[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 211 (Wednesday, November 2, 1994)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-27090]


[[Page Unknown]]

[Federal Register: November 2, 1994]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

18 CFR Chapter I

[Docket No. RM94-20-000]

 

Inquiry Concerning Alternative Power Pooling Institutions Under 
the Federal Power Act

    Issued: October 26, 1994.

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, DOE.

ACTION: Notice of inquiry and request for comments.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) is 
requesting comments on issues related to alternative power pooling 
institutions. It also requests comments on the role of traditional 
power pools in an era of increased competition. This Notice of Inquiry 
is needed because of the increasing access to transmission services in 
the electric utility industry and the concomitant increase in 
competition.

DATES: Written comments must be received by the Commission no later 
than March 2, 1995. Reply comments must be received by the Commission 
no later than April 3, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Send comments to: Office of the Secretary, Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 825 North Capitol Street NE., Washington, D.C. 
20426.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Janice Macpherson, Office of the General Counsel, Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 825 North Capitol Street NE., Washington, D.C. 
20426, Telephone: (202) 208-0921, (legal issues)
J. Stephen Henderson, Office of Economic Policy, Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 825 North Capitol Street NE., Washington, D.C. 
20426, Telephone: (202) 208-0100 (technical issues)
       or

Michael A. Coleman, Office of Electric Power Regulation, Federal Energy 
Regulation Commission, 825 North Capitol Street, NE., Washington, D.C. 
20426, Telephone: (202) 208-1236.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In addition to publishing the full text of 
this document in the Federal Register, the Commission also provides all 
interested persons an opportunity to inspect or copy the contents of 
this document during normal business hours in Room 3104, at 941 North 
Capitol Street, NE., Washington, D.C. 20426.
    The Commission Issuance Posting System (CIPS), an electronic 
bulletin board service, provides access to the texts of formal 
documents issued by the Commission. CIPS is available at no charge to 
the user and may be accessed using a personal computer with a modem by 
dialing (202) 208-1397. To access CIPS, set your communications 
software to use 300, 1200, or 2400 bps, full duplex, no parity, 8 data 
bits and 1 stop bit. CIPS can also be accessed at 9600 bps by dialing 
(202) 208-1781. The full text of this order will be available on CIPS 
for 30 days from the date of issuance. The complete text on diskette in 
WordPerfect format may also be purchased from the Commission's copy 
contractor, La Dorn Systems Corporation, also located in Room 3104, 941 
North Capitol Street NE., Washington, D.C. 20426.
Notice of Inquiry

    Before Commissioners: Elizabeth Anne Moler, Chair; Vicky A. 
Bailey, James J. Hoecker, William L. Massey, and Donald F. Santa, 
Jr.

October 26, 1994.

I. Introduction

    The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) is initiating 
this proceeding to solicit comments from interested persons on issues 
related to alternative power pooling institutions.1

    \1\Section 202(a) of the FPA reflects Congress' desire to 
promote and encourage the voluntary interconnection and coordination 
of utility facilities. While the Department of Energy now has 
primary responsibility for Section 202(a) of the Federal Power Act, 
see 42 U.S.C. 7151, 7172, all voluntary coordination and 
interconnection agreements involving public utilities must be filed 
with the Commission. The Commission, therefore, continues to play a 
pivotal role in this area.
    In addition, section 205(a) of the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) authorizes the Commission to exempt 
electric utilities, in whole or in part, from state law, rule or 
regulation which prohibits or prevents voluntary coordination. Under 
PURPA section 205(b)(2), the Commission also may recommend to 
electric utilities that they enter into negotiations concerning 
pooling arrangements.
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    Since the inception of power pools, fundamental changes have 
occurred in the electric utility industry. Most significant are the 
enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct)2 and the 
emerging development of a competitive bulk power market. The Commission 
has recently announced in a series of orders its policy of promoting 
competitive bulk power markets, and has emphasized the critical role of 
comparable transmission access in meeting that goal.

    \2\Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992).
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    Given the ongoing changes in the competitive environment of the 
electric utility industry--in particular, the potential for 
substantially increased access to transmission--we must consider 
whether we are appropriately balancing our dual objectives of promoting 
coordination and competition. Indeed, industry participants in many 
regions are responding to competitive changes by exploring the 
possibility of changes in, or alternatives to, traditional power pools.
    The Commission believes that the new alternative power pooling 
institutions have great potential. In particular, they may be of 
assistance in facilitating the resolution of some difficult federal-
state jurisdictional issues and in developing mechanisms for resolving 
or minimizing stranded cost issues. We therefore want to explore them 
in detail. We are particularly interested in determining whether 
alternative power pooling institutions may have special transmission 
pricing needs.3

    \3\Concurrently, the Commission is issuing a policy statement on 
transmission pricing in Docket No. ER93-19-000. See Inquiry 
Concerning the Commission's Pricing Policy for Transmission Services 
Provided by Public Utilities Under the FPA, Policy Statement, FERC 
Stats. & Regs. para.______ (1994).
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    We also wish to re-examine the role of more traditional power pools 
in an era of increased competition.
    For these reasons, we are initiating a notice of inquiry on 
alternative power pooling institutions. This notice has three parts. 
First, we relate our understanding of an innovative power pooling 
concept proposed by two utilities in Southern California in response to 
the California Public Utilities Commission's (California Commission) 
inquiry into retail access (the ``Blue Book Proposal'').4 We also 
note our interest in any other alternative pooling institutions that 
are being explored today. Second, we briefly describe power pools as 
they have evolved to date in order to provide a comparison of 
traditional power pools with emerging, innovative proposals. Third, we 
ask interested parties to respond to specific questions, as well as to 
provide us with any other comments they may have, on alternative power 
pooling institutions and existing power pools.

    \4\Proposed Policies Governing Restructuring of California's 
Electric Services Industry and Reforming Regulation, 151 PUR4th 73 
(California Public Utilities Commission 1994).
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    We note that a major focus of this notice of inquiry is on power 
pooling to accomplish short-term transactions, rather than long-term 
regional planning, which we addressed in our Policy Statement on 
Regional Transmission Groups (RTGs).5 While power pools do some 
transmission planning, it is not necessarily of a regional or long-term 
nature. In contrast, as envisioned in our policy statement on RTGs, 
RTGs may be better able to focus on long-term and regional transmission 
planning. In this sense, RTGs and poolcos, at a minimum, would be 
complementary, rather than competing, institutions. Indeed, the same 
institution could perform both functions. For example, some RTGs may 
decide to develop mechanisms to accommodate short-term transactions 
within the RTG. The Commission is interested in exploring whether RTGs 
would be appropriate institutions to accommodate power pooling.

    \5\Policy Statement Regarding Regional Transmission Groups, 58 
FR 41626 (Aug. 5, 1993), III FERC Stats. & Regs., Regulations 
Preambles para.30,976 (1993).
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II. Alternative Power Pooling Institutions

    Increased competition in the electric utility industry may signal 
the need for alternative power pooling arrangements. We are interested 
in considering new arrangements that could better capture the benefits 
of competition in bulk power markets without unnecessarily sacrificing 
coordination benefits. Serious discussion is occurring in California at 
the present time concerning an alternative power pooling arrangement.

A. The Poolco Concept

    Two utilities (San Diego Gas & Electric Company and Southern 
California Edison Company) have each proposed creating a regional 
pooling company, or ``poolco,'' in response to the California 
Commission's Blue Book Proposal. Both proposals discuss some form of 
restructuring, either vertical disintegration or the relinquishment of 
transmission control. Divestiture has not been proposed. However, the 
utilities may intend to create subsidiary companies for each function 
that would remain affiliated.
    Although the two proposals vary in some details, they share many 
fundamental characteristics. Basically, the poolco would be an 
independent entity that would not own any (or would own only a limited 
number of) facilities, but would control the operation of some or all 
generators, and all transmission facilities, in a region. The poolco 
would be open to all generators connected to the grid, who would 
automatically receive any transmission service needed to sell power 
into the regional pool. In effect, the poolco would be responsible for 
creating and maintaining a regional spot market for electricity. The 
spot price in each trading period (perhaps hour-by-hour) would be 
readily available and made known to all market participants.
    Generating resources would be centrally dispatched on an hourly 
basis by the poolco in much the same way as in current power pools. The 
principal difference appears to be that generators would be dispatched 
based on the bid price they submit to the poolco, rather than on their 
running costs. The poolco would operate a least-cost (in the sense of 
lowest bid) dispatch that accounts for any transmission constraints in 
the same manner as an existing power pool or a single utility dispatch 
center. Generators would be paid the market-clearing price\6\ during 
each hour, as opposed to the bid price that each generator submitted to 
the poolco.\7\ Likewise, distributors would pay the market-clearing 
price in each hour. Consequently, the poolco would break even in its 
basic dispatch function, since distributors would pay to the poolco 
what the generators would receive from the poolco.

    \6\The market-clearing price is the highest bid price of any 
generator that is selected to provide service to the poolco in an 
hour. Each successful bidder would receive this price, regardless of 
whether its bid price was less than the market-clearing price.
    \7\This method of pricing creates an incentive for each 
generator to bid near its marginal running cost, since it would risk 
losses if it bids less than its running costs and the poolco selects 
it to run, and it would risk losses if it bids more than its running 
costs and the poolco does not select it to run.
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    In effect, the poolco would become the market clearinghouse for the 
hourly energy market. Under the poolco concept, dispatch benefits are 
implicitly allocated among sellers and buyers by the spot trading at a 
market-clearing price. The poolco would have no further role in 
dividing or allocating benefits. Also, the proposed poolco would have 
no role in long-term energy or capacity markets. Generators and 
distributors could enter into contracts outside the poolco.
    Under San Diego's poolco concept as currently proposed,\8\ spot 
prices would vary from one geographical location to another to reflect 
transmission constraints.\9\ This would allow the spot trading to be 
conducted at a price that reflects the real ability and limitations of 
the grid to move power from low-cost to high-cost areas. The proposal 
includes opportunity cost pricing for grid congestion, as well as 
tradable capacity rights.

    \8\We understand that both San Diego's and Edison's proposals 
continue to be revised, and that the two proposals may become more 
similar as details are worked out.
    \9\Under Edison's proposal, in contrast, spot prices would not 
reflect transmission constraints.
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    While the poolco concept contains many similarities to existing 
power pools, it appears that significant differences exist between a 
traditional power pool and a poolco, particularly with respect to both 
generation and transmission pricing. Although a traditional power pool 
generally has flexible cost-based pricing schemes,\10\ we understand 
that a fundamental characteristic of the California poolco concept is 
that all short-term power sales would occur at a market-clearing price. 
In other words, whereas in a traditional power pool the offer-price 
mechanisms are cost-based, in the California poolco proposal they would 
be based on economic bids with an incentive to bid at or near the 
utility's marginal running costs.

    \10\These range from split-savings (e.g., Pennsylvania-New 
Jersey-Maryland Interconnection (PJM)) to a rate that falls under a 
price cap based on pool members' composite costs (Mid-Continent Area 
Power Pool (MAPP)).
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    Another difference between traditional power pools and the 
California poolco proposals is their membership. Today, some power pool 
agreements include explicit membership criteria. Most include no 
explicit provisions addressing the admission of new members. However, 
most existing pools to some extent limit membership. On the other hand, 
the California poolco proposals, as we understand them, would require 
open membership for at least all bulk power participants.
    The California poolco proposals represent an interesting 
alternative approach to achieving operating efficiency and competition 
in hourly electricity markets. However, the proposals are in an early 
stage of development and a number of significant transmission issues 
apparently have not yet been resolved (for example, how transmission 
owners would be compensated for the existing facilities, how to 
determine priorities for use of the transmission grid, how to allocate 
expansion costs and how to induce appropriate expansion). Since the 
California poolco proposals raise several questions and issues that 
need additional consideration, we have included a list of questions in 
section III.C of this Notice on which we seek comments from interested 
persons.

B. Other Alternative Power Pooling Institutions

    There may be other alternative pooling proposals of which the 
Commission is not aware. The above discussion is not intended to limit 
the scope of this inquiry. The Commission is interested in all 
innovative pooling proposals intended to capture the benefits of 
competitive bulk power markets while preserving those coordination 
benefits that are consistent with competition.
    The issue of alternative power pooling arrangements, and the 
California poolco proposal in particular, is part of a larger 
discussion concerning the future structure of the electric power 
industry in the United States. In addition to the California poolco 
concept, other innovative institutions have been proposed which, as the 
Commission comprehends them, might either work in tandem with a poolco, 
or separately from a poolco to facilitate the development of a more 
competitive bulk power market. For example, some have suggested that 
the electric power industry could be restructured to include: (1) 
generating companies, known as ``gencos,'' which are groupings of 
generators that may or may not be affiliated with utilities that 
compete to sell electricity in the wholesale spot and contract markets; 
(2) transmitters, known as ``transcos'' or ``gridcos,'' which are 
companies that would separately own and maintain a regional 
transmission grid; and (3) distributors, known as ``discos,'' which are 
utilities that would operate the local distribution systems and 
purchase energy in the competitive wholesale market for resale to 
ultimate customers.
    In such a restructured market, the poolco could be a fourth player 
that could control the operation of the generation and transmission 
facilities owned by gencos and gridcos; i.e., the poolco could dispatch 
the system based on buy/sell offers from individual gencos and discos. 
In addition, the poolco could provide any necessary ancillary services 
(e.g., load following, spinning reserves, and reactive power) at cost.
    In addition to proposals to restructure the electric power industry 
along functional lines, there may be other alternative institutional 
structures for the industry that warrant consideration in this inquiry. 
The Commission is interested in expanding its appreciation of any such 
proposals for alternative institutional structures. In particular, the 
Commission is interested in the extent to which such alternative 
institutional structures might facilitate the achievement of a more 
competitive bulk power market in a way that the current institutional 
structure of the industry may not. We have included several questions 
in this regard as part of section IV. of this notice.

III. Existing Power Pools

    In order to fully understand the issues presented by alternative 
power pooling institutions, it is necessary to understand existing 
power pools. In addition, given the competitive changes in the industry 
and the fact that new pooling alternatives are emerging, it is 
appropriate to consider whether existing power pools are functioning 
appropriately and, if not, to consider what changes are necessary.
    Historically, utilities began coordination activities by entering 
into simple bilateral arrangements, progressing gradually to more 
complex contractual agreements. Such agreements may simply cover an 
exchange of energy and power, or they may cover a variety of services. 
They generally are not considered to be pooling agreements unless they 
include coordination of reserve generating capacity and, in most cases, 
some coordination of planning and construction in addition to operating 
coordination. \11\

    \11\Although the terms ``pooling'' and ``coordination'' are 
sometimes used interchangeably, generally, the term ``coordination'' 
refers to the whole spectrum of relationships between utilities, and 
``pooling'' refers to more formalized agreements between utilities 
to operate and plan their systems in a manner that achieves the 
greatest regional economy and reliability.
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    Traditional power pools have provided to their members significant 
economic benefits and operating efficiencies, including: reduced 
operating costs resulting from joint dispatch; reduced fixed costs 
resulting from joint construction of generating units and reserve 
sharing; and increased system reliability resulting from reserve 
sharing and regional planning.
    Existing pools vary a great deal in the extent to which they are 
integrated, i.e., to which they plan and operate their individual 
systems as a single system.\12\ The most highly integrated pools are 
referred to as ``tight'' pools.\13\ Tight pools extensively coordinate 
their planning and operations in both the long and short run, and in 
theory provide the greatest benefits. They provide for joint planning 
on a highly coordinated basis and for centralized dispatch of 
generating facilities. They also establish contractual requirements 
with respect to generating capacity and operating reserves, together 
with financial penalties to enforce reserve requirements. \14\

    \12\Other pooling arrangements may coordinate extensively, but 
only involve a few companies, e.g., the coordination arrangement 
between Detroit Edison Company and Consumers Power Company. Some 
coordination arrangements often referred to as power pools are, in 
fact, simply vehicles for bilateral trades of economy energy, such 
as Western Systems Power Pool (WSPP) and Florida Energy Broker.
    \13\There are three tight power pools operating today. NEPOOL 
operates in six New England states, and its 90 members include 
investor-owned utilities (IOUs) and publicly-owned utilities. The 
New York Power Pool (NYPP) operates in the State of New York, and 
its members include the seven IOUs in the State and the Power 
Authority of the State of New York. PJM operates in the Mid-Atlantic 
region, and its eight members include only IOUs.
    \14\There are also several affiliated utility systems 
(registered holding companies under the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 1935) that operate as tight power pools. Southern 
Company, Entergy Corporation, American Electric Power Company, 
Allegheny Power System, Central & South West Corporation, General 
Public Utilities (which is itself a member of PJM), and Northeast 
Utilities (which is itself a member of NEPOOL). Together, these 
affiliated utility systems and tight pools account for approximately 
40 percent of the generating capacity in the Eastern 
Interconnection.
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    One of the key characteristics of a tight power pool is central 
dispatch, which ensures short-term efficiency by dispatching the pool's 
combined generating resources to meet the pool's combined loads, 
without regard to unit ownership. The benefits of central dispatch 
(i.e., the savings realized by dispatching jointly rather than 
individually) are shared among pool members. \15\

    \15\Even when pool members undertake bilateral trades with other 
pool members to increase their revenues from pool interchange, the 
pool dispatch is unaffected. The bilateral agreement is simply a 
mechanism for adjusting the pool's after-the-fact benefit sharing 
formula.
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    A long-term benefit of a tight power pool is joint action to 
enhance reliability. A tight pool coordinates maintenance to ensure 
that adequate reserves are maintained, that is, units are taken out of 
service on a staggered basis. Also, tight pools undertake some regional 
planning of production and transmission to facilitate joint solutions 
to regional needs and problems.
    Finally, tight pools conduct transactions with neighboring pools to 
realize additional economy savings and to increase reliability whenever 
possible.
    Tight power pools generally require that members provide 
transmission access to other members without a direct charge for 
economy trades effected through central dispatch as compensation for 
use of their facilities. However, the transmission providers may be 
assigned a share of the savings resulting from the central dispatch. 
Affiliated power pools, i.e., the registered holding companies, have 
more extensive transmission access provisions that generally include 
some form of transmission equalization payments among members.
    Pools that are characterized by a lower level of coordination are 
called ``loose pools.'' \16\ For example, while the participating 
utilities work together to establish principles and practices for 
interconnected operation, review area power supply problems and 
establish criteria for power supply adequacy, exchange generation and 
transmission construction plans, and plan coordinated efforts to attain 
optimal economy and reliability, there is no central dispatch and there 
may be less joint planning.

    \16\An example of a loose pool is MAPP, which operates in the 
Midwest. Its members (as well as associated members and a liaison 
participant) include IOUs, publicly-owned entities, generating and 
transmitting cooperatives, Canadian crown corporations and one 
Federal power marketing administration (the Western Area Power 
Administration).
    As discussed in section IV of this Notice, the Commission seeks 
comment on a number of questions pertaining to existing power pools 
(both tight pools and loose pools), and their strengths and weaknesses 
in light of emerging competitive bulk power markets.

IV. Request for Comments

    In order to assess the merits of alternative power pooling 
institutions, including the California poolco proposals, and to 
evaluate whether our existing policies will impede the development of 
such institutions, the Commission seeks comments from interested 
industry participants. We also believe that this proceeding is an 
appropriate forum to consider whether any changes should be made in our 
policies concerning existing power pools. Our intention is to ensure 
that our policies, while continuing to maintain adequate and reliable 
service, are consistent with the development of a competitive bulk 
power market. Answers to the questions below should refer to the 
number(s) of the specific question(s) when possible. In addition, 
commenters may address any other matters related to these issues. We 
are interested in all aspects of potential changes in, or alternatives 
to, existing power pools.

    Question 1. What alternative power pooling institutions might be 
beneficial? What are the strengths and weaknesses of these 
alternatives? What special transmission pricing needs, if any, would 
such alternative pooling institutions have? What specific benefits 
would an alternative bring that are not available today? What 
specific benefits of existing pools would be lost? What, if any, 
benefits would alternative power pooling institutions provide 
compared to bilateral trading? How would alternative power pooling 
institutions differ from a regime of bilateral trading?
    Question 2. Do any current Commission policies impede the 
formation of beneficial alternative power pooling institutions? What 
changes in our existing policies, if any, including pricing 
policies, are needed to encourage pools that facilitate competitive 
bulk power markets?
    Question 3. In discussing any alternative power pooling 
institution, please address how the adequacy of generation and 
transmission services would be ensured, e.g., maintenance of 
adequate generation and transmission reserves and construction of 
needed generating and transmission capacity? How would reliability 
be ensured, e.g., control of transmission systems, voltage support, 
reactive power, loop flow, load following, backup services and other 
control area services?
    Question 4. What are the conditions required for alternative 
power pooling institutions to be beneficial, e.g., a minimum number 
of sellers or buyers, a minimum geographic size, maximum market 
share for any seller or buyer, open membership, appropriate 
governance rules? Should participation by generators in the 
alternative pool's area be voluntary or mandatory?
    Question 5. Do alternative power pooling institutions have the 
potential to help resolve or minimize stranded cost issues? If so, 
how?
    Question 6. How would specific alternative power pooling 
institutions be regulated? In particular, can these institutions be 
designed to fit easily into the existing Federal-State regulatory 
structure so as to avoid duplicating the regulation of pool 
functions?
    Question 7. What are the merits of proposals to restructure the 
electric power industry along functional lines such as the genco-
gridco-disco delineation? Should the Commission be prepared to 
proceed with poolco-type proposals in advance of any functional 
utility restructuring efforts, or should the Commission refuse to 
act on poolco-type proposals unless the functional restructuring 
occurs simultaneously? Does such a restructuring have merit even if 
an alternative power pooling arrangement is not adopted? Would such 
a restructuring facilitate the development of a more competitive 
bulk power market in a way that the current institutional structure 
of the electric power industry cannot?
    Question 8. In addition to the proposal mentioned in the 
preceding question, are there other alternative institutional 
structures for the electric power industry that warrant the 
Commission's consideration in this Inquiry?
    Question 9. What are the strengths and weaknesses of today's 
power pools? We are particularly interested in concrete examples 
related to existing power pools. Should the Commission consider 
changing any existing power pool practices or policies to facilitate 
competitive bulk power markets?
    Question 10. Would changes to existing power pools be preferable 
to creating new pooling institutions? Is an RTG an appropriate 
institution to become a power pool? Or should the RTG's transmission 
planning function be kept separate from the pool's generation 
market-clearing function?
    Question 11. Can a pool provide advantages to its members 
without unduly preferring members to non-members? How should pool 
members relate to non-members in an open access market? Are any 
improvements in information availability necessary for existing 
pools or alternative pooling institutions to be more beneficial? 
What reciprocity conditions are appropriate between pool members and 
non-members? How would a state policy of retail access affect pool 
membership conditions and reciprocity obligations? What if retail 
access were available in only some states in the pool?
    Question 12. How should the Commission's recently-announced 
policy concerning comparability of transmission services be 
implemented with respect to alternative power pooling institutions 
and/or existing power pools?

V. Public Comment Procedures

    The Commission invites all interested parties to submit an original 
and 14 copies of their written comments. Comments should not exceed 100 
pages in length. In addition, commenters should submit an executive 
summary not to exceed five pages.
    The Commission will also permit interested persons to submit reply 
comments in response to the initial comments filed in this proceeding. 
Reply comments should not exceed 50 pages in length.
    Persons with common interests or views are encouraged to submit 
joint comments. Commenters should double space their comments, provide 
a concise description identifying the commenter, and should reference 
Docket No. RM94-20-000. In addition, commenters should submit a copy of 
their comments on a 3\1/2\ inch diskette in ASCII II format. Initial 
and reply comments must be filed with the Office of the Secretary, 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 825 North Capitol Street, N.E., 
Washington, D.C. 20426, no later than March 2, 1995 for initial 
comments and April 3, 1995 for reply comments.
    All written comments will be placed in the Commission's public 
files and will be available for inspection in the Commission's Public 
Reference Section, 941 North Capitol Street, NE., Washington, D.C. 
20426, during regular business hours.

    By direction of the Commission.
Lois D. Cashell,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 94-27090 Filed 11-1-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P