[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 220 (Wednesday, November 16, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-28285]
[[Page Unknown]]
[Federal Register: November 16, 1994]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
14 CFR Part 25
[Docket No. NM-100; Final Special Conditions No. 25-ANM-90]
Special Conditions; Dassault Aviation Model Falcon 2000 Airplane,
High Altitude Operation
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.
ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments.
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SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Dassault Aviation
Model Falcon 2000 airplane. This new airplane will have an unusual
design feature associated with an unusually high operating altitude
(47,000 feet), for which the applicable airworthiness regulations do
not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards. These special
conditions contain the additional safety standards that the
Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety
equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.
DATES: The effective date of these special conditions is November 4,
1994.
Comments must be received on or before January 2, 1995.
ADDRESSES: Comments on these final special conditions; request for
comments, may be mailed in duplicate to: Federal Aviation
Administration, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Attn.: Rules
Docket (ANM-7), Docket No. NM-100, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton,
Washington, 98055-4056; or delivered in duplicate to the Office of the
Assistant Chief Counsel at the above address. Comments must be marked
``Docket No. NM-100.'' Comments may be inspected in the Rules Docket
weekdays, except Federal holidays, between 7:30 a.m. and 4 p.m.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Stephen Slotte, FAA, Standardization
Branch, ANM-113, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington, 98055-4056,
telephone (206) 227-2797.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
The FAA has determined that good cause exists for making these
special conditions effective upon issuance; however, interested persons
are invited to submit such written data, views, or arguments as they
may desire. Communications should identify the regulatory docket and
special conditions number and be submitted in duplicate to the address
specified above. All communications received on or before the closing
date for comments will be considered by the Administrator. These
special conditions may be changed in light of the comments received.
All comments submitted will be available in the Rules Docket for
examination by interested persons, both before and after the closing
date for comments. A report summarizing each substantive public contact
with FAA personnel concerning this rulemaking will be filed in the
docket. Persons wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their
comments submitted in response to this request must submit with those
comments a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following
statement is made: ``Comments to Docket No. NM-100.'' The postcard will
be date stamped and returned to the commenter.
Background
On September 13, 1989, Dassault Aviation, B.P. 24, 33701 Merignac
Cedex, France, applied for a new type certificate in the transport
airplane category for the Model Falcon 2000 airplane. The Dassault
Aviation Model Falcon 2000 is a medium-sized transcontinental business
jet powered by two General Electric/Garrett CFE 738 turbofan engines
mounted on pylons extending from the aft fuselage. Each engine will be
capable of delivering 5,600 lbs. thrust. The airplane will be capable
of operating with two flight crewmembers and eight passengers.
The type design of the Model Falcon 2000 contains a number of novel
and unusual design features for an airplane type certificated under the
applicable provisions of part 25 of the Federal Aviation Regulations
(FAR). Those features include the relatively small passenger cabin
volume and a high maximum operating altitude. The applicable
airworthiness requirements do not contain adequate or appropriate
safety standards for the Falcon 2000; therefore, special conditions are
necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established
in the regulations.
Type Certification Basis
Under the provisions of Sec. 21.17 of the FAR, Dassault Aviation
must show that the Falcon 2000 meets the applicable provisions of part
25, effective February 1, 1965, as amended by Amendments 25-1 through
25-69. The certification basis may also include later amendments to
part 25 that are not relevant to these special conditions. In addition,
the certification basis for the Falcon 2000 includes part 34, effective
September 10, 1990, plus any amendments in effect at the time of
certification; and part 36, effective December 1, 1969, as amended by
Amendments 36-1 through the amendment in effect at the time of
certification. These special conditions form an additional part of the
type certification basis. In addition, the certification basis may
include other special conditions that are not relevant to these special
conditions.
If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness
regulations (i.e., part 25, as amended) do not contain adequate or
appropriate safety standards for the Falcon 2000 because of a novel or
unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under the
provisions of Sec. 21.16 to establish a level of safety equivalent to
that established in the regulations.
Special conditions, as appropriate, are issued in accordance with
Sec. 11.49 of the FAR after public notice, as required by Secs. 11.28
and 11.29, and become part of the type certification basis in
accordance with Sec. 21.17(a)(2).
Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which
they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended
later to include any other model that incorporates the same novel or
unusual design feature, or should any other model already included on
the same type certificate be modified to incorporate the same novel or
unusual design feature, the special conditions would also apply to the
other model under the provisions of Sec. 21.101(a)(1).
Novel or Unusual Design Feature
The Dassault Aviation Falcon 2000 will incorporate an unusual
design feature in that it will be certified to operate up to an
altitude of 47,000 feet.
The FAA considers certification of transport category airplanes for
operation at altitudes greater than 41,000 feet to be a novel or
unusual feature because current part 25 does not contain standards to
ensure the same level of safety as that provided during operation at
lower altitudes. Special conditions have therefore been adopted to
provide adequate standards for transport category airplanes previously
approved for operation at these high altitudes, including certain
Learjet models, the Boeing Model 747, Dassault-Breguet Falcon 900,
Canadair Model 600, Cessna Model 650, Israel Aircraft Industries Model
1125, and Cessna Model 560. The special conditions for the Learjet
Model 45 are considered the most applicable to the Falcon 2000 and its
proposed operation and are therefore used as the basis for the special
conditions described below.
Damage tolerance methods are proposed to be used to ensure pressure
vessel integrity while operating at the higher altitudes, in lieu of
the \1/2\-bay crack criterion used in some previous special conditions.
Crack growth data are used to prescribe an inspection program that
should detect cracks before an opening in the pressure vessel would
allow rapid depressurization. Initial crack sizes for detection are
determined under Sec. 25.571, as amended by Amendment 25-72. The
maximum extent of failure and pressure vessel opening determined from
the above analysis must be demonstrated to comply with the
pressurization section of the proposed special conditions, which state
that the cabin altitude after failure must not exceed the cabin
altitude/time curve limits shown in Figures 3 and 4.
In order to ensure that there is adequate fresh air for crewmembers
to perform their duties, to provide reasonable passenger comfort, and
to enable occupants to better withstand the effects of decompression at
high altitudes, the ventilation system must be designed to provide 10
cubic feet of fresh air per minute per person during normal operations.
Therefore, these special conditions require that crewmembers and
passengers be provided with 10 cubic feet of fresh air per minute per
person. In addition, during the development of the supersonic transport
special conditions, it was noted that certain pressurization failures
resulted in hot ram or bleed air being used to maintain pressurization.
Such a measure can lead to cabin temperatures that exceed human
tolerance. Therefore, these special conditions require airplane
interior temperature limits following probable and improbable failures.
Continuous flow passenger oxygen equipment is certificated for use
up to 40,000 feet; however, for rapid decompressions above 34,000 feet,
reverse diffusion leads to low oxygen partial pressures in the lungs,
to the extent that a small percentage of passengers may lose useful
consciousness at 35,000 feet. The percentage increases to an estimated
60 percent at 40,000 feet, even with the use of the continuous flow
system. Therefore, to prevent permanent physiological damage, the cabin
altitude must not exceed 25,000 feet for more than 2 minutes, or 40,000
feet for any time period. The maximum peak cabin altitude of 40,000
feet is consistent with the standards established for previous
certification programs. In addition, at high altitudes the other
aspects of decompression sickness have a significant, detrimental
effect on pilot performance (for example, a pilot can be incapacitated
by internal expanding gases).
Decompression resulting in cabin altitudes above the 37,000-foot
limit depicted in Figure 4 approaches the physiological limits of the
average person; therefore, every effort must be made to provide the
pilots with adequate oxygen equipment to withstand these severe
decompressions. Reducing the time interval between pressurization
failure and the time the pilots receive oxygen will provide a safety
margin against being incapacitated and can be accomplished by the use
of mask-mounted regulators. These special conditions therefore require
pressure demand masks with mask-mounted regulators for the flightcrew.
This combination of equipment will provide the best practical
protection for the failures covered by the special conditions and for
improbable failures not covered by the special conditions, provided the
cabin altitude is limited.
As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the
Dassault Aviation Model Falcon 2000. Should Dassault Aviation apply at
a later date for a change to the type certificate to include another
model incorporating the same novel or unusual design feature, these
special conditions would apply to that model as well under the
provisions of Sec. 21.101(a)(1).
Conclusion
This action affects only certain design features on the Dassault
Aviation Model Falcon 2000 airplane. It is not a rule of general
applicability and affects only the manufacturer who applied to the FAA
for approval of these features on the airplane.
The substance of the special conditions for this airplane has been
subjected to the notice and comment procedure in several prior
instances and has been derived without substantive change from those
previously issued. It is unlikely that prior public comment would
result in a significant change from the substance contained herein. For
this reason, and because a delay would significantly affect the
certification of the airplane, which is imminent, the FAA has
determined that prior public notice and comment are unnecessary and
impracticable, and good cause exists for adopting these special
conditions immediately. Therefore, these special conditions are being
made effective upon issuance. The FAA is requesting comments to allow
interested persons to submit views that may not have been submitted in
response to the prior opportunities for comment described above.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. app. 1344, 1348(c), 1352, 1354(a), 1355,
1421 through 1341, 1502, 1651(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. 1857f-10, 4321 et
seq.; E.O. 11514; and 49 U.S.C. 106(g).
The Special Conditions
Accordingly, the following special conditions are issued as part of
the type certification basis for the Dassault Aviation Model Falcon
2000:
Operation to 47,000 Feet
1. Pressure Vessel Integrity.
(a) The maximum extent of failure and pressure vessel opening that
can be demonstrated to comply with paragraph 4 (Pressurization) of this
special condition must be determined. It must be demonstrated by crack
propagation and damage tolerance analysis supported by testing that a
larger opening or a more severe failure than demonstrated will not
occur in normal operations.
(b) Inspection schedules and procedures must be established to
ensure that cracks and normal fuselage leak rates will not deteriorate
to the extent that an unsafe condition could exist during normal
operation.
(c) With regard to the fuselage structural design for cabin
pressure capability above 45,000 feet altitude, the pressure vessel
structure, including doors and windows, must comply with
Sec. 25.365(d), using a factor of 1.67 instead of the 1.33 factor
prescribed.
2. Ventilation. In lieu of the requirements of Sec. 25.831(a), the
ventilation system must be designed to provide a sufficient amount of
uncontaminated air to enable the crewmembers to perform their duties
without undue discomfort or fatigue, and to provide reasonable
passenger comfort during normal operating conditions and also in the
event of any probable failure of any system that could adversely affect
the cabin ventilating air. For normal operations, crewmembers and
passengers must be provided with at least 10 cubic feet of fresh air
per minute per person, or the equivalent in filtered, recirculated air
based on the volume and composition at the corresponding cabin pressure
altitude of not more than 8,000 feet.
3. Air Conditioning. In addition to the requirements of
Sec. 25.831, paragraphs (b) through (e), the cabin cooling system must
be designed to meet the following conditions during flight above 15,000
feet mean sea level (MSL):
(a) After any probable failure, the cabin temperature-time history
may not exceed the values shown in Figure 1.
(b) After any improbable failure, the cabin temperature-time
history may not exceed the values shown in Figure 2.
4. Pressurization. In addition to the requirements of Sec. 25.841,
the following apply:
(a) The pressurization system, which includes for this purpose
bleed air, air conditioning, and pressure control systems, must prevent
the cabin altitude from exceeding the cabin altitude-time history shown
in Figure 3 after each of the following:
(1) Any probable malfunction or failure of the pressurization
system. The existence of undetected, latent malfunctions or failures in
conjunction with probable failures must be considered.
(2) Any single failure in the pressurization system, combined with
the occurrence of a leak produced by a complete loss of a door seal
element, or a fuselage leak through an opening having an effective area
2.0 times the effective area that produces the maximum permissible
fuselage leak rate approved for normal operation, whichever produces a
more severe leak.
(b) The cabin altitude-time history may not exceed that shown in
Figure 4 after each of the following:
(1) The maximum pressure vessel opening resulting from an initially
detectable crack propagating for a period encompassing four normal
inspection intervals. Mid-panel cracks and cracks through skin-stringer
and skin-frame combinations must be considered.
(2) The pressure vessel opening or duct failure resulting from
probable damage (failure effect) while under maximum operating cabin
pressure differential due to a tire burst, engine rotor burst, loss of
antennas or stall warning vanes, or any probable equipment failure
(bleed air, pressure control, air conditioning, electrical source(s),
etc.) that affects pressurization.
(3) Complete loss of thrust from all engines.
(c) In showing compliance with paragraphs 4(a) and 4(b) of these
special conditions (Pressurization), it may be assumed that an
emergency descent is made by approved emergency procedure. A 17-second
crew recognition and reaction time must be applied between cabin
altitude warning and the initiation of an emergency descent.
Note: For flight evaluation of the rapid descent, the test
article must have the cabin volume representative of what is
expected to be normal, such that Dassault Aviation must reduce the
total cabin volume by that which would be occupied by the
furnishings and total number of people.
5. Oxygen Equipment and Supply.
(a) A continuous flow oxygen system must be provided for the
passengers.
(b) A quick-donning pressure demand mask with mask-mounted
regulator must be provided for each pilot. Quick-donning from the
stowed position must be demonstrated to show that the mask can be
withdrawn from stowage and donned with 5 seconds.
BILLING CODE 4910-13-M
TR16NO94.000
TR16NO94.001
BILLING CODE 4910-13-C
Issued in Renton, Washington, on November 4, 1994.
Darrell M. Pederson,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service, ANM-100.
[FR Doc. 94-28285 Filed 11-15-94; 8:45 am]