[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 207 (Thursday, October 27, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-26650]


[[Page Unknown]]

[Federal Register: October 27, 1994]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
[Docket No. EA92-041; Notice 1]

 

General Motors Pickup Truck Defect Investigation; Public 
Proceeding Scheduled

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of initial decision and public meeting.

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SUMMARY: NHTSA will hold a public meeting beginning at 10:00 a.m. on 
December 6, 1994 regarding the initial decision by the Secretary of 
Transportation that certain pickup trucks and other vehicles 
manufactured by General Motors Corporation (GM) contain a defect that 
relates to motor vehicle safety.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Ellen Berlin, Director, Office of Public and Consumer Affairs, National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW, 
Washington, DC 20590; (202) 366-9550.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 30118(a) (formerly 
section 152(a) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 
1966, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1412(a)), Secretary of Transportation 
Federico Pena has made an initial decision that model year 1973-1991 
full-sized GM pickup trucks and cab-chassis equipped with fuel tanks 
mounted outboard of the frame rails contain a defect that relates to 
motor vehicle safety.
    The rationale for this initial decision is set forth in the 
Engineering Analysis (EA) Report for EA92-041. The entire report, as 
well as the complete record on which the initial decision is based, are 
available for inspection during working hours (9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.) 
in NHTSA's Technical Reference Library, Room 5108, 400 Seventh Street, 
SW, Washington, DC 20590. That record consists of the public files for 
EA92-041 and Defect Petition (DP) 92-016. The Executive Summary of the 
EA Report is set out below.

Engineering Analysis Report--Executive Summary

    This Engineering Analysis was opened on December 8, 1992, as a 
result of granting a petition from the Center for Auto Safety (CAS) and 
Public Citizen to ``initiate a defect investigation into and recall all 
Chevrolet/GMC full-sized pickups (C/K-series) with fuel tank(s) * * * 
mounted outboard of frame rails.'' The objective of the investigation 
was to determine whether certain model year 1970-1991 Chevrolet and GMC 
full-sized pickup trucks contain a defect that poses an unreasonable 
risk to safety, related to the danger of fires following crashes, with 
primary focus on side-impact crashes. In the investigation, the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) Office of 
Defects Investigation (ODI) conducted analyses of real-world accident 
data and performed laboratory crash tests of the subject and peer 
vehicles. ODI also addressed questions related to the compliance of 
these trucks with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 
301, ``Fuel System Integrity.'' Additionally, ODI examined whether the 
fuel tanks and related components on the trucks were unduly affected by 
corrosion that could make them more likely to be involved in a fire.
    On April 9, 1993, ODI sent a recall request letter to General 
Motors Corporation (GM), recommending that GM conduct a safety recall 
on GM trucks with fuel tanks mounted outside the frame rails (subject 
vehicles). That letter was based on two principal factors:
    1. Real-world accident data in the Fatal Accident Reporting System 
(FARS) indicate that there is an increased risk of fatality caused by 
fire in side-impact crashes involving the subject vehicles compared to 
1973-1987 Ford full-sized pickup trucks. That increased risk led to an 
estimate that, in 1993, an additional 5-6 fatalities would occur in 
side-impact crashes involving the subject vehicles compared to what 
would occur if those trucks had the same side-impact fire performance 
as full-sized Ford pickups.
    2. Laboratory crash tests corroborated the findings from the real-
world accident data analysis. That is, in certain comparable side-
impact crash tests, GM fuel tanks leaked and Ford tanks did not. 
Further, these tests used instrumented test dummies. Dummy measurements 
indicate that humans could have survived the crash forces at the impact 
speeds at which the subject vehicles leaked. While these speeds are 
well in excess of the impact speed specified in FMVSS No. 301, the 
results indicate the increased fire risk in the GM trucks in crashes 
that are otherwise survivable.
    GM provided an extensive amount of data and arguments in response 
to the recall request letter. ODI has completed an exhaustive review 
and analysis of the GM submissions and has conducted a variety of 
additional analyses associated with issues involved in this 
investigation. These include:
     An assessment of the effect of corrosion on fuel tank 
leakage and fire performance in the subject vehicles;
     An analysis of non-fatal burn injuries in side-impact 
crashes involving the subject vehicles;
     An in-depth review of all available police accident 
reports and other records of side-impact, fire-involved fatal crashes 
involving the subject vehicles to assess the crash conditions and 
severity of each;
     An update of the FARS analysis that led to the April 9, 
1993 recall request letter;
     An analysis of the reasonableness of GM's decision to 
design the subject vehicle with side-mounted fuel-tanks, given what GM 
knew about the safety risks associated with that design and the 
availability of feasible alternative designs; and
     An analysis of the information about the risk of post-
crash fuel leaks that became available to GM during the time the 
subject vehicles were being manufactured.

Principal Findings

     A review of GM submissions, as well as ODI testing, 
indicates that there are no data on which to conclude that the GM 
trucks to which FMVSS No. 301 applied, when new, did not comply with 
the standard.
     There are no data to indicate a relationship between fuel 
tank corrosion and increased fire risk in the subject vehicles, either 
in side impacts or in non-crash incidents.
     Apart from the basic decision to locate the fuel tanks of 
the subject vehicles outside of the frame rails, many of the specific 
features of the design of the fuel storage system and the surrounding 
area have increased the likelihood of post-crash fuel fires in the 
subject vehicles.
     Based on a review of 1979-1993 accident data reflecting 
the performance of full-sized pickups in side-impact fatal crashes 
involving fire, occupants of the subject vehicles experienced 2.8 times 
as many fire-related fatalities (i.e., fatalities in crashes in which a 
fire occurred) per million registered vehicle-years as occupants of 
Ford pickups and 2.5 times as many as occupants of Dodge pickups. Where 
the FARS code indicated that the most harmful event (MHE) of the crash 
was fire, the GM-to-Ford occupant fatality per million registered 
vehicle-years ratio is 3.4 to 1, and the GM-to-Dodge ratio is 6.1 to 1.
     Real-world accidents data do not support GM's contention 
that GM and Ford pickup trucks have comparable side-impact fire 
performance and that differences in driver demographics and driver 
behavior explain the difference in the rates of fire-related and MHE-
fire fatalities in side-impact crashes for the GM and Ford pickups. 
This is demonstrated by the tremendous reduction in the rate of MHE-
fire side-impact fatalities that occurred after GM moved the fuel tanks 
for these pickups inside the frame rails in model year 1988.
     Contrary to GM's contentions, the MHE coding in FARS is a 
reliable indicator of the number of fatalities actually caused by fire.
     FARS data indicate that, if past trends continue, there 
would be approximately five additional fatalities due to fire in side-
impact crashes in 1994 compared to what would occur if the subject 
vehicles had the same side-impact fire performance as Ford full-sized 
pickups.
     Reports of non-fatal burn injuries indicate that, if past 
trends continue, there would be three to four additional non-fatal burn 
injuries in 1994 in side-impact crashes involving the subject vehicles 
compared to the Ford pickups.
     Laboratory crash data indicate that, at certain impact 
speeds and configurations, the subject vehicles will leak fuel in side 
impacts, while comparable Ford pickups will not.
     While the crash severities in fatal side-impact, fire-
involved crashes involving the subject vehicles are far in excess of 
the severity specified in FMVSS No. 301, they are generally less than 
the severities that result in fires in fatal side-impact crashes 
involving the Ford pickups.
     GM was aware at the time it designed the subject vehicles 
in the early 1970s that side-mounted fuel tank design presented an 
increased risk of post-crash fuel fed fires in side impacts, compared 
to the risk associated with other feasible alternative designs. 
Moreover, GM obtained additional information demonstrating the 
increased risk associated with the side-mounted tanks during the 15-
year period the subject vehicles were in production.

Principal Conclusions

     The increased risk of death and injury from fire in side-
impact crashes involving the subject vehicles is a result of the design 
of their fuel storage system, primarily the location of the fuel tanks 
outside of the frame rails, supplemented by other features of the 
design.
     Given the state of the art at the time and GM's awareness 
of the likely consequences, it was unreasonable for GM to design the 
subject vehicles with fuel tanks outside the frame rails.
     The increased safety risk due to post-crash fires in the 
subject vehicles is unreasonable.
    Therefore, on the basis of the entire investigative record, I have 
initially decided, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 30118(a) (formerly section 
152(a) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act), that the 
subject vehicles contain a defect that relates to motor vehicle safety.

[End of Executive Summary]
    Pursuant to 49 CFR 554.10, a public meeting will be held beginning 
at 10:00 a.m., on Tuesday, December 6, 1994 in Room 2230, Department of 
Transportation Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC, at 
which time GM and all other interested persons will be afforded an 
opportunity to present information, views, and arguments on the issue 
of whether the vehicles covered by this initial decision contain a 
safety-related defect. NHTSA's Deputy Administrator, Christopher A. 
Hart, will preside at that public meeting.
    Interested persons are invited to participate in this proceeding 
through written and/or oral presentations. Persons wishing to make oral 
presentations are requested to notify Ms. Judy Taylor, Office of 
Defects Investigation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 
Room 5326, 400 Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC 20590 (202) 366-2850, 
before the close of business on November 28, 1994. Such persons should 
indicate the approximate amount of time their presentation is expected 
to take and whether they will need any audio-visual equipment. Written 
comments may be submitted to the same address and must be received not 
later than the beginning of the meeting on December 6, 1994.

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30118(a).

    Issued on: October 21, 1994.
Federico Pena,
Secretary of Transportation.
[FR Doc. 94-26650 Filed 10-26-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-M