[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 192 (Wednesday, October 5, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-24604]


[[Page Unknown]]

[Federal Register: October 5, 1994]


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DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

[Recommendation 94-4]

 

Deficiencies in Criticality Safety at Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

ACTION: Notice; recommendation.

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SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made a 
recommendation to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a 
concerning deficiencies in criticality safety at Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. 
The Board requests public comments on this recommendation.

DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments, concerning this 
recommendation are due on or before November 4, 1994.

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this 
recommendation to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana 
Avenue, NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004-2901.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:Kenneth M. Pusateri or Carole C. 
Morgan, at the address above or telephone (202) 208-6400.

    Dated: September 30, 1994.
John T. Conway,
Chairman.

[Recommendation 94-4]

Deficiencies in Criticality Safety at Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant

    Dated: September 27, 1994.

    The Defense nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) has issued a 
number of recommendations concerning formality of operations, including 
Recommendation 92-5, Discipline of Operations in a Changing Defense 
Nuclear Facilities Complex. In that recommendation, the Board stated 
that facilities schedule for continued operations should develop a 
style and level of conduct of operations which is comparable to that 
achieved at commercial nuclear facilities. Recommendation 92-5 further 
noted that, prior to achieving an acceptable level of formality, major 
improvements were required in a number of areas, including safety 
analysis reports, limiting conditions of operation, and training and 
qualification of personnel.
    The Board and its staff have been monitoring the Department of 
Energy's (DOE) efforts to implement an acceptable level of conduct of 
operations at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, which is 
scheduled for continued operations. The Board has forwarded a number of 
reports to DOE during the last two years indicating the existence of 
safety-related concerns regarding operations at Y-12. DOE and its 
operating contractor, Martin-Marietta Energy Systems (MMES), have taken 
some actions to correct deficiencies; however, a number of recent 
events have led the Board to the conclusion that more aggressive and 
comprehensive management actions are required to bring the level of 
conduct of operations at Y-12 to a satisfactory level.
    The Board notes that during the past four months a number of 
violations of Operational Safety Requirements and other safety limits 
have occurred at the Y-12 Plant. Most recently, the Board's staff 
identified a substantial violation of nuclear criticality safety limits 
within a special nuclear material storage vault at Y-12. When the staff 
identified this deficiency to on-site personnel, including a senior 
MMES manager, an MMES nuclear criticality safety specialist, and one of 
DOE's facility representatives, immediate corrective actions that were 
required by Y-12 procedures were not taken. In fact, proper corrective 
actions that were required by Y-12 procedures were not taken. In fact, 
proper corrective actions were not taken until the Board's staff 
informed the DOE Y-12 Site Manager. Subsequently MMES curtailed a 
number of operations at the Y-12 Plant. Reviews of compliance with 
nuclear criticality safety limits at the Y-12 Plan revealed that a 
widespread level of noncompliance exists.
    In its Annual Report to Congress (February 1994) the Board noted 
that personnel and procedures are complementary elements in 
implementing conduct of operations. The report stated, ``The health and 
safety of the public and workers rest on a properly trained workforce 
accomplishing tasks in a formal deliberate fashion in accordance with 
reviewed and approved procedures.'' In responding to the Board's 
Recommendation 93-6, Maintaining Access to Nuclear Weapons Experience, 
DOE is evaluating the impact of expertise presently being lost through 
ongoing staff reductions on their ability to perform nuclear weapons 
dismantlement at Y-12.
    The Board recognizes that DOE and MMES management have begun taking 
aggressive actions to correct the specific problems of adherence to 
nuclear criticality safety limits, since the nuclear criticality safety 
occurrence referred to above. However, the Board believes that more 
remains to be done. According, the Board recommends that:
(1) DOE determine the immediate actions necessary to resolve the 
nuclear criticality safety deficiencies at the Y-12 Plant, including 
actions deemed necessary before restarting curtailed operations and any 
compensatory measures instituted. These actions should be documented, 
along with an explanation of how the deficiencies remained undetected 
by MMES and DOE (line and oversight).
(2) DOE perform the following for defense nuclear facilities at the Y-
12 Plant:
(a) An evaluation of compliance with Operational Safety Requirements 
and Criticality Safety Approvals (CSAs), including a determination of 
the root case of any identified violations. In performing this 
assessment, DOE should use the experience gained during similar review 
at the Los Alamos plutonium facility and during the recent 
``maintenance mode'' at the Pantex Plant.
(b) A comprehensive review of the nuclear criticality safety program at 
the Y-12 Plant, including: the adequacy of procedural controls, the 
utility of the nuclear criticality safety approvals, and a root case 
analysis of the extensive level of non-compliance found in recent 
reviews.
(c) A comparison of the current level of conduct of operations to the 
level expected by DOE in implementing the Board's Recommendation 92-5.
(d) Development of plans, including schedules, to address any 
deficiencies identified in the analyses conducted above.
(3) DOE evaluate the experience, training, and performance of key DOE 
and contractor personnel involved in safety-related activities at 
defense nuclear facilities within the Y-12 Plan to determine if those 
personnel have the skills and knowledge required to execute their 
nuclear safety responsibilities (in this regard, reference should be 
made to the critical safety elements developed as part of DOE's 
response to the Board's Recommendation 93-1).
(4) DOE take whatever actions are necessary to correct any deficiencies 
identified in (3) above in the experience, training, and performance of 
DOE and contractor personnel.
John T. Conway,
Chairman.

Appendix--Transmittal Letter to Secretary of Energy

September 27, 1994.
Hon. Hazel R. O'Leary,
Secretary of Energy,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Secretary O'Leary: On September 27, 1994, the Defense 
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 
Sec. 2286a(5), unanimously approved Recommendation 94-4 which is 
enclosed for your consideration. Recommendation 94-4 deals with 
Deficiencies in Criticality Safety at Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant.
    42 U.S.C. Sec. 2286d(a) requires the Board, after receipt by 
you, to promptly make this recommendation available to the public in 
the Department of Energy's regional public reading rooms. The Board 
believes the recommendation contains no information which is 
classified or otherwise restricted. To the extent this 
recommendation does not include information restricted by DOE under 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2161-68, as amended, 
please arrange to have this recommendation promptly placed on file 
in your regional public reading rooms.
    The Board will publish this recommendation in the Federal 
Register.
        Sincerely,
John T. Conway,
Chairman.
[FR Doc. 94-24604 Filed 10-4-94; 8:45 am]
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