[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 248 (Wednesday, December 28, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page ]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-31857]


[Federal Register: December 28, 1994]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Docket Nos. 50-261; 50-325 and 50-324; 50-400


Carolina Power & Light Co.; (H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, 
Unit No. 2, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2; Shearon 
Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1); Exemption

I

    Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L or the licensee) is the holder 
of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62 for Brunswick 
Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2, (Brunswick) located in Brunswick 
County, North Carolina; Facility Operating License No. DPR-23 for H.B. 
Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2, (Robinson) located in 
Darlington County, South Carolina; and Facility Operating License No. 
NPF-63 for Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, (Harris) located 
in Wake and Chatham Counties, North Carolina. The licenses authorize 
the operation of the above facilities.
    The licenses provide, among other things, that the licensee is 
subject to all rules, regulations and Orders of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (the Commission or NRC) now or hereafter in effect. The 
facilities consist of two boiling water reactors located at the 
licensee's Brunswick site, and two pressurized water reactors, one 
located at the Robinson site and one at the Harris site.
    Paragraph (a) of Section 73.55, ``Requirements for physical 
protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against 
radiological sabotage,'' of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
(10 CFR) states, in part, that ``the licensee shall establish and 
maintain an onsite physical protection system and security organization 
that will have as its objective to provide high assurance that 
activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to the 
common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk 
to the public health and safety.''
    Paragraph (1) of Section 73.55(d), ``Access Requirement,'' 
specifies that ``The licensee shall control all points of personnel and 
vehicle access into a protected area.'' Section 73.55(d)(5) requires 
that ``A numbered picture badge identification system shall be used for 
all individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without 
escort.'' Section 73.55(d)(5) also states that an individual not 
employed by the licensee (i.e., a contractor) may be authorized access 
to protected areas without escort provided the individual ``receives a 
picture badge upon entrance into the protected area which must be 
returned upon exit from the protected area . . . .''
    The licensee proposed to implement an alternative unescorted access 
control system that would eliminate the need to issue and retrieve 
badges at each entrance/exit location and would allow all individuals 
with unescorted access to keep their badge with them when departing the 
site.
    An exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is 
required to allow contractors who have unescorted access to take their 
badges offsite instead of returning them when exiting the site. By 
letters dated July 29, 1994, and December 5, 1994, and December 5, 
1994, the licensee requested an exemption from certain requirements of 
10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) for this purpose.

III

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, ``Specific exemptions,'' the Commission 
may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own 
initiative, grant such exemptions in this part as it determines are (1) 
authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common 
defense and security, and (2) are otherwise in the public interest.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the Commission may authorize a licensee 
to provide alternative measures for protection against radiological 
sabotage provided the licensee demonstrates that the alternative 
measures have ``the same high assurance objective'' and meet ``the 
general performance requirements'' of the regulation, and ``the overall 
level of system performance provides protection against radiological 
sabotage equivalent'' to that which would be provided by the 
regulation.
    Currently, unescorted access into protected areas of the Harris 
unit is controlled through the use of a photograph on a badge and a 
separate keycard. At Brunswick and Robinson, unescorted access into 
protected areas is controlled through the use of a photograph on a 
combination badge and keycard (hereafter, referred to as badge). The 
security officers at each entrance station use the photograph on the 
badge to visually identify the individual requesting access. The 
individual is then given the badge to allow access. The badges for both 
licensee employees and contractor personnel who have been granted 
unescorted access are issued upon entrance at each entrance/exit 
location and are returned upon exit. The badges are stored and are 
retrievable at each entrance/exit location. In accordance with 10 CFR 
73.55(d)(5), contractor individuals are not allowed to take badges 
offsite. In accordance with the plants' physical security plans, 
neither licensee employees nor contractors are allowed to take badges 
offsite.
    Under the proposed system, each individual who is authorized for 
unescorted entry into protected areas would have the physical 
characteristics of his/her hand (hand geometry) registered with his/her 
badge number in the access control computer. Access is then controlled 
by the individual requesting access placing his/her badge into the card 
reader and his/her hand on a measuring surface, the computer then 
compares the hand geometry to the registered badge number. If the 
characteristics of the hand geometry stored in the computer match the 
badge number, access is granted. If the characteristics do not match, 
access is denied. This provides a nontransferable means of identifying 
that the individual possessing the badge is the individual who was 
granted unescorted access. It also provides a positive means of 
assuring that a stolen or lost badge could not be used to gain access, 
thus eliminating the need to issue and retrieve the badges while 
maintaining the same high level of assurance that access is granted to 
only authorized individuals. All other access processes, including 
search function capability, would remain the same. The system will not 
be used for persons requiring escorted access (i.e., visitors). The 
access process will continue to be under the observation of security 
personnel located within a hardened cubicle who have final control over 
the release of the entrance station turnstiles. A numbered picture 
badge identification system will continue to be used for all 
individuals who are authorized access to the protected area with 
escorts. Badges will continue to be displayed by all individuals while 
inside the protected area.
    The licensee will use the hand geometry equipment which will meet 
the detection probability of 90 percent with a 95 percent confidence 
level. Testing evaluated by Sandia National Laboratory (Sandia report 
entitled ``A Performance Evaluation of Biometric Identification 
Devices,'' SAND91-0276 UC-906 Unlimited Release, Printed June 1991) 
demonstrated that the proposed hand geometry system is capable of 
meeting the proposed detection probability and confidence level. Based 
upon the results of the Sandia report and on its experience with the 
current photo-identification system, the proposed system will have a 
false acceptance rate that is at least as low as that of the current 
system. The Physical Security Plans for the sites will be revised to 
include implementation and testing of the hand geometry access control 
system and to allow licensee employees and contractors to take their 
badges offsite.

IV

    For the foregoing reasons, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the NRC staff 
has determined that the proposed alternative measures for protection 
against radiological sabotage meet ``the same high assurance 
objective,'' and ``the general performance requirements'' of the 
regulation and that ``the overall level of system performance provides 
protection against radiological sabotage equivalent'' to that which 
would be provided by the regulation.
    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
73.5, an exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or 
property or common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public 
interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Carolina Power & 
Light Company an exemption from those requirements of 10 CFR 
73.55(d)(5) relating to the returning of picture badges upon exit from 
the protected area such that individuals not employed by the licensee, 
i.e., contractors, who are authorized unescorted access into the 
protected area, can take their badges offsite. Pursuant to 10 CFR 
51.32, the Commission has determined that the granting of this 
exemption will not result in any significant adverse environmental 
impact (59 FR 65545).
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 20th day of December 1994.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Steven A. Varga,
Director, Division of Reactor Projects--I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation.
[FR Doc. 94-31857 Filed 12-27-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M