[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 229 (Wednesday, November 30, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-29487]


[[Page Unknown]]

[Federal Register: November 30, 1994]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260, and 50-296; Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328; 
Docket Nos. 50-390 and 50-391]

 

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3; Sequoyah Nuclear 
Plant, Units 1 and 2; Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; 
Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an exemption from certain requirements of its 
regulations to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52, DPR-68, 
DPR-77, DPR-79. These licenses are issued to the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (TVA) for operation of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 
1, 2 and 3 (BFN) located in Limestone County, Alabama, and the Sequoyah 
Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (SQN) located in Soddy Daisy, Tennessee. In 
addition, by this action, the Commission is considering issuing a 
similar exemption to TVA's Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (WBN) 
located at TVA's site on the west bank of the Tennessee River 
approximately 50 miles northeast of Chattanooga, Tennessee. Operating 
licensers have not been issued for WBN; they are currently under 
Construction Permits CPPR-91 and CPPR-92, for Units 1 and 2 
respectively.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of Proposed Action

    The proposed action is in accordance with the TVA's application 
dated October 24, 1994, for exemption from certain requirements of 10 
CFR 73.55, ``Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed 
Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage.'' 
The exemption would allow implementation of a hand geometry biometrics 
system to control site access at BFN, SQN, and WBN so that photograph 
identification badges for non-TVA employees who have been granted 
unescorted access into protected and vital areas may be taken offsite.

The Need for the Proposed Action

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, paragraph (a), TVA shall establish and 
maintain an onsite physical protection system and security 
organization. Regulation 10 CFR 73.55(d), ``Access Requirements,'' 
paragraph (1), specifies that ``licensee shall control all points of 
personnel and vehicle access into a protected area.'' Regulation 10 CFR 
73.55(d)(5) specifies that, ``A numbered picture badge identification 
system shall be used for all individuals who are authorized access to 
protected areas without escort.'' Regulation 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) also 
states that an individual not employed by the licensee (i.e., 
contractors) may be authorized access to protected areas without escort 
provided the individual ``receives a picture badge upon entrance into 
the protected area which must be returned upon exit from the protected 
area. * * *''
    Currently, unescorted access into protected areas of BFN and SQN 
(with plans to establish a similar system at WBN) plants is controlled 
through the use of a photograph on a badge/keycard (hereafter referred 
to as a ``badge''), which is stored at the access point when not in 
use. The security officers at each entrance station use the photograph 
on the badge to visually identify the individual requesting access. The 
badges for both TVA employees and contractor personnel who have been 
granted unescorted access are given to the individuals at the entrance 
location upon entry and are returned upon exit. In accordance with 10 
CFR 73.55(d)(5), the badges are not allowed to be taken offsite.
    TVA proposes to implement an alternative unescorted access control 
system which would eliminate the need to issue and retrieve badges at 
the entry point and would allow all individuals with unescorted access 
to keep their badges with them when departing the site.
    An exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to permit 
contractors to take their badges offsite instead of returning them when 
exiting the site.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

    The Commission has completed its evaluation of TVA's application. 
Under the proposed system, each individual who is authorized unescorted 
access would have the physical characteristics of their hand (hand 
geometry) registered with their badge number in the access control 
system. When an individual enters the badge into the card reader and 
places the hand on the measuring surface, the system would record the 
individual's hand image. The unique characteristics of the hand image 
would be compared with the previously stored template to verify 
authorization for entry. Individuals, including TVA employees and 
contractors, would be allowed to keep their badge with them when they 
depart the site.
    Based on a Sandia report entitled ``A Performance Evaluation of 
Biometric Identification Devices`` (SAND91--0276-UC-906 Unlimited 
Release, Printed June 1991), and on its experience with the current 
photo-identification system, TVA demonstrated that the proposed hand 
geometry system would provide enhanced site access control. Since both 
the badge and hand geometry would be necessary for access into the 
protected area, the proposed system would provide a positive 
verification process. Potential loss of a badge by an individual, as a 
result of taking the badge offsite, would not enable unauthorized entry 
into protected areas. TVA will implement a process for periodically 
testing the proposed system to ensure continued overall level of 
performance equivalent to that specified in the regulation. The 
Physical Security Plans for all plants will be revised to include 
implementation and testing of the hand geometry access control system 
and to allow TVA employees and contractors to take their badges 
offsite.
    TVA has determined that the proposed hand geometry access control 
process for identifying personnel meets the American National Standard 
ANSI/ANS-3.3, ``Security for Nuclear Power Plants'' criteria. It will 
provide the same high assurance objective regarding onsite physical 
protection as provided by the photo-identification process now in use.
    The access process will continue to be under the observation of 
security personnel. A numbered pictured badge identification system 
will continue to be used for all individuals who are authorized access 
to protected areas without escorts. Badges will continue to be 
displayed by all individuals while inside the protected area.
    Accordingly, the Commission concludes that this proposed action 
would result in no significant radiological environmental impact. With 
regard to potential non-radiological impacts, the proposed action does 
not affect non-radiological plant effluents and has no other 
environmental impact. Therefore, the Commission concludes that there 
are no significant non-radiological environmental impacts associated 
with the proposed action.

Alternative to the Proposed Action

    As an alternative to the proposed action, the staff considered 
denial of the proposed action. Denial of the application would result 
in no change in current environmental impacts. The environmental 
impacts of the proposed action and the alternative action are similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

    This action did not involve the use of any resources not previously 
considered in the Final Environmental Statements related to operation 
of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, dated September 1, 1972; the 
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, dated February 13, 1974; or the Watts Bar 
Nuclear Plant, dated December 1978.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

    The NRC staff consulted with the State of Tennessee and Alabama 
regarding the environmental impact of the proposed action.

Finding of No Significant Impact

    The Commission has determined not to prepare an environmental 
impact statement for the proposed exemption. Based upon the foregoing 
environmental assessment, the Commission has concluded that the 
proposed action will not have a significant effect on the quality of 
the human environment.
    For further details with respect to this action, see the request 
for exemption dated October 24, 1994 which is available for public 
inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, 
NW., Washington, DC; at the local public document room located at the 
Athens Public Library, South Street, Athens, Alabama (for the Browns 
Ferry Nuclear Plant); and at the Chattanooga-Hamilton County Library, 
1101 Broad Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402 (for the Sequoyah 
Nuclear Plant and the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant).

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 22nd day of November 1994.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frederick J. Hebdon,
Director, Project Directorate II-4, Division of Reactor Projects--I/II, 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 94-29487 Filed 11-29-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M