[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 211 (Wednesday, November 2, 1994)]
[Notices]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-27127]


[[Page Unknown]]

[Federal Register: November 2, 1994]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

 

Proposed Generic Letter Reconsideration of Nuclear Power Plant 
Security Requirements for an Internal Threat

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Notice of opportunity of public comment.

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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to issue 
a generic letter to notify all holders of operating licenses or 
construction permits for nuclear power reactors that NRC is 
reconsidering its positions about certain security measures to protect 
against an internal threat at nuclear power plants. NRC expects 
recipients to review the information for applicability to their 
facilities and consider actions, as appropriate. However, suggestions 
contained in this draft generic letter are not NRC requirements; 
therefore, recipients are not required to take specific action or make 
a written response to the NRC. NRC is seeking comment from interested 
parties regarding both the technical and regulatory aspects of the 
proposed generic letter presented herein.
    NRC will consider comments received from interested parties in the 
final evaluation of the proposed generic letter and will review the 
technical position and, when appropriate, analyze the value/impact on 
licensees. If NRC issues this generic letter, it will become available 
for public inspection in the Public Document Rooms.
    The comment period expires December 2, 1994. Comments submitted 
after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but 
assurance of consideration cannot be given except for comments received 
on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Submit written comments to Chief, Rules Review and 
Directives Branch, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001. Written comments may also be delivered to 11545 Rockville 
Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m., Federal 
workdays. Copies of written comments received may be examined at the 
NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW. (Lower Level), Washington, 
DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Robert F. Skelton, (301) 504-3208.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 
    NRC Generic Letter XXXX: Reconsideration of Nuclear Power Plant 
Requirements Associated With an Internal Threat.

Addressees

    All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for 
nuclear power reactors.

Purpose

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this 
generic letter to notify you that it is reconsidering its positions 
concerning certain security measures to protect against an internal 
threat at nuclear power plants. It is expected that recipients will 
review the information for applicability to their facilities and 
consider actions, as appropriate. However, suggestions contained in 
this generic letter are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific 
action or written response is required.

Background

    The fitness-for-duty rule (10 CFR Part 26) published on June 7, 
1989, required power reactor licensees to implement fitness-for-duty 
programs. The access authorization rule (10 CFR 73.56) published on 
April 25, 1991, required power reactor licensees to implement access 
authorization programs. One objective of these regulations was to 
ensure the reliability and trustworthiness of persons granted 
unescorted access to protected areas at power reactor facilities. In 
light of these regulations, the NRC evaluated security requirements for 
protection against the insider threat at nuclear power plants to verify 
that they remain appropriate. The staff discussed the initial results 
of this review in SECY 92-272, ``Re-examination of Nuclear Power Plant 
Security Requirements Associated With the Internal Threat,'' of August 
4, 1992. The staff then recommended reducing or eliminating certain 
security requirements that gave marginal protection against the insider 
threat.
    The Commission reviewed SECY 92-292 and asked the staff to re-visit 
the subject and explore alternatives for allowing reductions in 
unnecessary or marginally effective security measures. The staff 
discussed the results of this re-evaluation in SECY 93-326, 
``Reconsideration of Nuclear Power Plant Security Requirements 
Associated with an Internal Threat,'' December 2, 1993.

Description of Circumstances

    In a staff requirements memorandum of February 18, 1994, the 
Commission endorsed staff recommendations to (1) issue generic 
correspondence informing licensees of the opportunity to revise certain 
commitments in their security plan and (2) proceed with rulemaking 
regarding specific changes to reduce or eliminate certain security 
requirements. This generic letter discusses those areas in which 
licensees may choose to revise their plans.

Discussion

    NRC may accept changes to a licensee security plan in the following 
four areas:
(I) Vital Area Access Control Measures

    NRC may accept the changes to vital area (VA) access control 
measures in security plans discussed below upon confirmation that (1) 
certain other site-specific measures are in place or will be 
implemented to demonstrate (e.g., through contingency drills) a 
capability, including a protective strategy, to protect against an 
external adversary after making any of the changes and (2) measures are 
in place to examine hand-carried packages for explosives using 
equipment specifically designed for that purpose.
A. Compensatory Measures
    1. Eliminate compensatory measures for failure of vital area 
mechanical lock hardware if the access control hardware and alarms are 
operable.
    2. Extend the timeliness requirements for implementing compensatory 
measures for any malfunctioning element of the vital area access 
control system from 10 minutes to a period similar to that which 
technical specifications permit for safety equipment to be out of 
service while the plant is in Mode 1 until required to be in Mode 3.
    The licensee could extend the time to implement compensatory 
measures only if either the VA door lock or alarms are operable. The 
most restrictive limiting condition for the timeliness of the 
compensatory measure(s) would be the most restrictive safety equipment 
in the vital areas accessed by the VA door needing compensatory 
measures.
B. Maintenance of Discrete Vital Area Access Lists
    Eliminate separate access authorization lists for each vital area 
of the facility. As an alternative, maintain a single list of persons 
who have access to any vital area. This list would have to be revised 
as status of persons changes in order to maintain its accuracy, 
especially for removing vital area access authorization from 
individuals.
C. Alarm Response
    Modify the response to vital area access control alarms (doors). 
Response would only be needed to vital area access control alarms that 
coincide with an unresolved alarm at the protected area perimeter, a 
known intrusion, or a constant alarm, such as that caused by an open 
door.
D. Locked Condition of Door
    Although locking mechanisms and access control systems, including 
door alarms, would be retained, doors to vital areas could be left 
unlocked. A licensee choosing this option would be expected to have the 
capability to remotely lock the door(s) from both alarm stations, as 
necessary, in response to an external threat. Licensees choosing this 
option would be expected to demonstrate, as part of the demonstration 
of their capability to protect against an external adversary, the 
ability to remotely lock doors in time to delay the adversary where 
delay was essential in the protective strategy. Access control systems 
retained on vital area doors would continue to maintain a record of 
personnel access and generate alarms if the door was open without a 
proper access.
    The process for licensees to revise their security plans to 
implement the changes to security measures in vital areas will depend 
on the content of their present security plans. Since these changes 
would reduce slightly the effectiveness of the security program, most 
changes would need to be processed in accordance with the provisions of 
10 CFR 50.90. Some of the changes may be processed by an exemption 
request or in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(p). If appropriate, changes 
in security plans should include commitments to the measures described 
in paragraph (I) above. To ensure unrestricted emergency access, the 
NRC staff notes the advantages of (1) having the ability to remotely 
unlock doors to vital areas from each alarm station, (2) ensuring that 
malfunctions result in doors failing unlocked rather than locked, and 
(3) allowing all operators and auxiliary operators to carry metal keys 
that can override keycard-operated lock mechanisms.

(II) Access Search of On-duty Armed Security Guards

    NRC may accept changes to allow armed security officers who (1) are 
on duty and carry a weapon in accordance with assigned duties, (2) have 
already been searched during their current shift, and (3) have left the 
protected area on official business, to reenter the protected area 
without being subject to the metal detector searches (but still be 
subjected to explosive searches). If search equipment is a single unit 
containing both metal and explosive detection equipment, alarms from 
the metal detector may be disregarded. This change could be made to 
security plans in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(p).

(III) Containment Access Control Measures

    NRC may accept changes to allow persons other than security 
personnel, provided they are appropriately trained in access control 
procedures in accordance with the security plan, to control access for 
personnel and materials entering the containment any time frequent 
access is permitted to the containment. This change could be made to 
security plans in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(p).

(IV) Alternative Measures for Control of Security Badges

    NRC may accept changes to allow for alternative approaches for 
accountability of picture badges used for unescorted access so that 
certain types of badges may be taken outside the protected area. 
Alternative approaches need to include the ability to ensure positive 
identification of individuals upon entry to the protected area and to 
ensure the badge is disabled of its access function when taken out of 
the protected area. For employees, such changes can be made under 10 
CFR 50.54(p) because the regulations currently allow licensee employees 
to take badges off site. Changes to security plans to allow contractors 
to take security picture badges off site would require a request for 
exemption from the provisions of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5). Coincident with 
receiving approval of the exemption request, the licensee would be able 
to implement the change in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(p).
    This generic letter requires no specific action or written 
response.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 24th day of October, 1994.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Brian K. Grimes,
Director, Division of Project Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulations.
[FR Doc. 94-27127 Filed 11-1-94; 8:45 am]
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