[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 245 (Thursday, December 22, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-31443]
[[Page Unknown]]
[Federal Register: December 22, 1994]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328; Docket Nos. 50-259, 260 and 296; Docket
Nos. 50-390 and 391]
In the Matter of Tennessee Valley Authority; Sequoyah Nuclear
Plant, Units 1 and 2; Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3;
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Exemption
I
The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA or the licensee) is the holder
of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52, DPR-68, DPR-77, DPR-
79 for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1, 2 and 3 (BFN) and the
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (SQN), respectively. For the Watts
Bar nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (WBN), TVA is the holder of
Construction Permits CPPR-91 and CPPR-92, respectively, since Operating
Licenses have not been issued. The licenses provide, among other
things, that the licensee is subject to all rules, regulations, and
orders of the Commission in effect now and hereafter.
The facilities consist of two pressurized water reactors at
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, located in Soddy Daisy,
Tennessee; three boiling water reactors at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant,
Units 1, 2 and 3, located in Limestone County, Alabama; and two
pressurized water reactors under construction at Watts Bar Nuclear
Plant, Units 1 and 2, located at TVA's site on the west bank of the
Tennessee River approximately 50 miles northeast of Chattanooga,
Tennessee.
II
Title 10 CFR 73.55, ``Requirements for physical protection of
licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological
sabotage,'' paragraph (a), in part, states that ``The licensee shall
establish and maintain an onsite physical protection system and
security organization which will have as its objective to provide high
assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are not
inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an
unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.''
10 CFR 73.55(d), ``Access Requirements,'' paragraph (1), specifies
that ``The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle
access into a protected area.'' 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) requires that ``A
numbered picture badge identification system shall be used for all
individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without
escort.'' 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) also states that an individual not
employed by the licensee (i.e., contractors) may be authorized access
to protected areas without escort provided the individual ``receives a
picture badge upon entrance into the protected area which must be
returned upon exit from the protected area . . .''
TVA has proposed to implement an alternative unescorted access
control system that would eliminate the need to issue and retrieve
badges at each entrance/exit location and would allow all individuals
with unescorted access to keep their badges with them when departing
the site.
An exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to allow
contractors who have unescorted access to take their badges offsite
instead of returning them when exiting the site. By letter dated
October 24, 1994, TVA requested an exemption from the requirements of
10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) for this purpose.
III
Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, ``Specific exemptions,'' the Commission
may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own
initiative, grant such exemptions in this part as it determines are
authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common
defense and security, and are otherwise in the public interest.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the Commission may authorize a licensee to
provide alternative measures for protection against radiological
sabotage provided the licensee demonstrates that the alternative
measures have ``the same high assurance objective'' and meet ``the
general performance requirements'' of the regulation, and ``the overall
level of system performance provides protection against radiological
sabotage equivalent'' to that which would be provided by the
regulation.
Currently, unescorted access into the protected areas at the
operating TVA plants is controlled through the use of a photograph on a
badge/keycard (hereafter, referred to as ``badge''). The security
officers at each entrance station use the photograph on the badge to
visually identify the individual requesting access. The badges for both
TVA employees and contractor personnel who have been granted unescorted
access are issued upon entrance at each entrance/exit location and are
returned upon exit. The badges are stored and are retrievable at each
entrance/exit location. In accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5),
contractors are not allowed to take these badges offsits.
Under the proposed biometric system, each individual who is
authorized unescorted entry into protected areas would have the
physical characteristics of his/her hand (i.e., hand geometry)
registered, along with his/her badge number, in the access control
system. When a registered user enters his/her badge into the card
reader and places his/her hand onto the measuring surface, the system
detects that the hand is properly positioned, and records the image.
The unique characteristics of the hand image is then compared with the
previously stored template in the access control computer system
corresponding to the badge to verify authorization for entry.
Individuals, including TVA employees and contractors, would be
allowed to keep their badge with them when they depart the site and,
thus, eliminate the need to issue, retrieve and store badges at the
entrance stations to the plant. Badges do not carry any information
other then a unique identification number. All other access processes,
including search function capability, would remain the same. This
system would not be used for persons requiring escorted access; i.e.,
visitors.
Based on a Sandia report entitled, ``A Performance Evaluation of
Biometrics Identification Devices'' (SAND910276 UC--906 Unlimited
Release, Printed June 1991), and on its experience with the current
photo-identification system, TVA determined that the false-accept rate
for the hand geometry system will be at least equal to the current
photo-identification system in used at the TVA plants. The biometric
system has been in use for a number of years at several sensitive
Department of Energy facilities and, recently, at nuclear power plants.
TVA will implement a process for testing the proposed system to
ensure continued overall level of performance equivalent to that
specified in the regulation. When the changes are implemented, the
respective Physical Security Plans will be revised to include
implementation and testing of the hand geometry access control system
and to allow TVA employees and contractors to take their badges
offsite.
When implemented, TVA will control all points of personnel access
into a protected area under the observation of security personnel
through the use of a badge and hand geometry verification system. The
numbered picture badge identification system will continue to be used
for all individuals who are authorized unescorted access to protected
areas. Badges will continue to be displayed by all individuals while
inside the protected area.
Since both the badge and hand geometry would be necessary for
access into the protected area, the proposed system would provide a
positive verification process. The potential loss of a badge by an
individual as a result of taking the badge offsite would not enable an
unauthorized entry into protected areas.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the NRC staff
has determined that the proposed alternative measures for protection
against radiological sabotage meet ``the same high assurance
objective,'' and ``the general performance requirements'' of the
regulation and that ``the overall level of system performance provides
protection against radiological sabotage equivalent'' to that which
would be provided by the regulation.
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
73.5, an exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or
property or common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public
interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants an exemption from
those requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) relating to the returning of
picture badges upon exit from the protected area such that individuals
not employed by TVA, i.e., contractors, who are authorized unescorted
access into the protected areas at the Browns Ferry, Sequoyah, and
Watts Bar Nuclear Plants can take their badges offsite.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the
granting of this exemption will not result in any significant adverse
environmental impact (59 FR 61351).
For further details with respect to this action, see the request
for exemption dated October 24, 1994, which is available for public
inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 2120 L Street,
NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at
the Athens Public Library, South Street, Athens, Alabama (for the BFN
Plant), and at the Chattanooga-Hamilton County Library, 1101 Broad
Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402 (for the SQN and WBN Plants).
This exemption is effective upon issuance. It is expected to be
implemented for each plant separately when modifications, procedures,
and training are completed at the respective plant.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 15th day of December 1994.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Steven A. Varga,
Director, Division of Reactor Projects--I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
[FR Doc. 94-31443 Filed 12-21-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M