[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 192 (Wednesday, October 5, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-24580]


[[Page Unknown]]

[Federal Register: October 5, 1994]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
 

Proposed Finding of No Significant Impact; Proposed Tokamak 
Physics Experiment, Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory

AGENCY: U.S. Department of Energy.

ACTION: Proposed finding of no significant impact.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) has prepared this Proposed 
Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) on its proposal to construct 
and operate the proposed Tokamak Physics Experiment. This proposed 
finding is based on the DOE Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor Decontamination 
and Decommissioning Project and Tokamak Physics Experiment (TPX) 
Environmental Assessment (EA), DOE/EA-0813, August 1994, which 
evaluates the environmental effects of using the existing Tokamak 
Fusion Test Reactor (TFTR) systems and accessory facilities in the 
proposed construction and operation of the TPX. The purpose of the TPX 
is to develop fusion energy to compensate for dwindling supplies of 
fossil fuels and the eventual depletion of fissionable uranium used in 
present-day nuclear reactors. Proceeding with the TPX is contingent on 
use of existing TFTR systems and appurtenant facilities. 
Decontamination and decommissioning of the TFTR is an integral part of 
the scope of the proposed TPX; therefore both projects are evaluated in 
this EA.
    Based on the analyses in the EA, the DOE believes that the proposed 
action is not a major Federal action significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment within the meaning of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. 
Therefore, the DOE is issuing a Proposed FONSI pursuant to the Council 
on Environmental Quality regulations implementing NEPA (40 CFR Parts 
1500-1508) and the DOE NEPA implementing regulations (10 CFR Part 
1021). DOE will consider comments received in making a final 
determination on whether to issue a FONSI or to prepare an 
environmental impact statement.

DATES: Comments on the proposed FONSI should be postmarked November 4, 
1994, to ensure consideration. Comments postmarked after that date will 
be considered to the extent practicable.

ADDRESSES: Written comments on the proposed FONSI and requests for 
copies of the TPX EA should be directed to: Dr. W.S. White, U.S. 
Department of Energy, 9800 South Cass Avenue, Argonne, Illinois 60439, 
(708) 252-2101.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Requests for further information on the proposed project should be sent 
to: Milton D. Johnson, Manager, Princeton Area Office, U.S. Department 
of Energy, P.O. Box 102, Princeton, New Jersey 08542, (609) 243-3700.
    For general information on the DOE NEPA review process, contact: 
Carol M. Borgstrom, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of NEPA Oversight 
(EH-25), 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, D.C. 20585, (202) 
586-4600 or (800) 472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Proposed Action

    The proposed action is to use the existing TFTR systems and 
accessory facilities in the construction and operation of TPX, which 
would be primarily located inside the existing TFTR Test Cell. The TPX 
would require dismantlement and removal of all TFTR activated systems 
within the TFTR Test Cell Complex. Dismantlement and removal of 
nonradioactive and low activation components in areas such as the Test 
Cell Basement and the Hot Cell, would start immediately after the 
conclusion of the TFTR deuterium-tritium experiment, which is expected 
to conclude in Fiscal Year 1995. Cool-down of the Tokamak in the test 
cell will commence at that time.
    The TPX is being proposed as a national facility for fusion energy 
research to be built at the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory (PPPL). 
Its primary mission is to develop the scientific basis for an 
economical, more compact, and continuously operating Tokamak in support 
of the design of an attractive demonstration fusion power plant.
    Waste from decontamination and decommissioning would include 
stainless steel and aluminum structures, piping, copper coils, graphite 
tiles, solidified radioactive liquids, anti-contamination materials, 
and concrete rubble. Waste would be packaged into Department of 
Transportation (DOT) approved containers and transported to the DOE 
Hanford site in Richland, Washington, as are current PPPL wastes. 
Approximately 950 m3 (33,500 ft3) of waste weighing 
approximately 2270 metric tonnes (2500 tons) would also be disposed. 
Construction of a radioactive waste storage building for temporary 
storage of radioactive waste and final preparation of some radioactive 
waste shipments would be required. This facility would be approximately 
560 m2 (6000 ft2) in size, and would be constructed within 
the existing TFTR facility fence. A second storm water detention basin 
similar to and west of the existing detention basin would also be 
constructed.
    Decontamination and decommissioning of the TFTR Test Cell could be 
completed in approximately 1.5 years, after a 2-year cool-down period. 
TPX construction would minimally overlap decontamination and 
decommissioning of TFTR facilities. The TFTR Test Cell Complex would 
then be available for the TPX approximately 3.5 years after termination 
of TFTR deuterium-tritium experiments. The total cost for the 
decontamination and decommissioning of the TFTR is estimated to be $86 
million.
    The construction and operation of the TPX would take place within 
the existing TFTR facility at Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory 
(PPPL), with construction scheduled to begin in early FY-1998. The TPX 
conceptual design is based on the use of deuterium fuel, but does not 
preclude the potential upgrade and use of tritium fuel in the final 
year of operation. Existing TFTR facilities would be adapted and used 
by the TPX, including TFTR Test Cell Complex; ventilation exhaust vent 
and intake shafts; mockup building; tritium cleanup/waste handling 
area; field coil power conversion building; neutral beam power 
conversion building; radioactive waste systems space; office and 
technical support space; and miscellaneous PPPL support facilities. In 
addition to providing space for the TPX, the TFTR Test Cell Complex 
would provide shielding (via concrete walls, roof, and floor), and 
provide for confinement and handling of tritium-contaminated and/or 
radioactive components.
    The cost for construction of the TPX is estimated at $500M (FY-93), 
with the construction period 1997 to 2000. New facilities to be 
constructed include TFTR Test Cell building modifications, a new 
Cryogenic Equipment building, tank yards for water cooling and 
cryogenic tanks, and a new electrical substation. The Test Cell 
building modifications would be internal and would not increase the 
existing external dimensions of the building. The Cryogenic Equipment 
building would be constructed as a standard industrial single-story 
building, totaling about 1000 m2 (10,800 ft2) in area. The 
tank yard construction would include approximately 2,130 m2 
(22,950 ft2) of new tank yard areas for new gaseous helium tanks, 
liquid nitrogen storage tanks, water storage tanks, and truck-trailer 
access. This construction would take place on existing open space. The 
electrical substation construction would involve installation of a new 
138 kV transmission line between the existing substation and the new 
substation. The new substation would be for transforming 138 kV power 
to 13.8 kV. A new electric power line would be constructed entirely on 
PPPL property.
    Machine assembly would be scheduled for 1998, with the first 
operations during 2000. The TPX would be fueled with hydrogen and 
deuterium plasmas for 10 years; radiation generation would not be 
significant in terms of neutron activation of components or 
radiological doses. In deuterium operation, the peak fusion power would 
not exceed 140 kW. During long pulse deuterium operation, neutrons with 
energies of 2.45 mega electron volts (MeV) would be the primary 
neutrons produced, and annual production of these neutrons would be 
limited to 6.0  x  1021 neutrons. A smaller number of 14.1 MeV 
neutrons would be produced from deuterium-tritium fusion reactions with 
tritium produced from the deuterium-deuterium fusion reactions. The 
number of 14.1 MeV neutrons produced during deuterium operations would 
be approximately 2% of the number of 2.45 MeV neutrons produced.
    The TPX facility would be capable of operating with deuterium-
tritium plasmas during the last year of TPX operation. During 
deuterium-tritium operation, a fully-formed deuterium plasma would be 
developed (requiring up to roughly 1,000 seconds), into which tritium 
would be injected. Once tritium has been injected, the device would 
operate for 2 seconds with a peak fusion power of 15 MW, after which 
the plasma would be terminated. During the 2 seconds of deuterium-
tritium operation, both 2.45 MeV neutrons and 14.1 MeV neutrons would 
be produced, from deuterium-deuterium and deuterium-tritium fusion 
reactions, respectively. Production of 2.45 MeV neutrons during 
deuterium-tritium operation would be approximately 1% of the 14.1 MeV 
neutron production rate. Operation of the Tokamak would be controlled 
to limit annual neutron production so that the site boundary dose 
restriction adopted by the project would not be exceeded. The 
deuterium-tritium phase (if used) would be limited to the last year of 
TPX operation. Small amounts of tritium, and air activation products 
would be released, and minor amounts of direct radiation would result 
from fusion neutrons and activated structural components of TPX.
    Low-level solid radioactive wastes generated during TPX operations 
would consist of contaminated items (e.g., protective clothing) and 
solidified liquid wastes (tritiated water absorbed on desiccant and 
solidified liquid waste from the decontamination area). The volume of 
waste would be similar to that generated by TFTR operations, which was 
appropriated 7.4 m3 per year for deuterium-deuterium operations, 
and is projected to increase during deuterium-tritium operations to 
28.3 m3 per year (1000 ft3 per year). Wastes generated during 
TPX operations would be packaged to comply with applicable DOE and DOT 
requirements and is expected to be shipped to the DOE Hanford 
Reservation in Washington for disposal, as are current PPPL wastes.

Alternatives

    Three alternatives were considered: (1) The proposed action, use of 
the TFTR facilities for the proposed construction and operation of the 
TPX at PPPL, (2) proposed construction and operation of the TPX at the 
Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee, and (3) no action. Location of the 
TPX at the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant, near Knoxville, 
Tennessee, would require construction of new support facilities 
including a new test cell, hot cell, waste handling and storage areas, 
field coil power conversion building, and cryogenic facilities. The 
additional cost and time would jeopardize the U.S. fusion program and 
make the TPX project infeasible. Under the no action alternative, 
decontamination and decommission of TFTR facilities would occur under 
current management practices, but may involve a longer delay between 
safe shutdown activities and commencement of decontamination and 
decommissioning activities. The longer delay would not fit within the 
current schedule to meet the construction of the TPX. This delay may in 
turn be followed by a 2-3 year period of delay, during which the TFTR 
facility would be in a state of protective custody. The TPX would not 
proceed under the no action alternative.

Environmental Impacts

    The Environmental Assessment analyzed the impacts of the TFTR 
decontamination and decomissioning and TPX construction and operation 
on the environment and on the health and safety of workers and the 
public. Both routine operations and off-normal or accident scenarios 
were assessed. The Environmental Assessment considered impacts to air 
quality, noise, water quality and quantity, aquatic and terrestrial 
ecology, threatened and endangered species, the visual environment, 
land use, historical and archaeological resources, socioeconomic 
environment, radiological conditions, and impacts of potential 
accidents. No significant environmental impacts associated with the 
proposed action are anticipated.
    Activities associated with decontamination and decommissioning of 
the TFTR would not present any long-term or adverse nonradiological 
impacts to the public or the environment. It would result in minor 
impacts, consisting primarily of commitment of a small area of onsite 
land for the radioactive waste storage building and the second storm 
water detention basin. Construction of the radioactive waste storage 
building and storm water detention basin may result in a temporary 
small increase of effluent to Bee Brook, but would not exceed PPPL New 
Jersey Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit or other State or 
federal regulatory requirements.
    Potential radiological impacts of TFTR decontamination and 
decommissioning would not represent potential impacts greater than 
those from current PPPL operations, which have had no significant 
consequences. Decontamination and decommissioning activities would 
result in a dose of less than the adopted design objective of 10 mrem 
per year to any member of the public from all project sources. It would 
result in minor releases of activated metal and tritium to the 
atmosphere and sewer system. The maximum calculated individual public 
dose would be 2.3 mrem per year, and the increased probability of 
incremental lifetime cancer risk associated with exposure from this 
dose would be 1.1 chances in 1,000,000. This very low calculated effect 
means insignificant risk to the public. Occupational doses would not 
exceed the PPPL administrative limit of 1 rem per year, which is less 
than the DOE limit of 5 rem per year.
    Operational occurrences during decontamination and decommissioning 
that could result in the accidental release of tritium, activated 
gases, or solids consist primarily of component failures and human 
error, and any releases would be limited by inventories within the 
components. The largest calculated dose to the public from 
decontamination and decommissioning accident scenarios, including 
beyond design basis accidents, is 390 mrem to a maximally exposed 
member of the public. The increased probability of incremental lifetime 
cancer risk associated with exposure from this dose would be 195 
chances in 1,000,000.
    The TPX would not present long-term or adverse nonradiological 
impacts to the public or the environment at the PPPL site. Other TPX 
nonradiological impacts would be temporary, except for the commitment 
of a small parcel of land for construction of new TPX facilities. 
Construction impacts due to test cell modifications and construction of 
the cryogenic equipment building, tank yards, and electric substation 
would be minor. All construction would be built on land already 
committed to DOE operations. This construction would all be within the 
current land use restrictions governing PPPL site agreements with the 
DOE. For a construction project of this scope, the potential exists for 
2.5 lost workday cases (work related injuries that require time-off 
from work) over the construction period. Also there would be a 10% 
increase in the current amount of site traffic, which would increase 
the potential for on-site vehicular accidents slightly.
    Radiological impacts from the TPX would not exceed current impacts 
from PPPL operations, which has not been shown to cause incremental 
lifetime cancer risk associated with exposure. Potential environmental, 
safety, and health radiological impacts were evaluated for both 
deuterium and possible future tritium operations. Atmospheric releases 
of tritium and activation products constitute the potential sources of 
radiological exposure to members of the public. Maximum projected 
atmospheric releases would result in annual effective dose equivalents 
of 1.2 mrem and 4.6 mrem to a hypothetical maximally-exposed individual 
at the site boundary during deuterium and tritium operations, 
respectively, with a maximum increased probability of incremental 
lifetime cancer risk associated with exposure of 2.3 chances in 
1,000,000. These conservatively-calculated dose equivalents are less 
than the most restrictive limit for public doses caused by airborne 
releases (the EPA limit of 10 mrem per year). Direct radiation from the 
TPX would be mitigated with shielding to keep the total effective dose 
equivalent from all sources at the site boundary within the project 
design objective of less than or equal to 10 mrem per year. This design 
objective effective dose equivalent is well below the DOE limit of 100 
mrem per year to members of the public from routine DOE operations.
    Normal TPX deuterium-tritium operations would result in total 
estimated collective effective dose equivalents of 7.5 person-rem per 
year and 24 person-rem per year to the projected population within the 
80 km (50 mi) radius area surrounding PPPL during deuterium and tritium 
operations, respectively. These doses amount to an average effective 
dose equivalent of less than 0.002 mrem per year to each individual in 
the assessment area and would result in less than 1 health effect in 
the exposed population. On the basis of the collective effective dose 
equivalent, incremental lifetime cancer risk associated with exposure 
attributable to TPX operations are not expected to occur. A collective 
effective dose equivalent of 24 person-rem per year represents 
approximately .002% of the collective effective dose equivalent from 
natural background radiation in the area (exclusive of radon). 
Occupational doses to workers during TPX operations would result from 
direct radiation and small releases of tritium and activated gases. 
Operational procedures, administrative controls and monitoring would 
ensure that occupational doses are kept below regulatory limits and as 
low as reasonably achievable.
    Accidental releases of radioactive material could hypothetically 
result from (a) Natural phenomena (e.g., earthquakes), (b) accidents 
with external origin (e.g., airplane crashes), (c) shipping accidents 
(i.e., accidents involving the transportation of radioactive material), 
and (d) operational occurrences (e.g., tritium leaks). All TPX 
confinement boundaries would be capable of maintaining integrity for 
design basis natural phenomenon, and therefore a release due to a 
natural phenomena event is extremely unlikely.
    Accidents with external origins and transportation accidents 
involving small quantities of radioactive material would present little 
risk to the public and the environment. Transportation accidents 
involving larger quantities of radioactive material, form example 
tritium, could occur; however, the accidental release of significant 
quantities of radionuclides has a very low probability because of the 
demonstrated integrity of the approved containers that would be used.
    TPX operational occurrences that could result in the accidental 
release of tritium, activated gases, or solids consist primarily of 
component failures and human error. Releases associated with these 
occurrences would be limited by component inventories. The maximum 
calculated individual dose from accident scenarios is 390 mrem, which 
is well below the DOE siting guideline limit of 25 rem. Incremental 
lifetime cancer risk associated with exposure resulting from the 
collective doses would represent a negligible increase in the total 
number of such health effects in the exposed population from all 
natural background radiation doses. The largest potential radiological 
impacts to the public from TPX accidents, including beyond design basis 
accidents, are below regulatory limits.
    After TPX operation has ended, a proper NEPA review would be 
conducted for the decontamination and decommissioning of the facility. 
It is expected that the waste material resulting from decontamination 
and decommissioning activities would qualify as low-level radioactive 
waste and would be disposed of at an appropriate DOE waste disposal 
facility.
    TFTR operations would be discontinued prior to TFTR decontamination 
and decommissioning. Cumulative effects would be minor and would 
represent a continuation of, rather than a change in, any impacts 
(negative and positive) associated with TFTR operations. Commitment of 
560 m\2\ (6,000 ft\2\) of land for the construction of the radioactive 
waste storage building and 1,300 m\2\ (14,000 ft\2\) for construction 
of a second storm water detention basin would represent a long-term 
commitment of land use. Environmental releases of small amounts of 
residual tritium during decontamination and decommissioning would not 
add measurably to current low levels.
    No adverse long-term environmental effects are expected from normal 
operations of the TPX. Tritium releases during normal operations would 
not constitute a measurable contribution to background radiation 
levels, because of the small amount of tritium to be released, its 
relatively short half-life (12.3 years), and rapid dispersion in the 
environment. There are currently no measurable cumulative impacts 
occurring between PPPL and other facilities in the region, and none 
would be expected for the proposed TPX. Releases of radionuclides to 
the atmosphere by commercial operations (such as hospitals and research 
laboratories) near PPPL are not detectable in environmental samples 
collected around PPPL; analyses show no radionuclide concentrations 
above background levels.

Invitation To Comment

    DOE invites the public, including states which host DOE facilities 
and any Indian tribe that might be affected by the proposed action, to 
comment on this proposed FONSI. Please direct any comments to Dr. W.S. 
White at the address presented in the previous section.
    In accordance with 40 CFR 1501.4(a)(2)(i) and 10 CFR 1021.322(d), 
DOE is making this proposed FONSI available for public review for 30 
days. Copies of the EA are available upon request at the address given 
below. DOE will also make public comments received on this proposed 
FONSI available to the public. The EA and other material pertaining to 
this proposal are available for public review at the DOE public reading 
rooms listed below.

New Jersey, Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory Library, James 
Forrestal Campus, Route 1, Princeton, New Jersey 08542, (609) 243-3565.
District of Columbia, U.S. Department of Energy, Freedom of Information 
Reading Room, Forrestal Building, Room 1E-90, 1000 Independence Avenue, 
SW, Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-6020.

    For information on the availability of specific documents and hours 
of operation, please contact reading rooms at the telephone numbers 
provided.

Proposed Determination

    Based on the analyses in the Environmental Assessment, the DOE 
believes that the proposed action at the PPPL is not a major Federal 
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment 
within the meaning of the NEPA, and that an environmental impact 
statement is not required. DOE will make its final determination on 
whether to issue a FONSI or prepare an environmental impact statement 
after the 30-day public review period.

    Issued in Argonne, Illinois, this 21st day of September, 1994.
John P. Kennedy,
Assistant Manager for Safety and Technical Support, Chicago Operations 
Office.
[FR Doc. 94-24580 Filed 10-4-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-M