[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 245 (Thursday, December 22, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-31443]


[[Page Unknown]]

[Federal Register: December 22, 1994]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328; Docket Nos. 50-259, 260 and 296; Docket 
Nos. 50-390 and 391]

 

In the Matter of Tennessee Valley Authority; Sequoyah Nuclear 
Plant, Units 1 and 2; Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3; 
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Exemption

I

    The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA or the licensee) is the holder 
of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52, DPR-68, DPR-77, DPR-
79 for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1, 2 and 3 (BFN) and the 
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (SQN), respectively. For the Watts 
Bar nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (WBN), TVA is the holder of 
Construction Permits CPPR-91 and CPPR-92, respectively, since Operating 
Licenses have not been issued. The licenses provide, among other 
things, that the licensee is subject to all rules, regulations, and 
orders of the Commission in effect now and hereafter.
    The facilities consist of two pressurized water reactors at 
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, located in Soddy Daisy, 
Tennessee; three boiling water reactors at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, 
Units 1, 2 and 3, located in Limestone County, Alabama; and two 
pressurized water reactors under construction at Watts Bar Nuclear 
Plant, Units 1 and 2, located at TVA's site on the west bank of the 
Tennessee River approximately 50 miles northeast of Chattanooga, 
Tennessee.

II

    Title 10 CFR 73.55, ``Requirements for physical protection of 
licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological 
sabotage,'' paragraph (a), in part, states that ``The licensee shall 
establish and maintain an onsite physical protection system and 
security organization which will have as its objective to provide high 
assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are not 
inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an 
unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.''
    10 CFR 73.55(d), ``Access Requirements,'' paragraph (1), specifies 
that ``The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle 
access into a protected area.'' 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) requires that ``A 
numbered picture badge identification system shall be used for all 
individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without 
escort.'' 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) also states that an individual not 
employed by the licensee (i.e., contractors) may be authorized access 
to protected areas without escort provided the individual ``receives a 
picture badge upon entrance into the protected area which must be 
returned upon exit from the protected area . . .''
    TVA has proposed to implement an alternative unescorted access 
control system that would eliminate the need to issue and retrieve 
badges at each entrance/exit location and would allow all individuals 
with unescorted access to keep their badges with them when departing 
the site.
    An exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to allow 
contractors who have unescorted access to take their badges offsite 
instead of returning them when exiting the site. By letter dated 
October 24, 1994, TVA requested an exemption from the requirements of 
10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) for this purpose.

III

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, ``Specific exemptions,'' the Commission 
may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own 
initiative, grant such exemptions in this part as it determines are 
authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common 
defense and security, and are otherwise in the public interest. 
Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the Commission may authorize a licensee to 
provide alternative measures for protection against radiological 
sabotage provided the licensee demonstrates that the alternative 
measures have ``the same high assurance objective'' and meet ``the 
general performance requirements'' of the regulation, and ``the overall 
level of system performance provides protection against radiological 
sabotage equivalent'' to that which would be provided by the 
regulation.
    Currently, unescorted access into the protected areas at the 
operating TVA plants is controlled through the use of a photograph on a 
badge/keycard (hereafter, referred to as ``badge''). The security 
officers at each entrance station use the photograph on the badge to 
visually identify the individual requesting access. The badges for both 
TVA employees and contractor personnel who have been granted unescorted 
access are issued upon entrance at each entrance/exit location and are 
returned upon exit. The badges are stored and are retrievable at each 
entrance/exit location. In accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5), 
contractors are not allowed to take these badges offsits.
    Under the proposed biometric system, each individual who is 
authorized unescorted entry into protected areas would have the 
physical characteristics of his/her hand (i.e., hand geometry) 
registered, along with his/her badge number, in the access control 
system. When a registered user enters his/her badge into the card 
reader and places his/her hand onto the measuring surface, the system 
detects that the hand is properly positioned, and records the image. 
The unique characteristics of the hand image is then compared with the 
previously stored template in the access control computer system 
corresponding to the badge to verify authorization for entry.
    Individuals, including TVA employees and contractors, would be 
allowed to keep their badge with them when they depart the site and, 
thus, eliminate the need to issue, retrieve and store badges at the 
entrance stations to the plant. Badges do not carry any information 
other then a unique identification number. All other access processes, 
including search function capability, would remain the same. This 
system would not be used for persons requiring escorted access; i.e., 
visitors.
    Based on a Sandia report entitled, ``A Performance Evaluation of 
Biometrics Identification Devices'' (SAND910276 UC--906 Unlimited 
Release, Printed June 1991), and on its experience with the current 
photo-identification system, TVA determined that the false-accept rate 
for the hand geometry system will be at least equal to the current 
photo-identification system in used at the TVA plants. The biometric 
system has been in use for a number of years at several sensitive 
Department of Energy facilities and, recently, at nuclear power plants.
    TVA will implement a process for testing the proposed system to 
ensure continued overall level of performance equivalent to that 
specified in the regulation. When the changes are implemented, the 
respective Physical Security Plans will be revised to include 
implementation and testing of the hand geometry access control system 
and to allow TVA employees and contractors to take their badges 
offsite.
    When implemented, TVA will control all points of personnel access 
into a protected area under the observation of security personnel 
through the use of a badge and hand geometry verification system. The 
numbered picture badge identification system will continue to be used 
for all individuals who are authorized unescorted access to protected 
areas. Badges will continue to be displayed by all individuals while 
inside the protected area.
    Since both the badge and hand geometry would be necessary for 
access into the protected area, the proposed system would provide a 
positive verification process. The potential loss of a badge by an 
individual as a result of taking the badge offsite would not enable an 
unauthorized entry into protected areas.

IV

    For the foregoing reasons, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the NRC staff 
has determined that the proposed alternative measures for protection 
against radiological sabotage meet ``the same high assurance 
objective,'' and ``the general performance requirements'' of the 
regulation and that ``the overall level of system performance provides 
protection against radiological sabotage equivalent'' to that which 
would be provided by the regulation.
    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
73.5, an exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or 
property or common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public 
interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants an exemption from 
those requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) relating to the returning of 
picture badges upon exit from the protected area such that individuals 
not employed by TVA, i.e., contractors, who are authorized unescorted 
access into the protected areas at the Browns Ferry, Sequoyah, and 
Watts Bar Nuclear Plants can take their badges offsite.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will not result in any significant adverse 
environmental impact (59 FR 61351).
    For further details with respect to this action, see the request 
for exemption dated October 24, 1994, which is available for public 
inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, 
NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at 
the Athens Public Library, South Street, Athens, Alabama (for the BFN 
Plant), and at the Chattanooga-Hamilton County Library, 1101 Broad 
Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402 (for the SQN and WBN Plants).
    This exemption is effective upon issuance. It is expected to be 
implemented for each plant separately when modifications, procedures, 
and training are completed at the respective plant.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 15th day of December 1994.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Steven A. Varga,
Director, Division of Reactor Projects--I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation.
[FR Doc. 94-31443 Filed 12-21-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M