keep their badges with them when they depart the site.

Based on a Sandia report entitled ''A Performance Evaluation of Biometric Identification Devices'' (SAND91—0276 UC—906 Unlimited Release, printed June 1991), and on its experience with the current photo-identification system, the licensee stated that the false acceptance rate of the proposed hand geometry system is comparable to that of the current system. The lecensee stated that the use of the badges with the hand geometry system would increase the overally level of access control. Since both the badge and hand geometry would be necessary for access into the protected area, the proposed system would provide for a positive verification process. Potential loss of a badge by an individual, as a result of taking the badge off site, would not enable an unauthorized entry into protected areas. The licensee will implement a process for testing the proposed system to ensure continued overall level of performance equivalent to that specified in the regulation. The Physical Security Plan for WCGS will be revised to include implementation and testing of the hand geometry access control system and to allow licensee employees and contractors to take their badges off site.

The access process will continue to be under the observation of security personnel. A numbered picture badge identification system will continue to be used for all individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without escorts. Badges will continue to be displayed by all individuals while inside the protected area.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

The change will not increase the probability or consequences of accidents, no changes are being made in the types of any effluent that may be released off site, and there is no significant increase in the allowable individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant radiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed action involves features located entirely

within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR part 20. It does not affect nonradiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impact. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant nonradiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

Since the Commission has concluded there is no measurable environmental impact associated with the proposed action, any alternatives with equal or greater environmental impact need not be evaluated. The principal alternative to the action would be to deny the request. Such action would not change any current environmental impacts. The environmental impacts of the proposed action and the alternative action are similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

This action does not involve the use of any resources not previously considered in the ''Final Environmental Statement related to the operation of Wolf Creek Generating Station,'' dated June 1982 (NUREG–0878).

Agencies and Persons Consulted

The NRC staff consulted with the State of Kansas regarding the environmental impact of the proposed action. The State official had no comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

Based upon the environmental assessment, the Commission concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the Commission has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed action.

For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the licensee's letter dated November 23, 1994, which is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, The Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC and at the local public document rooms located at the Emporia State University, William Allen White Library, 1200 Commercial Street, Emporia, Kansas 66801, and Washburn University School of Law Library, Topeka, Kansas 66621.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 18th day of January 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Theodore R. Quay,

Director, Project Directorate IV–2, Division of Reactor Projects III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95–1815 Filed 1–24–95; 8:45 am]

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[Docket Nos. STN 50–456 and STN 50–457]

Commonwealth Edison Company; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of amendments to Facility Operating Licenses Nos. NPF–72 and NPF–77 issued to the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee) for operation of the Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, located in Will County, Illinois.

The proposed amendment would revise the Technical Specifications for Braidwood 1 and 2 by deleting Section 4.7.6.e.6 which presently requires a surveillance to verify that the control room ventilation system can be manually isolated and placed in the recirculation mode of operation. This manual isolation would be initiated in response to a report of a chlorine release in the vicinity of the Braidwood Station.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

A. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Elimination of the requirement to test control room ventilation manual isolation capability does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. This requirement had been previously necessary because of the potential of a rail borne chlorine accident. Since that time of the imposed surveillance, the Norfolk and Western railroad line which transported chlorine near Braidwood has been removed. In addition, a study has concluded that there are no potential stationary chlorine release sources within a 10 mile radius that could pose a threat to control room habitability. The evaluation concluded that the realistic probability of a transported source of chlorine passing within the critical distance of 4900 feet of Braidwood Station is practically zero. Even using the very conservative assumption that all transported sources of chlorine use IL 53 or IL 129, the occurrence of an accidental release from these shipments was calculated to be only 2×10^{-6} events per year. Thus the probability of a chlorine release is within the requirements of NUREG–0800, Standard Review Plan (SRP), July 1981 Section 2.2.3, and removal of the requirement to conduct Control Room ventilation isolation tests every 18 months does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

To ensure that no potential stationary chlorine release source is introduced within a ten mile radius of Braidwood Station, the station will perform a survey every three years to ensure that the protection of the control room personnel from risk due to any potential chlorine accident is maintained sufficiently small.

B. The proposed changes does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The probability of a chlorine accident that could impact the control room environment has been shown to be within the requirements of SRP Section 2.2.3. Control Room isolation capability testing was performed only to address a chlorine accident. Therefore, removal of this requirement does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

C. The proposed changes does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Control room ventilation isolation testing was performed as a result of the possibility of a chlorine accident in the vicinity of Braidwood. As demonstrated by a recent study, the probability of this event occurring has been reduced to practically zero within the acceptable limits of SRP Section 2.2.3 for transportable chlorine. Survey of the ten mile radius around Braidwood found no stationary chlorine sources with large enough quantities to pose a hazard to control room personnel. Thus, the removal of the requirement to perform Control Room ventilation isolation tests every 18 months does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of publication of this notice will be