[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 219 (Tuesday, November 15, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-28184]


[[Page Unknown]]

[Federal Register: November 15, 1994]


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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
International Trade Administration
[C-517-501]

 

Carbon Steel Wire Rod From Saudi Arabia; Final Results of 
Countervailing Duty Administrative Review and Revocation of 
Countervailing Duty Order

AGENCY: International Trade Administration/Import Administration, 
Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of final results of countervailing duty administrative 
review and revocation of countervailing duty order.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Commerce (the Department) has completed an 
administrative review of the countervailing duty order on carbon steel 
wire rod from Saudi Arabia. We determine the total bounty or grant to 
be 0.18 percent ad valorem for the period January 1, 1991 through 
December 31, 1991. In accordance with 19 CFR 355.7, any rate less than 
0.50 percent ad valorem is de minimis. In addition, because the 
requirements for revocation of the order have been met by the 
Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the sole producer of the 
subject merchandise pursuant to 19 CFR 355.25(a)(2) and 355.25(b)(2), 
the Department is revoking the countervailing duty order.

EFFECTIVE DATE: November 15, 1994.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joe Kaesshaefer or Kelly Parkhill, 
Office of Countervailing Compliance, International Trade 
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, DC 20230; 
telephone: (202) 482-2786.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    On November 2, 1993, the Department published in the Federal 
Register the preliminary results of its administrative review and 
intent to revoke countervailing duty order on carbon steel wire rod 
from Saudi Arabia (58 FR 58537). The Department has now completed this 
administrative review in accordance with section 751 of the Tariff Act 
of 1930, as amended (the Tariff Act).

Scope of Review

    Imports covered by this review are shipments of Saudi carbon steel 
wire rod. Carbon steel wire rod is a coiled, semi-finished, hot-rolled 
carbon steel product of approximately round solid cross section, not 
under 0.20 inch nor over 0.74 inch in diameter, tempered or not 
tempered, treated or not treated, not manufactured or partly 
manufactured, and valued over or under 4 cents per pound. Such 
merchandise is classifiable under item numbers 7213.20.00, 7213.31.30, 
7213.31.60, 7213.39.00, 7213.41.30, 7213.41.60, 7213.49.00 and 
7213.50.00 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS). The HTS item 
numbers are provided for convenience and Customs purposes. The written 
description remains dispositive.
    The review period is January 1, 1991 through December 31, 1991. 
This review involves one company, the Saudi Iron and Steel Company 
(HADEED), and three programs: (1) Public Investment Fund (PIF) loan to 
HADEED, (2) Saudi Basic Industries Corporation's (SABIC) transfer of 
Steel Rolling Company (SULB) shares to HADEED, and (3) preferential 
provision of equipment to HADEED. HADEED is the sole producer/exporter 
of carbon steel wire rod in Saudi Arabia.
    The Department's determination to revoke the countervailing duty 
order is based on the following. First, in accordance with the 
requirements of section 355.25(b)(2), the Government of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia has requested that the Department revoke the 
countervailing duty order on carbon steel wire rod from Saudi Arabia. 
Second, in accordance with the requirements of sections 355.25(b)(2) 
and 355.22(a)(2), certifications executed by officials of HADEED and 
the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia attest to the fact that 
the producer/exporter has not received any net subsidy during the 
January 1 through December 31, 1991 period of review. Third, in 
accordance with the requirements of section 355.25(a)(2)(i) of the 
Department's regulations, the Department has found the absence of net 
subsidies based on administrative reviews conducted for each of the 
past five consecutive years. Fourth, in accordance with the 
requirements of section 355.25(b)(2), HADEED has certified that it will 
neither apply for nor receive any net subsidy in the future. 
Accordingly, the Department has found that the producer/exporter 
covered by the order is not likely to apply for or receive any net 
subsidy in the future from any program found countervailable or from 
any other countervailable programs.

Analysis of Comments Received

    We gave interested parties an opportunity to comment on the 
preliminary results. We received comments from the respondent, HADEED, 
and the petitioners.
    Comment 1: HADEED argues that recent developments in Commerce 
practice warrant a reexamination of PIF linkage to the Saudi Industrial 
Development Fund (SIDF). HADEED cites to a memorandum examining the 
possibility of integral linkage of programs in the sixth administrative 
review on Live Swine from Canada as the basis for its claim that the 
Department has changed its practice with respect to integral linkage. 
(See, Memorandum from CVD Team to Joseph A. Spetrini, Acting Assistant 
Secretary for Import Administration (October 13, 1993), which is on 
file in the Central Records Unit (Room B099 of the Main Commerce 
Building) (Integral Linkage Memorandum).) As cited by HADEED,

    The Department acknowledges that: ``if the multiple programs are 
created at separate points in time, the Department has not required 
that * * * an express statement that the programs are complementary 
parts of an overarching governmental policy be made when the first 
program is enacted.'' The Department stated further that it seeks 
information showing ``an express intention to create multiple 
programs, whether at the same time or separately,'' which are 
designed to be ``complementary parts of an overarching governmental 
policy directive.'' (Integral Linkage Memorandum at 4 as cited, with 
emphasis added, by HADEED. Respondent's case brief at 3.)

    HADEED concludes from this that the Integral Linkage Memorandum now 
recognizes that: (1) linked programs need only be complementary, not 
identical; (2) linked programs can be created at separate points in 
time; and (3) explicit documentation of linkage is not required at the 
time of the enactment of the first program. According to HADEED, this 
recent development has eliminated two of the Department's three 
previous barriers to finding that PIF and SIDF are integrally linked 
and requires a reexamination of the record evidence on linkage as it 
pertains to the inception of SIDF.
    HADEED argues that the PIF loan program and the SIDF loan program 
are ``integrally linked'' as defined in section 355.43(b)(6) of the 
Department's proposed regulations; see Countervailing Duties; Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking and Request for Public Comments, 54 FR 23366 (May 
31, 1989). Since PIF and the SIDF are integrally linked, they should be 
considered together in determining whether loans provided by these two 
entities are limited to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of 
enterprises or industries. SIDF and PIF qualify for linkage under each 
factor identified in the Department's proposed regulations. These 
factors are (1) the administration of the programs, (2) evidence of a 
government policy to treat industries equally, (3) the purposes of the 
programs as stated in their enabling legislation, (4) the manner of 
funding the programs, and (5) ``other factors.''
    HADEED argues that the information on the record shows a Saudi 
government policy to treat industries equally. PIF and SIDF provide 
identical benefits--low-cost, long-term construction loans--on 
identical terms to a wide variety of industries. PIF and SIDF are two 
of five Specialized Credit Institutions that the Saudi government 
created to develop and diversify the Saudi economy. The PIF and SIDF 
share a common purpose as the only sources of low-cost financing for 
the industrial and manufacturing sector. PIF loans are available to 
companies with some government equity, and are suited for the types of 
large projects that the Saudi government would be most likely to 
undertake. SIDF loans, on the other hand, are available to companies 
with some private Saudi ownership and are best suited for small and 
medium-sized projects. Between them, the two programs address the 
borrowing needs of the entire range of Saudi industries.
    PIF and SIDF share a common purpose, based on statements in each 
entity's enabling legislation. PIF was created ``to finance investment 
in the productive projects of a commercial nature.'' Similarly, SIDF 
was created ``to support industrial development in the private sector 
of the Kingdom's economy.'' Both programs are aimed at financing 
development in the Saudi industrial and manufacturing sector.
    PIF and SIDF are administered in a comparable manner through SAMA 
(the Saudi Central Bank) and the Ministry of Finance and National 
Economy. Both PIF and SIDF are administered by boards of directors with 
a common chairman, the Minister of Finance and National Economy, with 
the remaining members drawn from SAMA and other Saudi government 
agencies.
    PIF and SIDF were originally funded through the Ministry of Finance 
and National Economy. Currently, both programs are self-sufficient. 
SAMA produces a consolidated balance sheet showing assets and 
liabilities of PIF and SIDF jointly. All information regarding budget 
allocations, disbursements and repayments of PIF and SIDF are published 
as consolidated statements.
    According to HADEED, other factors integrally linking PIF and SIDF 
include the fact that there are no de jure limitations on the types of 
industries eligible to receive loans under either fund. The lending 
practices and histories of both funds are similar. The maximum loan 
amount is SR 500 million for PIF and SR 400 million for SIDF. The 
maximum loan period for both PIF and SIDF is 15 years. The PIF requires 
Saudi government equity participation in a project in order to obtain 
funds. Similarly, SIDF requires at least 25 percent equity contribution 
from private Saudi sources in order to obtain funds.
    Thus, in light of the factors described above, HADEED argues that 
the Department has a compelling case for finding integral linkage 
between PIF and SIDF. The programs are part of the same overall 
government lending policy, they are intended to be complementary and to 
achieve the same purpose, they are administered and funded through the 
same governmental agency, and they provide similar benefits to the same 
sector of the Saudi economy. Based on a finding of integral linkage, 
the Department should consider PIF and SIDF programs together and find 
that they are not specifically provided and therefore not 
countervailable.
    The petitioner argues that the Department has rejected respondent's 
argument regarding integral linkage in the previous three reviews (see 
Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review; Carbon 
Steel Wire Rod from Saudi Arabia, 56 FR 26652, June 10, 1991; and, 
Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews; Carbon 
Steel Wire Rod from Saudi Arabia, 56 FR 48158, September 24, 1991). The 
unique aspects of the PIF program cannot be hidden by lumping it 
together with other Saudi government financing programs such as SIDF, 
which were established for other reasons. Nothing the Saudi government 
does in providing other loans through separate programs detracts from 
PIF's specificity.
    Department's Position: HADEED's arguments regarding integral 
linkage have been addressed and rejected in three previous reviews (see 
Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review; Carbon 
Steel Wire Rod from Saudi Arabia, 56 FR 26652, June 10, 1991; and, 
Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews; Carbon 
Steel Wire Rod from Saudi Arabia, 56 FR 48158, September 24, 1991). 
Further, a full reading of the Integral Linkage Memorandum and the 
Department's previous decisions on integral linkage in this case 
clearly indicates that: (1) the Department's practice with respect to 
integral linkage has not changed; and (2) a re-examination of the 
Department's decision with respect to PIF's linkage to SIDF is not 
warranted.
    Contrary to HADEED's assertion, the fact that linked programs need 
only be complementary is not a recent change in Departmental practice. 
The Department has never based its PIF linkage decision on the fact 
that PIF and SIDF are not identical. As stated in the 1988, 1989 and 
1990 administrative reviews, ``Documented information on the inception 
of the programs that explicitly ties PIF and SIDF as complementary 
parts of an overarching governmental policy directive has not been 
presented by the respondent [despite the Department's repeated 
requests.''] (Bracketed portion from the 1990 administrative review 
only.) Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews; 
Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Saudi Arabia, 56 FR 48160, September 24, 
1991 and Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews; 
Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Saudi Arabia, 57 FR 8304, March 9, 1992. 
Furthermore, HADEED completely misrepresents the Department when it 
states that the Department previously ``recognized'' that PIF and SIDF 
are complementary.1
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     1The sentence from which HADEED draws its conclusion that the 
Department has already determined that PIF and SIDF are 
complementary reads as follows, ``It may be that, in principle and 
practice, the respective roles of PIF and SIDF have evolved to 
complement and overlap each other.'' Final Results of Countervailing 
Duty Administrative Reviews; Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Saudi 
Arabia, 56 FR 48160, September 24, 1991 (emphasis added). This 
sentence is at the beginning of the paragraph that concludes that 
respondents have failed to provide the necessary factual information 
that PIF and SIDF were ``complementary parts of an overarching 
policy directive.'' Id.
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    It is also clear that the Integral Linkage Memorandum did not 
change the Department's practice with respect to a supposed timing 
requirement for the creation of linked programs. The Department never 
based its PIF linkage decision on the fact that PIF and SIDF were not 
created simultaneously. Rather, ``the fact that these programs were 
founded separately, three years apart, suggests (without other 
documented information) that the programs were not conceived as parts 
of a single program.'' Final Results of Countervailing Duty 
Administrative Reviews; Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Saudi Arabia, 56 FR 
48160, September 24, 1991 (emphasis added). That the Integral Linkage 
Memorandum follows the same standard can be clearly discerned from the 
following discussion preceding the Department's determination that the 
Tripartite Program is not integrally linked to the other three 
programs:

    Therefore, as we explained in Carbon Steel Wire Rod (57 FR at 
8304), in order to prevail on a claim of integral linkage, the 
claimant should be able to point to a clear undisputed statement in 
the enabling legislation or some other authoritative source 
indicating an express intention to create multiple programs, whether 
at the same time or separately, which are designed to be 
``complementary parts of an overarching governmental policy 
directive.'' * * * For instance, it is easy to state that the 
purpose of two separate programs is the same. * * * However, absent 
an objective indication by the government of why it created two (or 
more) programs instead of one, it is very difficult if not 
impossible to conclude that the government actually intended to have 
the programs complement one another. Similarly, if the government's 
policy is truly to treat the industries covered by the various 
programs equally, it is reasonable to expect the government to have 
made this intention clear. Integral Linkage Memorandum at 4 
(emphasis added).

    Finally, with respect to HADEED's claim that the Department has 
changed its practice and no longer requires explicit documentation 
demonstrating linkage at the inception of the first program, an 
examination of the cited passage clearly shows that the passage is 
describing a long-standing Departmental practice rather than a recent 
change in practice.\2\ The Department has not based its previous PIF 
linkage determinations solely on the lack of documentation linking PIF 
and SIDF at the inception of PIF. Rather, HADEED has consistently 
failed to present documented information at the inception of either PIF 
or SIDF that explicitly ties the two programs as complementary parts of 
an overarching governmental policy directive. It is the lack of the 
type of documentation indicated in the above passage from the Integral 
Linkage Memorandum (i.e., ``a clear undisputed statement in the 
enabling legislation or some other authoritative source indicating an 
express intention to create multiple programs. * * *''), that has led 
the Department to consistently find that PIF and SIDF are not 
integrally linked.
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    \2\If the multiple programs are created at separate points in 
time, the Department has not required that such an express statement 
be made when the first program is enacted.
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    Finally, it is the Department's practice as set forth in section 
355.43(b)(6) of the Department's proposed regulations to consider, 
among other factors, the following in determining whether two programs 
are integrally linked: ``the administration of the programs, evidence 
of a government policy to treat industries equally, the purposes of the 
programs as stated in their enabling legislation, and the manner of 
funding the programs.'' The Department has interpreted the second 
factor in a strict manner, so as to conform our interpretation of 
``integral linkage'' to the purpose of the specificity test as a whole. 
The specificity test was designed to avoid carrying the countervailing 
duty law to absurd results by countervailing public highways and 
bridges, i.e., programs, which clearly benefit the economy at large, as 
opposed to identifiable and specific segments of the economy. See, 
e.g., Carlisle Tire and Rubber Co., v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 834, 
838 (Court of International Trade, 1983). ``Integral linkage'' should 
not be interpreted to create a loophole which would allow de facto 
specific subsidy programs benefitting only particular segments of the 
economy to escape the imposition of countervailing duties.
    Permitting respondent governments to loosely connect two or more 
programs which were otherwise designed to serve different purposes 
would create the type of loophole the Department seeks to avoid. See 
Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review; Live Swine 
from Canada, 59 FR 12246 (March 16, 1994). Moreover, the creation of 
such a loophole would be contrary to the intent of Congress. S. Rep. 
No. 71, 100th Congress, First Session 123 (June 12, 1987). Congress 
stated that the Department should avoid taking an ``overly narrow'' or 
``overly restrictive'' view of its authority to determine specificity. 
Thus, the Department has required documented information from the 
inception of one or the other of the programs that explicitly ties PIF 
and SIDF as complementary parts of an overarching governmental policy 
directive. See Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Saudi Arabia; Final Results 
of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review, 57 FR 8304 (March 9, 
1992). Information of this nature has not been provided by respondent; 
therefore there is no information on the record that would tie SIDF and 
PIF at the inception of one or the other. We have thus considered each 
program separately.
    Comment 2: The respondent contends that it is unreasonable for the 
Department to demand any more factual proof of integral linkage than 
that which HADEED has provided. All known existing evidence has been 
presented. For reasons relating primarily to the nature of record-
keeping during the early stages of Saudi Arabia's industrialization 
process, better evidence appears not to exist. The Department is not 
justified in treating evidence of linkage at inception as a criterion 
for finding integral linkage. Such a criterion is not even explicitly 
listed in the Department's proposed regulation. Furthermore, the 
Department's insistence on proof of such additional factors violates 
prescribed rules of procedure by using factors purporting to be 
guidance as a final rule determining substantive rights. The Court of 
International Trade has held that the Department must follow the 
minimal ``notice and comment'' procedures embodied in the 
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) before promulgating final rules. 
Ipsco, Inc. v. United States, 687 F. Supp. 614, (Court of International 
Trade, 1988).
    Department's Position: With regard to the question of ``integral 
linkage,'' the Department has consistently focused its attention on the 
relationship between the programs in question and ``an overall 
government policy or national development plan.'' See Final Results of 
Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews; Carbon Steel Wire Rod from 
Saudi Arabia, 56 FR 48158, September 24, 1991. This interpretation was 
clearly stated in the Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty 
Determination; Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from the Netherlands (52 FR 
3301, February 3, 1987) wherein the Department would not find integral 
linkage because ``the government was unable to document the inclusion 
of [the programs] as part of an overall national energy program * * *'' 
Id. at 3309.
    In requiring that this relationship be explicit at the inception of 
one or the other of the programs, the Department violates no statutory 
or regulatory provision. Even if one turns to the Department's proposed 
regulations, the decision herein is fully supported. Section 
355.43(b)(6) of the proposed regulations tells us that when deciding an 
integral linkage question the Secretary will examine ``evidence of a 
government policy to treat industries equally.'' This broad instruction 
is included on a list that explicitly advises parties that the 
Department will consider the factors on the list together with ``other 
factors.'' Thus, it is within the Department's discretion to elaborate 
on each factor listed in the proposed regulation. This is precisely 
what the Department has done with the second factor listed in the 
proposed regulation.
    Comment 3: HADEED argues that, contrary to the Department's 
preliminary results, PIF loans are not limited to a specific group of 
enterprises, and therefore, they are not countervailable. HADEED 
contends that the Department's preliminary determination that the Saudi 
government, through PIF, provides loans to ``a specific enterprise or 
industry or group of enterprises or industries'' within the meaning of 
19 U.S.C. 1677(5)(B), is incorrect. The basis for the Department's 
determination is the erroneous assumption that only six companies have 
effectively benefited from the program. In reality, 24 companies in a 
wide variety of industries have received PIF financing. The 18 
companies that are at least 50 percent-owned by either SABIC or 
Petromin (government-owned corporations) should be treated as separate 
entities. The Department has, in effect, found that there is an 
intercorporate transfer of benefits based solely on corporate 
relationships with SABIC or Petromin. Such an application of the 
specificity test based on a commonality of shareholders is without 
precedent and contravenes the Department's established policy not to 
assume automatic transfer of benefits based on related party status. 
Respondents cite the following cases in defense of their argument: 
Industrial Phosphoric Acid from Israel, 52 FR 25447 (July 7, 1987); 
Operators for Jalousie and Awning Windows from El Salvador, 51 FR 41516 
(November 17, 1986); Low-Fuming Brazing Copper Rod and Wire from New 
Zealand, 50 FR 31638 (August 5, 1985); and Carbon Steel Structural 
Shapes from Luxembourg, 47 FR 39364 (September 7, 1982).
    The petitioner contends that PIF provides benefits almost 
exclusively to the projects undertaken by a few companies with 
controlling government ownership and therefore constitute a specific 
group of enterprises in Saudi Arabia.
    Department's Position: We disagree with respondent. We have 
considered and rejected respondent's argument in the original 
investigation, and in the subsequent three reviews (see Final 
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Countervailing Duty 
Order; Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Saudi Arabia, 51 FR 4206, February 3, 
1986; Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review; 
Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Saudi Arabia, 56 FR 26652, June 10, 1991; 
and, Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews; 
Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Saudi Arabia, 56 FR 48158, September 24, 
1991, respectively). We determined that the loan in question was part 
of a de facto specific program, and respondent has presented no new 
evidence that would disturb this conclusion (other than that pertaining 
to ``integral linkage'').
    We based this determination on the fact that there were three 
holding companies, SABIC, Petromin, and Saudia Airlines, which had 50 
percent or more ownership in virtually all of the PIF loan recipients. 
The Court of International Trade examined this analysis as it pertained 
to the original investigation of the subject merchandise, and held that 
the Department ``reasonably applied the specificity test,'' and that 
the determination was in accordance with law. See Saudi Iron and Steel 
Co. v. United States, 675 F. Supp. 1362 (Court of International Trade 
1987).
    Comment 4: Petitioners contend that the Department's use of a 
composite benchmark incorporating a short-term interest rate is 
incorrect. In calculating the benchmark, the Department relied on the 
erroneous assumption that HADEED could have obtained the SIDF's maximum 
loan limit of fifty percent of the project's total cost. In fact, the 
maximum amount HADEED could have obtained from SIDF was SR 400 million, 
significantly less than fifty percent of the project's total cost.
    Department's Position: We disagree. We have considered and rejected 
this argument in a previous review. The Department has previously found 
that the SIDF, in fact, often loaned combined amounts greater than the 
``cap'' to a single company. We concluded that it was reasonable to 
include more than SR 400 million in the benchmark. See Final Results of 
Countervailing Duty Administrative Review; Carbon Steel Wire Rod from 
Saudi Arabia, 56 FR 26652 (June 10, 1991). Our methodology remains 
unchanged from the original investigation. Since the PIF loan covered 
60 percent of HADEED's total project costs, for our benchmark we 
assumed that HADEED could have financed 50 percent of its total project 
costs with a SIDF loan (the maximum eligibility for a company with at 
least 50 percent Saudi ownership) and the remaining 10 percent of 
project costs with a Saudi commercial bank loan. The commercial bank 
portion of the benchmark was based on the average Saudi Interbank 
Offering Rate (SIBOR) for 1990, plus the normal one percent spread that 
is common for commercial borrowing from private Saudi banks.

Final Results of Review

    After reviewing all of the comments received, we determine the 
total bounty or grant to be 0.18 percent ad valorem for the period 
January 1, 1991 through December 31, 1991. In accordance with 19 CFR 
355.7, any rate less than 0.50 percent ad valorem is de minimis.
    Therefore, the Department will instruct the Customs Service to 
liquidate, without regard to countervailing duties, all shipments of 
this merchandise exported on or after January 1, 1991 and exported on 
or before December 31, 1991; in addition, the Department will instruct 
the Customs Service to refund with interest any deposits of estimated 
duties on such entries.
    We have determined that the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia has met the requirements for revocation of the countervailing 
duty order pursuant to 19 CFR 355.25(a)(2) and 19 CFR 355.25(b)(2). 
Based upon certifications by HADEED and the Government of the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia, as well as the Department's administrative 
determinations, we have determined that HADEED, the only producer of 
the subject merchandise, has not applied for or received any net 
subsidy for five consecutive years. In addition, HADEED has certified 
that it will not apply for or receive any net subsidy under a program 
deemed by the Department to be countervailable. We therefore determine 
that there is no likelihood that this company will apply for or receive 
any net subsidy in the future. Accordingly, we are revoking the 
countervailing duty order. The Department will instruct the Customs 
Service to terminate suspension of liquidation on entries of the 
subject merchandise and to liquidate, without regard to countervailing 
duties, such merchandise exported on or after January 1, 1992, the 
first day after the period reviewed herein. We will also instruct the 
Customs Service to refund any deposits of estimated duties on such 
entries.

Administrative Protective Order (APO)

    This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject to APO 
of their responsibilities concerning the return or destruction of 
proprietary information disclosed under APO in accordance with 19 CFR 
353.34(d). Failure to comply is a violation of the APO.
    This administrative review and notice are in accordance with 
section 751(a)(1) of the Act (19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(1)), and 19 CFR 355.22 
and 19 CFR 355.25.

    Dated: October 27, 1994.
Susan G. Esserman,
Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
[FR Doc. 94-28184 Filed 11-14-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P